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Abstract	  
Repeated claims have been made since the early 2000s that UK energy, and its 
governance, is ‘in transition’.  In this thesis it is argued, using a conceptual framework 
informed largely but by no means exclusively by ideational institutionalism, that 
although UK energy governance, policy and associated institutions have been 
undergoing a period of continuous crisis, challenge and change, a policy paradigm shift 
cannot as yet be claimed.  This is because UK energy governance processes have not 
fully rejected some of the ideas upon which the ‘pro-market’ system was founded in the 
early 1980s, and due to a lack of credibility in alternative frameworks and solutions.  
Governance practices do, however, appear to show tendential signs of policy paradigm 
change. This process of change has been initiated largely in response to public and 
political concerns about the security of energy supplies, which emerged in the mid 
2000s, in addition to growing political support in the UK for measures to mitigate 
climate change.  To the extent that any new ‘norms’ can be claimed it is suggested here 
that the emergence of an ‘energy-security-climate nexus’ in energy governance 
processes is of particular significance.  This nexus reflects the appropriation of the idea 
that domestic energy production is more ‘secure’ by climate change protagonists 
looking to encourage support for increased renewable energy production in the UK.  It 
also reflects a long-standing climate idea that decisions about energy and climate policy 
should be reached through inter-linked processes. 
 
This thesis provides an analysis of change and continuity in UK energy governance 
from 2000 to 2010 with a particular emphasis on the various ideas, about both energy 
and its governance, that have informed policymaking as well as the alternative 
narratives which have called for changes.  The thesis is informed empirically by a range 
of policy documents, including White Papers, Acts, reports and formal reviews, 
presentations by policy-makers and analysts, and secondary literature.  This material has 
been crosschecked against a limited number of unstructured interviews with 
policymakers, analysts, consultants and Government advisors.  Academic, media, think-
tank and other third party literature has also been used to inform and construct those 
narratives which have, over this period of time, presented critiques of and alternatives to 
the ‘status quo’ in energy policymaking. 
 14 
Thesis	  Introduction:	  Energy	  Governance	  and	  Change 
 
The subject of this thesis is energy governance in the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
year 2000 to 2010.  Various claims have been made, both within academia and within 
elite political circles, about UK energy policy and change over this time period.  Prime 
Minister Blair declared in 2003 that energy policy was undergoing “profound change” 
(Blair in DTI 2003: 3), one prominent Government energy advisor and academic has 
claimed that a “new energy policy paradigm” came into existence around the start of the 
2000s (Helm 2005a and 2007a), and various energy policy documents refer to energy 
being “in transition” (DECC various).  These all imply that profound changes to UK 
energy policy have already occurred.  By contrast, however, there are those, often but 
not exclusively from a climate change background, who claim that UK energy policy 
has proven remarkably resistant to change over the course of the first decade of the 21st 
century (Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009; Scrase et al 2009).  
 
These questions of profound change, often with reference to the terminology of 
paradigms and paradigm change, are complex and difficult to assess, particularly given 
the range of theoretical perspectives that tend to colour both analysis and conclusions.  
The complexity of these questions is also apparent in that energy ‘transition’ is 
routinely used to refer to movement toward a low or zero-carbon energy system, 
whereas other analyses of energy policy change focus more on questions of the role of 
the state within processes of policymaking. 
 
Questions surrounding the supply, use, and consequences of use, of energy have been 
subject to political involvement in Britain since Edward I’s ruling that wood should be 
burnt for heating purposes, to avoid the pollution caused by burning coal (Ezra 1983: 1).  
During the course of the last century or so Western nations in particular have become 
increasingly reliant on various inanimate energy sources to power those technologies 
that have underpinned industrialisation, modernisation and, in some instances, 
prosperity.  As such energy, and its supply, has over time become a core, if not always 
overtly recognised, aspect of ‘modern’ economic and social life as well as a more 
clearly defined subject for politicians and academics.  Historically, as is common in 
other areas of research, there have been varying ideas, both between and within nations, 
about how energy should be governed, accessed and what socio-economic role it plays.   
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What is further historically evident is that energy, an issue of international if not global 
proportions, has, over the course of the last century, been a highly politicised and 
contested area within which there has been little international political agreement, 
despite a growing number of attempts to build global and inter-regional governance 
regimes.1  For example, although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
provides rules and norms for a large number of traded ‘goods’ there is also a specific 
article (XX) which allocates trade exemptions to sectors which producer nations 
consider to be their ‘natural resources’ (Behn and Pogoretskii 2010).  As such large 
exporters of fossil fuels, such as Saudi Arabia, have been able join the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) without needing to extend GATT rules to their national resource 
sectors.  This relative lack of international, or global, governance framework might be 
taken as a reflection of the still existent differences in political approaches to energy, 
particularly between Western consumer and non-Western producer nations. 
 
It is interesting, within this historical context, to note the degree to which the UK had 
placed its energy eggs in the basket of progressing the international marketisation of 
energy.  Britain was an early mover in energy sector privatisation, liberalisation and in 
attempts to open the sector up to the forces of competition.  By the year 2000 UK 
energy governance seemed, despite some opposition from climate campaigners in 
particular, to be largely depoliticised with governance practices deeply embedded 
within a ‘pro-market’ framework.  This framework had been put in place during the 
large-scale privatisation and liberalisation programme undertaken by the Conservative 
Government of the 1980s but had been further consolidated under New Labour.  In 
2000, moreover, energy policymaking was the responsibility of the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI), as there was no Department for Energy, and it was still 
largely distinct from climate policy.2  
 
By contrast by 2010 a number of changes had, indeed, been made.  A new Department 
for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) had been established, energy and climate 
                                                
1	  There	  have,	  since	  the	  inception	  of	  the	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  in	  1951,	  been	  a	  number	  of	  
attempts	  to	  develop	  a	  co-­‐ordinated	  approach	  to	  the	  handling	  of	  energy	  supply	  within	  Europe,	  such	  as	  
the	  Common	  Energy	  Policy	  (CEP),	  none	  of	  which	  have	  proven	  particularly	  effective	  or	  conclusive	  
(McGowan	  2008:	  93)	  
2 The	  UK	  did	  have	  some	  carbon	  dioxide	  reduction	  targets,	  but	  responsibility	  for	  meeting	  these	  lay	  largely	  
with	  the	  Department	  for	  the	  Environment,	  Food	  and	  Rural	  Affairs	  (DEFRA).	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policy were becoming inter-twined in governance practice, and the state was starting to 
take a larger role in energy policy-making and investment processes.  Energy policy 
was being, by 2010, formulated with firm, legally binding, climate objectives in mind.  
These are, no doubt, significant changes but the question remains whether they 
constitute, as claimed, a policy paradigm shift.  The notion of “paradigm shift”, often 
used with reference to Thomas Kuhn’s early work on scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1962), 
implies a clear break with previous practices as an alternative, and often opposing, 
system comes to replace existing frameworks. 
 
This question is highly important to answer for a number of reasons.  Firstly, the UK 
energy governance structure, characterised in this thesis as ‘pro-market’, has been 
widely held up as a ‘model’ system which other countries, seeking to reform their 
energy systems, should follow (IEA 2006: 9; see also Oliviera and MacKerron 1992; 
Thomas 2006; Jegen 2009; cf. Interview 15).  The UK has, in addition, been one of the 
most vocal advocates of energy marketisation on an international basis, particularly 
within the EU and Russia, and considers itself to have been influential over recent EU 
liberalisation processes (Davies 1996; DTI 1998a; Helm 2003; FCO et al 2004; 
Timmins 2006; Jegen 2009).  Many in the UK, and elsewhere, are convinced that 
processes of liberalisation have directly allowed for lower costs to consumers over time.  
A wide number of countries, often encouraged by Intergovernmental Organisations 
(IGOs), such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Energy Agency (IEA), have 
over time sought to restructure their energy sectors along UK ‘pro-market’ lines 
(Thomas 2006: 583; Jegen 2009: 1; Lesage et al 2010: 6; EC 2011: 14).  As such any 
serious break with, and or rejection of, the pro-market system might have serious 
international and political implications. 
 
The UK Government by claiming that it is transitioning energy to a low-carbon system 
has left itself open to measurement against this goal, and potentially critique, if not 
achieved.  The UK has furthermore claimed leadership in international attempts to 
secure climate agreement.  If, however, it cannot reduce its own, domestic carbon 
emissions this may well have implications for its international negotiating position.  
Failure to produce a low-carbon energy system by a country claiming leadership in the 
complex and difficult battle to reduce global emissions might, in addition, engender 
particular inferences for some about the achievability of climate change mitigation. 
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1.  Energy, Paradigms and Change 
This thesis on UK energy governance and paradigm change is situated most directly 
within the literature, referenced above, which deals with questions of energy paradigms 
and change.  This small, but growing, body of work is situated in turn within the context 
of a wider literature on energy, governance and politics which has, over time, rarely 
departed from one of two sets of theoretical lenses, either geopolitical or (neo)liberal. 
Indeed, a recent review of European energy governance literature has suggested that the 
“…markets versus geopolitics…” debate is still “…state of the art…” (Youngs 2009; cf 
Correlje and van der Linde 2006; Finon and Locatelli 2008; Luft and Korin 2009).  This 
dichotomy within the literature has served to somewhat narrow what kinds of questions 
are asked about energy governance and possibilities for change.  This thesis is rooted 
not only in allowing for conceptual variety, but furthermore in understanding what role 
different perspectives have been playing in changes to UK energy governance so far in 
the 21st century. 
 
Common International Political Economy (IPE) questions about states and markets, as 
well as environmental questions about how to mitigate climate change, have also been 
under-represented in the energy literature.3  The lively debate, which had taken place in 
the 1980s, about the role of the state in UK energy governance fell away over the course 
of the 1990s as neoliberal, and rational choice, ideas started to assume a position of both 
academic and elite political ‘orthodoxy’ (cf. Yergin 1998; Egenhofer and Legge 2001; 
Hayes and Victor 2006; Maugeri 2006).  So much so that the ‘pro-market’ energy 
governance system, established by the Conservative Administration starting in the early 
1980s, became less open to question and to an extent reified.  Energy policy was 
researched, but largely with problem solving, in Coxian terms (Cox 1981), in mind (cf. 
CEPMLP 2006).  The debate about climate change, however, continued steadily 
through the 1990s and early 2000s, albeit that section which challenged and critiqued 
                                                
3	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  tradition	  of	  IPE	  research	  into	  subfields,	  such	  as	  the	  environment,	  energy	  as	  a	  
subject	  is	  strongly	  under-­‐represented.	  	  Only	  a	  small	  number	  of,	  albeit	  high	  profile,	  academics	  working	  
within,	  and	  in	  some	  instances	  to	  establish,	  IPE	  have	  extended	  their	  research	  to	  questions	  of	  energy	  and	  
its	  governance	  (Keohane	  1984;	  Strange	  1988;	  Bromley	  1991).	  	  Some	  IPE	  textbooks	  have	  explicitly	  dealt	  
with	  energy	  issues,	  but	  in	  the	  limited	  context	  of	  oil	  crises,	  oil	  cartels,	  and	  associated	  questions	  of	  conflict	  
and	  power	  (Gill	  and	  Law	  1988;	  Stubbs	  and	  Underhill	  1994;	  Spero	  and	  Hart	  1997).	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existing energy policy was largely marginalised, or compromised, within elite political 
circles (Jacobs 1991; Carter 2001; Bernstein 2001; Dryzek 2005).  This thesis will 
address specifically questions about the state and the market in UK energy governance 
as well as that of how energy and climate policy have come to interact over time. 
 
This is where we return to the literature on energy, paradigms and change.  This 
literature explicitly recognises that there have been some quite consistent approaches to 
energy trade and politics over the past twenty or thirty years, but that these structured 
processes are open to change (Stanislaw 2004 and 2006; Helm 2005a and 2007a; Yergin 
2006; Gonzales 2006; Clarke 2007; Klare 2008a; Mitchell 2008; Nuttal and Manz 2008; 
Froggatt and Levi 2009; Jegen 2009; Kern 2009).  Analyses referring to, varying types 
of, energy paradigms have tended to not to pose specific questions about how energy is 
governed whilst also tending to generalise across large regions, or globally (Stanislaw 
2004 and 2006; Yergin 2006; Gonzales 2006; Clarke 2007; Klare 2008; Nuttal and 
Manz 2008; Froggatt and Levi 2009).  Rarely within this literature are paradigms, or 
what constitutes paradigm change, clearly or rigorously defined.  The marked 
exceptions being Catherine Mitchell’s book on UK sustainable energy policy and 
Florian Kern’s thesis on Dutch and UK energy innovations policy (Mitchell 2008; Kern 
2009).  Both these works however provide definitions of paradigms, with a particular 
focus on the ways in which they have constrained change, but not of paradigm change 
and why and how it can take place.  
 
Amongst these analyses there are a few papers and books that have considered UK 
energy governance processes specifically (Helm 2005a and 2007a; Rutledge 2007; 
Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009; Rutledge and Wright 2011).  These analyses all suggest that 
the UK energy policy paradigm has been one largely influenced by neoliberal ideas 
about privatisation, deregulation, cost efficiency and competition over a period of 
decades.  As already suggested, however, very different conclusions have been reached 
about profound change to this ‘pro-market’ energy paradigm.  In fact, amongst those 
academics writing on energy policy only one has gone so far as to claim a paradigm 
shift (Helm 2005a and 2007a).   Although Rutledge and Wright entitle their book “UK 
Energy Policy and The End of Market Fundamentalism” the chapters in it are more 
focused on elucidating the great many challenges to current energy policy practices 
perceived by the authors (Rutledge and Wright 2011).  Rutledge, Mitchell and Kern, 
conversely, all conclude that UK energy policy has remained remarkably closed to 
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alternative ideas about how to govern energy, despite the need to do so in order to 
facilitate new climate and energy security objectives (Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; 
Kern 2009).   Mitchell suggests that “…it is far easier for Government to do nothing 
than it is to make change…” (Mitchell 2008: 14). 
 
This small literature on UK energy policy paradigms although it overtly acknowledges 
that ideas are important to energy policymaking still leaves a range of questions 
unanswered.  All deal in some way with UK energy governance but only two pieces, a 
journal article and an edited volume, are specifically focused on energy, if not on 
climate, policy (Rutledge 2007; Rutledge and Wright 2011).  Mitchell is concerned with 
sustainable energy policy (Mitchell 2008), Kern with innovations policy (Kern 2009) 
and Helm with OECD energy policy (Helm 2005a and 2007a).  This thesis analyses not 
just UK energy policy, including objectives and instruments, but also other structures of 
governance by including in its characterisation of energy governance, as of the year 
2000, interpretive frameworks as well as physical institutions of governance, such as 
Government Departments and independent regulatory bodies.  In this way the combined 
structures of UK energy governance, referred to as the ‘pro-market’ energy policy 
paradigm’ (PEPP), will represent a broad, but complex and inter-related, governance 
system. 
 
 
2.  Contributions to Knowledge, Hypothesis and Research Questions  
The hypothesis underpinning this thesis is that UK energy governance has entered a 
process of change which may, or may not, result in a paradigm shift away from the 
existing ‘pro-market’ energy policy paradigm.  The principal question, therefore, that 
this thesis seeks to answer is whether or not ongoing changes to UK energy governance 
can be understood as profound or not and the degree to which they represent a break 
from the past. This work distinguishes itself from the current literature on paradigms 
and shifts in energy in that it defines clearly and in detail what is meant by a policy 
paradigm and by paradigm shift.  By doing so this thesis also suggests that policy 
paradigm theory, and associated concepts that can assist in providing contextual 
explanations of consistency and change, can reveal much about UK energy governance 
in the twenty-first century so far. 
 
 20 
Change is understood here as a relative concept (cf. Hay 1999c: 30), and this brings us 
to the second question which this thesis seeks to pose, which is about the kind of energy 
governance system that existed at the start of the period of analysis, the year 2000.  One 
way in which change can be measured is in relation to what has gone before both in 
terms of degree and type of change.   By providing an in depth definition of UK energy 
governance as of 2000, and on a number of different levels, this thesis has been able to 
offer a detailed picture against which to measure change, particularly in terms of 
profundity.  It should also be noted that within the literature on paradigms and paradigm 
shift judgements made about degree of change can also be related, to a large extent, to 
normative positions taken on what kind of change should happen.  To the extent that it 
is possible, therefore, the principal research question of this thesis will be posed with no 
normative agenda in mind with regard to what energy governance should entail.4 
 
Again, as suggested above, utilising a conceptual framework that draws on a range of 
explanatory devices has also enabled this thesis to provide for measurement in terms of 
the type of change that is taking place.  If energy governance structures in 2000, 
characterised as the PEPP, can be explained as reflecting certain sets of ideas within 
particular political practices, then energy governance in 2010, can be measured in terms 
of how the structures of governance differ in comparison.  The degree to which the 
PEPP can be seen as both willing and able to resist change can be understood as one 
implication of the particular assumptions underlying policy (cf. Greener 2001: 133) and 
the particular ways in which they have been implemented. 
 
Policy paradigm theory (Hall 1993; see also Hall and Taylor 1996; Campbell 1998; Hay 
2001 and 2004; Greener 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Larsen and 
Andersen 2009) in application to UK energy governance has produced a picture of an 
embedded and ideationally quite static system.  It has also helped to explain the ways in 
which the PEPP could pursue ‘business-as-usual’ policies even in the face of growing 
political support for climate change mitigation under New Labour.  Peter Hall in 
particular has explained this type of occurrence by suggesting that deeply embedded 
policy paradigms can tend to throw old policies at new problems based on belief in 
existing structures and a lack of conceivably credible, alternative solutions (Hall 1993: 
280).  This thesis has suggested that the PEPP, and those political protagonists which 
                                                
4	  Emphases	  author’s	  own.	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supported it, were able to see off challenges and alternative ideas about what should be 
done partly through the marginalisation of ideas, but also by adopting various 
compromise positions over time (cf. Bernstein 2001). 
 
One more way in which this thesis might be understood as making a contribution to the 
literature has been the inclusion of physical institutions of governance within the 
characterisation of the PEPP, and how they can be understood as being constitutive of a 
certain range of outcomes.  Policy paradigm theory is, of course, very much focused on 
policymakers as actors, and the ways in which their actions and decisions can be 
constrained.  Catherine Mitchell also places some emphasis on they ways in which 
certain government institutions, particularly the Office of the Gas and Electricity 
Markets (Ofgem), have worked to resist change over time (Mitchell 2008).  This thesis 
uses understandings implicit in concepts of depoliticisation in order to explain in more 
detail how such physical institutions of governance have served to resist change.  It will 
also be argued that processes of depoliticisation, reflecting as they have certain ideas 
about appropriate roles for the state in energy governance, can be understood as a 
method through which the PEPP became embedded institutionally over time. 
 
This is not, however, to say that marginalisation, cognitive boundaries and compromise 
can necessarily continue to drown out alternative ideas about energy governance ad 
infinitum.  Without understanding clearly, however, how policy paradigms are 
institutionally pre-disposed to offer up resistance to change the significance of change, 
when it finally does happen, might otherwise be under-estimated.  This is where we turn 
to the third question posed by this thesis which explores why change has been taking 
place. As such, this thesis is not only concerned with measuring type and degree of 
change but with analysing in depth why, in what circumstances, change has taken place.   
 
Again, this approach can be interpreted as a contribution to the literature on energy 
paradigms and paradigm shift in that change is not only defined, but also understood, as 
a complex process unfolding unevenly over time.  In approaching the question of why 
change became possible notions that widely perceived crises can provide political 
impetus for change (Hay 1996 and 2001; Blyth 2002; cf. Mahoney 2000) have been 
reinforced with notions, from the Copenhagen School, that the language of security can 
also be the language of political priority (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al 1998).  As such this 
thesis argues that perceptions of a security of energy supply crisis, which started to 
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emerge strongly from 2004-2006, were essential to a political re-awakening regarding 
energy, or a degree of repoliticisation.  It also argues, however, that it was precisely the 
specific nature of the crisis narrative, focused on insecurity and fears of dependence on 
unstable foreign suppliers, which elicited a high degree of political response.  This 
reflection about why more significant processes of change were put in place is one 
which is original with reference to UK energy governance, if not with reference to 
analyses of EU energy governance in the 2000s (cf. Jegen 2009; Froggatt and Levi 
2009).  
 
Fears about energy insecurity are understood to have also necessitated a ‘re-think’ of 
energy which, in turn, brought to light the degree to which processes of depoliticisation 
had left the UK state lacking significantly in political capacity to deliberate and act in an 
informed manner.  The process of ‘re-thinking’ can then also be offered as part answer 
to the fourth question which is about how energy governance change has taken place.  
As energy became repoliticised and ‘re-thought’, and as the problems understood to be 
facing energy did not relent over time, the depth and complexity of these problems 
started to come to light.  Energy policy had, as such, new objectives of energy security 
and carbon dioxide reduction and it was decided that new institutions, with different 
mandates, would be required to implement these complex, and possibly in some 
instances conflicting, new objectives.  
 
Such processes, theoretically, would also have to lead to conclusions that existing 
governance structures are less than capable of delivering in order for paradigm change 
to take place.  The neoliberal perspective continued to inform various elements, 
including some personnel within Ofgem and the energy division of the Department for 
Trade and Industry (DTI), who still maintained that structural changes were not 
required.  Others believed and argued, however, that the PEPP needed an overhaul.  
Amongst these groups were those informed by ideas about climate change and the ways 
in which energy policy could be used to help in the process of mitigating it, and 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions.  These political, and academic groups, continued to 
argue for change, and most importantly, provided evidence of failure of existing policy 
to deliver on objectives (RCEP 2000; PIU 2002; van der Horst 2005; Stern 2006; 
Greenpeace 2006; Ragwitz et al 2005; Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Scrase et al 2009; 
Giddens 2009; Paskal 2009; Macalister 2010; WWF 2010).  Some arguments that had 
been marginalised, and compromised, over time became more credible and audible 
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given the ongoing ‘re-think’ of energy and political interest in addressing newly 
perceived problems. 
 
What this thesis ultimately tells us about UK energy governance is that although it has 
been through an accelerated period of re-think and structural change on many levels, it 
cannot yet be argued that an energy policy paradigm shift has taken place.  This is partly 
because of the degree to which dominant ideas about the role of markets in energy 
supply have not shifted, but also because of the continuing degree of uncertainty and 
change still ongoing in 2011.  One important new norm is, however, identified in the 
emergence of an energy-security-climate nexus within  processes of energy governance.  
As such, energy and climate policy are now understood to be inter-related and devised 
together within one Department of State, the Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC).  In addition, policies traditionally utilised to meet climate change 
objectives, such as reducing carbon dioxide emissions, are now also being set against 
the achievement of energy security objectives.  This is partly because it is now 
understood that boosting domestic supplies, including of renewable energy, will provide 
for energy security by allowing the UK to import less from abroad. 
 
 
3.  Methodology  
This thesis is written with the intention of providing deeply contextual explanations of 
UK energy governance processes and structures, of how and why they are changing, 
and of what type of system is emerging in comparison to the starting position.  It is a 
largely empirical piece of work but is structured around a somewhat mixed conceptual 
framework which is applied in order to assist in producing a more in depth 
understanding of energy governance processes from 2000 to 2010, and it has been 
applied for that reason.  Each of the concepts put to work allow for the operational co-
existence of structures, agency, influential ideas, both on a cognitive and normative 
level, and possibilities for change.  This thesis is less concerned with finding 
generalisable theories, with pointing to gaps in theory or, indeed, with suggesting new 
policies or political approaches.  As such, this thesis does not apply theory in order to 
“…aspire to predict or to prescribe…” and is a non-normative, reflective approach to a 
specific subject area (Strange 1988: 11 and 19). 
 
The second way in which this thesis is structured is around the four research questions 
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presented in the section above.  These are simple questions, which give rise to complex 
answers, and which have been phrased in order to leave the thesis open to answers, 
rather than to guide it in one particular direction.  Clearly the questions as phrased do 
imply that some change is happening and this is the starting position of the thesis.  Even 
those analyses on the UK energy policy paradigm (Rutledge 2007), or sub-sets of this 
policy area (Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009), which argue that UK energy policy is 
remarkably resistant to change do acknowledge that some changes are, as elsewhere, 
taking place.  The focus, therefore, has to be upon producing a non-normatively biased 
answer as to the depth and degree of change – this allows still for consistency of 
governance practices to co-exist alongside processes of change. 
 
There is a degree to which the initial characterisation of UK energy governance as of 
2000 as ‘pro-market’ might guide the analysis that unfolds only toward answering 
questions regarding the degree to which governance in 2010 is less ‘pro-market’.  This 
can be taken as a positive in that, as already argued, classic IPE questions of states and 
markets in energy governance are under-represented (important exceptions being Helm 
2003; Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009).  But it could also be taken as a 
negative if it were to blind the analysis to other types of change taking place.  This is 
where the three principal narratives, the third structuring element of the thesis, come 
back into play, in particular the climate narrative which keeps the thesis alive to non 
‘state-market’ ideas about energy governance.  
 
The principal difficulty in attempting to answer questions about paradigm change has 
been the contemporary nature of this analysis.  Original intentions had been to finish the 
analysis in 2008, allowing at least a few years for ‘historical perspective’ to develop 
between the closing date for the analysis and writing up findings.  However, as the 
creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) in November 2008 
was such a significant institutional change it was felt that the analysis would have to 
continue beyond that point.  With the end date extended to 2010, however, new 
challenges emerged in that there has been little pause for extra contemplation of the 
very recent events which have unfolded.5   On the one hand this has allowed to thesis to 
                                                
5	  2010	  was	  chosen	  as	  a	  cut	  off	  date	  due	  to	  the	  May	  general	  elections	  and	  the	  change	  in	  Government.	  	  	  
However,	  the	  consistency	  of	  new	  energy	  governance	  structures,	  given	  the	  change	  from	  New	  Labour	  to	  
the	  Conservative-­‐	  Liberal	  Democrat	  coalition,	  tend	  to	  show	  staying	  power	  and	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  
lasting	  structural	  change.	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consider some more significant changes to the way in which energy has been governed 
in the UK, leading to a conclusion that some structural changes have taken place.  On 
the other hand, however, it might have been easier to come to firm conclusions about 
the degree and type of change given a few additional years of hindsight.   Instead the 
conclusion is of ‘evolving’ or tendential structural change. 
 
As the subject of this thesis is governance, processes of policymaking and the structures 
that delineate them, the main focus is upon a textual analysis of the key pieces of policy 
documentation from 2000 to 2010.   As the empirical section of the thesis is split into 
three consecutive periods of time both the language used, reflecting emerging narratives 
and alternative ideas, and the content, in terms of policy objectives and instruments, can 
be seen to evolve from period to period.  The analysis of policy documents, and 
associated reviews and consultancy reports, has been supplemented with, and cross-
referenced against, a series of unstructured interviews.  These were conducted with 
policy analysts, decision-makers, Government advisers, third-party consultants and 
those involved in writing policy reviews.6   These interviews have been further 
supplemented by a range of private conversations with, and conference presentations 
by, policy analysts and decision-makers.  
 
The primary purpose of conducting the interviews was to understand the perspective 
from which each individual was approaching energy and how it should be governed.  
Interviews have usually taken the form of conversations rather than a formal question 
and answer session in order to leave the interviewee open to offering their viewpoint, 
rather than reflecting back my own.  Interviews with those involved, either directly or at 
the periphery, of UK energy policymaking have been particularly helpful, also, in 
understanding processes which take place ‘behind-the-scenes’ which are not reflected in 
formal policy documents.  As such, some indication emerges about processes of 
compromise and how they can affect policy outcomes. 
 
Not all interviewees were happy to have their names and employment details revealed 
and, in that a level of anonymity seemed to allow for more in-depth conversations, it 
was decided to refer in the text of the thesis to an interview number, institution and 
rough date of interview only.  The degree of reluctance to be put formally ‘on the 
                                                
6	  See	  Appendix	  1	  for	  a	  full	  list	  of	  interviews,	  institutions	  and	  dates,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  a	  list	  of	  private	  
conversations	  and	  presentations	  that	  have	  further	  informed	  this	  work.	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record’ might indicate the degree to which energy was becoming repoliticised by the 
time the interviews were taking place, from the end of 2007 to mid-2011.  One final 
difficulty that should be mentioned is that it was not always, partly due to a high degree 
of staff turnover and institutional change, possible to find personnel to interview that 
had experience of energy policy across the time-span covered by this thesis.  Some of 
the most informative interviews have been conducted with energy policy advisors who 
have been involved across the whole period. 
 
Lastly, in terms of methodology employed, in addition to the focus on representatives of 
the state in energy, and their advisors, this thesis has also conducted an analysis of 
popular media reports, and alternative non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
think tanks.  These have tended, particularly within those chapters focused on the earlier 
periods of analysis when energy governance structures displayed more consistency than 
change, to be reflective of alternative narratives about energy.  However, by the last 
empirical chapter which covers 2008-2010, some of these narratives can be seen within 
Government papers and other official documents.  This, in particular, applies to the 
energy security-climate narrative which married together ideas about energy security 
with solutions which had emanated from within the climate perspective on energy. 
 
 
4.  Brief Thesis Outline 
It has already been suggested that there are three principal structuring elements to this 
thesis, the conceptual framework, the four research questions, and the three principal 
narratives about energy and energy governance.  All of these structuring elements will 
have been introduced by the end of chapter two of the thesis, the research questions 
already having been outlined in this introduction.  Chapter one, which serves as a 
review of the available literature on energy governance, paradigms and change, will 
also present a view of recent energy events through the eyes of the three principal 
perspectives on energy governance.  This provides the rest of the thesis with an 
indication of what kind of energy world was understood to exist from each perspective, 
but also what kinds of political responses were taken to be appropriate as events 
unfolded.  These perspectives, and the narratives which they inform, are understood as 
being analytically separable, but also as being fluid and subject to change over time.  
One viewpoint that each perspective came to share over the course of the 2000s, 
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however, was a perception that energy, albeit for different reasons, was once more in 
‘crisis’. 
 
Chapter two provides an outline of the conceptual framework, the third structuring 
element, as well as of UK energy governance as of 2000.  Much has already been said 
about the conceptual framework, so suffice to say at this point, that the PEPP is 
characterised in chapter two as being made up of five separate, but inter-related, levels 
of governance.  These are: ideas about energy, rarely analysed elsewhere, and about 
energy governance, which together provide the ‘interpretive framework’, objectives and 
instruments of policy, and the physical institutions of governance.  Governance, as such, 
is understood as taking place upon a variety of levels and requiring a greater or lesser 
degrees of state and market input over time (cf. Rosenau and Czempiel 1992). 
Importantly, politics is understood as being made up of collective deliberation, 
including social interaction, the possibility for informed agency and for choice (cf. Hay 
2007: 65-70; cf. Wood 2011). 
 
This thesis has been structured in order to take account of the idea that change, if it is to 
be understood as a relative concept, cannot really be understood or, indeed, measured if 
there is no in depth understanding of the starting position.  This premise might fall foul 
of criticisms that such an approach would tend an analysis towards taking too little 
account of the longer-term evolution of that area of policy (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 
5).  Chapter three, therefore, has been constructed to in order to place the PEPP, as of 
the year 2000, into a much longer-term historical and ideational context.  It also draws 
our attention to the depoliticised and embedded nature of the PEPP by the advent of the 
New Labour Administration in 1997. 
 
Chapters four, five and six are the empirical chapters of the thesis covering, in turn, the 
periods 2000-04, 2004-07 and 2008-10.  Chapter four, following on from chapter three, 
initially provides more detail about the ways in which the PEPP was maintained and 
operated under New Labour.  It soon moves on, however, to suggest the emergence of 
various challenges to the status quo in energy governance, and, in response, a high 
degree of resilience within the various levels of the PEPP.  The degree of resilience 
is explained in particular through the application of notions of depoliticisation, in 
particular ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’, which had been outlined in chapter two.  
By considering the PEPP during this period, of growing climate challenge, we can 
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better understand how the PEPP managed to continue to draw on existing ideas, 
policies and methods of governance in answer to growing commitment to action on 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
Chapter five deals mostly with the question of why change of more profound 
proportions started to take place.  Various events were unfolding within the 
international political economy of energy at this time, not least Russian energy 
governance restructuring and the Russia-Ukraine gas transit dispute, which were 
perceived as possibly threatening to UK energy supplies, and governance.  This chapter 
will seek to trace relationships between the particular way in which energy crisis was 
becoming perceived, as a national security concern, and the start of processes of energy 
repoliticisation and of ‘re-thinking’ energy.  Some consideration, within this, will be 
given over to the role of wider public perceptions as well as to the language of security 
in prompting political engagement with energy once more.  Links will also be drawn 
between the ongoing process of ‘re-thinking’ energy, the continuing sense of crisis and 
the formalisation of climate objectives through the acceptance of the European Union’s 
’20-20-20’ commitment on climate change.7 
 
In chapter six the process of ‘re-thinking’ energy is understood to still be ongoing.  It is 
however also accompanied by mounting evidence of failure, and alternative solutions 
being produced by increasingly high profile but competing political protagonists.  It is 
during this era that it can be claimed that change really started to escalate, resulting in 
new institutions and evolving ideas about energy and about new methods of 
governance.   This chapter concludes by suggesting that although a degree of change 
had taken place within each identified level of the PEPP, it did not yet feel like a 
planned process of profound governance change had been completed.  This is largely 
because, as of the end of 2010, ‘market’ ideas about economic governance had not been 
rejected by political elites nor had a comprehensive new framework been identified. 
 
                                                
7	  This	  is	  an	  EU	  package	  which	  builds	  on	  the	  Kyoto	  protocol	  and	  was	  endorsed	  by	  EU	  leaders.	  	  The	  targets	  
are	  to	  reduce	  greenhouse	  gas	  emissions	  by	  20%	  	  over	  1990	  levels,	  to	  consume	  20%	  of	  energy	  from	  
renewable	  sources	  and	  to	  reduce	  primary	  energy	  use	  by	  20%	  -­‐	  all	  by	  the	  year	  2020.	  	  These	  targets	  
became	  legally	  binding	  in	  January	  2009	  when	  the	  ‘climate	  and	  energy	  package	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  
European	  Parliament	  (see	  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm).	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What can be identified therefore across the empirical chapters are three broad eras of 
the complex evolution of change: consistency of interpretive framework and associated 
structures; repoliticisation of energy under conditions of perceived crisis; and change - 
even if not yet representing a significant break with the past.  In total these eras of 
change have led to an emphasis on the complex, messy and evolutionary nature of 
change, but they also raise the question of what might constitute necessary 
conditions for paradigm shift to be considered as taking, or having taken, place.  
 
Chapter seven returns in more detail to the conceptual framework outlined in chapter 
two.  Although this framework is ever present within chapters four to six, particularly in 
that it structures them and informs the analysis, chapter seven reflects in more detail on 
the various iterations of change and on the differences between each chapter in the ways 
in which change had evolved.   It does so by looking back at each of the empirical 
chapters in turn and considering how best to understand why and how energy 
governance evolved through the prism of the conceptual framework.  
 
The concluding chapter will briefly look into some of the implications of the findings of 
this thesis for the ways in which we can understand UK energy governance today as 
well as for the literature reviewed in chapter one.  It will, however, also eke out further 
implications for those theoretical concepts, policy paradigm theory, ‘speaking security’, 
and de- and re-politicisation, which have largely underpinned the framework of analysis 
used here.  Some attempt will be made to identify the ways in which those concepts, 
some of which have emerged from different disciplinary backgrounds, conflict and 
inter-relate with one another, as well as complement each other.  
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Chapter	  1:	  Perspectives	  on	  Energy,	  Governance	  and	  Change 
 
Introduction 
 
... all we have so far, are competing doctrines – sets of normative ideas about the 
goals to which state policy should be directed and how politics and economics (or, 
more accurately, states and markets) ought to be related to one another. (Strange 
1988: 16) 
 
This opening chapter bridges the wide and varied literature that concerns itself with 
Western, including UK, energy and how it is, or in some cases how it should be, 
governed.  It has been observed on a number of occasions that within the social sciences 
there are competing doctrines, or sets of normative ideas, about the objectives and 
organisation of state policy.  These compete to provide explanations and solutions for 
problems in the social and political world and offer ideas about the goals to which state 
policy should be directed and how politics and economics, or states and markets, ought 
to be related to one another (Strange 1988: 16; cf. Runciman 1969: 156 onwards; Smith 
1987).   
 
Recent academic analyses of energy prove no exception.  Broadly speaking, three 
principal perspectives can be identified within academic analyses of energy and its 
governance, being pro-market, geopolitical and climate.  This chapter will be organised 
around these three different, and in some ways competing, understandings of, and 
political approaches to, energy.   The pro-market perspective has, as with other areas of 
research, tended to dominate academic analyses of UK energy over the past few 
decades, as well as analyses conducted within the energy directorate of the Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI).  More recently, however, geopolitical and climate 
interpretations have become increasingly commonplace.    
 
These differing perspectives are presented in this thesis more as heuristic devices than 
as rigid characterisations.  The boundaries between the perspectives as characterised 
here are porous, there are some similarities between groups, some ideas overlap, and 
they are understood here as subject to change and adaptation over time.  At this stage of 
the thesis these perspectives are, however, also put forward as largely reflective of 
genuinely held beliefs about energy and how it should be governed. 
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This chapter commences with a brief definition of each academic approach to 
understanding energy, its socio-economic role, as well as sets of corresponding ideas 
about how it should be governed.  The chapter proceeds upon the notion that these 
different understandings of energy, and how it should be governed, produce in 
application particular sets of policy, governance recommendations and structured 
outcomes.  This will be followed in each case by a more detailed assessment of the 
different ways in which each perspective has tended to construct understandings of, and 
responses to, energy events in the 2000s.  By doing so, these sections fulfil the function 
of outlining both the ideational and material context within which UK energy 
governance changes were taking place as well as an assessment of current literatures on 
energy. 
 
One consistent perception across pro-market, geopolitical and climate perspectives is 
that energy had entered a period of crisis in the first decade of the 21st century.  The 
various ways in which energy crisis has been constructed and understood are shown to 
be being partly constitutive of the range of governance solutions offered.  As a 
generalisation, although each perspective recognises certain core components of 
energy’s renewed hour of difficulty, different emphasis has been placed on the 
importance of those components depending on the theoretical approach and/or related, 
normative position taken.  Clearly, each perspective may well represent an 
oversimplification of events but these perspectives are important to understand in that 
they are largely constitutive of the academic literature on energy over this time period. 
 
As the review of perspectives on energy evolves an interesting, arguably under-
analysed, debate emerges.  Elements within each of the three categories dealt with by 
this chapter have increasingly begun to consider, alongside perceptions of crisis, that 
international energy has entered, or at least should enter, a period of significant change.  
As might be expected, a range of reasons are offered for change, but the most 
interesting new analyses emphasise change of a profound nature, often referred to as 
paradigm shift.  The varied literature on paradigms and change is utilised within this 
thesis as a starting point from which to begin the analysis of change in UK energy 
policy and governance.  
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1.	  	   The	  Liberal-­Geopolitical	  Debate 
As outlined in the introduction to this thesis it has been suggested that two competing 
narratives currently dominate the literature on energy (Youngs 2009: 6; cf. Correlje and 
van der Linde 2006; Finon and Locatelli 2008; Luft and Korin 2009: 340).  Clearly, this 
debate is not new in international political economy (IPE) terms, and gives energy 
analysis from an IPE perspective an impression of being stuck in a time-warp.  But it is 
at least a debate that recognises that there are differing political approaches to energy 
both geographically and historically, even if it rarely asks questions about why these 
different approaches exist.  Prior to the re-emergence of this debate many energy 
experts had fallen in line with leading energy academic and US Government advisor, 
Daniel Yergin, who had in 1998 concluded with regard to energy that “…it is the 
economic terms themselves, rather than the philosophy of the terms, over which 
governments and companies wrangle” (Yergin 1998a: x).  
 
Neoliberalism had, however, become the dominant approach both to governing energy, 
and for academic analyses of energy, from the early 1980s to at least the mid 2000s 
(Hadfield 2007; Finon and Locatelli 2008; Youngs 2009).  Although it had constituted a 
small but growing strand of the energy literature pre the 1980s, work written from a 
pro-market perspective did not come to dominate the energy literature until after the 
paradigm shift to pro-market governance.  Pre-1980s this body of work was focused on 
advocating pro-market energy, by the 1990s it was, as argued again below, more 
focused on describing aspects of policies or on problem solving within the boundaries 
set by pro-market energy governance practices, which already reflected many of the 
ideas earlier advocated.  
 
By 2001 one much cited study concluded that international commodity markets had 
now developed to such an extent that “... competition is the rule and economics works” 
(Mitchell et al 2001: 176).  As recently as 2006, pro-market energy analysts suggested 
the “old world” model, which is laden with state guarantees, subsidies and other 
measures that dampen the “…pure expression of market forces…”, has been rejected by 
Western nations.  The ‘new world’ model had come to replace this old model to the 
extent that “…(t)oday almost all consuming markets have adopted plans to allow for a 
greater role for the "invisible hand" of the market” (Hayes and Victor 2006: 322).  The 
extent to which this perspective, particularly in terms of appropriate roles for markets 
and the state, had become accepted among energy academics and policymaking elites 
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alike, meant that privatised and liberalised energy markets were increasingly analysed 
as fait accompli as opposed to social construct (Egenhoffer and Legge 2001; Hayes and 
Victor 2006; cf. Helm 2005a; Cherp and Jewell 2011).  
 
There are three quite recent analyses of energy security, if not precisely about energy 
governance, which have attempted to broaden the debate by considering a slightly wider 
range of different conceptual approaches to understanding energy (Belyi 2003; Ciuta 
2010; Cherp and Jewell 2011). Felix Ciuta in a recent article, which serves as a 
conceptualisation of the notion of energy security, breaks academic work down into 
three key perspectives on, or logics of, energy security, being the logic of war, of 
subsistence and of total security (Ciuta 2010: 124-5).  Each dimension, or logic, reflects 
differing perspectives on what is important in seeking to understand what energy means, 
on understanding what is happening and therefore on what the priorities for governance 
should be.  Ciuta encourages for more research which, like his analysis, allows for 
conceptual variety and for meanings to be contextualised (Ciuta 2010). 
 
1.1 Brief Definition: the ‘Pro-market’ Perspective and Energy 
The emphasis in this section is on reviewing academic research, written from a pro-
market perspective, on energy, including interpretations of recent events, and how it is 
or should be governed.  This will be done only in brief, however, as chapter three, on 
the creation of the PEPP, will outline this perspective in more detail.  The pro-market 
view rested largely upon neoliberal economic, and then also rational choice, ideas about 
governance. 
 
One of the fundamental ideas underlying pro-market energy perspectives, as argued by 
advocates of neoliberal governance practices in the late 1970s and early 1980s, was 
related to the socio-economic role that energy was considered to play.  The post 1945 
emphasis on energy’s central role in powering modern economies was de-emphasised in 
the 1980s when it was suggested that energy should be considered first and foremost as 
“…just another commodity…” rather than a national or merit good (Lawson 1989: 23; 
see also DoE 1982; Littlechild and Vaidya 1982; Cherp and Jewell 2011).  From this 
perspective energy, as a commodity, is ultimately fungible, or replaceable, which 
implies little or no intrinsic value (cf. Youngs 2009: 7).8  By 2001 oil, the most 
                                                
8	  Intrinsic	  value	  is	  understood	  here	  in	  the	  philosophical	  sense	  whereby	  an	  object	  can	  have	  value	  in	  and	  
of	  itself	  or	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  	  	  
 34 
dominant and problematic energy source was understood to have been “commoditized” 
(Mitchell et al 2001: 176).   
 
Broadly speaking, therefore, energy should be left to trade on open markets and, to the 
extent that governance is required, it should be exercised with an emphasis on 
economic, or cost, efficiency over state planning and on ensuring competition 
(Littlechild and Vaidya 1982).  It followed that energy, like other economic sectors, 
should become subject to processes of deregulation and privatisation as the new ideas 
became implemented, and later sedimented (Borenstein and Bushnell 2000 in Jegen 
2009: 5).  The pro-market system of governance which was emerging in the UK, and 
Chile, came to be legitimated and institutionalised in the UK and was underpinned 
internationally by the emergence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ within inter-
governmental organisations (IGOs) in the 1980s and 1990s (see Held 2006: 161).   
 
Another important idea underpinning the pro-market perspective was that the newly 
emergent freely trading energy markets, once further established, should be supported 
through international co-ordination, based around the setting of generic, good 
governance standards, and multilateral institutions (Youngs 2009: 8).  The clear focus 
within this perspective has been on positive economic interdependence in energy trade, 
on “…markets and institutions…”, their internationalisation and their vital roles in 
energy governance (Youngs 2009; Goldthau and Witte 2009; Lesage et al 2010).  Much 
of the original thinking behind promoting the liberalisation of oil markets and pricing 
had been to prevent ‘states’ from impacting negatively upon the international oil trade 
in that smoothly functioning ‘free’ markets were understood to be the “best insurance” 
for a country’s security of supply (Mitchell et al 2001: 177; cf. Youngs 2009; Lesage et 
al 2010; cf. Cherp and Jewell 2011). 
 
1.2 Energy in the 2000s: Events and Pro-market Interpretations 
The pro-market energy perspective can be further defined here by considering the ways 
in which it has tended to interpret and explain key energy events in the 2000s, both in 
terms of why they were happening and what should be done about them.  These events, 
and their interpretation provide important backdrop, or context, in terms of 
understanding how energy governance and politics evolved between 2000 and 2010.  
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Initial observations, particularly within UK energy policymaking circles, about key 
elements of the international energy trade which had started to alter were quite sanguine 
(PIU 2001; DTI 2003; cf. Noel and Pollitt 2010).  After two decades of declining 
demand for oil, quite substantial, but relatively unanticipated, growth in fossil fuel 
demand had been emerging.  Much of the additional growth was coming from China 
and India in line with their fast accelerating economies (Mitchell et al 2001; DTI 2003).  
The UK was due, over this same time period, to move from a net exporter to importer of 
oil and gas (Blackhurst 2004).  At the same time, climate change arguments were 
gaining political saliency, the Enron and California crises had occurred, and Hugo 
Chavez’s Administration had seized control of Venezuela’s large oil exporting 
company, PdVSA. 
 
However, as briefly alluded to above, neoliberally pro-market analysts had spent much 
of the very early 2000s arguing that neoliberalism had become political orthodoxy in 
energy, on a globalising basis, and was providing solutions to old problems (Yergin 
1998a; Mitchell 1998; Mitchell et al 2001; Hayes and Victor 2006).  One leading energy 
analyst argued, for example, that energy security, in a geopolitical sense, was now “a 
footnote... an empty phrase” as archaic as “…medieval mystery plays…” (Mitchell et al 
2001 in Youngs 2009: 7).  Issues facing world energy trade, such as “nationalism” and 
“sovereignty”, were understood to have been resolved (Yergin 1998a: x).  Attempts 
were being made to sediment neoliberal energy governance via international institutions 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (Bielecki 2002; Chen and Jaffe 2007).  Given 
the degree of belief in the institutionalisation of free and fair international energy 
markets, especially in that they are constitutive in and of themselves of energy security, 
it is less surprising that, even as the events of the early 2000s started to unfold, the pro-
market perspective still upheld a sanguine view of the international energy environment. 
 
By the mid-2000s, however, things had started to change even from a pro-market 
perspective, in that ‘politics’, in the form of ‘statism’ and ‘resource nationalism’, was 
starting to emerge strongly again.  Pro-market commentators, having so recently 
celebrated the death of ‘old world’ energy, were perplexed.  China, it was now 
observed, was pursuing a programme of aggressive energy diplomacy (Baghat 2006; 
Yergin 2006; Chen and Jaffe 2007).  It had begun to sign bi-lateral energy deals with 
various African states, Venezuela, and Russia, as opposed to buying its energy on open 
markets.  Furthermore many of the countries with which China was dealing directly 
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were considered to be anti-OECD, if not outright enemies of the modern liberal, 
democratic order.  China was thereby understood to be undermining marketised energy 
as well as current and further multilateralism in energy (Chen and Jaffe 2007).  
 
Furthermore, in 2004 Russia had started to extend state control over various of the 
country’s key energy companies, despite much criticism from Western powers, and had 
imprisoned leading energy oligarch, Mikhael Khodorovsky. Russia had ‘re-negotiated’ 
contracts with high profile global energy companies, such as ExxonMobil and Shell, 
and had announced restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russian oil and 
gas sectors thereby discriminating against international oil companies (IOCs) (Yergin 
2006; Baghat 2006; Dickel 2010).  It was, however, the gas dispute between Russia and 
the Ukraine, and the consequent threat of reduced European gas supplies in 2006, that 
really shook pro-market commentators. It was considered that Russia was directly using 
energy as a political tool, a strategy which ought to have been unthinkable given claims 
about the orthodoxy of neoliberal forms of energy governance (cf. House of Commons 
2007a). 
 
In addition, oil and gas prices had started to rise rapidly, arguably partly as a result of 
market speculation that growing ‘resource nationalism’ would prove bad for investment 
prospects, but also reflecting growing political uncertainty.  Oil and gas prices more 
than trebled between 2002 and 2007, with oil prices peaking at over $140 per barrel in 
2008 (Youngs 2009: 1).  What is reasonably clear, however, is that these kinds of prices 
had not been anticipated by pro-market analysts – the Economist had not been alone in 
1999 when it speculated a future price of $5 per barrel of oil (Economist 1999 in Helm 
2003: 387).  However, the high and volatile energy prices of the mid and late 2000s 
provided much of the reason why energy was starting to be considered to be in crisis in 
Western importer nations both within public, political and academic circles. 
 
This overtly geo-political, and or ‘statist’, turn in energy, trade and relations, was 
interpreted as having negative consequences for international energy markets and future 
investment requirements (Erixon 2009; Goldthau and Witte 2009).  State run, or 
national, oil companies (NOCs), which had access to increasing percentages of the 
world’s oil and gas partly due to Russia’s and China’s actions, were understood not to 
have sufficient financial capacity, or management capability, to re-invest in required 
levels of exploration and production to meet rising global demand. This was partly 
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because “...investment decisions based on political calculations tend to ignore some of 
the underlying economics” and as a result there was a high “...risk of money flowing 
into the wrong projects...thus negatively affecting allocation of investment” (Goldthau 
2010: 43).  NOCs were, in addition, understood to be less transparent, transparency 
being held as key to the efficient operation of world markets (Goldthau 2009: 44).9 
 
As such, there increasingly emerged a trend, amongst previously sanguine pro-market 
energy analysts, of concluding that energy was, once again, in crisis and of referring 
once more to ‘energy security’, meaning (in-)security of supply, as a significant current 
problem (Yergin 2006 and 2007; Stanislaw 2006; Baghat 2006).10  Pro-market 
explanations laid the blame for the experience of crisis largely outside the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, on those countries 
who were reverting once more to the practices of ‘resource nationalism’.  The project of 
international liberalisation would only work properly if all major players in the energy 
markets followed ‘good governance’ practice, and state intervention in energy trade did 
not fit with such practice. 
 
1.3 Crisis Response and Policy Recommendations: More of the Same 
Some pro-market analyses somewhat dismissed the re-emergence of ‘statist’ behaviour, 
by concluding that it would over time quite simply just be proved ‘wrong’ (Considine 
and Kerr 2002; Finon and Locatelli 2008; Noel and Pollitt 2010). Others, however, 
started to consider solutions to the crisis, as perceived. Some analysts have noted that, 
from the pro-market perspective on energy governance, if a particular outcome is 
unsatisfactory in some way the answer usually proposed is “... more private ownership, 
the removal of restrictions on trading, and the promotion of competition” (Carter 2001: 
63; cf. Ciuta 2010; Scrase et al 2009).  Felix Ciuta, has further observed that solutions 
                                                
9	  Early	  references	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  low	  transparency	  in	  international	  oil	  markets	  can	  be	  found	  in	  a	  1979	  
study	  concluding	  that	  models	  predicting	  global	  oil	  reserves	  could	  only	  ever	  be	  approximate	  given	  a	  
general	  lack	  of	  information	  (Dasgupta	  and	  Heal	  1979).	  	  This	  conclusion	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  reached	  by	  
Susan	  Strange	  who	  claimed	  that	  economists	  were	  wary	  of	  applying	  theory	  to	  energy	  due	  to	  the	  high	  
susceptibility	  of	  energy	  markets	  to	  political	  forces	  (Strange	  1988:	  194).	  	  Dasgupta	  and	  Heal	  proposed,	  as	  
a	  solution,	  that	  countries	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  improve	  transparency	  allowing	  models	  to	  become	  
more	  accurate	  and	  markets	  to	  trade	  on	  sufficient	  information	  (Dasgupta	  and	  Heal	  1979:	  473).	  
10	  The	  sense	  of	  threat	  to	  supply	  security	  was	  further	  underpinned,	  in	  a	  post	  9/11	  world,	  by	  fears	  of	  Al	  
Qaeda	  attacks	  on	  energy	  infrastructure	  and	  transport	  systems	  (Baghat	  2006;	  Yergin	  2006).	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offered with the intent of improving market functionality are often put forward with the 
understanding that they are ‘generic’ in that they can also be applied to many other 
areas (Ciuta 2010: 12).  It is not surprising, therefore, that initial responses to the energy 
crisis, and well as to new climate change targets, represented little break from ‘business-
as-usual’ (Mitchell 2008).  This would also be considered an expected response given 
the degree to which the PEPP had become embedded in the UK. 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, solutions proffered initially were based again upon notions of 
markets, and market instruments, as sources of energy security in and of themselves 
(Bielecki 2002; Yergin 2006; Baghat 2006; Erixon 2009).  It had previously been 
understood, as alluded to briefly above, that free trade represented the “…best route to 
national energy security for most countries…” and, in addition, that market institutions 
were vital components in energy security for Western nations (Mitchell 2002: 4-5).  
Some analysts emphasised the need to further develop and internationalise gas markets, 
and short-term trading in gas, such that gas could be traded more freely thereby 
hindering the possibility for countries, like Russia, to impact on trade (Interview 1; cf. 
Youngs 2009: 7)  
 
Much analysis focused on the need to make renewed efforts to encourage further 
liberalisation, privatisation, transparency and competition around the world and to 
support emerging market institutions (Bielecki 2002; Yergin 2006; Erixon 2009; 
Goldthau and Witte 2009).  The idea was that those countries pursuing ‘statist’ energy 
policies might still be convinced of the inefficiency, particularly economically, of such 
programmes thereby making them more likely to move toward free market international 
trade, good governance and transparency (Interviews 1 and 19). This viewpoint was, 
perhaps in hindsight, hopeful in the extreme, especially given the lack of co-operation 
from producer states over time in providing relevant market information (Goldthau and 
Witte 2009).  Interestingly, given later developments, Daniel Yergin had cautioned 
against political reactions in the West to the crisis that would encourage greater 
‘independence’ in energy.  From his perspective security for all consumers resided in 
the stability of the market and secession, therefore, could not be an option (Yergin 
2006: 76).   
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2.	  	   The	  ‘Geopolitical’	  Perspective 
As is the case in other areas of analysis and politics, there are clear tensions between the 
pro-market and geopolitical perspectives on energy, events and governance. A such, the 
geopolitical perspective on energy can be taken here as a direct critique of the pro-
market perspective, or as one analyst put if, of the “economistic” turn in energy analysis 
(Hadfield 2007: 2). 
 
It is worth making a brief point of differentiation here to avoid confusion.  Much pro-
market research on energy refers to ‘statism’ in a blanket fashion as covering a 
multitude of approaches to energy, i.e. any approach that assumes state, or political, 
intervention in energy markets.  This might include both states pursuing ‘aggressive’ 
energy relations internationally, such as China, as well as governments deciding on state 
ownership and management of domestic energy companies, as was evident in the UK 
prior to the 1980s, but which could also be referred to as socialism.  This section of the 
thesis, in attempting to avoid analytical confusion between realist and socialist politics, 
defines geopolitics very differently from state socialism. 
 
2.1 Brief Definition: Geopolitics, Energy and Power 
It could be argued that geopolitical perspectives on energy share a long and well-
established history.  These perspectives represented arguably the dominant way of 
thinking in international energy, with the emphasis on oil, relations for the most part of 
the 20th century.  After the brief hiatus in the 1980s and 1990s, geopolitical perspectives 
seem to have been substantially revived in the UK and Europe in the mid-2000s, 
particularly as perceptions that energy is in crisis have deepened (McGowan 2008: 91).  
This is, as with all organisations of political thought into groupings, a wide-ranging 
group.   
 
In general, however, and in contrast to the pro-market perspective on energy, the 
geopolitical perspective is defined here as emphasising the geographically fixed and 
finite nature of natural resources, in particular, and tends to associate possession of 
resources with power and influence (Venn 1986; Hadfield 2007 and 2008; Klare 2008a; 
Gilpin 1987). Partly as a consequence of this and the associated importance of being 
able to access energy, the role of state sovereignty in energy governance is stressed, as 
are international energy relations and foreign policy.  
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Historically, energy has been understood, through geopolitical lenses, more as a 
national or strategic asset which states must be able to access for the maintenance of 
modern life, or as one analyst defined it, as the ‘lifeblood’ of modern economies (Gault 
2004: 182; cf. Yamani and Ahmad 1981: 66).  Other analysts have emphasised the 
importance of energy within diplomacy and international relations.  Fiona Venn in her 
historical account of oil observes that “...the history of oil and the history of 
international relations…” are intrinsically linked (Venn 1986: 1).  Such analyses 
contrast, clearly, with those that emphasise the fungible nature of natural resources as 
traded commodities within an economically and positively inter-dependent world. 
 
Emphasis within this analytical group has been placed on the role of the state in 
ensuring energy supply security, on strategic, often bi-lateral, alliances, on the search 
for ‘exclusive backyards’ and on the use of military power to protect supplies (Youngs 
2009: 8).  Energy security has, therefore, been considered as a question for national 
level politics and associated arrangements (Goldthau 2011: 129).  Analyses of energy’s 
past, particularly oil’s, often refer to military conflicts, between nations, exacerbated by 
the perceived need to access oil on acceptable economic and political terms (Venn 
1986; Bromley 1991; Painter 1997; Clarke 2007).  A reading of geopolitically informed 
energy literature offers up some pointers as to why energy, as an area of international 
negotiation, has remained remarkably free of agreement, let alone global governance 
‘norms’, over the last century (McGowan 2008; Natorski and Surralles 2008).11   
 
This line of thinking ties in with recent foreign policy analysis which, although not 
obviously geopolitically informed, concluded that in the energy sector “...the state has 
been more resilient than anticipated...” (Hadfield 2007: 33).  This is despite the period 
of substantial international marketisation that energy has been through.  Furthermore, 
with reference to Keohane and Nye’s earlier observations on energy, the analysis 
concluded that the “...global dynamics inherent in a sector like energy are still largely at 
the mercy of national ‘holders of power” (Hadfield 2007: 33).    
 
 
                                                
11 Examples	  often	  given	  are	  the	  ineffectiveness	  European	  Coal	  and	  Steel	  Community	  (ECSC)	  treaty	  and	  
the	  failure	  of	  the	  Common	  Energy	  Policy	  (CEP)	  to	  reach	  final	  conclusions	  (Strange	  1988:	  192;	  McGowan	  
2008:	  93).	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2.2 Energy Events in the 2000s and Geopolitical Interpretations 
Analysis of energy, through pro-market and geopolitical lenses, have a number of 
factors in common in the interpretation of energy events of the 2000s.  As already 
mentioned they both understand energy to have entered a period of crisis and they both 
identify underinvestment in energy as a core component of that crisis.  Geopolitical 
lenses, however, tend to interpret the crisis differently.  Whereas pro-market analysts 
have understood underinvestment in energy to be in part caused by the ‘statist’ 
behaviour of some states, the geopolitical perspective conversely understood it as a 
problem caused specifically by the marketisation of energy (Gault 2004; Umbach 
2010).  It is observed that international energy markets are inefficient, not through lack 
of transparency, but in that they tend not to reflect some of the hidden costs of the world 
trade in energy.  These costs range from environmental impacts to the costs of 
maintaining military protection for production sites, sea routes and pipelines (Youngs 
2009: 9).  In addition it is not considered possible to refer to international energy 
markets with any degree of accuracy as gas, and LNG, continue to be traded via long-
term contracts and not on open exchanges (Belyi and Kuzemko 2007).  
 
The argument continues that too much faith in a pro-market system has resulted in 
underinvestment in exploration and development for primary energy sources as well as 
in energy transit systems (Gault 2004; Umbach 2010).  The private sector is understood 
not to have been sufficiently motivated to invest in this increasingly uncertain, and 
historically long-term, area.  One analyst observed that it constituted “...a huge leap of 
faith to assume that since markets functioned in the 1990s, they will be able to cope 
with a future crisis in today’s changing political backdrop” (Myers-Jaffe 2005: 9). 
 
Broadly speaking, this perspective has likewise understood the role of changing energy 
supply fundamentals within the crisis differently.  It has been observed that after 2010 
growth in oil supplies would come from a much smaller number of non-OECD states.  
Given that national access to natural resources is also considered to confer power and 
influence, hence notions of ‘energy superpowers’, these conditions would distort free-
market dynamics and further exacerbate existing dependencies (Venn 1986; Clarke 
2007; Klare 2008a).  Together this would lead to a further reduction in the ability of 
markets to respond to energy crisis (Youngs 2009: 9; cf. Klare 2008a; Umbach 2010). 
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Michael Klare takes this argument one step further by dividing the world into “energy-
deficit” and “energy-surplus” nations when defining his “new international energy 
order” (Klare 2008a:14).  Given that trade in resources is understood from this 
viewpoint as a zero-sum game energy deficit nations, such as the US, China and UK, 
will increasingly have to compete with one another to secure supplies from energy 
surplus nations such as Russia and Saudi Arabia.  Furthermore, enormous wealth 
transfer will continue to take place between consumers and producers (Reihing 2007; 
Clarke 2007; Klare 2008a).  Klare claims that “...in 2006 alone, oil-exporting countries 
sucked up an estimated $970bn from oil-importing states” (Klare 2008a: 15).  
 
In extreme cases, as in the past, it is understood that increased competition, and relative 
lack of primary energy sources, may well lead to inter-state conflict, militarisation and 
war (Lugar and Woolsey 1998; Le Billon 2005; Russell 2008; Wilson 2008; Klare 
2008a; cf. Parra 2004). This has been seen as particularly relevant in developing 
countries but also as developed countries seek to defend access to globally important 
natural sources of energy such as oil and gas (Klare 2008a; cf. Lugar and Woolsey 
1999; Le Billon 2005). Some have claimed that “…the conflict-laden history…” of 
international oil in the twentieth century is, therefore, bound to continue (Mommer 
2000: ii).  This line of thinking lead to a natural conclusion, as explicated in more detail 
below, that nations should defend themselves by seeking to become more independent 
in energy and that nations with sizeable indigenous energy supplies should keep control 
of them. 
 
From the geopolitical perspective, therefore, Western governments are understood to 
have been slow to understand, and react to, these emerging political realities thereby 
exacerbating the energy crisis. Western governments stand accused of failing to fully 
acknowledge the role of the state in procuring and protecting national supplies of energy 
(Klare 2008a: 21).  These criticisms are largely levelled at EU countries, such as the 
UK, who understanding energy to be a tradable good, have overemphasized the role of 
market forces in energy and underemphasized the role of national, strategic and 
geopolitical interests (Umbach 2010: 1230).    
 
2.3 Crisis Response and Policy Recommendations 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the kind of critique levelled at the pro-market energy 
system above, some within the geopolitical group have suggested that governments in 
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the West need to become more directly involved in governing energy.  Amelia 
Hadfield’s suggestion that energy be integrated with and into wider foreign policy 
structures is one that is echoed quite widely elsewhere in this group (Hadfield 2007; 
Gault 2004; Umbach 2010; cf. Youngs 2009).  Specifically, Hadfield suggests that 
…the challenge of ensuring a consistent supply of energy whilst avoiding ‘security of 
supply’ problems clearly moves energy out of the commercial realm… and into the 
terrain of cross-border issues and national interests where foreign policy issues reside 
(Hadfield 2007: 3) 
This she observes is a particular concern for the UK. 
 
Others have emphasised the need for government to become more involved per se, 
alongside difficulties associated with such a process, and not just in devising energy 
foreign policy (James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy 2001; cf. CEPMLP 2006; 
Hadfield 2007).  One high-level report in the US warned that 
...the US administration had retreated too much from the energy sector, leaving 
decisions to de-monopolized private companies when a more ‘comprehensive strategic 
approach’ needed to be pursued through national champions.  (James A. Baker III 
Institute for Public Policy 2001: 29) 
Furthermore, it has been proposed that foreign policy should be designed in such as way 
as to take greater account of rights to policy-making sovereignty and specific national 
demands within producing states (Gault 2004: 182; Umbach 2010: 1239).  Too much 
emphasis on global economic processes when analysing energy and its governance has 
been to the detriment of analyses that take national and regional political requirements 
into account (Umbach 2010: 1239).  
 
Within the context of this thesis on UK energy governance and change, the geopolitical 
perspective on energy is understood to have provided an alternative picture, or re-
telling, of the energy crisis.  This thesis, largely in chapter five, will suggest that it is 
partly the urgent and evocative picture created by this perspective on energy crisis, and 
its effects on public perceptions of energy, that prompted political elites to re-consider 
energy governance in the UK.  In fact Klare’s recent book, outlining a geopolitical 
nightmare in future energy relations can, to some extent, be read as strategically using 
the fear of such a future to provoke change (Klare 2008a; see also Homer-Dixon 2009).   
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3.	  	   Climate	  Narratives	  
The pro-market-geopolitics debate, for all that it may still represent quite accurately 
academic research into energy and its governance, is too narrow.  Analyses focusing on 
such debates tend to underestimate and under-emphasise another strand of the literature 
that deals specifically with questions of energy governance from a climate perspective.  
The climate narrative is characterised as that section of the climate change literature that 
is concerned specifically with how energy policy and governance practices might enable 
climate change mitigation.  This perspective has long presented a critique of pro-market 
energy governance by repeatedly suggesting policy and governance change in order to 
enable the delivery of a more sustainable, low carbon energy system. 
 
3.1 Brief Definition: Critique and Change 
The way in which this perspective will be characterised here is, perhaps, more artificial 
than the two previous perspectives.  As Steven Bernstein has suggested, providing 
definitions of climate or environmental groups can prove problematic.  He has observed 
that environmental analysts, although they may be pursuing a similar end game in the 
protection of the planet, often suggest extremely different routes to that same end 
(Bernstein 2001: 29).  Even at the time of the first UN conference on the environment, 
the ‘Stockholm Conference’ of 1972, splits had emerged.  These were between 
environmental scientists and conservationists who understood the earth’s resources to 
be finite, and therefore argued for limits to growth, and those who were more concerned 
with economic growth and poverty reduction (Bernstein 2001: 29; cf. Meadows et al 
1972; Tickner 1993).  This split is characterised by Joerg Friedrichs as that between the 
Neo-Malthusians, who take the view that limits to growth present an inescapable human 
predicament, and the Cornucopians, who believe in man’s ingenuity and ability to solve 
problems with technology and knowledge (Friedrichs 2011: 1; cf. Carter 2001). 
 
Attempts to characterise the climate perspective here need to be conscious of these rifts.  
By the early 1990s a “…shift in norms of environmental governance had occurred…” 
which can be characterised by a general acceptance of “…liberalization in trade and 
finance as consistent with, and even necessary for, international environmental 
protection” (Bernstein 2001: 29; cf. Carter 2001: 169).  Although this view has tended 
to dominate political approaches to climate governance, as argued by a wide range of 
climate analysts (Carter 2001; Bernstein 2001; Dryzek 2005; Mitchell 2008; Scrase et al 
2009; Friedrichs 2011), the climate perspective will be characterised here as those that 
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have opposed this position.  As such this perspective is concerned with openly 
critiquing current energy policy in that it is understood to be incapable of delivering on 
climate mitigation goals.  This perspective is, therefore, interested in arguing for, and 
bringing about, political change, albeit there remain differences in ideas about how to 
change. 
 
Like pro-market perspectives on energy, climate groups understand the world to be 
inter-connected and inter-dependent, but with a focus on the ways, both positive and 
negative, that mankind’s actions reverberate around the living planet.  Energy is clearly 
understood to have an important role to play in climate change and clean energy is 
understood to be something which should be made available for all. Estimates are that 
the global energy sector contributes almost 60 percent of the world’s annual greenhouse 
gas emissions (Blyth 2010: 133).  On the other hand, however, energy policy, in pursuit 
of a low carbon energy sector, might also provide the possibility for mitigating climate 
change (Campbell 2005; Scrase et al 2009).  Energy use and climate change are, 
therefore, perceived to be inextricably inter-related within the deeply interconnected 
world, the ‘global commons’ (Vogler 2000).  It is, in addition, considered increasingly 
impossible to disentangle questions of energy policy from questions of climate change 
policy (Carter 2001; Held 2006; Giddens 2009; Scrase et al 2009; Blyth 2010).  This 
viewpoint has been encapsulated well in the claim that “…climate policy is energy 
policy…” (Scrase et al 2009: 3). 
 
3.2 Energy Events in the 2000s: Climate Interpretations  
Generally speaking although some within this group define the energy crisis as a current 
event (Helm 2005a), others see it as part of a larger problem analysed and discussed, 
with increasing frustration, for decades (Bernstein 2001: 29-47; Giddens 2009: 49; cf. 
Jacobs 1991; Carter 2001 and 2007).  The energy crisis is understood largely within the 
context of the ongoing warming of the planet partly due to the use of fossil fuels to 
power modern society.  Reference is often made to key events such as the 1972 
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 
and the 1992 United Nations led Earth Summit, where world leaders had convened to 
discuss and attempt to effectively address global environmental concerns, but which 
since then have produced little real change in policy or behaviour (Vogler 2000; 
Bernstein 2001; cf. Held 2006; Mitchell 2008; Friedrichs 2011).  
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Whereas the pro-market perspective might present the causes of the current energy 
crisis as being external to current systems of energy governance, the ‘climate’ 
perspective often highlights problems of an endogenous nature.  The modern system of 
growth and accumulation, including current forms of globalisation, is critiqued in that it 
has, through its emphasis on economic growth over other variables, exacerbated climate 
change (Carter 2001: 63; Paterson et al 2003; Held 2006: 160; Newell 2008; Mitchell 
2008; Newell and Paterson 2010).  The current world system, which underpins a 
‘hegemony of the market’, has been criticised as being capable of little more than 
offering market solutions to environmental problems and being, in this sense, 
ineffective (Carter 2001; Mitchell 2008; Scrase et al 2009; Kern 2009).  Held goes on to 
suggest that by widely promulgating a deep distrust of positive roles for government in 
core areas of socioeconomic life, the Washington Consensus viewpoint has further 
undermined the ability of governments to work together to address energy and 
sustainability concerns (Held 2006: 161).  
 
Steven Bernstein takes this relationship between energy and environmental governance 
systems and wider political systems further.  He also perceives there to be a wider 
system of governance, labelled the ‘economic paradigm’, which creates problems for 
progress towards establishing a sustainable energy system.  This paradigm had been 
winning out over scientific and other environmental ideas about how to govern the 
environment for decades in a process which he terms ‘the compromise of liberal 
environmentalism’ (Bernstein 2001: 187).  Specifically he argues that  
...economic ideas overshadowed scientific ideas and ecological thought in producing 
normative compromises at key junctures in the evolution of the environmental norm-
complex over the last thirty years (Bernstein 2001: 190) 
 
Examples of policy outcomes of this kind of compromise can be found in recent 
analyses of UK energy policy (Helm 2003; Mitchell 2008).  Catherine Mitchell has 
pointed to the dominance of quantitative over qualitative analysis within UK 
government institutions concerned with energy and to the dangers of “ideological lock-
in”.  This has meant that the bulk of analysis has failed to assist in making policy 
decisions related to judgement calls or, just as importantly, to highlighting progressive 
change required to the system of governance (Mitchell 2008: 1).  Dieter Helm had also 
previously concluded that the inability of UK energy policymakers to think outside of 
the neoliberal energy ‘box’ had resulted in policy that was no longer fit for purpose 
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(Helm 2003: 402).  It has thus been observed that an economic paradigm, based on pro-
market ideas, had been sufficiently institutionalised such that although the need to reach 
climate change goals could be identified, more productive methods of achieving this 
often lay outside of accepted ‘normal’ practice. 
 
3.3 Climate Responses to Crisis 
As already asserted above, this perspective on energy and crisis has been concerned 
with the urgent requirement for change in how energy is governed, and used, on a 
world-wide basis.  That is not to say that all within this broad church would recommend 
the same specific policies - there are deep divides between those who might recommend 
nuclear as a clean, low carbon, and sustainable energy source (Helm 2007a; Giddens 
2009) and those who would not (Held 2006; Mitchell 2008: 122).  This is a core 
ongoing split within current energy policymaking circles.  
 
Like those writing from the geopolitical perspective some experts start with the 
recommendation that governments should become more directly involved in energy 
governance in order to establish sustainable energy systems (Carter 2001; Held 2006; 
Mitchell 2008; Giddens 2009).12  This is not least because of the view that markets, left 
to their own devices, would deliver gas fired power stations to the exclusion of all else 
in response to perceptions of crisis given that that would be perceived as the 
economically efficient answer (Fells 2001: 1).  This perspective often points to the very 
urgent need to build energy, and climate, governance capacity both domestically and 
internationally (Stern 1987; Carter 2001; Helm 2005c; Held 2006: 159; Giddens 2009;).  
 
A range of specific recommendations to improve energy usage, thereby slowing the 
pace of global warming, have been suggested including the implementation of an 
effective national sustainable energy strategy (Carter 2001; Giddens 2009; Scrase et al 
2009).  Such a strategy is understood as being capable of going some way towards re-
instating collective thinking on sustainable energy to counter-balance the short-term 
outlook of the markets for energy (Giddens 2009: 128). Other, more specific, policies 
include an increase in direct government investment in renewable energy technology 
research and development (Mitchell 2008: 214; cf. Kern 2009), improved market 
                                                
12	  Antatole	  Kaletsky	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  climate	  narrative,	  given	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  current	  
economic	  paradigm	  and	  recommended	  role	  for	  the	  state	  in	  governance,	  is	  often	  associated	  with	  ‘the	  
left’	  (Kaletsky	  2010).	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regulation (Jacobs 1991: 136-138), feed-in tariffs to provide generators of renewable 
energy with a ‘risk free’ deal (Mitchell 2008), taxation of non-sustainable energy usage 
(Sentence 2009; Green Fiscal Commission 2009), and renewed usage of qualitative 
alongside quantitative analysis (Hope et al 1987; Mitchell 2008).  All of these 
suggestions infer, to a greater or lesser degree, less devolved and or independent energy 
governance. 
 
Again, with specific regard to ways in which energy is governed, others have observed 
that energy and climate policy should be reached through an inter-linked process (Carter 
2001; Greenpeace 2006; Held 2006; Giddens 2009; Scrase et al 2009; Blyth 2010: 133).  
As of the year 2000, the starting date of the period of analysis covered in this thesis, 
responsibility for climate policy lay largely within the Department for the Environment, 
Farming and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).  Responsibility for energy policy lay within the 
Energy Directorate of the DTI.  
 
 
4.	  	   Energy,	  Paradigms	  and	  Structural	  Change 
Given the consensus across perspectives that energy has been in crisis for much of the 
first decade of the 21st century, it is unsurprising that there has also been much talk of 
change. Chapter two will explore in some detail conceptual linkages between 
perceptions of crisis and political ability, and willingness, to change, but here it might 
just be worth mentioning that such links are possible.  This can be done with reference 
to Colin Hay who has suggested that crises should be understood not just as moments of 
considerable uncertainty, but also as moments of “decisive intervention” (Hay 2001: 
196).  
 
4.1 The Paradigm Come Back  
What has complicated questions about how to respond politically in energy’s renewed 
time of crisis, or of how to intervene decisively, is the existence of the above-mentioned 
variety of ways in which the crisis has been understood.  One way of claiming that there 
are different ways of understanding, and doing, things is to talk in terms of paradigms.  
Paradigms are often used in political science to denote certain, distinct, ways of thinking 
theoretically (Hall 1993; Hay various; Blyth various; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; 
Keohane 2009; Wood 2011).  The term paradigm has very recently started to appear in 
analyses of energy, and of climate change, to denote fixed ways in which energy has 
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been used and governed, often specifically within the context of wider paradigms 
(Carter 2001; Helm 2003; Stanislaw 2004; Yergin 2006; Clarke 2007; Mitchell 2008; 
Nuttall and Manz 2008; Klare 2008; Jegen 2009; Kern 2009; Homer-Dixon 2009).  This 
body of work is focused on describing the ways in which the context within which 
energy governance takes place is changing, often by pointing to global warming, peak 
resources, or energy supply insecurity. 
 
Given that this thesis is concerned with the alteration of the PEPP it is interesting to 
note that there are high profile pro-market energy analysts who have recently suggested 
that a new energy paradigm needs to emerge (Stanislaw 2004 and 2006; Yergin 2006).  
Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw have been involved politically in the 
‘marketisation’ of energy, partly as Government advisors, both in the UK and US.  
Joseph Stanislaw served as senior economist at the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and together they founded the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), a world 
leading energy consultancy firm.  They are co-authors of ‘The Commanding Heights: 
the Battle for the World Economy’ (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998).  Both analysts have, 
however, recently proposed new governing procedures capable of understanding 
energy, and its security, as being lodged within larger relations amongst nations and as 
capable of acting accordingly (Yergin 2006: 71; Stanislaw 2006: 10). Neither, however, 
put forward suggestions for particularly profound change, although given their previous 
positions in support of the neoliberalisation of energy in the 1980s, changes that might 
seem small to a climate analysts might to them seem more significant. 
 
Analysts writing on energy, from a climate perspective, have, as already suggested, had 
more to say about specific ways in which energy governance should change.  From this 
perspective a major transformation needs to take place in how energy resources are used 
and utilised around the world.  Pablo Gonzales has concluded that the current 
“economic paradigm”, in which the “scarce factor of production” has been capital, is 
fast moving to one where the scare factor will become natural resources (Gonzalez 
2006: 12). What needs to change therefore is the economic paradigm given that it is 
based on growth without due consideration for environmental and social consequences 
(see also Carter 2001 and 2007; Newell and Patterson 2010; Friedrichs 2011; Garner 
2011).  Carter references the existence of an “…alternative paradigm of sustainable 
development…” which has not been pursued due largely to the compromise between 
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neoliberal forms of economic governance and climate change ideas (Carter 2001: 169; 
cf. Bernstein 2001). 
 
Across the energy paradigm literature, the term paradigm tends to be applied in an 
undefined manner, assuming that the audience will understand what a paradigm is.13 
Some sort of inter-subjective meaning seems to be assumed between author and reader 
thereby suggesting that the term paradigm is widely understood and recognised.  What 
is missing, therefore, is much substantial definition both of what a paradigm is, and of 
what a paradigm shift is and how and why it might occur.  This literature often takes as 
its subject either global or regional energy systems, making conclusions that are general 
across broad geographical boundaries. 
 
With regard to UK energy governance processes more specifically, however, a few 
analysts have recently characterised UK energy policy as being influenced by neoliberal 
ideas which deeply constrain its ability to respond to climate, and energy security, 
problems as they arise (Helm 2003; Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009).  In his 
stinging critique of energy governance under New Labour Ian Rutledge describes a 
“Lawsonian paradigm” underpinned by a particularly fundamentalist view of the role of 
competitive markets in achieving objectives (Rutledge 2007: 901 and 903).  Florian 
Kern, in his recent PhD thesis, applies discursive institutionalism to great effect to 
reveal ways in which neoliberal ideas about energy governance have affected how 
energy ‘innovation policy’ has been devised (Kern 2009).  Kern’s analysis highlights, in 
detail, the way in which personnel working within innovation policy, particularly at the 
UK’s Carbon Trust, openly reflected ideas about government “…doing as little as 
possible…”, “…giving the market room to breathe…” and allowing for markets to 
deliver (Kern 2009: 124-5). 
 
Catherine Mitchell’s recent book refers to UK sustainable energy policy as having been 
devised very much within the context of wider UK economic governance practices.  
The book starts with a definition of the UK’s sustainable energy policy as reflecting the 
character of the “...underlying political-economic paradigm” (Mitchell 2008: 1).   This 
                                                
13	  This	  observation	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  made	  by	  Flinders	  and	  Buller	  on	  depoliticisation:	  “…scholars	  who	  
have	  employed	  the	  concept	  as	  a	  central	  element	  of	  their	  work…	  write	  with	  a	  fluidity	  and	  verve	  that	  
clearly	  denotes	  some	  kind	  of	  shared	  understanding…	  but	  yet	  never	  seeks	  to	  explicate	  the	  core	  essence	  
of	  the	  term”	  (Flinders	  and	  Buller	  2006:	  295).	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political-economic paradigm is further defined as a Regulatory State Paradigm (RSP) 
with reference to the work of Michael Moran (Moran 2003).  This paradigm suggests 
that Government should “...provide a regulatory framework which ‘steers’ towards a 
defined general direction and then leaves it to the market to select the means to reach 
that end...” (Mitchell 2008: 1).  Much of the rest of the book is given over to articulating 
the ways in which this politico-economic paradigm has restricted change and the 
development of effective sustainable energy policy in the UK.  Mitchell suggests a 
range of solutions, many of which would require a break with existing practices.14   
 
These pieces of research are highly significant as they are the first to suggest that the 
parameters of UK energy policy, or sub-sectors of it, have been severely restricted 
within specific policy paradigms.  In that all three focus on consistency of policy over 
change they do not, however, include analysis of actual changes ongoing in wider 
energy policy, nor do they define ways in which paradigms can be changed. 
 
4.2 Policy Paradigm Change 
There is an equally small group which has written on questions of paradigm change in 
energy policy (Helm 2005a and 2007a; Jegen 2009; Frogatt and Levi 2009; cf. Rutledge 
and Wright 2010).  Although this small group of work agrees that the starting position 
from which to evaluate change is a governance system heavily influenced by ideas 
about privatisation, liberalisation and competition, conclusions about change differ.  
These range from suggestions that a paradigm shift has already taken place (Helm 
2005a and 2007a; Keay 2010), through those that those that understand key elements of 
the policy process to have been changing (Jegen 2009; Froggatt and Levi 2009), to 
those that recognise and elucidate a wide range of policy failures challenging the pro-
market energy model (Rutledge and Wright 2010; Rutledge 2010).  
 
Dieter Helm, a climate change economist and UK Government advisor, has produced 
the most in depth work on paradigm change in energy policy (Helm 2005a and 2007a).  
His analysis of OECD energy policy is concerned less with the wider system of 
economic governance as representing a paradigm, as was the case with Mitchell’s book, 
but with energy governance in particular as constituting a policy paradigm.   The 
                                                
14 Changes	  suggested	  include	  government	  targeting	  of	  particular	  technologies	  and	  policies	  that	  
intervene	  directly	  in	  the	  market,	  such	  as	  priority	  access	  for	  renewable,	  not	  just	  ‘clean’,	  technologies	  to	  
generation	  (Mitchell	  2008:	  211-­‐213).	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characterisation of the PEPP used in this thesis will suggest elements which relate it to 
the wider system of economic governance, but also elements, in the form of ideas about 
energy and of physical institutions of governance, that are particular to the energy 
policy paradigm. 
 
The analysis starts with a brief definition of a paradigm, again with reference to Thomas 
Kuhn’s seminal work on the philosophy of science, as “...a coherent pattern of research 
organized around commonly shared theoretical propositions and models” (Kuhn 1962 in 
Helm 2005a: 1).  Helm proceeded by suggesting that paradigms can exist also in 
politics. Helm’s 2005 and 2007 articles both paint a picture of an energy policy 
paradigm, which dominated policymaking across the OECD during the 1990s, and 
which was built upon ideas about liberalisation and privatisation.  However, although 
Helm has referred to the way in which a policy paradigm is internally consistent and 
therefore provides a preferred solution to problems he does not explicitly offer any 
detailed definition of what a policy paradigm is or how it operates (Helm 2007a: 32).  
 
Helm then continued by proposing that a “…paradigm shift…” can be understood as 
“…the emergence of an alternative framework of common and shared analysis...” 
(Helm 2007a: 9).  Paradigm shifts can be understood to have occurred when  
...the historical context changes to a sufficient degree making it increasingly hard to 
reconcile the existing mindset of policy-makers with the evidence leading eventually to 
new objectives and new policy instruments  (Helm 2007a: 9) 
In addition, paradigm shifts in policy are put forward as also requiring a change in ideas 
in response to changing contexts (Helm 2007a: 9).15   
 
The energy policy paradigm shift that Helm claims took place seems to be more 
concerned with changing objectives than anything else.  He suggests that the primary 
focus of energy policy changed from competition, and associated cost minimisation, to 
climate change and security of energy supply (Helm 2007a: 18).  However, although it 
is inferred in the title of each piece, both of which reference ‘the new energy paradigm’, 
it is not clearly argued within the body of each work that an energy policy paradigm 
shift has indeed taken place (Helm 2005a and 2007a).  By concluding that policy 
objectives have changed, whilst arguing that the instruments of policy have not yet 
                                                
15	  This	  is	  done	  without	  reference	  to	  Peter	  Hall’s	  1993	  article	  on	  policy	  paradigms	  and	  paradigm	  shifts	  
although	  Helm’s	  definition	  does	  appear	  similar	  to	  Hall’s.	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changed, the title is left somewhat stranded from the text (Helm 2007a: 32).  By Helm’s 
earlier, fleeting definition of a policy paradigm shift both new objectives and new 
policy ideas and instruments are required (Helm 2007a: 9).  
 
In some recognition, however, of the temporality of, and of constraints on, change Helm 
does posit that any change to the existing energy policy paradigm takes place as part of 
an ongoing process which will be problematic due to the existence of “...institutional 
and structural constraints to a new paradigm in energy” (Helm 2005a: 14).  This is 
perhaps why Helm proposes that part of the problem of devising new instruments of 
energy policy rests on the question of how to marry up “…the new objectives with the 
liberalized markets” (Helm 2007a: 32).  In this Helm has not been posing questions 
about how to alter the underlying market-based model and the institutions which it has 
produced, despite the new objectives to which policy has been set.  
 
Maya Jegen’s work on EU energy paradigm change has a broader focus both in that her 
analysis covers climate and energy security policy.  She has suggested, in line with 
Helm, that EU energy policy has changed in that its objectives are now much more 
oriented toward reducing carbon dioxide emissions and ensuring energy security (Jegen 
2009: 18).16  In conclusion, however, she remains ambiguous as to whether a ‘genuine’ 
paradigm shift, outlined yet again with a brief reference to Kuhn’s scientific 
revolutions, took place (Jegen 2009: 19).  It could be argued, as with Helm’s articles, 
that by failing to provide any distinct definition of a paradigm shift it has been difficult 
for this analysis to really measure whether or not one has taken place.   
 
What is apparent from all the analyses of energy paradigms and of change is that 
reference is being made to a range of different types of paradigms.  This might be 
related to the observation that, with the exception of Mitchell, Kern and Rutledge, the 
energy paradigm research has tended to proceed in a somewhat broad fashion by 
generalising across a number of countries and political systems.  This again seems 
problematic in the light of various assertions that energy, albeit security, can mean 
different things at different points in time and so too to different groups at the same 
point in time (Jegen 2009; Ciuta 2010).  Building on this small emerging literature this 
                                                
16	  Jegen	  specifically	  suggests	  that	  Russia’s	  actions	  around	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  were	  responsible	  for	  ‘re-­‐
politicising’	  energy	  in	  Europe	  five	  (Jegen	  2009:	  18)	  –	  an	  idea	  to	  which	  this	  thesis	  will	  return	  in	  chapter	  
five.	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thesis will take the notion of a paradigm shift in energy policy as a starting point for the 
analysis of one policy paradigm, the PEPP.   
 
Conclusions 
The focus of this chapter has not been on trying to establish which perspective is ‘right’ 
or ‘wrong’ in their interpretation of the political economy of energy in the 2000s, but to 
build a profile of each perspective on energy in terms of how they understand and 
represent crisis, what they recommend in response to it, and the degree to which they 
understand change to be taking place.  Clearly, as already mentioned, there is some 
overlap between each perspective but sufficient generalisations exist in their normative 
positions and/or their theoretical approaches to argue for separation.  The three energy 
perspectives will underpin much of the rest of this thesis in that each perspective is 
understood to have a role in the process of change to UK energy governance and policy 
both in terms of facilitating and constraining change.   
 
It appears, on reading the analysis on energy paradigms and change, that it is at best 
ambiguous whether or not an energy policy paradigm shift is taking, or has taken, place.  
Academic work on energy paradigms does appear to consistently suggest that UK, and 
EU, energy policy has been increasingly influenced by ideas about liberalisation, 
deregulation and competition over a period of decades (Helm 2003; Thomas 2006: 583; 
Mitchell 2008; Jegen 2009: 1; Lesage et al 2010: 6; EC 2011: 14).  In addition, what 
can be read from this literature is some similarity in the consideration of the objectives 
to which energy policy is set.  Objectives appear to have been re-ordered such that the 
security and sustainability of energy supplies appear to have emerged as primary, ahead 
of the creation of liberal and competitive energy markets (Helm 2005: 2; Mitchell 2008: 
2; Jegen 2009: 2; cf. Kuzemko 2012 (forthcoming)).   
 
There has been a remarkable increase in debates about energy centred on energy 
security and climate change as issue areas which have arguably served to repoliticise 
energy and to raise a wide range of questions about change. Although there is 
considerable agreement, across perspectives, that change is required there appear to be 
quite deep differences about the degree and type of change necessary. 
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Chapter	  2:	  Conceptualising	  Change	  and	  the	  Pro-­Market	  Energy	  Policy	  
Paradigm	  
 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework through which this thesis will develop 
the analysis of UK energy governance in the 21st Century.  As already noted, there has 
been a widespread perception within academic, government and wider circles that we 
have been living through a period of crisis in energy for much of the 2000s.  Renewed 
emphasis has emerged in the UK on questions of international energy security, 
perceived often as insecurity of supply, alongside growing political traction behind 
arguments about climate change and the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.  
 
The conceptual framework is based predominantly on ideational strands of 
institutionalism, proposed by Colin Hay as a ‘synthesis’ of historical and discursive 
variants of neo-institutionalism (Hay 2001: 193).  The framework will present first of 
all a clearly defined concept of a policy paradigm with reference to Peter Hall (Hall 
1993).  It will then build on Hall’s concept of a policy paradigm in outlining five 
‘levels’ of governance within the UK pro-market energy policy paradigm (PEPP) 
against which change can be measured.  An explanation of the PEPP, why certain 
energy decisions were made over others and some of the social, political and economic 
outcomes of those decisions, provides us with a deeper understanding of the context 
within which change occurred in the 2000s. 
 
It will further be argued, through reference to other new institutionalist concepts, that 
the PEPP had become well sedimented in the UK by the start of the 2000s.  It will be 
argued not only that energy had become quite significantly depoliticised over time (cf. 
Kern 2009), but indeed that various processes of depoliticisation had actively served to 
embed and cement the PEPP (cf. Hay 2007).  These processes will be introduced here as 
‘marketised’, ‘deliberative’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘secretised’ depoliticisation.  The 
depoliticised nature of the PEPP, along with the policymaking mindsets inherent within 
Hall’s notion of a policy paradigm, help to explain the degree to which, and ways in 
which, the PEPP provided resistance to change (Hall 1993; Hay 2007).  If such a 
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sedimented system can be seen to have changed profoundly, and in a lasting manner, 
then this can be understood as significant.17 
 
Having established a starting point for the analysis of change this chapter will 
supplement the concept of policy paradigms, and the PEPP in particular, by considering 
how and why change of profound proportions can take place to such a well sedimented 
energy governance system.  Much of the energy paradigm and environmental literatures 
claim that political change is required, but also despair over the lack of change over 
time (Carter 2001; Bernstein 2001; Stanislaw 2004; Gonzales 2006; Mitchell 2008).  
What is needed in order to consider how and why change takes place is a 
conceptualisation of processes of change.  This will be formed by considering the role 
of narratives, based partly on perspectives outlined in chapter one, as catalysts for and 
enablers of change (Hay 1996 and 2001; Blyth 2002 and 2003).  Understandings of the 
role of narratives in change will be supplemented by arguments about repoliticisation 
(cf. Wood 2011), ‘re-thinking’ and securitising moves (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al 1998).
  
 
1. Policy	  Paradigms	  and	  Ideas 
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.  Indeed, the world is 
ruled by little else (Keynes 1997: 383) 
 
The conclusion of chapter one observed that among the failings of the current, albeit 
nascent, energy paradigm literature is a lack of any well-defined explanation of what a 
paradigm is.  With the notable exception of Catherine Mitchell’s work on sustainable 
energy policy, paradigms remain largely emblematic, used as heuristic devices to 
signify a particular way of doing things (Stanislaw 2004; Gonzales 2006; Clarke 2007; 
Klare 2008).  This chapter is an important step towards being able to characterise a 
specific ‘pro-market energy policy paradigm’ (PEPP).   
 
As already noted at the end of chapter one, Catherine Mitchell and Dieter Helm have 
gone the furthest in trying to define paradigms by providing us with some, albeit brief, 
descriptions of some of internal machinations.  Without specifically referring to ideas as 
                                                
17 Particularly	  in	  that	  UK	  energy	  policy	  had	  been	  actively	  held	  up	  as	  a	  model	  which	  other	  states	  wishing	  
to	  ‘reform’	  their	  energy	  sectors	  should	  follow	  (IEA	  2006;	  Thomas	  2006;	  cf.	  Interviews	  1	  and	  15).	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influential variables within political processes, Catherine Mitchell has put forward the 
notion that UK sustainable energy policy reflects the character of the overall socio-
economic paradigm, referred to as the Regulatory State Paradigm (RSP) (Mitchell 2008: 
1).18  Mitchell is referring, however, to one specific paradigm, not a definition of 
paradigms per se.  She notes that the RSP “… supports the status quo and the 
momentum of the current energy system” (Mitchell 2008: 50) and observes throughout 
the book that the character of the political paradigm has to change in order for 
successful sustainable energy policies to be pursued (Mitchell 2008).  However, by 
failing to define what constitutes a political paradigm more generally or how it can be 
that paradigms have a certain ‘character’, it becomes harder to also conceptualise how it 
might be possible for such change to take place.  
 
1.1 Policy Paradigm as Interpretive Framework 
Given the range of different paradigms associated with energy, which have recently 
emerged within the energy literature, providing a specific definition of a paradigm is 
considered to be fundamental to this thesis.  There are, however, a number of other 
reasons for this.  Firstly, as already mentioned, change is considered here as a relative 
concept (Hay 1999c: 30).  As such a full understanding of the UK energy governance 
starting position, as PEPP, is considered necessary in order to qualify and quantify that 
change.  Secondly, if we remain ignorant of the ways in which a specific policy 
paradigm operates then it might be problematic to suggest how and why it might be 
changing.  Lastly, it might be possible to argue that some of the political and economic 
consequences of policymaking, structured within a particular set of ideas, might in turn 
constitute crisis.  
 
As already indicated in the introduction the definition offered in this thesis of a 
paradigm is based on Peter Hall’s conceptualisation of policy paradigms (Hall 1993). 
Hall’s work is situated within a growing literature which understands policy both as 
socially constructed and as influenced and structured by sets of ideas (Hall 1993; 
Berman 1998; Campbell 1998; Wilson 2000; Hay various; Greener 2001; Blyth various; 
                                                
18	  This	  thesis	  agrees	  with	  this	  notion	  but	  will	  ascribe	  different	  ‘characteristics’	  to	  the	  UK	  energy	  policy	  
paradigm.	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Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Schmidt and Radaelli 2006; Berry 2008; Schmidt 2008; 
Larsen and Andersen 2009; Kern 2009; Chwieroth 2010; Mugge 2011; Woods 2011). 19  
 
In an early analysis of UK economic governance Hall observed that there are certain 
‘paradigms of politics’ (Hall 1986: 3).  This was an attempt at understanding how 
institutions, taken as formal rules and standard operating practices, structure decision 
making within certain, broad units of polity.  These institutions were understood as 
more formal than cultural norms but not necessarily derived from any legal standing 
(Hall 1986: 19).  This work also served to “...illuminate the political dimensions of 
economic management...” arguing that the direction of policy was determined “... not 
simply by economic conditions but also by a political dynamic…” and as such that 
policy was not pre-determined (Hall 1986: 20). 
 
Hall built on this concept of socially constructed rules and norms in political practice 
when he came to define the policy paradigm.  His work on policy paradigms furthered 
the notion that individuals within political institutions were structured in their decision-
making but reflected in more detail on how this process takes place and with what 
consequences.  Hall put it this way: 
...policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. 
[T]his framework is embedded in the very terminology through which policymakers 
communicate about their work, and it is influential precisely because so much of it is 
taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this 
interpretive framework a policy paradigm. (Hall 1993: 279) 
There is a lot that we can take from this quote when trying to understand what policy 
paradigms are and how they work.  Instead of a paradigm presented as a ‘given’ and left 
largely undefined Hall’s concept allows us to problematise existing sets of governance 
structures and to understand affects of ideational contexts on policymaking.  
 
                                                
19	  For	  in	  depth	  explorations	  of	  the	  role	  of	  ideas	  as	  independent	  variables	  in	  political	  analysis	  see	  both	  
Mark	  Blyth	  and	  Sheri	  Berman	  who	  include	  excellent	  accounts	  in	  the	  opening	  chapters	  of	  their	  books,	  
respectively	  ‘Great	  Transformations’	  and	  ‘The	  social	  democratic	  moment:	  ideas	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  
making	  of	  interwar	  Europe’	  (Berman	  1998;	  Blyth	  2002;	  see	  also	  Jacobsen	  1995).	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Hay and Wincott offer a further explanation of the role of ideas in policymaking 
processes by proposing them as the link between context and conduct, institutions and 
behaviour or, in other words, as part of the ‘why’ of analysing actions (Hay and Wincott 
1998: 953).  As such what becomes important is the way in which political actors 
interpret events and how policy decisions relate to interpretations. This kind of linking 
up of ideas, about a problem area and how it should be addressed, and political 
outcomes in the form of policy choices assists us in understanding Catherine Mitchell’s 
proposition that the RSP has particular “characteristics” (Mitchell 2008:1).  These 
characteristics, which have resulted in certain methods of governing sustainable energy, 
are the visible outcome of working within a given interpretive framework.  
 
The second observation, that the policy paradigm, or interpretive framework can end up 
being ‘taken for granted’ is a fascinating notion that will be taken up in more detail in 
the next section of this chapter.  As such policymakers may not actively be aware that 
their choices are constrained in this way as by its very nature an interpretive framework 
presents choices as ‘common sense’, ‘the norm’ or just simply correct procedure.20  This 
form of ideational constraint is similar to one of John Campbell’s ‘types of ideas’ that 
effect policymaking, which he also refers to as ‘paradigms’.  A paradigm for Campbell, 
who draws on historical and organisational institutionalism, is an “…elite assumption 
that constrains the cognitive range of useful solutions available to policy makers” 
(Campbell 1998: 385).  These result in elite policy prescriptions, or ‘programs’, which 
help policymakers to chart a clear and specific course of action.  As such ideas both 
enable action, but only action constrained within a range of elite assumptions. 
 
As such, the interpretive framework also allows for high degrees of certainty when 
addressing complex political and economic issue areas such as energy, and such 
certainty can allow for stability as well as lack of political or public discourse about 
such policy areas. This may be what Dieter Helm meant when he suggested that policy 
paradigms are ‘internally consistent’ (Helm 2007: 9).  It can also, however, leave 
policymakers blind to, or dismissive of, alternative ways of understanding their issue 
area and other, potentially more effective, methods of achieving policy goals.  
 
                                                
20	  Policymakers	  may,	  however,	  be	  all	  too	  aware	  of	  other	  constraints	  such	  as	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  
engage	  in	  certain	  policies,	  or	  of	  lack	  of	  public	  financing	  sufficient	  to	  commit	  to	  required	  departmental	  
resources.	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Hall’s conceptualisation of a policy paradigm also suggests that policymakers, and 
those associated with the policymaking process, understand the “...very problem they 
are supposed to be addressing...” through this interpretive framework.   As suggested in 
chapter one, and as will be outlined in more detail in chapter three, the ‘very problem’ 
that UK energy policymakers were addressing was indeed interpreted in a particular, 
arguably somewhat narrow, way.  It will be further argued that the way in which energy 
was initially conceptualised by the Conservatives in the early 1980s, as a tradable good 
or commodity, is key to understanding how energy came to be treated politically.  
 
1.2 Legitimacy, Belief and Strategic Language 
Lastly, in terms of understanding the ways in which a policy paradigm, in the form of 
the interpretive framework, is understood to impact upon policymaking, it is worth 
noting Hall’s claim that the “…framework is embedded in the very terminology through 
which policymakers communicate about their work” (Hall 1993: 279).  Steven 
Bernstein, writing on the evolution of climate policymaking, has also suggested that 
legitimacy and credibility matter.  He observed that “… the question is not whether the 
norm exists, but the political authority the norm enjoys” (Bernstein 2001: 30). 
Communication is key here and it is linked to notions of legitimacy in policymaking 
and to questions of what kind of policy, based upon a certain set of ideas, is considered 
acceptable.  For example, within the context of an embedded policy paradigm, wherein 
policymakers communicate using specific, often highly technical language, those 
seeking to advise would need to use similar language to be perceived as credible.  As 
such it can be further argued that the dominant interpretive framework influences who, 
or which, organisations have credible voices within policymaking processes (Adler and 
Haas 1992; Kern 2009: 53; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). There is, as such, a 
considerable degree of authority implied in the way in which Hall has characterised the 
policy paradigm and associated political and policy practice.  
 
A further question to be raised here is that of strategic action as opposed to acting on the 
basis of belief.  Hall’s policy paradigm theory suggests that policymakers actions are 
informed by a framework of ideas in which they may well believe, if they are overtly 
aware of its influence.  Colin Hay’s analysis of political behaviour would also suggest 
actors pursuing certain courses of action because they genuinely perceive those courses 
to be correct, or right (Hay 2007: 94).  Given the degree to which it is often argued that 
neoliberal ideas have come to dominate economic, and energy, policymaking over time 
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genuine belief in these ideas might not be too surprising a prospect.  This would relate 
to Campbell’s notion of ideas as elite assumptions constraining action (Campbell 1998: 
385) and left unproblematised.  Generally speaking, this thesis takes ideas as being 
influential over policy making in this kind of way. 
 
The other side of this argument suggests, however, that some policymakers, politicians 
and political protagonists also act strategically in that they use certain language and 
reference certain ideas in order to appeal to publics in order to get legislation through, 
or get elected (Geddes and Guiraudon 2004: 335; Kern 2009: 54).  This corresponds to 
another of Campbell’s idea types, “frames”, which can help policymakers to “… 
legitimize policy solutions to the public” (Campbell 1998: 385; cf. Geddes and 
Guiraudon 2004: 335). 21 This process implies a degree of inter-subjective 
understanding between policymaker, or other political protagonist, and their audience 
(Yee 1996: 90-91; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004: 335; Schmidt 2006: 252; cf. Kern 
2009: 49).  This may not always be the case, but an example of the use of particular 
concepts on the assumption of inter-subjective understanding is the way in which 
climate analysts, in seeking to promote renewables, have drawn on the language of 
national security and energy independence.  
 
 
2.	  	   Depoliticisation	  and	  Physical	  Structures	  of	  Governance 
This thesis has often referred to the PEPP as being deeply embedded and therefore 
somewhat resistant to change, which arguably makes any claim of significant alteration 
all the more meaningful.  A good way of coming to understand what is meant by an 
embedded, or institutionalised, policy paradigm is by starting to think about it as a 
process that takes place over time.  At any particular moment in time certain sets of 
ideas effectively dominate politics, or more precisely political decision-making, and 
therefore can be seen as having both legitimacy and authority.  Chapter one claimed, for 
example, that sets of neoliberal ideas had come to dominate both energy, and wider 
macroeconomic, policymaking in the UK, and beyond.  In order to reach such a position 
of legitimacy within elite circles a policy paradigm, and the ideas upon which it rests, 
                                                
21	  It	  may	  be	  worth	  referencing	  the	  distinction	  made	  in	  the	  ‘social	  movement’	  literature	  between	  
‘strategic	  framing’,	  as	  political	  actors	  framing	  their	  discourse	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  so	  as	  to	  promote	  the	  
solutions	  they	  propose,	  and	  ‘ideology’,	  which	  implies	  more	  belief	  and	  less	  strategic	  use	  of	  language	  (Zald	  
1996	  in	  Geddes	  and	  Guiraudon	  2004:	  335).	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would first have to have been subject to certain social and political processes, often 
referred to as institutionalisation.  In a general sense, Colin Hay has noted that 
“...paradigms become entrenched both culturally and institutionally” (Hay 1998: 213).  
Others have observed that ideas, when they become embedded in institutions, be they 
political, economic or social, tend to become more established and harder to challenge 
and therefore change (Jacobsen 1995: 285). 
 
We will take here the example of the establishment of neoliberal and public choice 
ideas as influential over political practice across OECD countries, and beyond.  There 
were, according to Colin Hay, two distinct phases of establishing this policy paradigm.  
The first phase, referred to as normative neoliberalism, took place in Anglophone 
democracies in the 1970s and 1980s and was highly politicised in that neoliberal ideas 
came to dominate political debates.  The second phase, normalised neoliberalism, was 
by contrast a period of diffusion and consolidation that extended neoliberal economic 
governance beyond Anglophone democracies in the 1990s (Hay 2007: 98).  This second 
phase is understood here as that within which the dominant neoliberal ideas became 
embedded within political practice – therefore as part of the relationship between theory 
and praxis. 
 
2.1 Depoliticisation as Institutionalisation 
Florian Kern has briefly suggested that energy innovation policy in the UK could be 
considered as be ‘depoliticised’ in that responsibility is passed on to the private sector, 
but without much discussion or analysis of what is meant by the term or of its 
consequences (Kern 2009: 131).  Depoliticisation is understood here as being capable of 
taking a policy paradigm from an accepted normative position, based on a certain set of 
ideas, to an established political system which could be described as ‘normalised’ (cf. 
Buller and Flinders 2005; Hay 2007: 98).  Specifically ‘depoliticisation’ has been used 
to refer to the passing of responsibility, and accountability, in a given issue area away 
from government (Burnham 2001; Buller and Flinders 2005; Flinders and Buller 2006; 
Hay 2007; Mügge 2011).22  Although these decisions can result in a ‘de-politicised’ 
issue area the decisions themselves remain highly political (Flinders and Buller 2006: 
307). 
 
                                                
22	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  depoliticisation	  ‘type	  1’.	  	  Hay	  also	  presented	  a	  ‘type	  2’,	  which	  involves	  further	  
movement	  into	  the	  ‘private’	  sphere,	  but	  this	  type	  will	  not	  be	  utilised	  here	  (Hay	  2007:	  85).	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Flinders and Buller suggest that depoliticisation is something of a misnomer in that the 
politics remain “…but the area or process through which decisions are taken is altered” 
(Flinders and Buller 2006: 296).  In this respect we can turn to Hay’s suggestion that 
depoliticisation can take one of two general forms.  The first is the displacement of 
responsibility from governmental to public or quasi-public authorities, which works 
particularly well for subjects that can be considered as ‘technical’ (Hay 2007: 82).23  
This form will be referred to in this thesis as ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  With 
regard to the institutionalisation of the PEPP, ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation can be used 
to refer to the process whereby the Ministry of Energy was disbanded and responsibility 
for energy policymaking was passed to an Energy Directorate within the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) and to ‘independent’ regulators. As time passed energy 
became increasingly viewed as a ‘technical’ matter suitable to the rigorous quantitative 
analysis of experts at the DTI and Ofgem, mostly economists, rather than elected 
representatives of state.  
 
The second form that depoliticisation can take is the “… off-loading of areas of formal 
political responsibility to the market”, or ‘marketised’ depoliticisation in the 
terminology of this thesis (Hay 2007: 82).  This form can likewise be applied to the 
institutionalisation of the PEPP in that it was decided to privatise energy companies 
such that supplying energy to British consumers became the responsibility of ‘the 
market’.  Together ‘market’ and ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation can result in an 
immediate disadvantage for energy politics in the “…potential loss of policy-making 
capacity that displacement of responsibility may entail” (Hay 2007: 83).  This argument 
is certainly borne out by this thesis, particularly in chapters five, six and seven. 
 
Both these forms of depoliticisation include “… the effective demotion of issues 
previously subject to formal political scrutiny, deliberation and accountability to the 
non-governmental sphere” (Hay 2007: 82). This aspect of the process of 
depoliticisation, referred to here as ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation, can be considered 
most significant under Hay’s definition of politics.  He understands that there needs to 
be active deliberation and collective choice for politics to be representative or for the 
state to act as an effective guarantor of the public good (Hay 2007: 93; cf. Woods 
                                                
23	  This	  is	  similar	  in	  many	  respects	  to	  Flinders	  and	  Buller’s	  ‘institutional’	  depoliticisation,	  but	  emphasises	  
the	  degree	  to	  which	  this	  works	  for	  subjects	  that	  are	  considered	  ‘technical’	  and	  therefore	  not	  suitable	  to	  
those	  not	  ‘expert’.	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2011).  Both ‘marketised’ and ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation help to reinforce 
‘deliberative’ depoliticisation by limiting debate about energy policy to small, defined 
communities which often use terminology which is not accessible to lay communities.  
 
One further aspect of these processes of depoliticisation, particularly ‘deliberative’, is 
the erosion of trust in governance and political ‘authority’, as identified in a recent study 
on UK sustainable energy trajectories (Rayner 2009).  Publics furthermore can end up, 
through exclusion from debates, becoming disengaged with topics and distrusting 
motives for policy.  This is something which Jonathan Stern warned about in a 1987 
article about the exclusion of energy from public policy debates both between elections 
and at times of National Elections (Stern 1987: 498).  
 
Hay further argues that the tendency for all the above forms of depoliticisation to be 
pursued under New Labour has been underpinned not only by the growing acceptance 
of neoliberal ideas but also of public choice theory (cf. Interview 20).  In developing a 
“science of political failure” this theory has taken neoliberal ideas about the role of 
government one step further by positing that the state holds limited capacity to govern, 
and that public servants are self-serving (Hay 2007: 96).  Putting these ideas about the 
role and capacity of the state into political practice has served as a method of more 
deeply embedding the neoliberal economic paradigm by distancing the state from 
deliberation, active decision-making and the provision of certain goods.  Furthermore, 
public choice theory has served to further institutionalise and legitimate the idea of a 
limited role for the state by pronouncing neoliberalism the only feasible economic 
paradigm in an era of globalization.  In doing so it has effectively both depoliticised 
neoliberal political practice and rendered it ‘non-negotiable’ (Hay 2007: 98). 
 
Dieter Helm claims that both Conservative and New Labour politicians had actively 
sought to remove energy from politics, making it an ‘economic’ subject: 
From the early 1980s, British energy policy, and its associated regulatory regime, was 
designed to transform a state-owned and directed sector into a normal commodity 
market. Competition and liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of 
the political arena… Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off 
the political agenda….  (Helm 2003: 386) 
This thesis understands energy to have been, at least temporarily, quite successfully 
depoliticised by 2000. This is not to say, of course, that it did not face any contestations 
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or challenges, but that the PEPP seemed to evolve in such a way that these challenges 
had been neutralised.  As Flinders and Buller point out, even post the delegation of 
responsibility and accountability, politicians can still be exposed to pressures which 
cause issues to be ‘re-politicised’ (Flinders and Buller 2006: 296). 
 
2.2 Governance Institutions 
Governance institutions, once formed, can further reinforce a policy paradigm, and the 
ideas upon which it rests, limiting the entry of new ideas.  It has been suggested that the 
way in which a system is organised can allow or restrict “…the access of social groups 
to political leaders and bureaucratic officials” (Yee 1996: 92).  The way in which 
institutions are constituted can, thus, “…set the parameters of what people talk about as 
well as of who talks to whom in the process of policy-making” (Schmidt and Radælli 
2004: 197).  This can refer both to who is hired but also to who may offer credible 
information and to assigned mandates, as already suggested in section 1.2 above.  
Specific hiring practices can mean that only individuals who have been educated to 
interpret meanings in a similar, or appropriate, way are offered employment within a 
given institution (Adler & Haas 1992; see March & Olsen 1984 reference in Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010: 5). Such individuals may just naturally present as being ‘qualified’ 
and, or, ‘right’ for the job. 24 
 
The proposed tendency within formal institutions to hire likeminded, or appropriately 
educated, individuals can be further reinforced by specific training once inside an 
institution, training that can lead to “...institutionalised subjects and institutional 
environments” (Hay and Wincott 1998: 954).  As will be seen in more detail in chapter 
three this has very much been the case with employment and training structures within 
the DTI.  Within the DTI, those hired to research energy have generally come from 
economics or statistics backgrounds (Interviews 1 and 15).  Physical institutions of 
government, run by groups of likeminded experts, can be further reinforced by 
processes of ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation which serve to isolate “…policy making 
from public debate and democratic scrutiny” (Mügge 2011: 189). 
                                                
24	  Helm	  claims	  that	  Nigel	  Lawson	  as	  Energy	  Minister	  made	  strategic	  decisions	  in	  that	  likeminded	  
individuals	  were	  chosen	  to	  join	  his	  team:	  “Lawson,	  like	  Thatcher,	  put	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  choosing	  
the	  right	  individuals	  to	  carry	  out	  his	  policies.	  He	  wanted	  to	  find	  managers	  who	  were	  ‘one	  of	  us’	  …	  
executives	  were	  to	  be	  chosen	  with	  a	  mind	  to	  the	  political	  objectives	  as	  much	  as	  their	  managerial	  
competence.”	  	  (Helm	  2003:	  65)	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Both Mitchell and Helm have referred to the ways in which narrow analytical 
methodologies adopted, and in particular a focus on quantitative over qualitative 
analysis, have resulted in missed opportunities to develop and improve UK energy 
policy (Helm 2003: 395; Mitchell 2008: 31).  Mitchell refers to the ways in which a 
focus on economic variables leaves policymakers and analysts blind to non-economic 
factors, such as human consumption and behaviour, and to policy instruments blind to 
any preference for type of fuel source, including renewables (Mitchell 2008:31). 
 
2.3 The Five Constituent Levels of the PEPP 
Policy paradigms have often been used to refer to macroeconomic policy (Hall 1993; 
Hay 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004), but they have also been used to 
explore other areas such as Welfare, and even ‘drinking’, policy (Greenaway 1998; 
Greener 2002; Larsen and Andersen 2009).  According to Hall, however, policy 
paradigms are not as strong or influential in all policy areas, as they have been in 
macroeconomic policymaking, but they are relatively strong in areas which involve 
highly technical issues as well as a body of specialist knowledge, such as energy (Hall 
1993: 291).  
 
According to Hall different policy paradigms, or interpretive frameworks, also lead 
policy-makers towards different methods of governing.  He understood the 
policymaking process as being made up of different variables:  
(t)he overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field, the techniques or policy 
instruments used to attain these goals, and the precise setting of these instruments 
(Hall 1993: 278) 
The goal, or objective, of energy policy under the PEPP in 2000 was the secure, (cost) 
efficient and competitive supply of energy to UK households and corporations.  The 
principal methods of achieving this objective were centred initially around the long 
process of privatising and deregulating the sector, and later around the construction of a 
new regulatory framework which would effectively “…steer towards a defined general 
direction... [but] leave it to the market to select the means to reach that end...” (Mitchell 
2008: 1).  Specifically, as opposed to the previous policy of  ‘planning’, markets would 
now determine the price and quantity of energy supplied (Helm 2005a: 7).  Once 
established the regulatory framework become the principal instrument of policy which 
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would come to be managed not by any government department by the independent 
regulator, Ofgem.   
 
It is argued here, partly along the lines of Hall’s variables, outlined above, that it is 
possible to separate the PEPP out into five different levels of analysis, which are 
demonstrated in Table One below. Each level is taken as important in itself in 
understanding specific ways in which the PEPP operated.  Table One, in addition, 
suggests some specific ways in which each level of the PEPP influences structures of 
energy governance, and each other.  This represents, therefore, the working definition of 
the UK energy policy paradigm as it stood in 2000 against which change can be 
measured and understood.  As the thesis progresses, in chapter four, it will be possible 
to fill in more detailed characteristics of each level of the PEPP. 
 
Table 1: The Five Constituent Levels of the Pro-Market Energy Policy Paradigm 
(PEPP) 
 
• The	  socio-­‐economic	  role	  of	  energy:	  commodity	  • Encourages	  marketised	  depoliticisation	  Ideas	  About	  Energy	  
Pro-­‐Market	  Energy	  Policy	  Paradigm	  
• Economic	  ef?iciency	  and	  competition.	  • Inability	  of	  government	  to	  supply	  and	  govern;	  • Encourages	  technocratic	  and	  marketised	  depoliticisation	  Ideas	  About	  Energy	  Governance	  
• Competitive,	  reliable	  and	  cost	  effective	  energy	  supply	  • Partly	  de?ines	  mandates	  of	  the	  physical	  structures	  of	  governance	  Objectives	  of	  Policy	  
• Re?lect	  ideas	  about	  energy	  and	  governance:	  moved	  to	  independent	  and	  quasi-­‐government	  sphere	  • Reduced	  capacity	  reinforces	  and	  re?lects	  technocratic	  depoliticisation	  Physical	  Structures	  of	  Governance	  
• Regulatory	  framework	  designed	  to	  enhance	  ability	  of	  markets	  to	  supply	  • Limited	  by	  ideas	  about	  energy	  governance	  and	  mandates	  Instruments	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As can be seen from Table 1, above, objectives and instruments of policy make up two 
of the constituent levels of how the PEPP is here defined.  These are variables suggested 
by Hall as being part of policymaking processes (Hall 1993: 278).  This thesis is 
suggesting a new level which will be called the ‘physical structures of governance’.  
These structures are considered particularly important in the sense, outlined in section 
2.2 above, that they actively reinforce which ideas are appropriate or legitimate.  These 
three levels are understood to be highly influenced, in turn, by sets of ideas which make 
up the interpretive framework, or in Hall’s terms policy paradigm.  The interpretive 
framework represents ideas both about energy, referenced in section 1.1 above, and 
about how it should be governed. Suggesting that these sets of ideas, as well as 
objectives, instruments and physical structures all represent separate levels of 
governance draws together Hall’s conception of a policy paradigm with his variables of 
policymaking processes. 
 
 
3.  Crises,	  Insecurity	  and	  Repoliticisation:	  Why	  Change	  Commences 
Clearly, and as pointed out on a number of occasions, work on policy paradigms and the 
ways in which they reinforce themselves, suggests continuity over time and relatively 
conservative and path-dependent politics (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 16; Schmidt 2008: 
313; Kern 2010: 53).  The next two sections will proceed, however, with a detailed 
examination of processes of change.  Through this examination this thesis will be 
enabled to understand what the catalysts for change have been, the ways in which 
change of profound proportions can unfold as well as timescales involved.  
 
Third order change can, according to Hall, be considered to have taken place in the 
event that all variables of policymaking change.  On his definition it is essential that the 
goals, or objectives, to which policy is set change, if only the instruments or settings of 
policy shift then third order change cannot be claimed (Hall 1993: 279).25  What is 
important, in addition, to consider is not just the way in which objectives change but 
also changes in the hierarchy of goals (Hall 1993: 279).  Although Hall has less to say, 
than some analysts below, about the conditions under which third order change can 
occur, he does suggest that it can take place during times of crisis or of a change of 
                                                
25	  This	  reflects	  some	  early	  IPE	  analysis	  which	  suggested	  that	  the	  ‘objectives’	  and	  ‘organisation’	  of	  policy	  
are	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  political	  process	  (Strange	  1988:	  16).	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government as a result of a general election.  He, furthermore, suggests a shift in the 
locus of authority over policymaking such that supporters of a new paradigm can 
institutionalise it (Hall 1993: 281).  A further critique of Hall’s notion of third order 
change is that it defined largely by changes in variables of policymaking, but does not 
reflect in any detail on the role of changing ideas (Hall 1993). 
 
Hall’s separation of policy, however, into different variables in order to measure 
whether or not they have changed has suggested an accurate method of assessing 
change, which this thesis will adopt by measuring change against the five constituent 
levels of the PEPP.  A high degree of departure from previous policy and governance 
practice will need to be discernable at each level for this thesis to claim policy paradigm 
change. 
 
3.1 Temporal Aspects of Governance Change 
This section has so far initiated the process of finding a definition of change for the 
purposes of this thesis by looking into the question of how change can be measured, or 
that of ‘degree of change’ (Marsh 1999: 10).   As well as seeking to measure the degree 
of change in UK energy governance, by assessing change to all five levels, this section 
will move on to consider the actual process of change both in terms of causes, why 
change takes place, and in terms of the way in which, or how, change takes place.   
 
To do so change will have to be considered as taking place over a period of time.  In 
theoretical analyses of change the distinction is often drawn between those that 
understand political change as a more discontinuous or revolutionary event and those 
that understand change to be a more continuous or evolutionary process (Marsh 1999: 
10; Hay 2002: 150-161; Campbell 2004: 33-35; Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 23-31).  
Although most of these analyses have considered change as diachronic, in that they take 
time into account, what separates them is a question of pace and degree of change at 
junctures in time.  Evolutionary change is understood, over time, to be as capable of 
resulting in profound change as revolutionary change (Mahoney and Thelen 2010).  It 
seems fair to say that both revolutionary and evolutionary conceptions of political 
change will be relevant at different points in history and for different political systems 
(Hay 2002: 155).  It also seems fair to say that even in ‘revolutionary’ times there will 
be some continuities between past and future political institutions, just as there can be 
large scale change involved in evolutionary conceptions of change. 
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There is a third notion of change combining aspects of both the revolutionary and 
evolutionary conceptions of change.  This notion, “punctuated evolution”, references 
contemporary evolutionary biology which points to the punctuated nature of species 
evolution and the significance of catastrophic events (Hay 2002: 160; cf. Campbell 
2004: 34).  Hay characterises “punctuated evolution” as  
…a discontinuous conception of political time in which periods of comparatively 
modest institutional change are interrupted by more rapid and intense moments of 
transformation  (Hay 2002: 161).   
He goes on to suggest, like Hall, that these intense moments of transformation may well 
coincide with moments of perceived crisis (Hay 2002: 162). In this way we can 
understand that institutions of governance can change both incrementally over time, as 
well as more quickly and perhaps profoundly during periods of punctuation.   
 
Oliver and Pemberton take a very particular line on questions of profound change and 
time (2004).  Their understanding of processes of change is that they can be messy and 
contingent, not linear, clean cut nor leading necessarily to paradigm shift.  They 
complicate the matter further by suggesting that although profound changes can be 
revolutionary, often in response to crisis, they do not always result in the adoption of a 
new policy paradigm (Oliver and Pemberton 2004: 416).  This may be partly explained 
through separating a policy paradigm out into different levels of governance, as done 
here, and suggesting that each level may change at different points in time.  A widely, 
publically perceived crisis might be understood as providing impetus for change, or 
revolution, but it may not immediately spark change to all levels of a policy paradigm.  
As an example, on the level of ‘physical structures of governance’, the UK Energy 
Ministry was disbanded only in 1992, almost ten years after the pro-market energy 
paradigm was initially accepted as the replacement for planning. 
 
3.2 Shocks, Perceived Crises and Security 
The notion that change can be associated with periods of crisis, uncertainty or shock is 
common across the social sciences.  James Mahoney, an historical sociologist, refers to 
the distinction between “critical junctures”, which are moments within which new 
institutions are formed, and periods of stasis (Mahoney 2000: 1).  Ann Swindler, a 
sociologist, draws a distinction between “settled’ and “unsettled” times, in which the 
latter are seen as “periods of social transformation” (Swindler in Mahoney and Thelen 
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2010:29).  In human biology osmotic shock, which is a sudden change in the solute 
concentration around a cell, causes rapid change (Lang et al 2005) and in economics 
both ‘technology’ and ‘supply’ shocks, not to mention ‘Shock Therapy’,26 are 
understood to be causal of change (Klein 2008).  
 
What seems to be understood within all these applications of ‘shock’ is that the human 
condition is such that radical change can come about when ‘everyday’ life is perceived 
as being disrupted causing a reaction in the form of change (cf. Widmaier et al 2005: 
748).  Such disruptions are reminiscent of Hay’s proposal that large-scale policy change 
can come about at times of crisis, experienced as rupture and breakdown (Hay 1996 cf. 
Wilson 2000; Campbell 2004; Widmaier et al 2007; Challies and Murray 2008; 
Chwieroth 2010), or as Mark Blyth has suggested as “Knightian” uncertainty (Blyth 
2002: 31-34).  These are both elements of how the events which came to constitute the 
energy crisis of the mid 2000s, such as the Russian nationalisation of its energy industry 
and Gazprom’s reduction of gas supply to Europe, were perceived in the UK. 
 
In a continuation of this theme, it is apparent in her chapter on why UK sustainable 
energy policy has been so resistant to change, that Catherine Mitchell also understands 
shock as productive of change.  She begins by claiming that the UK Government is 
better at slow, incremental change rather than the kind of rapid change that she, and 
other climate change specialists, insist is required.  She goes on, however, to reference 
the ability of Government to drive new legislation in the light of a “shocking event” and 
uses the example of 9/11 (Mitchell 2008: 61).   
 
The shocking event to which Mitchell has referred is one that was understood, and 
constructed, as potentially threatening the national security of the UK.  Analysts within 
the ‘Copenhagen School’ have also drawn a link between shocking events, perceived as 
security threats, and political action. According to Buzan and Wæver, key proponents of 
the Copenhagen School, ‘security’ is 
                                                
26	  The	  negative	  impacts	  of	  Shock	  Therapy,	  particularly	  on	  Russia,	  are	  well	  documented	  in	  Chapter	  5	  of	  
‘Globalization	  and	  its	  Discontents’	  by	  nobel	  prize	  economist	  Joseph	  Stiglitz.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  after	  effects	  of	  
adopting	  economic	  policy	  so	  clearly	  associated	  with	  ‘Western’	  economists	  and	  political	  elites,	  and	  which	  
was	  latterly	  perceived	  to	  have	  failed	  so	  badly,	  has	  had	  long	  lasting	  social	  and	  political	  repercussions	  in	  
Russia,	  and	  for	  the	  West	  (Stiglitz	  2002;	  see	  also	  Challies	  and	  Murray	  2008	  re:	  Shock	  Therapy	  in	  Chile).	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… the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the 
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.  Securitization can thus 
be seen as a more extreme version of politicization. (Buzan et al 1998: 23) 
Once a subject has been securitised and taken beyond ‘normal’ politics then 
Government, as security is the language of political priority, is enabled to break with 
‘normal’ political practices to address the problem (Wæver 1995: 54-55; Smith 2005: 
34; cf. Buzan et al 1998).27  
 
According to the Copenhagen School, however, a subject that has been successfully 
securitised may well become subject to reduced levels of public discussion or 
involvement, or to policymaking in secrecy, as well as to heavy handed or militaristic 
solutions.  This is partly because a subject, once securitised, tends to move into the logic 
of national security where the state becomes more preoccupied with identifying and 
countering enemies (Wæver 1995: 55; cf. Williams 2003; Floyd 2007; McDonald and 
Browning 2010).28  As such the subject could be considered as having been, certainly in 
the ‘deliberative’ sense that has been suggested above, depoliticised through securitising 
moves. An example of this, or of what we term here ‘secretised’ depoliticisation where 
policymaking takes place behind closed doors, might be the way in which access to oil 
is rarely discussed openly by politicians as a reason for war (O’Hanlon 2010).29  This is 
despite the vast military spending that has been expended principally by the US, but 
also by Britain, over the years to defend access to oil (O’Hanlon 2010: 60; cf. Bromley 
1991). 
 
There are, however, other, recent suggestions within the critical security literature that 
speaking security does not always have to lead to negative outcomes or to policymaking 
behind closed doors (cf. Floyd 2007; McDonald 2008: 580; McDonald and Browning 
                                                
27	  As	  already	  pointed	  out,	  this	  implies	  both	  that	  there	  is	  such	  a	  thing	  as	  ‘normal’	  politics,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
rather	  fixed	  notion	  of	  what	  ‘normal’	  politics	  is	  (McDonald	  2008).	  	  This	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  be	  problematic	  in	  
that	  ‘normal’	  energy	  politics	  of	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  very	  different	  from	  what	  it	  was	  
understood	  to	  be	  in	  the	  1950s,	  60s	  and	  70s.	  
28	  The	  2007	  paper	  entitled	  ‘The	  Governance	  of	  Britain’	  stated	  that	  ‘Ensuring	  the	  security	  of	  the	  nation…	  
is	  the	  first	  responsibility	  of	  government’	  (House	  of	  Commons	  2007c:	  32).	  	  
29	  ‘Secretised’	  is	  a	  fourth	  way	  in	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  depoliticisation	  which,	  although	  it	  was	  
arguably	  part	  of	  how	  energy	  was	  governed	  under	  the	  PEPP,	  was	  by	  no	  means	  specific	  to	  it.	  	  As	  such	  it	  is	  
not	  referred	  to	  as	  often	  over	  the	  course	  of	  this	  thesis	  as	  the	  other	  three	  suggested,	  ‘marketised’,	  
‘deliberative’	  and	  ‘technocratic’.	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2010).  This might be portrayed as unsuccessful securitising moves, whereby a subject 
is spoken about as a security issue, it travels along Wæver’s continuum from ‘non-
politicised’ to ‘politicised’ but not all the way to ‘securitised’ (Wæver 1995).  It is taken 
here, therefore, as an instance wherein a subject is repolitcised in that it is spoken about 
as potentially threatened, publics accept this notion, and politicians become more 
engaged and involved.   
 
This is reminiscent of the claim from Flinders and Buller, referenced in section 2.1, that 
politicians can be pressured to re-politicise a subject and become engaged again with it 
(Flinders and Buller 2006: 296) but offers a set of specific conditions under which this 
might happen.  What is important, therefore, about this form of repoliticisation is that 
fears about the security of a particular subject can equate to a sense that something is 
wrong, that something needs to be done (cf. Widmaier et al 2005: 749), and that it 
provides impetus for deliberation of, as well as challenge to, existing policy.  It also 
implies that, possibly because security is still understood largely as a public good, 
Government has direct responsibility  to respond (cf. Wæver 1995: 55). 
 
Suffice to say, at this stage, that crisis, which can be experienced in many ways 
including as shocking or as representing insecurity, can be understood as the moment 
when agency can win out over structure (Mahoney and Thelen 2010: 494 cf. Hall 1993; 
Blyth 2002; Schmitt in Williams 2003; Widmaier et al 2005; Chwieroth 2010).  This 
thesis proceeds in the understanding of a connection between ways in which crises are 
experienced, i.e. as uncertainty, shock and rupture, and conditions for re-politicisation, 
in a ‘deliberative’ sense, and change.  Such an interpretation is similar to that of Colin 
Hay who suggests that crisis is not only a time of uncertainty but also  “…of decisive 
intervention….”  (Hay 2001: 196), but more specific in terms of the mechanisms 
involved.   
 
4.	  	  	  	   Crisis	  Narratives:	  How	  Profound	  Change	  Takes	  Place	  
As already implied in the concept of securitisation, sociological institutionalists have 
also suggested that crises are not self-apparent phenomena and as such they need to be 
narrated and explained (Blyth 2002: 9; see also Hay 1996; Widmaier 2005; Widmaier et 
al 2005).  Chapter one of this thesis referenced three different, although at times 
overlapping, perspectives on energy governance, reasons for crisis, and related 
solutions.  If we are to link change with crisis, then a widespread perception that crisis 
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does indeed exist needs to be first established (Hay 1996: 261).  A number of events, 
some of them unexpected, were occurring over the course of the early to mid 2000s 
which were perceived as having various impacts, including on the production and 
distribution of energy.  This thesis argues, however, that what was important for UK 
governance change was not only that these events occurred, but how these events came 
to be interpreted in UK elite and public circles (cf. Stone 1988: 106; Hall 1993; Hay 
1996; Wilson 2000; Hay 1999).  
 
The suggestion that narratives, or explanations of events, can be important in processes 
of change relates to arguments put forward elsewhere.  This is implicit in the concept of 
securitisation, above, and is fundamental to discourse analysis which suggests that 
language not only shapes political action and practices but can become a central form of 
agency for political actors (Yee 1996; Bulkeley 2000; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; 
Schmidt 2006; Hajer in Kern 2010: 30 and 49).  Vivien Schmidt suggests that an 
understanding of discourse can help in understanding how ‘sticky’ institutions can be 
changed (Schmidt 2008: 313 – in Kern 2010: 53).  Much discourse analysis has tended 
to stress the ‘strategic’ use of narratives, or storylines, in order to achieve political ends 
(cf. Wæver 1995: 54).  This thesis, however, understands narratives to be largely, but 
not exclusively, populated by sets of ideas in which political protagonists have some 
degree of belief, i.e. in a more ideological and less strategic sense (cf. Hay 2007: 94). 
 
4.1 Narratives in Times of Crisis: ‘What Has Gone Wrong’ 
Section 3.2 above has gone some way in explaining links between crisis and change 
through suggesting that a subject can become repoliticised during times of perceived 
crisis, particularly if the crisis is perceived in terms of a threat to security at the national 
level.  Part of this process of politicisation involves widespread deliberation and debate 
once more about a subject, such as in this case energy.  If we take Hay’s understanding 
that politics is deliberation, and informed collective agency, then in order for a policy 
paradigm to change then there would need to be debate about policy and governance 
(Hay 2007: 81).  Chapter one suggested that energy was increasingly perceived to be in 
crisis across all three perspectives and energy was once more newsworthy. 
 
During times of uncertainty, however, there usually ensues a search for a credible way 
of explaining what is going wrong, as well, of course, for solutions.  This search may be 
conducted across and between political groups, the media, public and academic circles 
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(Blyth 2002: 36; Greener 2002: 164; cf. Hay 2001; Wood 2011).  Ideas can be seen as 
assisting the diagnosis of “what has gone wrong” by providing an explanation for these 
events and of the uncertainty that surround them (Blyth 2002: 10).  Any version of 
events would need to have elements of Campbell’s ‘frames’ about it in that audiences, 
elite and public, would need to identify with the problem as explained in order to 
request, and then support, any given version of change (Campbell 1998; see also 
Schmidt 2001: 249). 
 
This brings us to the notion that change of paradigmatic proportions comes about based 
on which ‘crisis narrative’ prevails through the process of change (Hay 1996 and 2001; 
Blyth 2002).  As observed in chapter one, pre-2004 from a pro-market perspective, 
there was no energy crisis and climate change was understood as being resolved through 
the extension of existing policies and instruments.  By 2005, however, a perception not 
only that energy was in crisis was emerging, but that it was a security of supply crisis.  
This narrative, informed by geopolitical perspectives, put forward an interpretation of 
energy events, based in turn on a particular conception of international relations, that 
suggested energy was once more a matter for national security.  Reputable newspapers, 
such as the Times and Financial Times, and journals such as the Economist, painted a 
picture of energy supply insecurity underpinned by overt threats to the British supplies 
from countries such as Russia (Wagstyl 2006: 3; Ostrovsky 2006: 5; Rodgers 2007: 5; 
cf. Times 2006).  The UK was described, with its move to importer of fossil fuels once 
more, as increasingly energy dependent and reliant on ‘unstable’ states for supply and 
subject to energy competition from countries such as China and India.   
 
What ensued was a debate about energy, the like of which had not been witnessed since 
the 1970s and a repoliticisation of energy, certainly in a ‘deliberative’ sense.  Growing 
academic, elite and media debates in the UK, and across the OECD, bore to witness the 
emerging dominance of geopolitical understandings of energy (Kalicki and Goldwyn 
2005; Eaglesham 2006; Fox 2006; Correlje and van der Linde 2006; DTI 2006 and 
2007; House of Commons 2007a; Rodgers 2007; Bird 2007; Klare 2008a; Wicks 2009; 
Ciuta 2010).  This debate also drew on the re-emergence of the ‘peak oil’ debate which 
served to throw fuel on the fire of fears about being able to access sufficient energy 
supplies in future (Simmons 2005; Leggett 2005; Kunstler 2005; Heinberg 2006; Klare 
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2008a).  Peak resource arguments, about running out of oil, gas and in some instances 
water, have a record of wide popular appeal.30   
 
Indeed, it has been argued that for a narrative to prevail it does not necessarily need to 
be complex or sophisticated, but that it should be cognitively convincing and 
normatively appealing (Hay 1999: 100; cf. Schmidt 2001 in Kern 2009: 48).31  Success, 
as such, can depend on whether a narrative can appeal to existing, or emerging, norms, 
values and understandings (Schmidt 2006: 252; cf. Campbell 1998; Geddes and 
Guiraudon 2004). Simple explanations can be effective in that they can be 
communicated more easily and widely than complex explanations that perhaps require a 
more in depth knowledge of the subject to be comprehended.  Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that not all subjects can be as successfully spoken about in terms of security 
as others (Waever 1995; Buzan et al 1998; Browning and MacDonald 2010).  It is 
argued here that energy crisis, perceived as threatened national supplies, seems to have 
struck a chord in the UK with both publics and elites in a way that climate explanations 
previously failed to.32  The idea of energy supply crisis was not only simple and easy to 
express, but it also spoke to recent history in terms of narratives that had prevailed 
during the 1970s crises, and, arguably, to near-term self interest. 
 
In addition to the popular appeal of arguments about threats to energy supplies, it is 
worth emphasising the role that Russia was perceived as playing.  This is in terms of 
both possibly threatening supplies of gas and oil, particularly post the Russia-Ukraine 
gas transit dispute, but also in terms of posing a threat to the further marketisation of 
energy internationally. Language, previously prevalent during the Cold War, and with 
popular resonance came once more to the fore.  Well regarded newspapers ran stories 
on Russia ‘bullying’ UK, and other Western, energy companies (Times 2006), and of 
                                                
30	  The	  notion	  of	  running	  out	  of	  energy	  is	  a	  popular	  one,	  inspiring	  terror,	  which	  has	  underpinned	  much	  
popular	  fiction	  and	  some	  movies.	  	  For	  examples	  see	  movies	  such	  as	  ‘Mad	  Max	  II’;	  ‘Americathon’;	  books	  
such	  as	  Alex	  Scarrow’s	  ‘Last	  Light’	  and	  Robert	  Charles	  Wilson’s	  ‘Julian	  Comstock:	  A	  Story	  of	  22nd	  Century	  
America’;	  and	  the	  video	  game	  ‘Frontlines:	  Fuel	  of	  War’.	  
31	  Psychologist	  Kevin	  Dutton	  suggests	  that	  in	  order	  to	  be	  persuasive	  an	  argument	  needs	  firstly	  to	  be	  
simple,	  and	  secondly,	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  person’s	  ‘self-­‐interest’	  (Dutton	  2010:	  13).	  
32	  In	  a	  2011	  survey,	  by	  YouGov	  and	  Chatham	  House,	  security	  of	  energy	  supply	  was	  identified	  by	  opinion	  
formers	  as	  posing	  as	  great	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  UK’s	  way	  of	  life	  as	  international	  terrorism,	  just	  behind	  
instability	  in	  international	  financial	  markets,	  and	  well	  ahead	  of	  climate	  change	  (Niblett	  2011:	  23).	  
 77 
Russia now carrying a ‘threat’ rather than a solution, as had previously been assumed, 
to energy security in Europe (Ostrovsky 2006).  Articles were replete with Cold War 
terminology and reference to Russia’s emerging position as an energy ‘superpower’ 
based on geopolitically informed assumptions that the possession of large quantities of 
oil and gas qualified a nation to be internationally powerful (Ostrovsky 2006; Rodgers 
2007: 5).  Clearly Liechtenstein might not be as successfully interpreted as a threat to 
UK security as might, for example, Iraq or Russia. 
 
Just as much as perceptions of a security of supply crisis were emerging strongly what 
arguably, and importantly, also needed to be established was that current domestic 
political institutions were failing.  This is because in the instance that policy failure is 
credibly claimed an existing policy paradigm may weaken and lose ‘authority’ and/or 
legitimacy in that it ceases adequately to provide solutions for policy problems (Hall 
1993: 280).  Oliver and Pemberton refer to the importance of “…mounting evidence of 
failure…” in weakening the position of the existing paradigm (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004: 417).  It would not be enough, therefore, for widespread perceptions of a security 
of supply and climate crisis to exist, but it needed to be proven that the existing 
paradigm was partly at fault. 
 
This was a more complicated part of the puzzle in that much of the UK energy crisis 
debate initially tended not to identify reasons for change as being endogenous to the 
PEPP.  Technocrats and much of the media, in the mid 2000s, blamed the perceived 
security of supply crisis on external actors, largely outside the West, who were refusing 
to govern energy in the ‘right’ way (DTI 2005; JESS 2006).  Others suggested that the 
external context for energy governance was changing but without laying any blame on 
current governance practices (Helm 2005a and 2007a).  Climate narratives, however, 
came to play an important role in proving governance failure, and in re-politicisation of 
energy.  From 2008 onwards, in the context of a much more active and widespread 
debate about energy, it was being increasingly claimed that the UK was missing new 
climate targets (Van den Horst 2005; Carbon Trust 2006; Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 
2009; Jha 2009; Helm 2010).  As such arguments that climate change mitigation, whilst 
maintaining security of supply, could take place without profound change to the 
existing PEPP started to become more difficult to defend.    
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What makes the inter-play between geopolitical and climate perspectives within the 
crisis debate more interesting is they way in which climate groups, particularly those 
involved in pushing for political change, seized upon the new sense of urgency and fear 
surrounding energy.  Some started to utilise geopolitical language about energy 
dependency to underpin their arguments about the need to support domestic renewables 
production and, as such, an energy-security-climate narrative emerges. Although 
climate groups were still explaining the crisis differently and were suggesting solutions 
consistent with those explanations, their methods of doing so changed.  There is a clear 
sense of instrumentality in the way that some political activists used existing fears about 
energy security to further their conclusions about the need for change (Greenpeace 
2006; Bird 2007; Ochs 2008; Klare 2008a; Giddens 2009; ITPOES 2010).  The 
instrumental application of geopolitical language suggests, again, that UK audiences 
were understood to engage much more thoroughly with arguments about energy as a 
near-term, national security issue, under threat from Russia and others, than with long-
term, global climate arguments (BBC 2010). 
 
It is worth making explicit here links, which are inferred above, between elite 
politicians, technocrats and wider society within the process of establishing a successful 
crisis narrative. Widmaier et al argue for an inter-subjective relationship between 
publics and political possibility (Widmaier et al 2007: 755), and Hay argues that “… 
paradigm shifts… are generally associated... with highly politicized and public 
debates...” (Hay 2001: 200; see also Hay 1996: 261; Woods 2011: 21).  The concept of 
‘securitisation’ also infers that wider publics matter in the processes of political change 
when it is suggested that Governments can use public fear about an issue to justify a 
break with normal political practice (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al 1998).  The evocative 
language of geopolitical security, of threat, urgency and dependency, understood as the 
language of political priority, when applied in such a widespread manner to energy in 
the UK arguably lent the concept ‘mobilizing powers’ (cf. Buzan et al 1998; Ciuta 
2010).  
 
4.2 Ideas, Narratives and Seeking Solutions: ‘What is to be Done’ 
What has been suggested in the above section is that narratives are here understood to 
play two specific roles in processes of profound structural change.   The first role relates 
to the establishment of the idea, amongst varied social and political groups, that a crisis 
did indeed exist.  The second relates to the ability of one, or in this case more, narratives 
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to explain why it exists which might also include claims of policy failure.  The 
combination of these two aspects of narratives within processes of change has resulted, 
in the empirical case analysed here, in a ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation of energy, to 
growing deliberation about and to a ‘re-think’ of energy policy and governance.  New 
work by Matthew Wood (2011) suggests that repoliticisation can be considered as an 
“explanatory concept” of paradigm change in that contestation and the recognition of 
political agency is an important determinate of change (Wood 2011: 21).  This is, in 
turn consistent with Hay’s notion of politics as including collective deliberation and the 
possibility for informed political agency (Hay 2007: 93). 
 
For profound change to occur ideas must, in addition to explaining what is going wrong 
and providing evidence of failure, also successfully assist in diagnosing “…what is to 
be done…” (Stone 1989; Hay 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  
Theoretically, legitimate ideas can provide agents with both a scientific and a normative 
critique of the existing economy and polity but also a blueprint that specifies how these 
elements should be constructed (Blyth 2002: 37).  Hay has argued that a key factor in 
the replacement of a politico-economic paradigm is the perception that a credible 
alternative exists (Hay 2001: 102). The alternative, based on different sets of ideas, is 
usually related directly to the explanation of crisis.  For example Hay’s observations 
about the shift in macroeconomic policy paradigm in the 1980s suggest that by 
explaining crisis as a lack of ability of government to govern the answer was clear, to 
pull back the state from its role in macroeconomic governance (Hay 1996). 
 
It is at this point that this thesis, again, finds it slightly difficult to fit the empirical 
evidence into this conceptual picture.  What appears to have happened within the 
process of change through which UK energy governance has been travelling is that 
alternative ideas about governance have not cleanly broken with the market model.  
This takes us to the work of Oliver and Pemberton who suggest that although policy 
paradigms can travel quite far down the route of profound change, they are not always 
replaced in the “…battle to institutionalise a new paradigm…”.  This can be because, 
re-iterating Hay’s emphasis on the importance of an alternative paradigm in completing 
a shift, alternatives are not always perceived to be legitimate (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004: 419).  It is suggested that policymakers, in this instance, return to addressing 
problems using the existing framework but with further experimentation with policy 
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instruments (Oliver and Pemberton 2004: 420).  What happened in the UK case appears 
somewhat different and, if possible, more complex. 
 
The PEPP had, by 2010, experienced change on almost every level.  Energy had started 
to become increasingly understood less as a commodity and more as an important issue 
for national concern (cf. Miliband 2008; Wicks 2009).  The objectives of policy had 
changed such that energy security and climate change mitigation became primary policy 
objectives, replacing the objective of creating a competitive system in the hierarchy.  
The creation of a new institution at the end of 2008, the Department for Energy and 
Climate Change (DECC), brought energy, and climate, policy back to Cabinet Level 
deliberation.   It can also be seen as the operationalisation of climate ideas that energy 
and climate policy should be treated as integral to one another (Carter 2001; PIU 2002; 
Held 2006; Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 2009; Scrase & McKerron 2009).  DECC 
ultimately started to take responsibilities back from Ofgem, the independent regulator, 
and a greater degree of ‘intervention’ in the market was approved. 
 
A further problematic in assessing the process of change unfolding was that the two 
prominent, alternative narratives were explaining crisis in different ways, or offering up 
different energy crises.  Together they, over time, provided what is theoretically needed 
for paradigm change to occur: one offered up a sense of crisis and urgency, and the need 
for political deliberation, whilst the other provided evidence of policy failure. This left 
policymakers with two alternative sets of solutions based on quite different perspectives 
about energy, which in other situations, outside of this crisis, they would have found 
less credible.  This thesis will argue that the new governance structure that was 
eventually pursued represented a still quite marketised system on top of which a range 
of energy-security-climate ideas were laid.  As such it could be argued that the new 
governance structure represented what might be described as ‘inter-paradigm’ 
borrowing (Hay 2010: 22). 
 
Conclusions	  
This chapter has started off the process of presenting the UK energy policy paradigm as 
one which was, as of 2000, institutionalised and depoliticised in a ‘deliberative’, 
‘technocratic’ and ‘marketised’ sense. As will become clear in the next chapter this is 
not to claim that the UK energy governance system had completely devolved authority 
to the market, but to say that the ideas that dominated the way in which the system was 
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structured and run were ‘pro-market’ ideas about competition, economic efficiency, 
privatisation and liberalisation.  The system of governance in place largely reflected 
these ideas, and viewed other ideas as less credible.  Regulation was still a not 
inconsiderable part of the UK PEPP but it was always hoped that with the passage of 
time it could be increasingly withdrawn.  It can be claimed, therefore, that the UK PEPP 
could be found, on any continuum between a ‘state’ or ‘market’ system, closer to the 
market end than most other countries in the world. 
 
Having established a starting point against which to measure paradigm change, as well 
as a system of measuring the degree of change, this chapter was then given over to 
understanding why and how change might come about.  In particular it has focused on 
conceptions of paradigm shift that link together widespread perceptions of crisis with 
punctuations in the evolution of policymaking and those which underpin the importance 
of ‘crisis narratives’ to the process of change over time.  Narratives are understood to 
have provided for a widespread perception that energy was in crisis, to have been 
responsible for providing evidence of policy failure and for offering up a range of 
alternative solutions.  When applied to UK energy governance change in the 21st 
century these insights can assist in explaining why perceptions of energy crisis, 
explained as a security of supply crisis, came to inject a sense of urgency into UK 
political elites resulting in a repoliticisation and then a ‘re-think’ of energy.  
 82 
Chapter	  3:	   
The	  Pro-­‐Market	  Energy	  Policy	  Paradigm	  (PEPP):	  Historical	  Context,	  Ideas	  
and	  Institutionalisation	  
 
 
Introduction	  
 
In the last decade, the case for market economics has emerged, coherent and 
formidable, as a blueprint for prosperity and a guarantee of freedom.  
(Department of the Environment, This Common Inheritance, 1990) 
 
The above quotation from the seminal UK document on climate change, ‘This Common 
Inheritance’, is a clear reminder of the extent to which belief in the possibilities of 
market economics had penetrated the UK political establishment by 1990.  This chapter, 
however, instead of taking the PEPP as ‘fait accompli’ will analyse the evolution of the 
PEPP by seeking out how and why this system came into being, as well as by starting to 
consider the degree to which it became institutionally embedded, and with what 
consequences.   
 
The brief section on British energy policy between the Second World War and the early 
1980s reflects an alternative perspective on energy, based in turn within a Keynesian 
model of governance.  Energy companies were largely nationalised during this time 
period and the emphasis was on ensuring nationwide, industrial and domestic, access to 
electricity, on ensuring energy supply security, as well as on protecting the domestic 
coal industry.  This period, from the mid 1940s to the late 1970s, was one within which 
the notion of actively maintaining energy provision and security was regularly on 
political agendas.  This was particularly as Western domination over the primary source 
of energy, at that time oil, came to be challenged by huge finds in, and production 
increases from, the Middle East.   
 
By the late 1970s, and early 1980s, neoliberally informed economists had come to decry 
what they perceived as high levels of managerial inefficiency and a lack of cost 
effectiveness in the energy sector, including oil, gas and electricity.  This tied in well 
with other, increasingly dominant, ideas about economic governance and, in specific, 
the appropriate role of the state relative to that of the market in the provision of 
economic goods.  A close inspection of pronouncements made by political figures key 
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to energy governance, such as Margaret Thatcher, Nigel Lawson and Stephen 
Littlechild, show an overt commitment to creating political conditions within which 
markets would become the primary providers of energy to UK businesses and 
households.  Energy security from this perspective could and would be more possible 
through the domestic and international marketisation of energy and the introduction of 
competition and cost efficiency. 
 
The following section of this chapter will consider the ways in which pro-market ideas 
were implemented, or in other words how they became part of everyday political 
practice in energy.  The recently elected Conservative Administration embarked on a 
programme of energy sector privatisation and liberalisation.   They set new goals for 
policy, created new policy instruments and, in 1992, disbanded the ‘Energy Ministry’ 
and with it the role of Secretary of State for Energy.  The process of implementation can 
be better understood by considering the various types of depoliticisation, as put forward 
in chapter two, in particular ‘marketised’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’.  
 
Although the argument here is that pro-market political practice came to be more deeply 
embedded within political norms and institutions over time this did not spell the 
complete demise of alternative ways of thinking about energy governance.  It should by 
no means be assumed, either, that the processes of putting pro-market ideas into policy 
practice were straightforward.  The social upheaval experienced by mining communities 
in the wake of attempts to withdraw state support for coal was a salutary warning of the 
difficulties inherent in attempting to remove energy from politics. 
 
1.	  	   British	  Energy	  Politics	  Under	  Keynesianism 
Energy, like many areas of polity, has been subject to various ideas about how, and 
indeed whether, it should be governed over time.  In the 12th century, Edward I of 
England ruled that wood should be burnt for heating instead of coal, which had 
polluting properties.  Much later, in 1819, Parliament convened a Select Committee on 
the subject of the environment (Ezra 1983: 199). The concerns have remained largely 
consistent over time, pollution and access to supplies, but political attitudes and 
priorities given to energy, and pollution, have changed.  
 
What has been quite consistent over the past century or so, and across perspectives, 
however, is a sense that energy can, and does, play an important socio-economic role. 
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Early examples of this view are arguments put forward about the central role that new 
knowledge about how to produce energy played in both the Agricultural and Industrial 
Revolutions (Cipolla 1964; Hartshorn 1966; Bromley 1991; Hudson 1992; Wrigley 
2010).  More recently academic energy analysts, and key political commentators, from a 
wide range of theoretical perspectives, have emphasised the role of energy in modern 
society, politics and policy (Feis 1950; Cipolla 1964; Venn 1986; Yergin 1991; Strange 
1988; Painter 2002; Helm 2003; Freese 2003; Stanislaw 2004; Baghat 2006; McGowan 
2008; Klare 2008a; Giddens 2009; Wrigley 2010).  Such observations, which highlight 
humankind’s dependencies on energy, are well reflected in this quote from Heinberg: 
If we were to add together the power of all the fuel-fed machines that we rely on to 
light and heat our homes, transport us, and otherwise keep us in the style to which we 
have become accustomed, and then compare that total with the amount of power that 
can be generated by the human body, we would find that each American has the 
equivalent of over 150 ‘energy slaves’ working for us twenty-four hours a day.  
(Heinberg 2003 in Giddens 2009: 36) 
 
1.1 Domestic Energy Policy under Keynesianism 
Energy, in the post-war era, was very much intertwined with overall ideas about 
economic governance practices, and as before, with ideas about the role of the state.  
The post-war era in Britain had born witness to a major socio-economic shift, which has 
been described, by new institutionalists, as a policy paradigm shift (Marsh 1999; Hay 
2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  This was the emergence, under the 
Atlee Government, of the dominance in political practice of Keynesian ideas and 
concepts (Marsh 1999: 9).  Also underpinning the way in which energy was governed 
over this period was a strong sense of energy’s socio-economic role: as vital to much 
needed economic growth, as a public service and as linked to modernity. 
 
In 1942 a new Ministry of Fuel and Power had been established, initially with the 
intention of ensuring adequate energy provision for military as well as commercial and 
domestic purposes.33  During the war energy prices had been controlled and petrol was 
rationed, indeed since the conversion of the British navy from coal to oil, supplies of 
petrol was considered integral to the war effort (Strange 1988; Yergin 1991).  Post 
WWII the Ministry of Fuel and Power was maintained, but energy policy’s objectives 
                                                
33	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Fuel	  and	  Power	  was	  renamed	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Power	  in	  1957.	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and design changed.  A principal objective, therefore, of energy policy post war became 
to produce the energy required to provide social goods and to grow the economy, which 
had shrunk considerably over the course WWII.  Energy, importantly, was seen as a 
pre-requisite for economic growth (Helm 2003: 2). 34  
 
Energy, and specifically electricity provision, was also deemed important as a part of 
some of the wider aims of the Welfare State. It was understood that individuals should 
have access to certain social or ‘merit goods’ such as “…food, clothing, heating, health 
and shelter…” (Helm et al 1989: 56-57).  Although electricity was understood to be a 
direct input into the minimum requirement of heating, it was also an input into the 
provision of food, clothing, health and shelter.  As such, energy was understood to 
provide social as well as distributional roles in society (Helm 2003: 15; cf. McGowan 
2008).  Energy policy planners were, in addition, concerned with ensuring an ‘optimal’ 
supply mix to meet estimated future demand.  Energy efficiency was not, during the 
1950s and 1960s on the policy agenda, although technological change and high 
investment had led to steady improvements in energy utilization (Chesshire 1986: 396) 
 
Indeed it had been considered that energy was of such vital national importance that, in 
line with wider Keynesian principles, markets were hopelessly inadequate in providing 
appropriate energy supplies.   Energy companies were largely nationalised and some 
industries, especially coal, were protected (Hartshorn 1966: 1). Over time, in the energy 
sector, “...state owned companies were deemed to be so natural that they were made 
statutory monopolies” (Helm 2003: 1). There had emerged a national energy policy 
which was designed to map out demands and supplies, and to ensure that they were 
balanced within a planned, monopoly system, the coal industry was supported by the 
state, and energy prices were controlled (Helm 2003: 14).  A new system of electricity 
supply was over time established, following work that had started in the 1920s, 
requiring enormous state expenditure in a National Grid, large regional power stations 
and extensive transmission systems.35  
                                                
34	  The	  ‘rule	  of	  thumb’	  was	  that	  GDP	  growth	  of	  three	  percent	  would	  require	  growth	  in	  electricity	  demand	  
of	  around	  seven	  percent	  (Helm	  2005:	  3).	  	  The	  recognition	  of	  overt	  relationships	  between	  economic	  
growth	  and	  the	  need	  for	  ample	  supplies,	  at	  affordable	  prices,	  has	  in	  large	  part	  been	  an	  influencing	  
factor	  on	  Chinese	  economic	  and	  foreign	  policy	  during	  the	  2000s.	  
35	  The	  Central	  Electricity	  Board	  (CEB)	  was	  initially	  set	  up	  under	  The	  Electricity	  (Supply)	  Act	  of	  1929	  in	  
order	  to	  standardise	  the	  nation’s	  electricity	  supply.	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By 1969, however, with the physical infrastructure to support national demand and with 
political consensus about energy and how it should be governed largely in place, the 
Ministry of Power was merged with the Ministry of Technology – which was 
subsequently, in 1970, merged with the Board of Trade to form the Department for 
Trade and Industry (DTI).   Unlike the later dissolution of the Department of Energy 
(DoE) in 1992 this change reflected a continued faith in the role of the state – 
particularly given the established structure of state run energy enterprises, infrastructure 
and area and general boards.  However, it does display a similarity in political thinking 
with the later dissolution in that both reflected the degree to which political consensus 
had emerged about how energy should be governed.  Once each system had been 
established it appeared that political desire for a separate Ministry, or Department, with 
all the associated costs incurred, diminished.  The 1969 decision had also co-incided, 
see below, with a couple of decades of stable oil prices. 
 
1.2 Energy, International Relations and Foreign Policy 
British foreign energy policy has been, at best, controversial over the course of the last 
century or so.  Keynesian politics may have come to dominate domestic energy policy, 
but geopolitics arguably continued to dominate international relations in energy over 
much of the 20th century.  During Victorian times and the early 1900s Britain was a net 
exporter of coal.  Some have suggested that large indigenous supplies of the world’s, at 
that time, primary energy source played a material part in Britain’s ability to maintain a 
hegemonic role, or ‘great power status’ (Katzenstein 1978; Bromley 1991; Painter 
2002).   
 
As oil came to replace coal, however, British foreign policy came to reflect the need to 
access oil and on acceptable economic and political terms.  Britain moved form its 
longstanding position as a net exporter of energy to a being a large net importer of oil 
(Hartshorn 1966: 7).  This material change was replicated in the mid 2000s when the 
UK moved from an, albeit shorter period, of net exports of oil and gas to a net importer 
of hydrocarbons.  Britain’s switch to oil and its lack of indigenous supply was 
understood as having major foreign policy implications.  Churchill had famously 
suggested that “…(t)o commit the Navy irrevocably to oil was indeed ‘to take arms 
against a sea of troubles’…” (Churchill in Yergin 1991: 12).  There were widespread 
fears about reliance on distant and insecure oil supplies, but oil was considered, by 
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many including Churchill, so technologically superior to coal that the decision was 
made to switch the British Navy to run on oil. 
 
As new finds of oil were increasingly being made outside the US, in the Middle East in 
particular, it was assumed that access to supplies at ‘reasonable’ prices would be 
enabled through British control of oil companies, particularly the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (Keohane 1984: 164).36  And through extensive diplomatic relations, 
particularly with the US, oil diplomacy became a central theme of foreign policy (Venn 
1986; Keohane 1984).  Britain maintained its foreign policy of supporting access to 
reserves on terms favourable to the ‘Seven Sisters’, which included British Petroleum 
and Shell.37  Access to oil from ‘Persia’ was maintained through a range of different, 
but inter-related, structures, partly corporate, partly ‘imperial’ and partly military 
(Tretault 2009: 376-7).  When ‘oil diplomacy’ failed military means were sometimes 
adopted.  An oft cited example is US and British support for the overthrow of Iran’s 
Mossadeq Administration, which had nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 
1951.  In retrospect, the extent to which Britain was prepared to protect access militarily 
became clear (Painter 2002), although at the time the decision to become involved in 
Iran was taken under conditions of ‘secretised’ depoliticisation. 
 
Not long after the overthrow of Iran’s Mossadeq, another international event, the ‘Suez 
Crisis’ was more widely perceived as threatening to British energy supply security.  It 
has been argued that as a result of this crisis the British Government made a specific 
decision to treble in size the already planned nuclear power programme (Helm 2003: 
34).  This, in turn, implies an increasing awareness of the risks of depending on too few 
sources of energy, the emergence of new, non-carbon based technologies, as well as of 
links between perceptions of crisis, in the form of supply insecurity, and policy change.  
Nuclear electricity, in that it can be produced domestically, has in addition often been 
the response of UK government’s to perceptions of supply insecurity. 
                                                
36	  In	  1939	  British	  companies	  still	  accounted	  for	  around	  half	  of	  oil	  production	  outside	  the	  US	  and	  the	  
USSR	  (Painter	  1993).	  
37	  The	  ‘Seven	  Sisters’	  are	  the	  oil	  companies	  which	  dominated	  international	  trade	  in	  oil	  for	  a	  substantial	  
part	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  They	  included	  five	  American	  and	  two	  British	  companies.	  	  Although	  the	  
American	  companies	  were	  privately	  owned	  and	  managed,	  they	  received	  considerable	  quantities	  of	  state	  
support	  over	  time	  in	  terms	  of	  tax	  breaks,	  diplomatic	  support,	  and,	  where	  deemed	  necessary,	  military	  
support	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  access	  to	  oil	  at	  acceptable	  prices	  (Yergin	  2001;	  Painter	  2002).	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The period following on from the early 1950s was one in which there was a low and 
stable world oil price, growing international oil trade, and a “…greater ability of oil 
companies to control both the supply and price of oil…” (Chesshire 1986: 395).  This 
was accompanied by very little concern in Britain, as was the case in the 1990s, about 
long-term global energy availability.  It is also worth noting briefly, however, that 
although the 1950s and 1960s also marked the start of a substantial increase in 
international agreements and organisations, many of which covered trade, energy 
remained remarkably free of international agreement (Keohane 1984; McGowan 2008).  
The European Union, which started life as the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1951, did not actually manage to come to agreement on energy (McGowan 2008; 
Natorski and Surrallez 2008).  When the internal market of the EU was launched in 
1992, the energy sector was left out, although attempts have recently, in 2007, been re-
instated to launch an ‘Energy Policy for Europe’ (McGowan 2008: 93; EC 2011: 
editorial).  
 
1.3 1970s ‘Oil Shocks’: Energy and Crisis 
In the last three decades we have become so increasingly dependent on imported 
energy that today our economy and well-being are hostage to decisions made by 
nations thousands of miles away… The energy crisis has placed at risk all of this 
nation’s objectives in the world.  
(Kissinger in Strange 1988: 204) 
 
The two ‘oil shocks’ of 1973 and 1979 swiftly reversed energy policy trends. The 
shocks, once more, prompted broad and extensive public debate about energy in Britain 
and the West.  There was a renewed emphasis on international threats to security of 
supply, defined as reliable supplies at affordable prices, this time from OPEC.  Over the 
course of the 1970s complacency gave way to acute concern that total global energy 
consumption had, over the previous decades, been doubling every 15 years (Chesshire 
1986: 396). The depth and breadth of public concern were unsurprising given OPEC’s 
decisions, consumption growth, the sudden quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and 
various economic and social knock-on effects across Britain (Hay 1999; Helm 2003; cf. 
David Steel in Ezra 1983: 196). One of the most clear cut political responses 
internationally was the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) to attempt 
to co-ordinate consumer nations’ energy strategies, to improve communication and 
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technology sharing (Leaver 2005: 92; cf. Friedrichs 2010: 3).38  The IEA recommended 
that member countries seek to become more energy efficient, improve excess storage 
facilities and look to diversify access both geographically and in terms of energy source 
(Yergin 2006). 
 
The oil shocks also prompted a much wider review of energy policy in Britain 
(Chesshire 1986: 396).  In 1974, in the immediate aftermath of the first crisis, it was 
decided that Britain needed a Department of Energy (DoE) once more, only five years 
after the Ministry of Power had been merged into the Ministry of Technology.  Again, 
we can draw parallels between renewed fears about energy supply security mounting in 
the mid 2000s and the formation of Department for Energy and Climate Change 
(DECC) in 2008. Although in the period between oil shocks energy policy did not 
undergo a profound structural shift, aside from the re-instatement of the DoE, a wide 
number of changes were made. The price shocks were interpreted as another reminder 
of the dangers associated with a lack of diversity in energy supply and as such, the 
nuclear and coal industries, as domestically based, received another boost in Britain, as 
well as in France, the United States and Germany (Chesshire 1986: 396).  In an 
associated political reaction the first, albeit small, state support programme for 
‘renewable’ energy was also established (van der Horst 2005: 705).  
 
Oil and gas had, however, been discovered in the late 1960s in the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) region of the North Sea and production from these sites started in the 
1970s.  In a move again not dissimilar to initial reactions to perceptions of energy 
insecurity in the 2000s, Britain also responded to the 1973 oil crisis by decreeing a 
boost in output from the UKCS with the intention of becoming ‘self sufficient’ by the 
end of the decade (Katzenstein 1978: 296).  So although diversity in terms of source and 
geographic location of energy was being overtly encouraged, and at this stage also by 
the IEA, there ran alongside a tendency to concentrate on energy independence and on 
domestic production as an antidote to international insecurities.  By the 1980s oil and 
gas were to become a serious boost to the coffers of the UK Treasury (Kemp and 
Stephen 2007: 183). 
 
                                                
38	  Other	  energy	  organisations	  were	  set	  up	  in	  response	  to	  the	  1973	  oil	  shock,	  such	  as	  the	  ASEAN	  Council	  
on	  Petroleum	  (ASCOPE)	  (Karki	  et	  al	  2005:	  499).	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The Department of Energy produced a ‘consultative document’ on energy policy in 
1978, in the immediate aftermath of the second ‘oil shock’ (DoE 1978).  This document 
was primarily concerned with questions of energy security and it took the view that 
“…energy policy is necessarily concerned with a long time horizon…” and with the 
wider world energy scene (Rutledge 2007: 902).  Concerns were expressed about 
longer-term availability of oil  
… there is wide agreement that world oil supplies cannot continue to increase for 
much more than a decade or so and will thereafter become increasingly scarce and 
expensive (DoE 1978: 1) 
Diversity of supply source, therefore, also remained a priority and energy policy would 
be required to deliver on this.  The objectives of energy policy were focused, 
unsurprisingly, on the provision of adequate and secure supplies of energy but with an 
eye to the least social cost, and the efficient allocation of resources.  It was understood 
that energy policy could intervene to change the pattern of energy use in order to ensure 
development of energy sources in accordance with the national interest (DoE 1978 in 
Webb 1985: 28). 
 
 
2.	  	   The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  PEPP:	  Ideas	  about	  Energy	  and	  Governance 
In the first chapter of this thesis a brief introduction was given to the pro-market 
perspective on energy.  Chapter two built on the ideas outlined in chapter one to 
construct a picture of the UK pro-market energy policy paradigm (PEPP) which was 
characterised as containing five separate levels.  Each level outlined was in turn, but 
perhaps in different ways, influenced by ideas about energy, its politico-economic role, 
and pro-market ideas about how it should be governed.   This section will start to 
explore in some detail how such ideas came, first of all, to be important in energy 
policymaking processes.  
 
This section is, in conceptual terms, particularly informed by arguments outlined in 
chapter two about the active relationships between ideas and political practice expressed 
by various new institutionalists (Hall 1993; Berman 1998; Greenaway 1998; Hay and 
Wincott 1999; Greener 2001; Hay 2002; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; 
Schmidt 2006; cf. Kern 2009).  As this section progresses on to section three clear links 
will emerge between political narratives and ideas about energy, stated objectives 
relating to these ideas and how energy then came to be governed.  
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2.1 The Path of ‘Radical Reaction’ 
It is possible to piece together quite a thorough picture of Conservative ideas at this 
time, which were sometimes described as ‘revolutionary’ and as acting as a clear break 
with past political behaviour.  Such evocative claims of ‘revolution’ may have been 
somewhat overstated given the tendency for different ideas about energy, and broader 
governance, to dominate policymaking processes and systems at different points in 
time.  Prior to the era of Keynesian economic governance ideas about the need to limit 
the role of the state in economic governance had dominated for a considerable period of 
time (Ruggie 1982: 386; cf. Lawson 1980; Helm 2003).  It has been argued that liberal 
economic ideas had reached a position of such dominance over the course of the Pax 
Britannica that they came to restrict “...the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of 
which state power was expected to be employed...” to that of safeguarding the self-
regulating market (Ruggie 1982: 386).  As will be seen below, similar ideas about the 
appropriate role of the state came to dominate again – although this time, in energy, 
perhaps for a much shorter period of time. 
 
2.1.1 Political Protagonists 
Towards the end of chapter two some important questions were raised about the role of 
various actors, or groups of actors, in processes of profound governance change.  Very 
brief conclusions were made about the role of ‘top down’ change via political elites, but 
also about the crucial role that publics have played in allowing for conditions conducive 
to profound change.  This brief sub-section looks back at the late 1970s/early 1980s and 
tries to identify key protagonists for change during this period.  This is done in order to 
start making connections between ideas and political actions and outcomes, as well as to 
give some guidance in terms of the role of key actors and groups in energy governance 
and policy change in the 2000s. 
 
Dieter Helm, in his particularly thorough history of UK energy policy from 1979 to 
2003, claims that energy was given a “…clear ideological and political steer...” both 
under Margaret Thatcher and Nigel Lawson, who became Secretary of State for Energy 
in 1983 (Helm 2003: 2).  This implies a very ‘top down’ process of political change in 
the energy sphere.  Considering the same period, Andrew Graham observed that the 
Prime Minister was, due to a variety of reasons, in a strong position and so could enact 
change (Graham 1997: 117).  Assuming, however, that Prime Minister Thatcher did not 
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single-handedly manage to reach back in time and re-invent classical liberal economic 
ideas, it might be worth considering, at this point, a wider range of actors.   
 
Thatcher and Lawson’s ideas about energy and its governance, referenced in more detail 
below, had already been most clearly elucidated in academic work of the late 
1970s/early 1980s in the UK.  This body of work, written by leading economists who 
later crossed over from academia into political and departmental positions, and 
vocalised for popular purposes by Conservative MPs such as Enoch Powell, specifically 
recommended energy governance change based on neoliberal economic ideas (Forman 
1977; Robinson 1981; Robinson and Marshall 1981; Eden et al 1981; Littlechild 1981; 
Littlechild and Vaidya 1982; Lawson 1989).  This work recommending change to 
energy governance was itself embedded within a wider field influenced by the ideas of 
Friedman and Hayek on neoliberal economic governance and public choice analysis 
(Littlechild 1981: 11-14; Helm 2003: 414; cf. Lee 2007; Interview 16).  Keith Joseph, 
the ‘entrepreneur of ideas’ or ‘Minister of Thought’, and the ‘Institute of Economic 
Affairs’ have been referred to as primary interlocutors between neoliberal academic 
ideas and Conservative political practice (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998: 95). 
 
We have already briefly considered, above, intellectuals, academics and policymakers 
as having been influential over energy policy change.  However, it might be worth 
extending the range of possibly influential actors even wider to consider other advocacy 
groups, professionals and practitioners directly engaged with the issue, such as Energy 
Ministry staff (Wilson 2000: 258). Hay and Marsh have observed that the 
Conservatives’ overall commitment to the market owed a great deal to “…the gathering 
influence of such ideas in the Treasury and the Bank of England from the mid-1960s 
onwards…” (Hay and Marsh 1999: 213).  This suggests a role for other important 
Departments of Government in facilitating change.   Lastly, again, public acceptance of 
change based on these ideas was also important, as observed by Andrew Graham, when 
he suggested that neoliberal ideas 
…have had a long history… they had a special resonance in the UK, where many of 
them originated or acquired special prominence… (Graham 1997: 119; see also 
Lawson 1980: 10) 
  
All of this in turn both warns against considering any set of ideas within a social or 
historical vacuum and against ascribing political change to one set of actors alone.  In 
 93 
chapters five and six of this thesis attention will be paid to the roles of a range of social 
groups within the process of change.  This is partly to address concerns about policy 
paradigm theory and a lack of detail with regard to how change takes place and, indeed 
related, partly to ascertain how various influences can come together in the process of 
change (cf. Widmaier et al 2007; Schmidt 2009; Chwieroth 2010). 
 
2.1.2 ‘What has Gone Wrong’ and ‘What is to be Done’ 
In chapter two, when considering the role of crises and shock in profound governance 
change it was suggested that first of all a problem needed to be identified, then narrated, 
usually by principal political protagonists, and then solutions needed to be offered (Hay 
1996 and 1999; Wilson 2000; Blyth 2002).  This section will suggest that energy 
governance change was, under the Conservatives, part of a wider programme of change 
in response to an extended period of perceived economic and social crisis in the UK 
during the 1970s.   
 
The oil shocks, however, may well have had an impact on public perceptions of that 
crisis. This suggestion takes us back to the notion raised in section four of chapter two 
that publics, and the media as interlocutor and intermediary, are also important in the 
process of political change (Hay 1996: 261; Hall 1996: 286; Buzan et al 1998; 
Widmaier et al 2007: 755).  Without widespread conviction that there is a crisis, which 
needs to be addressed, it would be much more difficult to implement profound 
governance change with all its implied social and economic upheaval.  Colin Hay has 
suggested that the ‘oil shock’ of 1973 served as a catalyst for the longest and deepest 
economic crisis since the Great Depression (Hay 1999b: 103; cf. Chwieroth 2010).  
Others have suggested that energy crises, in the form of escalating oil prices, have been 
at least partly responsible for economic recessions over time (Steel in Ezra 1983: 196; 
Stevens 2007: 142; cf. Hamilton 1983; Chwieroth 2010). 
 
‘Keynesianism’ was furthermore portrayed by ‘New Conservatives’ as having neither 
explanation nor solution to the economic crisis (Hay 1999b: 103; cf. Lawson 1980).  
The Conservatives came to power partly on the back of its convincing narrative about 
how to address the widely perceived economic and social crisis in the UK, dubbed the 
‘Winter of Discontent’ (Hay 1996 and 1999b).  This alternative narrative constructed 
the crisis as a failure of Keynesianism to which they could present the solution being a 
withdrawal of the state, particularly from economic governance (Lawson 1980: 2-3).  
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Faith in “…efficacy of government action…” was labelled a “delusion” (Lawson 1980: 
2).  Lawson, like Graham above, has suggested that “…scepticism with state power and 
state intervention…” is closely related with “…the instinctive beliefs of the British 
people in general, and of the working classes in particular…”  (Lawson 1980: 10; cf. 
Graham 1997).  Once the crisis had been, intentionally, constructed as one of an 
overextended, overloaded and ungovernable state the solution, for the state to do less, 
followed naturally (Hay 1999: 100).  In later work, on de-politicisation under the 
Conservatives, Hay further refers to this period of narrating, or overtly stating, how the 
UK economy should be governed as “normative neoliberalism” (Hay 2007: 98). 
 
2.2 Ideas about Energy and its Governance 
As has already been suggested, various analyses on UK energy paradigms in the 1990s 
and 2000s argue that the way in which energy had come to be governed was subject 
almost exclusively to the emergence of broader macroeconomic governance ideas 
(Helm 2003; Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; see also Rodriguez 1987).  This section 
will however also consider ideas about energy and its role in society as being important 
to governance practices and to change.  It will ask how it was that energy, formally 
treated as an important social need, akin to a public or merit good, became viewed as 
just another sector of the economy.  It will also consider those ideas, specific to energy 
governance, that became so influential on the design, implementation and maintenance 
of the UK PEPP. 
 
2.2.1 Ideas about Energy 
In order to resolve questions of how to govern energy the Conservatives needed to 
formulate their own understandings of the function that energy plays in the UK political 
economy. One of the core ideas underpinning the Conservative approach to energy 
emerged such that it could, and should, be treated as “just another commodity” or traded 
good which is ultimately replaceable, or fungible (Lawson 1989: 23; cf. DoE 1982; 
Littlechild and Vaidya 1982; Helm 2003; Blackhurst 2004; Umbach 2010).  Energy, it 
followed, should be treated in political terms like any other sector of the economy 
(Lawson 1989: 23), but not subject to state provision like other services, still viewed as 
‘minimal basic services’ or public goods, such as defence and health care (Helm 1986: 
1).  
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Although energy was denationalised, as were other ‘economic’ sectors during the 
1980s, it could be argued that the changes represented a more radical departure for the 
energy sector.  By assigning it to the category of ‘just another commodity’ energy, 
which had formed the basis of the UK’s ability to modernise in an industrial and 
economic sense, had been stripped of much of its wider national and social meanings.  
This is not to say that energy was considered unimportant but that initially it was 
stripped of its role as ‘merit good’, and over time, energy supplies lost, again, their role 
as important to national security and economics. Again, the wider ideational context 
was still important.  Anatole Kaletsky has suggested that the growing intellectual 
dominance of market fundamentalism encouraged serious economists to assume that 
social values and market prices were one and the same thing (Kaletsky 2010: 326-7). 
 
Such links between how energy was conceptualised, particularly in terms of socio-
economic role, and how it was governed hint at change in energy governance as being 
more than just part of a wider paradigm shift in economic management.  It was 
important to the governance of energy that it became understood as just another sector 
of the economy as it became, as such, an industry which had “…no place in the public 
sector…” (John Moore, MP, in Webb 1985: 28). Energy’s re-characterisation also 
facilitated the idea that it was not a ‘political’ but ‘economic’ subject and not open to 
government intervention (Williams 2003: 515; cf. Helm 2003: 386; Interviews 2 and 
15).  What is also of note is the extent to which it became a ‘technical’ subject which 
would be better understood, and dealt with, by ‘technical’ experts, preferably 
economists (cf. Hall 1993: 291; Burnham in Hay 2007: 92).  
 
The context within which ideas about energy, and its socio-economic role, changed was 
also quite specific.  There are some important factors which underpinned this view and 
prevented it from becoming challenged in a credible way within the UK over the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Firstly, post-war administrations, as already mentioned, had spent 
considerable funds on building up a significant electricity supply system for Great 
Britain (Helm 2008). Likewise in the oil and gas sector initial, heavy investments, 
which had already been made in North Sea exploration, production and transit, had been 
boosted and facilitated by ‘state sponsorship’ (Helm 2003: 62).39  Once in place, 
                                                
39	  Particularly	  important	  to	  the	  establishment	  and	  future	  success	  of	  the	  North	  Sea	  venture	  were	  the	  
investments	  made	  in	  infrastructure	  to	  enable	  supplies	  to	  reach	  UK	  consumers.	  	  A	  new	  pipeline	  system	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however, these systems could be taken for granted – the bulk of investment 
requirements having already been met in this sector of heavy initial investment 
requirements and long-term returns. 
 
Secondly, large-scale production of oil and gas from the North Sea, which had emerged 
as significant over the 1980s, meant that questions of supply, and its security, could 
over time become less directly significant.  From the late 1970s onwards supply from 
the North Sea rose steadily, such that by the early 1990s the UK had become an 
exporter of both oil and gas.  In addition tax revenues from oil and gas became an 
important revenue stream for the Treasury.  For example “…(o)il revenues rose sixfold 
over the period 1979/80 to 1984/85 to some £12 billion, or nearly one-tenth of the 
Chancellor’s budget” (Keegan 1985: 17) and these were used to prop up public finances 
(Helm 2003: 1; Kemp and Stephen 2007).  Also important in terms of keeping questions 
of energy supply security at bay was the reduction in domestic demand, which in turn 
was a result of the sharp contraction in the manufacturing sector, steel, coal, aluminium, 
chemicals, cement and car industries (Helm 2005a: 4).40  The 1979 oil shock, the 1980-
1982 recession, and rising exchange rates were understood to have impacted heavily on 
the manufacturing sector (Helm 2007a: 3).  
 
2.2.2 Ideas about Energy Governance: 
The PEPP emerged, therefore, amidst changing ideas about energy’s function in society, 
facilitated by growing indigenous supply, but it was part of the New Conservative’s 
“conscious change of direction” (Lawson 1980: 1).  In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
also in the wake of two energy crises, a number of economists became increasingly 
adamant that energy needed to be freed from government planning and interference in 
order to improve economic efficiency, to lower end costs to consumers and to improve 
security (Forman 1977; Robinson 1981; Eden et al 1981; Littlechild 1981; Littlechild 
and Vaidya 1982).  This group of economists, mentioned already in section 2.1.1 above, 
were responsible for outlining the practical energy policy implications of a range of 
economic ideas promulgated by well-known academics such as Milton Friedman and 
Friedrich Hayek (Helm 2003: 59; cf. Mitchell 2008: 28).  
                                                                                                                                          
was	  installed	  and	  domestic	  appliances	  and	  commercial	  boilers	  needed	  to	  be	  replaced.	  	  	  The	  public	  sector	  
could	  carry	  the	  risk	  on	  the	  back	  of	  the	  monopoly	  and	  guarantee	  of	  the	  Treasury	  (Helm	  2003:	  110).	  
40	  The	  manufacturing	  industry	  was	  using	  25%	  less	  energy	  in	  1982	  versus	  1970	  (Lehman	  and	  Hough	  1983:	  
267).	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Economic efficiency and competition, or lack of either, were increasingly held to be of 
the utmost importance when considering the historical performance of the energy 
sector.  Competition was, wherever possible, to be encouraged in that the key was 
understood to lie in increasing the responsiveness of these, read energy, industries to the 
forces of the market place (Lawson 1989).  This was also particularly within a wider 
context of ideas about the need to reduce the overall size of ‘the state’ financially as 
well as politically.  Conservative thinkers and politicians were intent on monetarism, 
and in particular on reducing the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) (Webb 
1985: 27).  
 
This line of thinking followed that if energy can be classified as a commodity, always 
replaceable, then there would be no more need for national management strategies, 
otherwise known as national energy policy.  Such strategies were perceived to cost 
more than they were worth, to be inefficient in allocating goods and to be run by 
government, who according to new thinking, did not have the capacity to do so 
(Littlechild and Vaidya 1982).  Stephen Littlechild referred in his work to ‘public 
choice’ theory when casting doubt on the adequacy of political rules for achieving 
“efficient allocation of resources” and on the merit of running industries in order to 
achieve political ends such as the redistribution of income and power (Littlechild 1981: 
11-12).  It was concluded that a, what some might term artificial, separation be made in 
active governance terms between energy, as an economic sector, and politics, as 
previously represented by state interventionism (Bromley 1991: 49).   
 
Unsurprisingly much academic work from this perspective focused on the need to 
marketise energy in the UK by assuring that energy was supplied to end consumers via 
freely trading, competitive markets - stripping it away from government planning, 
interference, price control and specifically national management strategies (Robinson 
1981; Eden et al 1981; Lawson 1989).  This would allow, it followed, for greater 
economic and managerial efficiencies and, through increased competition, for less 
monopolistic practice in energy supply (Webb 1985; Lawson 1989; Blackhurst 2004).  
Competitive markets would, it followed, be much more efficient at setting prices 
thereby sending the correct signal to producers about what to produce, when and in 
which area providing a further boost to energy security (Bohi and Towman 1996).  
Competition would furthermore improve the procurement of energy (Mitchell 2002: 6), 
 98 
and benefit consumers by bringing down end costs whilst also partially redressing the 
power imbalance in the consumer-producer relationship (Yergin 1991: 781). 
 
Other economists pointed to a further role that markets can play in improving energy 
trade: 
(t)here is a fundamental difference between 'policies' pursued by companies, and 
government 'policies'. The former are subject to on-going checks of reality against the 
market: if the policies are wrong then companies lose money, and they fairly rapidly 
change their policies or go out of business. (Henney 1994: 11) 
Many believed that the internationalisation of freely trading energy markets would help 
to reduce the potential for ‘statist’ exporters to interfere in the trade of these 
commodities.  Such interference was perceived to have been responsible for various 
negative effects on pricing, production, trade and consumer economies over time 
(Mitchell et al 2001; cf. Youngs 2009).   The institutionalisation of these ideas within 
international governmental organisations would, theoretically, be the “icing on the 
cake” of the establishment in practice of neoliberal economic ideas about energy 
governance (cf. Youngs 2009).  The existence of energy security became, over time, 
synonymous with the internationalisation of competitive, freely trading energy markets 
in that they would provide for less possibility of supply disruption and leave importers 
less vulnerable (Yergin 2007). 
 
It has been further observed that, from the 1980s onwards, the wider ideational climate 
increasingly became one wherein economic growth, the pursuit of profit, short-term 
enhancement of share prices, and other cultural values began to grow in importance 
against other social values (Friedrichs 2004).  Private finance and financial engineering 
became a widespread part of the overall culture of marketisation and energy proved, as 
is discussed below, no exception to this. 
 
 
3.	  	   The	  Making	  of	  the	  PEPP:	  Ideas	  and	  Political	  Practice	  
This section will argue that processes of depoliticisation can be applied in order to 
understand the ways in which the range of ideas outlined above, about energy and 
governance, became embedded within political and market institutions.  There is an 
emphasis in this section on processes of ‘marketised’ depoliticisation used, as suggested 
in chapter two, to mean the passing of responsibility from formal state institutions to the 
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market for energy supplies.  Depoliticisation, in its ‘technocratic’ sense, has also 
affected this issue area by actively ‘demoting’ it from being subject to formal political 
scrutiny, deliberation and accountability, to, ultimately in the case of energy, a position 
akin to political silence (Hay 2007: 82).  
 
3.1 ‘Normative Neoliberalism’ and Energy 
If we return to Helm’s history of British energy policy he notes that: 
(c)ompetition and liberalization would, its architects hoped, take energy out of the 
political arena... Labour shared this vision and hoped that energy would drop off the 
political agenda. (Helm 2003: 386)   
The early years of the Conservative Energy Ministry, despite strong academic 
blueprints having been presented for the direction of reform to energy, got off to a slow 
start.  This is partly because in 1979 many were more concerned, again, about 
immediate energy security risks in the wake of the second oil shock.  The first had had 
knock-on effects of energy shortages, petrol queues and gas supply interruptions and 
these were feared again the second time around (Helm 2003: 45; cf. Steel in Ezra 1983: 
196; Hay 1999b: 103).  This was also because Prime Minister Thatcher did not, 
initially, have widespread support for energy reforms (Helm 2003: 44).  Energy 
remained, as such, very much on the active political agenda right up to the mid 1980s 
and the normative ideas of the Conservatives on reform needed to be stated and pursued 
(cf. Hay 2007: 97).41 
 
As with UK energy governance change in the mid to late 2000s, much resistance to 
change could be located within those government, or in the case of the 2000s quasi-
state, institutions responsible. Hall’s arguments about policy paradigms and 
‘institutionalised subjects’ help us to understand how previously dominant ideas and 
assumptions can take time to disappear (Hall 1993).  Helm has noted that policymakers 
in the very early 1980s continued, between 1979 and 1981, to operate under old 
assumptions about energy, and the provision of security, despite other efforts to 
reclassify energy and redesign governance (Helm 2003: 54).  In 1980 and 1981 early 
steps were taken to prepare the energy sector for privatisation and liberalisation, such as 
                                                
41	  This	  period	  of	  normative	  neoliberalism	  where	  ideas	  needed	  to	  be	  overtly	  stated,	  and	  to	  an	  extent	  
deliberated,	  contrasts	  heavily	  with	  energy	  under	  the	  later	  period	  of	  ‘normalised	  neoliberalism’	  wherein	  
political	  debate	  of	  a	  critical	  nature	  had	  all	  but	  ceased	  (cf.	  Hay	  2007:	  98).	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the 1980 Competition Act and the 1981 Oil and Gas Enterprise Act, but it was not until 
the Energy Act of 1983 that the process was more clearly and forcefully initiated. 
 
One of Prime Minister Thatcher’s mandates with regard to energy governance had been 
to make sure that those with important posts at the Energy Ministry were “one of us” 
and in the September 1981 Cabinet shuffle Nigel Lawson became Secretary of State of 
State for Energy. This is where we return again to the economists, Stephen Littlechild, 
Eileen Marshall and Michael Beesley, who had largely been responsible for producing 
the blueprint of ideas about how to govern energy (Helm 2003: 59; cf. Forman 1977; 
Littlechild 1981; Littlechild and Vaidya 1982; Beesley 1981; Robinson et al 1981).  
They were to receive executive and advisory positions within the DoE and the regulator, 
indeed some of these principal figures, such as Marshall and Littlechild, were to hold 
office for most of the 1990s, and into the early 2000s (Helm 2003: 60).  This implies 
that Thatcher understood that existing public servants would need a ‘push’ in order to 
change.  As such in order to pursue profound governance change, or ‘revolution’ in 
New Conservative terminology, those that supported the new blueprint would need to 
be placed in relevant positions of influence.  
 
Both Lawson’s 1980 treatise ‘The New Conservatism’ and his early, much cited, speech 
as Secretary of State for Energy in 1982 serve as reminders of why Thatcher had placed 
so much faith in his willingness to ‘radically reform’ energy (Lawson 1980 and 1989). 
So great was Lawson’s influence in creating a new energy governance system that it 
came to be referred to retrospectively as the “Lawsonian paradigm” (Rutledge 2007). 
His works, in addition, serve to elucidate the relationship between this certain set of 
political ideas, the strong desire to put them into political practice and specific ideas 
about how this could and should be achieved.  It seems that, in line with Hay’s thinking 
on political decisions to depoliticise, Lawson and his new team genuinely believed that 
the energy sector would work better if subject to processes of privatisation and 
liberalisation (Lawson 1980 and 1989; cf. Miliband 2008).  
 
3.2 Restating the Goal(s) of Energy Policy 
This is where we again take up Peter Hall’s notion that policy paradigms, and the core 
set of ideas that delineate them, are influential over objectives of policy, one of the five 
levels of the PEPP.  If the idea to be pursued, politically and actively, was the reduction 
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of state interference in the energy sector then an obvious place to start would be by 
restating the goals of energy policy.  
 
The new, overarching, objective of energy policy, the creation of an economically 
efficient, un-distorted market for energy, was clearly laid out by Nigel Lawson in his 
1982 speech:  
(f)or the United Kingdom... the pre-eminent objective must be to ensure that the vitally 
important energy sector functions as efficiently and effectively as possible within the 
context of economic policy as a whole… Our task… is to set a framework which will 
ensure that the market operates in the energy sector with a minimum of distortion and 
that energy is produced and consumed efficiently (Lawson 1989: 23). 
 
Previously, the objectives of energy policy had been focused on the provision of 
adequate and secure supplies of energy but with an eye to the least social cost, and to 
the efficient allocation of resources.  It had been understood that energy policy could 
and should intervene to ensure the development of energy sources in accordance with 
the national interest (DoE 1978 in Webb 1985: 28).  The objective of secure energy 
supply did not disappear but was in effect demoted - all efforts were put behind the 
creation of competitive, efficient markets which were seen as the only objectives of 
policy that had come to matter (Mr John Moore, MP, in Webb 1985: 27; Helm 2004: 
273; Rutledge 2007: 903).  Besides, the thinking went that security of supply would, see 
above, be a natural outcome of the processes of marketisation (Mitchell 2002), and with 
sharply increasing production from North Sea Oil and Gas this theory would not tested 
for some time to come (Helm 2003).  The ‘social’ qualifications to energy objectives 
were also somewhat lost as was the goal of developing energy sources in the ‘national 
interest’.  The closest overt recognition of social aspects of energy policy was the 
assumption that growing competition in the sector would allow for prices to fall thus 
facilitating energy affordability and protecting consumers (Littlechild 1981: 13; cf. 
Yergin 1991).   
 
By the time of the 1986 Gas and the 1989 Electricity Act the Secretary of State was 
charged with only three rather vague and flexible over-riding duties relating to security 
of supply, financial competence of energy companies and the promotion of competition 
(HMG 1986 and 1989). As such, in terms of hierarchy of objectives, they now seemed 
to run from creating a competitive market for energy and economic efficiency at the top 
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tier, to a second tier including security and affordability.  Assumptions were already 
being made that if the first tier of objectives were to be reached, then the second tier 
would fall automatically into place. 
 
Aligned to changing objectives, it had also strongly been suggested that there would, in 
future, be no more place for a national energy policy that, in part, sought to “… plan the 
future shape of energy production and consumption” (Lawson 1989: 23).  The 
subsequent abandonment of national energy policy, which had first been proposed by 
Enoch Powell at the 1976 National Energy Conference (Littlechild and Vaidya 1982: 
15), was deeply contested at the time as can be seen in more detail in section four below 
(Webb 1985: 28).  It did, however, follow well the line of thinking, referenced above, 
which suggested that it would be inefficient for states to pursue such goals given their 
limited capacities. 
 
Core energy policies were specifically abandoned, including the calculation of resource 
costs and the coordination of investment decisions by the DoE, as well as its central 
planner role in price setting (Helm 2003: 58).  Within the context of the Conservative 
plan to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement the energy sector now faced 
specific financial targets.  These targets had been proposed in 1978, “…to act as proper 
discipline on the industries’ financial management…”, but were first implemented in 
1980 (DoE 1978; cf. Rodriguez 1987: 464).  Once privatised, however, it was assumed 
that state-set financial targets would no longer be required to discipline energy 
companies’ economic performance. 
 
3.3 Instruments of Energy Policy 
In addition to alterations in the objectives of energy policy the instruments of energy 
policy were also altered.  It was agreed that the ultimate ‘job of government’ should be 
limited to setting the framework within which the scope of market forces, and 
competition, could be maximised (Lawson 1989: 23).  This framework became one of 
the principal instruments of energy policy, but certain conditions first needed to be put 
into place in order for it to be created. 
 
The 1980s, like the 2000s, are remarkable for the number of Acts related to the energy 
sector which were passed but, as already suggested, the implementation of a new 
paradigm takes much political activity (HMG 1982; 1983; 1986; 1989).  The ‘Oil and 
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Gas (Enterprise) Act’ of 1982 and the 1983 Energy Act represented the first major 
attempts to deregulate energy, particularly the electricity sector (HMG 1982 and 1983).  
The ‘Oil and Gas’ Act initiated a process of separating out Britoil and Enterprise Oil 
ready for privatisation as well as that of opening up the gas networks to competition.  
The aim of the Energy Act, in 1983, was to facilitate competition in generation, 
transmission and supply by abolishing monopolies, requiring the ‘Area Boards’ to 
purchase electricity from private producers, and causing the industry to allow private 
companies to make use of transmission and distribution systems (Helm 2003; Thomas 
2006). Post the Act, despite its clear intentions to boost competition (cf. Littlechild 
1981: 13), the sector remained dominated by the monopolies and new entrants were 
seen as ‘Davids’ to the established ‘Goliaths’ (Helm 2003: 64; see also Thomas 2006).  
 
Alongside processes to deregulate and reshape the sector to allow for competition, an 
extensive and extended series of privatisations were undertaken.  The process of 
privatisation took place over the course of the 1980s and 1990s – starting with Britoil in 
1982 and ending with British Energy, the nuclear company, in 1996.42  For some 
companies the turnaround between being nationalised and privatised was just a matter 
of years, for example, the British National Oil Company (later referred to as Britoil) had 
been nationalised only in 1977 and then privatised in 1982 (Helm 2003: 18).  By the late 
1990s, however, all major national companies had been broken up and sold off across 
all sectors of the energy industry including electricity, coal, gas, oil and nuclear – see 
table 1.  This had been not only a lengthy but also a difficult process, particularly in the 
gas and nuclear electricity sectors (Helm 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
42	  The	  nuclear	  sector	  had	  proven	  much	  harder	  to	  privatise	  given	  the	  age	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  and	  very	  
high	  costs	  associated	  with	  replacing	  aging	  stock	  (Thomas	  2006:	  590;	  cf.	  Mitchell	  2000).	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Table 2: UK Energy Sector Nationalisation and Privatisation Schedule 1947-96 
Sector  Nationalised     Privatised 
Coal  National Coal Board (1947)   RJB Mining (1995) 
Electricity Central Electricity Authority (1948)  National Power, PowerGen  
        (1990) 
  Central Electricity Generating Board, National Grid Company  
        (1990) 
  Area Boards, Electricity Council (1957) Regional electricity 
        companies (1990) 
        Scottish Power and Hydro  
        (1991)    
Gas  Area Boards, Gas Council (1948),  British Gas (Gas Act 1986) 
  British Gas Corporation (1972) 
Oil  BP (partial), British National Oil (1977) BP (final) (1987), Britoil  
        (1982), Enterprise Oil 
        (1984) 
Nuclear UK Atomic Energy Authority (1954)  British Energy (1996) 
  British Nuclear Fuels (1971), Nuclear 
  Electric (1990), Scottish Nuclear (1990) 
 
Post two decades of policy aimed at enabling competitive energy markets observations 
have persisted that major energy companies still dominated the industry particularly in 
the electricity sector (Helm 2003: 204; cf. Thomas 2006; Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 
2008).  This is partly because in the aftermath of the 1995 release of the ‘golden shares’, 
which had prevented re-sale, there ensued a frenzy of mergers and acquisitions across 
the sector.  The newly created, smaller energy companies sought at this time economic 
efficiencies and market power through merging with, or purchasing, competitors thus 
reducing the potential for competition within the sector (Helm 2003: 242). 
 
Alongside the series of Acts aimed at deregulation it was decided that, in response to 
‘natural’ tendencies in the electricity sector towards monopolies, a new regulatory 
system would still need to be established (Helm 2003: 209; cf. Littlechild and Vaidya 
1982).  Gone was ‘national energy policy’ to secure certain levels of supply at certain 
prices, and national energy companies to provide such supplies with the support of 
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monopoly status and the Treasury.  In their place the new regulatory framework for 
electricity had an economic formula, of price-cap regulation, at its heart.  The technical 
formula, otherwise referred to as RPI-X, was designed by the UK Treasury economist, 
Steven Littlechild, such that utility prices could increase annually by inflation, as 
measured by the Retail Price Index (RPI), minus ‘X’ which represented set efficiency 
gains (Helm 2003: 209; Thomas 2006: 598).43  The system was intended to mimic a 
competitive market, protect consumers against strong price increases by the privatised 
energy companies but also, importantly, to provide incentives for greater cost efficiency 
gains as any gains above those set (at ‘X’) could be passed onto shareholders. 44 
 
Privatised regional energy companies (RECs) benefitted financially from this formula 
as they could strip out inefficiencies, reduce capital expenditure but still, through 
mergers, maintain dominant market positions.  It could be argued, as will be seen 
below, that the emphasis on this kind of return system contributed ultimately in a high 
degree of underinvestment in electricity networks in the UK (CEPMLP 2006).  There 
was pressure on Littlechild to re-set the formula in the early 1990s, as some REC values 
quadrupled.  They had experienced very high profits, had paid generous dividends to 
shareholders, giving an impression to consumers, many of whom were still bound to 
certain providers, of being fat cats getting rich on consumers’ dependence on them for 
electricity.  Littlechild resisted such pressures, however, preferring to view the price cap 
mechanism as a ‘technical’ device whilst arguably under-estimating political and social 
impacts (Helm 2003: 210).  
 
3.4 Physical Structures of Governance 
If we look now to how the PEPP level, physical structures of governance, was 
constructed we can also discern a little more about the idea of depoliticisation as 
method, and as an active political process, in implementing neoliberal economic ideas.  
Changes made to the machinery of government display how depoliticisation was 
achieved on an institutional basis, and is an example of a process of ‘technocratic’ 
depoliticisation in practice.  A detailed look at the way in which the physical structures 
                                                
43	  RPI-­‐X	  was	  otherwise	  known	  as	  the	  ‘incentive	  formula’	  (Thomas	  2006:	  598).	  
44 The	  recognition	  that	  regulation	  would	  still	  be	  required	  suggests	  a	  regulated	  market	  system	  (cf.	  Moran	  
2003;	  Mitchell	  2008;	  Lindstrom	  and	  Buller	  2011)	  for	  energy,	  albeit	  much	  of	  the	  regulation	  was	  designed	  
around	  creating	  conditions	  for	  competition	  and	  to	  keep	  end	  prices	  from	  escalating.	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of governance evolved over this time is also evidence of the ways in which certain ideas 
became enshrined within institutional mandates and capacities. 
 
As has already been mentioned both Prime Minister Thatcher, and Nigel Lawson, had 
sought to hire ‘likeminded people’ to work at the Department of Energy as, certainly 
initially, energy privatisation was still reasonably controversial and had the backing 
only of a small group within the Cabinet (Helm 2003: 44 and 76).  Hence those key 
economists, who had written extensively on energy sector reform, as well as those who 
could be expected to ‘tow the line’, were employed to oversee the process of 
denationalisation and liberalisation.  As we shall see in section 4.1, the method of 
getting the right people involved in policymaking was also used in the process of 
dealing with the coal-mining sector.  
 
The decision, in 1992 when at least some of the process of privatisation and 
liberalisation had taken place, to abandon the DoE and the concurrent role of Secretary 
of State for Energy, is interpreted here as revealing in many ways.  Not least in that it 
embodies the claim that the Conservatives had actively sought to depoliticise energy 
(Helm 2003: 386), but this time in a ‘technocratic’ sense whereby responsibility for 
decision-making was passed further from Government.  It is also revealing of the extent 
to which political contestation in energy, which had taken place in the early, 
‘normative’ part of the process of reform, had begun to level off.  The drop in political 
contestation might be assigned to the degree to which neoliberal economic ideas had 
become institutionalised by this time, particularly boosted by the end of the Cold War 
and the ‘capitulation’ of socialism, but also to the growth in North Sea oil and gas 
supplies, and the shrinking manufacturing sector while international supply was strong 
and prices were low. 
 
It is important to consider some other institutional implications of abandoning the DoE.  
The existence of the Department had been considered as signifying that energy was 
politically important whereas Margaret Thatcher’s opinion at that time was that the title 
Department of Energy “...smacked of economic planning … whereas our energy needs 
should be supplied by the market” (Thatcher in Blackhurst 2004).  Also gone with the 
DoE was the role of Secretary of State for Energy.  This meant that energy was no 
longer represented at Cabinet Level further impairing active political consideration and 
reinforcing both ‘deliberative’ and ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  Also important in 
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terms of the institutional structure inherited by New Labour, the structure from which 
this thesis will measure governance change in the 2000s, was that responsibility for 
energy policymaking came to lie with the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) and 
for energy efficiency with the Department of the Environment.  This is significant 
partly, as will be argued in detail in chapter seven, because the DTI’s mandate was to 
provide support and regulation for British business and to provide for competitive 
markets, not specifically to ensure security of energy supply. 
 
What is also worth highlighting is the way in which energy was further depoliticised, in 
a ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’ sense, with this change.  This is because the new 
Energy Directorate, by being a sub-section of a bigger institution no longer commanded 
direct Cabinet Level representation and was such less on the agenda for discussion.  
With the ‘technical’ experts so firmly in charge, elected representatives in the form of 
generalist politicians would have less and less need, or opportunity, to consider energy 
issues, becoming over time arguably less and less able to do so (Interview 12; Helm 
2003).45  The technical experts, at arm’s length from government’s elected 
representatives, had in addition less capacity to place energy policy within broader 
objectives of collective social policy given that DTI objectives were primarily designed 
around supporting business, and consumer preferences were increasingly treated as 
exogenous (Helm et al 1989: 55; cf. Mitchell 2008).  This is, in turn, a reflection of the 
de-emphasising of ‘social’ aspects of energy policy referred to in section 3.2 above. 
 
The two new institutions created to regulate electricity and gas, the Office of Electricity 
Regulation (OFFER) and the Office of Gas Supply (Ofgas), are another case in point of 
‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  These institutions were not created as government 
departments but as ‘independent’ bodies funded by gas and electricity industry 
participants albeit given statutory objectives which had been defined in the Gas Act 
1986 and the Electricity Act 1989 (HMG 1896 and 1989).  The primary objective, for 
both institutions, was to oversee the market for trading and to defend consumers 
through introducing, and later maintaining, competition (Mitchell 2008: 139).  These 
mandates can be understood as a direct outcome of thinking, referenced above, that 
competition breeds efficiency leading to lower consumer prices.   
                                                
45	  See	  chapter	  five	  for	  more	  detail	  on	  the	  ‘de-­‐skilling’	  of	  the	  UK	  state	  in	  energy	  (Interview	  12).	  	  This	  also	  
ties	  in	  well	  with	  Hay’s	  conjecture	  that	  de-­‐politicisation	  might	  result	  in	  the	  loss	  of	  policy-­‐making	  capacity	  
(Hay	  2007:	  83).	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There are two further institutional outcomes of the dominance of pro-market thinking 
over energy policymaking, and of the ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation of energy.  The 
first is the impact on how energy was analysed, or actively understood, within the 
energy division of the DTI and at the regulator(s).  Despite the initial healthy scepticism 
of  “…detailed mathematical, statistical, and econometric analysis…which had 
prevailed in the Austrian school…” (Helm 2003: 60), there emerged over time a strong 
tendency among policymakers to analyse energy quantitatively using bounded models 
(Interviews 1, 2, 5, 12, 14 and 15).   
 
Over the course of the 1970s much time and energy, in the UK and the US, had been 
put into developing large-scale mathematical models of particular fuels or of the energy 
sector as a whole.  In 1967 the ‘Energy Model Group’ had been set up within the DoE 
and this formed the basis of the new energy division within the DTI.  It was understood, 
by the architects of new energy policy, that these models could  
…contribute very little to such fundamental political and social issues as whether the 
production of energy should be left to the market or made subject to government 
planning, or what national goals should be aimed at.  Nor can it say what 
consideration should be given to national self-sufficiency, international relations, 
unemployment and the quality of the environment (Littlechild and Vaidya 1982: 22). 
This quotation indicated that models were seen, by one of the key architects of the 
PEPP, as being able to help clarify the consequences of such choices, but not take away 
the need to make such choices in the first place.  This was, perhaps, a salutary lesson 
that became lost over time in the way that energy governance practices became 
increasingly taken for granted and separated from initial detailed knowledge.   
 
Elected MPs can be understood as the method through which the requirements of 
individuals and groups become represented in governance practice.  By withdrawing 
them from the process, through ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation in 
energy, these interests were less likely to be represented, neither were questions about 
what national goals should be aimed at or the quality of the environment.  As will be 
seen in the next chapter, by the mid to late 2000s, the DTI was indeed being criticised 
for being too focused on quantitative analysis that did not allow for decisions which 
might lead to change, flexibility and response to the evolving international energy 
environment (Helm 2005c; Mitchell 2008; Giddens 2009).  This in turn might suggest 
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that some of the detailed nuance of complex theories can get lost in the process of 
uncritical political practice over time (see Watson 2005). 
 
The second institutional outcome was the way in which energy provision, by ‘the 
markets’, became intertwined with and dependent upon private finance such that it has 
had an active institutional role to play in supporting the market-based approach to 
energy.  Energy liberalisation and privatisation took place alongside the ‘Big Bang’ 
liberalisation of London’s financial centre often referred to as ‘the City’.  Trade in and 
finance of energy became over this period increasingly ‘sophisticated’ as the role of 
derivatives, global trading and commodity exchanges and speculation grew (cf. Smith 
and Emshwiller 2003; McLean and Elkind 2003).  The City has, therefore, had a strong 
hand in the marketisation of energy in that the role of financial markets in energy trade 
and supply has expanded rapidly (CEPMLP 2006: 6; cf. Youngs 2009). 
 
 
4.	  	   Overcoming	  Challenges	  to	  Neoliberal	  Energy	  Governance 
This chapter has so far painted a picture of an emergent energy policy paradigm which 
could be described as ‘depoliticised’ both in the sense of the planned, and to a great 
degree successful, withdrawal of the state from the energy industry, and in the sense 
that active political deliberation, debate and some skills in energy management had 
started to dwindle.  Academic analyses of energy by the end of the 1990s reflected the 
pro-market political consensus by tending to approach energy policy analysis by 
assuming competition, cost efficiency and low state involvement as fait accompli rather 
than as social construct (Egenhoffer and Legge 2001; Mitchell 2002).  As Joseph 
Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin so famously observed in 1998 
(w)hat Joseph and Thatcher started is no longer radical but rather very much the 
heart of a new consensus in Britain (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998: 390) 
 
Looking back from the late 1990s, when marketised energy had become so entrenched 
ideationally and institutionally, it might be easy to forget the degree of challenge faced 
down by the Conservative Administration.  Some difficulties associated with privatising 
electric utilities in a socially ‘fair’ manner and with the general lack of competition 
which ensued (Helm 2003; Thomas 2006; Mitchell 2008), have already been raised in 
sections 3.2 and 3.3 above. Aside from ‘natural’ tendencies towards larger, dominant 
energy companies (cf. Littlechild 1981) there were other difficulties that the 
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Conservatives understood as necessary to surmount in order to introduce ‘economic’ 
efficiency into the energy sector, and to allow for competition.   
 
4.1 Coal and the National Union of Mineworkers 
As suggested by Oliver and Pemberton, old paradigms are not replaced until the 
“…battle to institutionalise the new paradigm…” has been won (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004: 419).  One of the key battlegrounds in terms of implementing the PEPP was over 
coal.  Coal had held a strong position within Britain’s recent history, not least with 
regard to its role in fuelling the industrial revolution. The coal industry, as such, had 
once been at the heart of British industrialisation, a major employer, and had become, 
for many over time, a way of life.  For some the miners had represented the heart and 
soul of the Labour party, they personified the ‘working class’ and their heroic struggle 
(Helm 2003: 67).  The British Government had long supported coal, financially, but this 
was something that the Conservative Administration had hoped to dispense with (Fine 
1990; Walker 1991; Helm 2003; Thomas 2006).  Coal had managed to maintain its 
position as a much-needed source of electricity, despite its low efficiency versus other 
sources, partly due to its position as a domestic source of energy.  As suggested, the oil 
shocks of the 1970s had reinforced the idea of keeping support for coal, and nuclear, as 
a part of energy policy.   
 
Key political protagonists within the Conservative party, not least Margaret Thatcher 
and Nigel Lawson, had different ideas about the coal sector (Helm 2003: 67).  These 
ideas were, arguably, based on core ideological differences.  Thatcher, and Lawson, had 
long argued for the need to ‘break the back’ of the Unions which they saw as a 
fundamental obstacle to economic efficiency and which they referred to as ‘the enemy 
within’ (Helm 2003: 67).  As one observer noted at the time  
the Government appears to be motivated by… hostility to the miners… bound up in an 
ideological preference for the markets which specifically involves coal imports… 
whatever the … wider economic and social implications (Fine 1990: 182) 
Ideas about the unions played out as part of the construction of the ‘Winter of 
Discontent’ narrative, which was widely aired within sections of the British media, 
which placed blame for the 1970s economic crisis on ‘strikers’ as ‘enemies’ of Britain 
(Hay 1996: 263). 
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There are those who have argued that Thatcher was keen, in a way, for battle with the 
NUM to commence as this might provide an opportunity, finally, to break the Unions 
but this is far from clear (Walker 1991: 166-9; Helm 2003: 7).  As part of the process of 
privatisation of the electricity network Conservative policy was to start withdrawing 
support for coal prices, and for the sector as a whole. In response the National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM), under Arthur Scargill, supported a policy of no mine closures in 
the mid 1980s.  Given the fall in demand for coal domestically and internationally, the 
shrinking British manufacturing sector, the strength of the British Pound and 
Conservative policy on reducing support for coal this was to ultimately prove an 
impossible ask on behalf of the NUM.46  Changes in British law, including the 1980 
Coal Industry Act and the 1984 Trade Union Act, a shift from coal to oil to gas for 
electricity supplies, and the strategic build-up of coal stocks all allowed the 
Conservatives to prevail over the striking miners.  Another key component in fighting 
off the challenge from the Unions was to replace those personnel who were considered 
not up to the battle even in advance of the start of the strikes (Helm 2003: 76-77).  Even 
before the national strikes of 1984 Lawson had had key personnel replacements made at 
the heads of the National Coal Board and the Central Electricity Generating Board in 
anticipation of what was to come (Lawson 1989; Helm 2003: 77). 
 
The incident, however, arguably serves as a salutary reminder of how integrated coal, 
and energy more broadly, had for some time been within wider social and national 
political issues.  These lingering social aspects of coal, and its position as an indigenous 
source of energy, meant that, even with a reduction in state support under the 
Conservatives, it continued to be subsidised throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Thomas 
2006: 590; cf. Helm 2003).  Coal, and ongoing state support for it, remained a key 
contradiction within the PEPP, particularly later as New Labour supported carbon 
dioxide emissions reduction whilst at the same time subsidising coal production (Helm 
2003: 303).  The residual legacy of state support for coal, as indigenous source and 
large-scale employer, however is another sign of the degree to which elements of old 
policy paradigms can continue even under a new system (Hall 1993: 280). 
 
4.2 Alternative Narratives Challenge the Institutionalisation of the PEPP 
It is worth, however, considering how alternative narratives of energy policy fared over 
this time.  A review of articles from the journal ‘Energy Policy’ in the mid-1980s 
                                                
46	  Particularly	  as	  coal	  was	  at	  the	  time	  still	  heavily	  subsidised	  in	  Germany	  and	  France. 
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confirms that, while the UK was going through the early processes of energy 
marketisation, wider governance questions used more often to run alongside analyses of 
more narrowly defined technical questions (Lehmann and Hough 1983; Chesshire 1986; 
Webb 1985; Cooper 1987).  What is apparent from this debate is that, certainly in the 
1980s and early 1990s, there was still clear ability and willingness to question the 
emergent PEPP from a critical perspective.  This critical debate fell away over the 
course of the 1990s as political consensus was maintained, and even expanded 
internationally, and as energy was increasingly understood as a secure, rather than 
politically contested, area. 
 
The first common thread within this debate revolved around calls for a greater role for 
the state in energy governance through the provision of a national ‘strategic framework’ 
and ‘national management of the energy sector’ as opposed to the continued withdrawal 
of the state apparatus from the energy sector (Ezra 1983; Keegan 1985; Hope et al 1986; 
Rodriguez 1987; Fells and Lucas 1992).  The problem that was being identified at the 
time, to which we will return in chapter six, was that even as government receded 
further from a central management role in energy, exacerbated by the dissolution of the 
Department of Energy in 1992, questions of how to provide policy that addressed 
national collective issues still needed to be considered.  One specific problem identified 
was that energy, as a sector requiring notoriously long-term investment planning, would 
need a forward looking, co-ordinated, national approach if sufficient investment were to 
be made for national security of supply (Owens 1986: 5).  This was considered a 
particular difficulty for the PEPP given the Conservatives stance as ‘anti-planning’ 
(Stern 1987: 501).   
 
Delegation of responsibility to ‘the markets’, and a ‘do it yourself’ approach to 
environmental regulation, was also considered at the time to have potential 
consequences for the ability of energy policy to respond to social considerations, 
particularly the environment (Hope et al 1986; Cooper 1987).  This viewpoint was 
expressed well by Owens in his 1986 article: 
(m)arket forces also have no way of deciding the weight to be attached to the death of 
a snail darter compared to, say, the death of a worker at an accident at a nuclear 
power station (Hope et al 1987: 6) 
This is an argument which has come to form a significant part of the debate on energy 
policy in the late 2000s specifically with regard to the inability of the market model to 
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make qualitative decisions about sustainable energy (cf. Mitchell 2008; Giddens 2009; 
Scrase et al 2009).   
 
This critical debate also raised concerns about creating an institutional framework for 
energy governance with monetarist principles and targets, particularly aimed around 
reducing the PSBR, at its heart.  It was feared that one of the outcomes of such a 
framework would be that Government would not be able to meet its real energy 
objectives which critics understood as still, ultimately, being the secure and affordable 
supply of energy (Webb 1985; Stern 1987; Rodriguez 1987).  Rodriguez further 
specified that by making energy policy about the achievement of a competitive market 
in energy, governance was no longer even designed with specific energy objectives in 
mind (Rodriguez 1987: 464). 
 
There were other concerns expressed about the consequences of not debating energy, 
and energy policy, publically or in other words of emerging ‘deliberative’ 
depoliticisation (Hope et al 1986; Stern 1987).  In particular, Jonathan Stern had noted 
the absence of any energy coverage in the 1987 General Election campaign, the drop in 
political debate about energy policy since 1979, and the lack of up-to-date published 
energy projections.  His concern was that there would be a lack of public acceptance 
and awareness of important decision on major energy projects (Stern 1987: 498).  It was 
later observed that the relative absence in political debate about energy had ultimately 
resulted in a lack of awareness, under New Labour, of international energy events and 
the way in which the energy environment was developing (Blackhurst 2004).  The 
findings of this analysis, in chapter four, would support this conclusion. 
 
This debate could also be seen as extending to questions of energy affordability, 
previously a core objective of energy policy.  Clearly under the Welfare State questions 
of access for all households had been paramount.  Although the Conservatives did stick 
with some welfare policies to help poorer households afford energy, such as hardship 
payments in bad weather, the question of affordability did not go away despite falling 
international energy prices.   Whilst Conservative critics of welfare provisions 
continued to oppose them pointing to the ‘paternalism’ involved, many households 
continued in ‘energy poverty’ (Helm et al 1989: 55).  
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One method of dealing with those that sought to challenge the new paradigm, and some 
of these academics had been involved under the previous paradigm, was simply, as with 
the miner’s strike, to replace them or otherwise exclude them from policymaking 
circles.  This is where Thatcher’s ‘one of us’ policy came into its own.  A specific 
example of this was the replacement of Derek Ezra as head of the National Coal Board 
(Helm 2003: 77).  Thatcher had labelled Ezra “an appeaser” (Thatcher 1995: 342 in 
Helm 2003: 77), and Lawson had doubted his commercial credentials (Helm 2003: 
342), but there might have been more to their desire to replace him.  Ezra had been a 
keen supporter of a greater role for the state in energy governance and was also 
supporter of political action to prevent further climate change (Ezra 1983).  Much of 
what Ezra was writing about in 1983 is still relevant within climate and energy debates 
today. 
 
The replacement of key personnel was one core part of the Conservative strategy to 
disperse alternative narratives within the policymaking debate.  Another method might 
be considered in the support that much of the British media gave to the Conservative 
Administration, certainly for much of the 1980s (Hay 1996).   Stern’s observations, 
above, about the lack of discussion of energy matters within the 1987 election debates, 
or ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation, may well have been underpinned by low(er) energy 
prices in comparison, certainly, to the 1970s.  To the degree that low energy prices have 
often equated to public interest, those, such as Ezra, who supported changes to energy 
policy to recognise social issues, such as climate change, did not at this time enjoy wide 
public interest or support. 
 
 
Conclusion	  
Conservatives had claimed ‘revolution’ in terms of their redesign of economic 
governance.  Certainly, with regard to energy, it was widely claimed that the reforms 
being carried out constituted a radical break with recent history as well as something 
unseen elsewhere in the Western world (de Oliveira and MacKerron 1992: 157; see also 
Rodriguez 1987; Helm 2003; Thomas 2006).  The degree to which this new policy 
paradigm, the PEPP, had become institutionalised within the UK was, however, later 
underpinned by the international expansion of ‘market’ energy – to Australia, the US, 
the EU, Eastern Europe and, often under the advise of the World Bank, to a number of 
other developing countries (de Oliveira & MacKerron 1992: 157).  By the early 2000s, 
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some experts had come to believe the international energy economy had been 
fundamentally transformed over the 1980s and 1990s by the expansion of market 
institutions, and commodity and financial markets (Egenhofer and Legge 2001: 3; 
Mitchell et al 2001: 176; see also Hayes and Victor 2006).  Pro-market energy 
originally ‘pioneered’ by the UK, and Chile, had spread around the world (Thomas 
2006: 583; Scrase and McKerron 2009: 5). 
 
It might be worth posing questions, however, about how the emerging lack of political 
deliberation and contestation of energy policy, and the decline in physical institutions of 
governance, compares with previous periods of relative silence on energy.  As Derek 
Ezra has pointed out in his book on energy policy, which takes on historical lenses, 
debate about energy has tended to ebb and flow over time (Ezra 1983: 202; see also 
Leaver 2005; McGowan 2008).  This ebb and flow has been historically related to 
periods when energy has been considered to be ‘in crisis’, as in the 1970s, and this 
perception is often related to the ascendance of energy prices.  It might also be 
suggested that ‘secretised’ depoliticisation has also played an historic role in the degree 
to which publics did not engage regularly with questions of energy and its supply.  
Because decisions about ‘defending’ access to oil have, over time, tended to be made 
‘behind closed doors’, publics appear to have little idea of the cost of defending access 
to oil and gas nor of details in terms of the role Britain has played (cf. Keohane 1984; 
Bromley 1991; Painter 1992). 
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CHAPTER	  4:	  	  
The	  Pro-­Market	  Energy	  Policy	  Paradigm	  2000-­03:	  Challenge	  and	  
Compromise	  
 
 
Introduction	  
By the time New Labour took office in 1997 a new energy governance system, the ‘Pro-
Market Energy Policy Paradigm’ (PEPP), had been established despite some difficulties 
experienced, particularly in the early to mid 1980s. This chapter will open with the 
claim that despite the change of government, which could theoretically have presented a 
firm test for the new paradigm, the PEPP did not markedly shift.  The period from 2000 
to 2003, which is to be analysed here, is understood as one largely of continuity in 
energy governance.   This analysis of UK energy governance over this time period will 
be supplemented, as with the analyses of the two subsequent time periods, with further 
theoretical analysis in chapter seven. 
 
Ideological commitment to the PEPP, despite Labour’s social roots, was apparent from 
the start. Judged on Labour’s first term in office it could be argued that the PEPP came 
to represent an even more depoliticised, in ‘technocratic’ and ‘marketised’ terms, 
system than that under the Conservatives.  Furthermore the PEPP was increasingly 
underpinned by the internationalisation of the UK energy model which had been taking 
place in the US, Europe and other developing countries, often via conditionalities 
associated with World Bank, and IMF, lending schemes.  This was, importantly, 
supported in turn by the demise of the principal ‘challenger’ in terms of political models 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent decisions by ex-Soviet states, 
most significantly the Russian Federation, to adopt a process of privatisation and 
liberalisation in their energy sectors.   
 
Conversely, however, Labour’s first term in office can also be marked down as a period 
of mounting challenges to pro-market energy emanating, largely from outside the UK 
energy establishment.47  This period bore witness to the ‘Enron scandal’, the California 
energy crisis, rising energy prices, and a related but brief spate of fuel protests in the 
winter of 2000.  In addition, and importantly, the Government was becoming 
                                                
47	  The	  energy	  establishment	  is	  taken	  here	  to	  be	  those	  in	  Ofgem	  and	  the	  DTI	  directly	  involved	  in	  energy	  
analysis	  and	  policymaking,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  third	  parties,	  such	  as	  Ernst	  &	  Young,	  who	  were	  chosen	  to	  
provide	  extra	  analysis	  and	  advice.	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increasingly aware that UK North Sea assets were depleting at such as rate that the time 
horizon within which the UK would start importing oil and gas again was narrowing 
quickly.  Not least, this period also saw growing commitment to carbon dioxide 
reduction targets alongside emerging evidence of underperformance in this area, 
particularly evident in the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) 
report of 2000 (RCEP 2000). 
 
In response to the realisation that the UK would become an importer once more and to 
the critique of climate policy, Tony Blair announced that the Performance and 
Innovation Unit (PIU), which reported to in this instance to ‘Number Ten’, would 
conduct a review of UK energy policy.  This review represented quite a challenge to the 
PEPP, on a number of levels.  However between the issuance of the Energy Policy 
Review in 2002 and the production of the Energy White Paper in 2003 many of the 
more challenging suggestions had been omitted.  The 2003 White Paper did, however, 
commit energy policy for the first time to two new, separate ‘social’ goals: those of 
lowering carbon dioxide emissions and of reducing energy poverty.  This appeared, on 
the surface, to be a change to the objectives of energy policy, one of the ‘levels’ of the 
PEPP.  The conundrum that this chapter seeks to answer is, however, how the 
objectives of energy policy could seemingly change without much other accompanying 
signs of paradigm shift.  
 
This contradiction will, in part, be explained by arguing that certain effects of both 
‘technocratic’ and ‘marketised’ depoliticisation led to quite a high degree of resistance 
to other aspects of paradigm change.  In addition, carbon dioxide reduction targets were 
not legally binding and were seen within parts of the Energy Directorat and Ofgem, the 
two bodies most responsible for devising and carrying out energy policy, as more 
indicative than necessarily binding, or even realistic.  Furthermore, the 2003 White 
Paper proposed that the new objectives could and should be met using existing methods 
enshrined within the PEPP.   
 
 
1.	  	   New	  Labour,	  Normalised	  Neoliberalism	  and	  Internationalisation	  of	  
Market	  Energy	  	  
The previous chapter laid out in some detail the intellectual and political backdrop 
underpinning the processes of creating the PEPP.   This section will continue to build 
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towards a detailed picture of the PEPP as of the year 2000, the starting point of the 
period under review in this thesis. This is the system of energy governance, against 
which change will be measured and is outlined in Table 3 below.  This section will also 
seek to show the degree to which pro-market energy had become embedded within the 
UK political system by 2000, as well as internationally making it further resistant, to a 
large degree, to change.  
 
Table 3: The Pro-Market Energy Policy Paradigm in 2000 
 
 
1.1 Labour in Opposition 
In the meanwhile, in a vast drama, the state continues to withdraw from the 
commanding heights, leaving it more and more to the realm of the market. This 
represents a great reconnecting - a conjoining of the beginning and the end of the 
twentieth century. The century opened with markets ascendant and an expanding 
global economy, buttressed by a spirit of optimism.  (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998: 390) 
• A	  commodity	  or	  tradeable	  good	  • A	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  not	  a	  basic	  service	  or	  merit	  good	  Ideas	  About	  Energy	  
Pro-­‐Market	  Energy	  Policy	  Paradigm	  
• Competition	  to	  drive	  down	  prices	  for	  consumers	  and	  encourage	  economic	  ef?iciency	  • Low	  ability	  of	  state	  to	  govern	  the	  energy	  sector:	  markets	  to	  supply	  energy	  • Fiscal	  austerity	  and	  cost	  ef?iciency	  
Ideas	  About	  Energy	  Governance	  
• To	  implement	  and	  maintain	  competitive	  and	  cost	  effective	  markets	  in	  energy	  • Safe,	  reliable	  and	  affordable	  energy	  Objectives	  of	  Policy	  
• Responsibility	  for	  policymaking:	  division	  in	  DTI	  • Regulation	  by	  'independent'	  regulator,	  Ofgem	  • Technocratic	  and	  deliberative	  de-­‐politicisation	  Physical	  Structures	  
• Framework	  to	  enhance	  ability	  of	  markets	  to	  supply	  • Regulation,	  in	  electricity,	  around	  RPI-­‐X;	  regulate	  for	  competition	  and	  to	  incentivise	  cost	  ef?iciency	  • Marketised	  de-­‐politicisation	  Instruments	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Reflecting the quote above from one of the many books claiming the benefits of 
widespread ‘market’ orthodoxy at the end of the 20th century, this section argues that far 
from altering the PEPP, the New Labour Government failed to offer any lasting 
ideational challenges to the premises upon which many levels of the PEPP rested, but 
they also actively completed energy sector, electricity and gas, liberalisation (Helm 
2003; Thomas 2006; Rutledge 2007; Keay 2010).  
 
It might have been expected, around 1997, that Labour would pursue more profound 
changes to the way in which energy was governed, not least based on the position taken 
in opposition on various aspects of the energy system (Rutledge 2007: 904).  Prior to 
1997 a lively debate had taken place within the party ranging from those who wanted to 
reverse privatisation, through those who wanted to reform and those who were happy to 
stick with the ‘status quo’.  Some of those in favour of reform supported a change in the 
institutional architecture and changes to the primary duties of regulators, Offer and 
Ofgas, away from an overwhelming emphasis on promoting competition and cost 
efficiency towards recognising wider social interests, including, for some, the 
environment (Helm 2003: 287).  In opposition Labour had made easy targets of ‘fat cat’ 
utilities which, they exclaimed, were run primarily for the benefit of shareholders and 
top executives, and which were not reflecting consumer needs (Blair in Helm 2003: 
273).48  In addition Labour had been reportedly, at best, ambivalent to the all-important 
concept of competition in energy markets (Helm 2003: 295). 
 
Certainly Labour had maintained a more pro-environment narrative than had the 
Conservatives before them and had made some commitments to pursuing carbon 
dioxide emissions reduction in the 1997 Manifesto (cf. Carter 2001: 120).  Specifically 
they had committed to: 
… put concern for the environment at the heart of policymaking, so that it is not an 
add-on, but informs the whole of government… (New Labour 1997) 
                                                
48	  In	  1997	  New	  Labour	  implemented	  a	  one	  off	  ‘Windfall	  Tax’	  on	  utilities.	  	  This	  tax	  was	  criticised	  in	  that	  if	  
‘lax	  regulation’	  had	  been	  the	  reason	  why	  such	  utilities,	  or	  ‘fat	  cats’	  in	  previous	  Labour	  terminology,	  had	  
made	  so	  much	  money	  then	  the	  regulation	  should	  be	  fixed.	  	  Rutledge,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  this	  tax	  
was	  a	  devise	  used	  by	  New	  Labour	  to	  draw	  a	  line	  under	  the	  past	  and	  to	  prevent	  further	  questioning	  of	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  privatised	  and	  deregulated	  energy	  sector	  (Rutledge	  2007:	  904).	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It was notable within the Manifesto, however, that the commitment to environmental 
policymaking was the last of the nine big changes that New Labour were, at the time, 
promising. 
 
By contrast, however, Labour had not voted against the “Lawsonian” 1995 Gas Bill, 
which had laid the ground-work for domestic gas supply competition (Rutledge 2007: 
903).  As it happened, New Labour continued in their first term in office with plans for 
electricity sector liberalisation, which had been put in place under the Conservatives, as 
well as with a very overt commitment to the role of competition, as will be seen in more 
detail below.  September 1998 saw the initial ‘opening’ of the domestic electricity 
market to competition, run largely by the independent regulator Offer, and the process 
was completed by May 1999 (Helm 2003: 270).  
 
1.2 The PEPP in 2000: Energy and Domestic Energy Governance 
If New Labour’s first Energy Report, in 1997, can be seen as a holding document (DTI 
1997), then the second Energy Report, in 1998, can be seen as an early indication of 
their new-found commitment to private sector energy supplies and to competition (DTI 
1998b).  It stated that the objective of energy policy was “…to ensure a secure, diverse 
and sustainable supply of energy at competitive prices” (DTI 1998b: 5).  The 2000 
Energy Report further noted that the key to achieving these was “…competitive markets 
and companies…” (DTI 2000c: 7).  
 
The Utilities Act 2000, which some had hoped would result in tougher regulation for 
utilities companies more broadly ended up, in effect, being an Energy Act.  It set out the 
merger of Offer with Ofgas to form a new regulator, the Office of the Gas and 
Electricity Markets (Ofgem).  Under the Utilities Act, this independent, economic 
regulator would also have more power than the previous incarnations (Mitchell 2008: 
138) in pursuing its primary responsibility to 
…protect the interests of consumers, present and future, wherever appropriate by 
promoting effective competition between persons engaged in… the generation, 
transmission, distribution or supply of electricity… (Ofgem 2006: 107) 
 
As already mentioned in chapter three, Ofgem emerged as a principal advocate of the 
role of competition in energy governance and a defender against any state intervention 
in electricity and gas markets (Mitchell 2008; Tutton 2009; Scrase et al 2009).  
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Increased powers meant more ability to do so.  Aside from the merger of gas and 
electricity regulators, the physical structures of energy governance remained the same.  
The subsequent review of energy pricing, the ‘RPI-X’ model, also resulted in a lack 
of change.  The model was maintained, despite accusations that it had resulted in a 
lack of investment in key infrastructure with the focus having been on cutting costs 
and asset sweating under these conditions (Helm 2003: 344).  
 
Therefore, although elements within Labour had been outspoken critics of the PEPP 
when in opposition they continued not just to maintain, but also to further embed, it 
once in power.  Some might argue that this was position was adopted partly out of 
convenience (Interview 12), but this could also be due to the extent of New Labour’s 
buy-in to the intellectual ideas of Conservatives overall and the degree to which they 
had already become embedded in existing institutions of state (cf. Hay & Wincott 1998; 
Watson 1999; Williams 2005; Gamble 2009).  Matthew Watson has, in turn, suggested 
that commitment to some neoliberal policies, such as financial liberalisation, reflected 
the need to gain a strong electoral foothold with the Middle Classes, where ‘Old’ 
Labour had traditionally fared less well (Watson 2002: 198; cf. Bevir 2005).  It might 
also, however, be worth raising the question of the need for core corporate support in 
order to maintain a position of power in UK politics, and the big utilities were not in 
support of different, or further, regulation (cf. Interview 14). 
 
Continuity in commitment to competition, and its key role in delivering policy 
objectives, was echoed across early policy documents, including the 1998 Competition 
White Paper (DTI 1998a; Rutledge 2007).  The objectives of energy policy were stated 
as being the “…secure, diverse and sustainable supplies of energy at competitive 
prices…” (DTI 2000a: 8) and it was understood that competitive business conditions 
would have a key role to play in meeting these objectives.  This excerpt encapsulates 
the thinking of the time well: 
(c)ompetition itself brings with it benefits for consumers, for companies and for 
security of supply. Consumers enjoy lower prices, better choice and higher standards 
of service. Companies are given the incentive to innovate by the drive to provide ever 
more desirable products and services. Competition also plays a vital part… using the 
price signal to indicate when and where new investment should take place and 
encouraging a wide range of suppliers and sources of energy. (DTI 2001: 1) 
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The same report goes on to claim that competition will also drive environmental 
innovation, the ‘sustainability’ element of supply, in private companies as they strive to 
respond to consumers who will become more environmentally aware (DTI 2001: 5).  As 
such competitive conditions were still not only a stated objective of energy policy but 
also the means of achieving that objective (Rutledge 2007: 904). 
 
Other primary drivers of the PEPP such as cost efficiency (Tutton 2009: 3; cf. Helm 
2003), and the understanding of governments as relatively inefficient in terms of 
economic governance remained at the heart of policymaking (Mitchell 2008: 138).  
Thus the continued commitment to markets bearing responsibility for energy supply, or 
to ‘marketised’ depoliticisation: 
(m)arkets can be a more effective instrument for delivery of government policy than 
more traditional mechanisms  (DTI 2001: 2) 
The extent to which this perspective had become embedded within energy governance 
systems was also reflected within third part advisory reports (cf. DTI 2005b; Ernst and 
Young 2006).  Ian Rutledge has suggested that even a cursory reading of policy 
documents from the late 1990s and early 2000s 
…reveals the extent to which New Labour and its advisors had come to espouse a 
particularly ‘fundamentalist’ view of the role of ‘competitive markets’ in achieving 
energy policy objectives (Rutledge 2007: 902) 
 
The active academic debate of the 1980s, when energy was being restructured, had 
largely dissipated by the late 1990s.  So much so that a 1997 review of the UK energy 
literature concluded that “…(p)rivatisation remains the godsend of the last decade to 
economics research…” (Weyman-Jones 1997: 899).  A 2006 review confirmed that 
outside of neoliberal economic and technical fields very little research was being 
conducted into energy (CEPMLP 2006).  Privatised and liberalised energy markets were 
increasingly being analysed as ‘fait accompli’ as opposed to social construct 
(Egenhoffer and Legge 2001; Hayes and Victor 2006; cf. Helm 2005c; Mitchell 2008).  
 
1.3 The PEPP in 2000: Foreign Policy and International Relations 
Continuity in terms of the dominance of pro-market ideas about governance, and of the 
central notion of positive economic inter-dependence, was reflected in the arena of 
energy foreign policy, and foreign policy more broadly (cf. Lee 2004; Williams 2005). 
However, due to the degree of ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation in energy and in the 
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absence of any specific international strategy, it is a little difficult to consider energy as 
a concrete area of foreign policy at this time.  As highlighted in chapter three, much of 
the way in which energy has featured in international relations over the past century had 
been related primarily to ensuring stable access for net importers of energy, specifically 
oil, at ‘reasonable’ prices.  As a net exporter of both oil and gas during the 1990s, and in 
the absence of any shocks or periods of high prices, perceptions of the international 
energy environment remained positive.  This was reflected in the early Energy Reports 
and statements from key policymakers, such as Stephen Littlechild, which suggested 
that they were “…sanguine about security, both in the short and in the longer term” 
(Rutledge 2007: 905). 
 
What was clear, however, is that to the extent to which energy did feature in UK foreign 
relations it was largely through active encouragement of the UK energy model abroad, 
in Europe, Russia and beyond (Davies 1996: 502; Helm 2003: 372; cf. Timmins 2006).  
In the case of ‘emerging economies’ this was often to be achieved through advice and 
‘educational assistance’ to assist in the process of energy governance reform, as was the 
case with Russia and other Eastern European countries (Davies 1996; House of Lords 
2002; Interview 1).  Much of the thinking behind promoting the liberalisation of oil 
markets and pricing had been to prevent ‘states’ from impacting negatively upon the 
international oil trade and smoothly functioning markets were understood to be the ‘best 
insurance’ for continuing security of supply (Youngs 2009; Lesage et al 2010: 6; cf. 
PIU 2002: 7).  In addition, it was expected that increased competition would drive 
exporters to expand capacity (Mitchell et al 2001).   
 
As an example, some sections of the 1998 White Paper on how to build “competitive 
modern markets” were focused on New Labour’s drive to “open markets” abroad and to 
“…ensure competition in international markets…” (DTI 1998: 51). And there is little 
doubt that many did believe in the UK’s success so far both in implementing such 
conditions in the home market (DTI 1998: 51; PIU 2002) and in encouraging their 
uptake abroad (PIU 2002: 21; Helm 2003: 372).  The International Energy Agency 
(IEA) proposed that the UK energy policy model should be used by other countries 
wishing to reform their energy sectors (IEA 1998 and 2006a; see also Friedrichs 2010).  
The Economist held the UK up as ‘the poster-child’ for liberalisers (Economist 2003). 
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This aspect of policy pursued under the PEPP was underpinned by general New Labour 
support for the expansion of deregulated capitalism, multilateralism, free trade and 
liberalisation (Watson 1999 and 2002; Coates and Hay 2001; Williams 2005; Dunne 
2008).  As Coates and Hay have argued, Blairism, like Thatcherism, saw itself  
…both as an ideological project for export, and as one whose domestic success 
requires the resetting of international (and particularly of Western European) 
institutions and practices in its image. (Coates and Hay 2001: 448) 
 
It also found support from a wide base of domestic interest groups, particularly in the 
corporate sector, such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) (House of 
Commons 2007d).  ‘The City’ arguably also has had an interest in the expansion of 
competitive markets in energy as the role of the financial and commodity markets in 
facilitating energy trade had, by this stage, expanded considerably (CEPMLP 2006: 6; 
Youngs 2009: 6; cf. Helm 2003).   The International Petroleum Exchange for example, 
based in London, had through the 1990s established itself as one of the world’s largest 
futures and options exchanges and, as such, had a vital institutional role to play in 
facilitating and supporting a market-based approach to energy (Youngs 2009: 6).  Trade 
in natural resources including futures and options, and particularly with the advent of 
the ‘Mega Btu-Marketers’ like Enron, was now very big business indeed (Rutledge 
2007: 903; cf. McLean and Elkind 2003; Smith and Emshwiller 2003).  
 
New Labour, in the interests of supporting its Manifesto commitment to ‘enterprise’ and 
UK Plc, were unlikely to stand in the way of such business interests, something which 
might also be negatively perceived by its new ‘Middle Class’ voter base (New Labour 
1997; see also Bevir 2005; Watson 2005).  Furthermore, it has been claimed that Irwin 
Stelzer, member of the board of Enron and “employee and confidant” of Rupert 
Murdoch, had a direct line to New Labour which he used to strongly and regularly 
encourage further energy liberalisation (Rutledge 2007: 903).   
 
The idea that the neoliberal economic paradigm could and should be exported beyond 
the Anglo-Saxon sphere was reinforced by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s and by the accompanying, self-reinforcing, rhetoric of the ‘end of history’.  This 
sense that there was a lack of any credible alternative politico-economic model was felt 
strongly among key political elites in the UK (Kaletsky 2010: 273; cf. Yergin and 
Stanislaw 1998; Williams 2005), and arguably impacted upon the ability of competing 
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political protagonists to suggest profound change based on alternative narratives.  
Moreover, Russia’s adoption of a process of political reform based upon aspects of the 
pro-market model, including privatisation of its considerable energy assets, was seen as 
further proof of the victory of the ‘Western’ model as it extended to energy (Fukuyama 
1992).  In the unipolar moment of the 1990s it was increasingly assumed that there were 
no credible alternatives.  This arguably fed into the degree of ‘deliberative’ 
depoliticisation already in existence and further encouraged a lack of understanding, or 
even recognition, of different political models.  Diplomacy was increasingly conducted 
both as an extension of business relations and by experts from the business community 
as if those were the negotiations that were now more worthwhile (Lee 2004; Williams 
2005). 
 
As such the 1990s had emerged as a period within which neoliberal economic ideas 
were widely understood to represent the new “common sense” (Watson 2002: 187) and 
of a “…zeitgeist in support of the markets…” (Hogan 2003: ix).  Likewise acceptance 
of a limited role for the state in energy had reached a position whereby it was referred to 
as “conventional” wisdom in the UK and beyond (CEPMLP 2006: 4; cf. Mitchell et al 
2001; Jaffe et al 2006).  Further diffusion of the pro-market model more broadly was 
undertaken through international institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Watson 2002) and these institutions played a 
specific but related role in furthering the pro-market energy model internationally 
partly under the auspices of “good governance”49 (de Oliveira and McKerron 1992: 
157; Youngs 2009: 8; cf. Rufin 2003).  
 
The pro-market energy model was to be institutionally underpinned as the ‘norm’ 
through the Energy Charter Treaty Protocol (ECT), modelled on the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was designed to put these trade norms on a legal 
footing, assisted by a comprehensive dispute settlement mechanism.  Russia, having 
‘come in from the cold’, and Norway both signed the ECT thereby creating the first 
international energy trade agreement which included significant net exporters as well as 
importers.  This was widely understood as a profound step forward given previous 
tendencies for political agreements, based around oil, coal and other energy sources, to 
fail (Keohane 1984; Strange 1988: 193; McGowan 2008). 
 
                                                
49	  Italics	  author’s	  own.	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1.4 The PEPP in 2000: Climate and Renewable Energy Policy 
It is well worth understanding, at this stage, a little more about how climate policy was 
treated within this energy governance model.  Clearly climate objectives had not 
represented a formal commitment for energy policy under the Conservatives.  The 
primary commitment to ‘clean’ energy under the Conservatives had come in that they 
did openly recognise the idea that greenhouse gases cause global warming (Thatcher 
1995: 640; Helm 2003: 346; Vogler 2009: 2685). This recognition led to a report 
entitled ‘This Common Inheritance’ (Department of Environment 1990), which 
included a target to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 2005, and some environmental 
legislation – most notably the bans on leaded petrol and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) 
refrigerators.  The carbon dioxide reduction target was, however, easier to meet than 
expected given the large reductions in coal usage and the decline in UK manufacturing, 
and it was met early, by 2000 (Helm 2003: 347; cf. DETR 2000; Mitchell 2000).  It is 
also worth noting that the emissions target was not legally binding, and reiterating that 
it was not an objective that energy policymakers were formally required to achieve.  
 
Outside of specific laws to phase out leaded petrol, the prevailing UK view was that the 
markets would, in time, “demand” renewables (IEA 1998: 67), that competition would 
provide for renewable energy (DETR 2000; cf. Rutledge 2007) and that targets to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions would need to be balanced by other economic 
demands (DoE 1990; cf. Bernstein 2001; Carter 2001).  In the late 1980s, partly to take 
account of the politics of the early 1980s recession, the UK adopted a definition of 
‘sustainable development’ that included possibilities for economic growth, a definition 
which became widely adopted.50  Indeed, economic growth was understood as key to 
achieving sustainable development, and it was further argued that that the UK economic 
model already conformed to such sustainable growth (Jacobs 1991: 59; see also DoE 
1988).  This clearly implied commitment to bearing the future environment in mind, 
without having to change many energy governance practices today. 
 
As already suggested in chapter one, questions of which definition of ‘sustainable’ 
should be used to underpin policies towards the environment raise another important 
                                                
50	  ‘Green’	  environmentalists	  argued,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  that	  economic	  growth	  and	  environmentally	  
sustainable	  development	  are	  not	  positively	  inter-­‐related	  in	  that	  environmental	  protection	  does	  mean	  
constraints	  on	  economic	  activity	  (Jacobs	  1991:	  59)	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question, of how dominant political ideas had come to colour responses to 
environmental science and claims about man’s relationship to climate change.  Even 
once political elites had accepted the need to act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, a 
wide variety of political action, or inaction, and other responses emerged dependent 
upon dominant ‘worldviews’ (Rayner 2009).51   
 
This is where we return to Steven Bernstein’s notion of the liberal-environmental 
compromise, otherwise known as ‘climate capitalism’, whereby neoliberally informed 
political elites take on responsibility to act in response to climate change but do so on 
their own ideational and political terms (Bernstein 2001).  Bernstein’s excellent analysis 
provides a detailed account of how scientific concerns about environmental protection 
emerged, through concern about economic growth and poverty reduction, into a single 
framework of ‘sustainable development’ (Bernstein 2001: 29).  Terminology, 
previously common in environmental reports such as the ‘Brundtland Report’, of 
“managing” the environment moved to terminology of “developing”, more in line with 
notions of a reduced role for government institutions (Bernstein 2001: 59). 
 
As already suggested New Labour could be marked out from the Conservatives in that 
they claimed a greater degree of political commitment to the need to mitigate climate 
change, as well as narrative in opposition to nuclear.  Their 1997 election manifesto had 
committed to specific carbon dioxide emission cuts of 20%, over 1990 levels, by 2010 
(New Labour 1997).  They also put forward a target whereby 10% of electricity should 
be supplied by renewable sources, also by 2010 (Mitchell and O’Connor 2004: 1937).  
Not much was included in the manifesto, however, about how this target might be 
achieved which has been, perhaps, one of the key weakness of climate policy under 
New Labour – the gap between stated aspirations and ability to meet them.  For 
example, after taking office a review was conducted into the feasibility of meeting the 
renewable target, the Renewable Energy Review (DTI 1999).  The ensuing response 
suggested that the UK would work towards the 10% target, but provided very little in 
terms of concrete policy to facilitate the target (Mitchell 2000: 287).   
  
                                                
51	  For	  example,	  in	  Germany	  and	  Sweden	  much	  legislation	  has	  already	  been	  passed,	  including	  ‘risk	  free’	  
feed-­‐in-­‐tariffs	  (Germany)	  and	  carbon	  taxes	  (Sweden).	  	  Both countries	  have	  managed	  to	  substantially	  
increase	  the	  percentage	  of	  renewable	  energy	  in	  the	  overall	  mix,	  as	  well	  as	  reduce	  carbon	  dioxide	  
emissions	  (Ragwitz	  et	  al	  2005;	  Mitchell	  2008;	  Giddens	  2009).	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Also not long after taking office the ‘Marshall Report’, led by an industrialist Lord 
Marshall, was commissioned to look into which economic instruments could be used to 
enable carbon dioxide emission reductions (Kern 2009: 129).  The Climate Change 
Programme was launched, a key component of which was the establishment of a 
Climate Change Levy (CCL).  The levy was to be advanced on business, not residential, 
energy users ostensibly in replacement of the Fossil Fuel Levy (FFL) which had been in 
operation since 1989 (DTI 2000b: 27).   
 
Given the opposition it generated this was the first real test of Labour’s commitment to 
carbon dioxide reduction targets.  The CCL was introduced in 2000 but when, 
particularly fuel-intensive, industries objected a number of exemptions and alterations 
were made along with the notion of giving something back to business (Kern 2009: 
129-30 and 147; see also Carter 2001: 120; Helm 2003: 356).  Negotiated agreements 
were reached such that large industrial energy users, companies and regions, could 
agree carbon dioxide emission reduction plans in exchange for reductions in CCL 
payable.  Fuels for electricity generation, petrol, and diesel were exempted, and 
reductions in national insurance contributions were put in place to offset some of the 
effects of the CCL (Rutledge 2007: 906).52   
 
A second key component of the Climate Change Programme was the establishment of a 
Carbon Trust (CT) which was set up as a ‘business lead’ organisation, separate from, 
but funded by, Government, in order to assist in the transition to a low carbon economy 
(Kern 2009: 160).  The CT was seen as a body which could help in the ‘delivery’ of 
transition through improving communication and dialogue, and also by recycling some 
CCL receipts (Kern 2009: 130).  One in depth review of this organisation, based on a 
wide range of interviews within the CT, has suggested that it represented yet another 
attempt to keep energy and climate change free from political interference.  The 
dominant assumption was that by having the “freedom to operate” separately from 
government departments this organisation would be able to make objective, non-
political decisions and therefore achieve much more (Kern 2009: 131) 
 
                                                
52	  This	  is	  another	  example	  of	  New	  Labour’s	  understanding	  that	  in	  order	  to	  get	  policy	  through	  they	  would	  
need	  to	  design	  it	  such	  that	  key	  corporations	  would	  be	  able	  to	  accept	  it.	  	  For	  more	  detail	  on	  this	  see	  
(Kern	  2009:	  147-­‐149).	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In that the CCL can be seen as a replacement for the Conservatives’ FFL, and in that it 
was overtly committed to being independent of state interference, continuity in actual 
climate policies adopted can be claimed, despite the greater rhetoric on targets.  Also 
consistent with Conservative policy on renewable energy, New Labour continued 
initially with the Renewable Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO), which had been in 
place to support ‘low-carbon’ energy production since 1990.  Given the status of 
nuclear energy as ‘low carbon’ the NFFO had gone largely to supporting nuclear energy 
production since its inception, in 1988, such that in 2000 renewable energy accounted 
for only 3% of electricity production (Helm 2003: 350; cf. Mitchell 2000; Mitchell and 
Connor 2004; van der Horst 2005).  One analyst and government advisor has suggested 
that the NFFO was never about supporting renewables specifically in that it had been 
adopted in 1990 only in order to facilitate the privatisation of the electricity system 
(Mitchell 2000: 293-4). 
 
When the NFFO came to an end in 2000 a new obligation, the Renewables Obligation 
(RO), was placed on electricity suppliers to purchase certain percentages of low carbon 
electricity from renewable sources.  Commitment to a renewables policy was an 
achievement in itself given the long debate, which took place within the Energy 
Advisory Panel, prior to this as to whether to have a specific renewables policy or not.  
Despite a high degree of opposition, from the pro-nuclear lobby and ‘laissez-faire’ 
economists, it was decided to go ahead with a specific renewable policy in place of the 
NFFO (Interview 14; cf. Mitchell 2000).  
 
Alongside the RO a new aim was adopted which was to achieve 3% of electricity 
generated by renewables by the end of March 2003, rising to 10.4% by March 2011 
(Rutledge 2007: 906).  The RO was, however, technology non-specific in that it was 
recognised that “…it is no longer the job of Government to pick winners or to introduce 
artificial distortions into the marketplace” (DTI 2000b: 3; cf. Mitchell 2008: 126).  
Furthermore it was decided that a price cap would be applied - ostensibly to protect 
consumers given New Labour’s commitment to keeping electricity prices in the 
“…lower half of the EU/G7 basket” (DTI 2000b: 3; see also Rutledge 2007: 906). The 
price cap operated as a ‘buy out’ element whereby electricity companies could escape 
the obligation if it appeared too costly (Rutledge 2007: 906).  The RO was accompanied 
by some, given the overall requirements of developing renewable research, 
development and production, small capital grants which, despite protestations about not 
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picking winners, were allocated to particular sources of energy over others, i.e. onshore 
wind over energy from waste (DTI 2000b: 3). 
 
A further institutional problem for Labour, other than being seemingly out of new 
policy ideas, was the existing set-up of energy and environmental governance 
structures.  If the plan was to use energy policy to meet climate goals, as was implied in 
DTI documents, then this was made more difficult given the omission of specific 
climate objectives for energy policy.  In addition the Department for the Environment, 
Transport and Regions (DETR) had historically held ultimate responsibility for 
‘sustainable development’ (DoE 1990; DETR 2000), but elements within the DTI 
considered their analysis to be “wooly”, non-quantitative and unconvincing (Interview 
5; Interview 13).53  Under the PEPP as of 2000, the UK’s Climate Change Programme 
was more of a DETR affair pursued largely alongside, rather than integrated within, 
energy policy (cf. Helm 2003: 361).  As such there was an understandable sense within 
the DTI’s energy division was that climate change was not their priority (Interview 13).  
Again, as already mentioned above, there was still considerable belief within the DTI’s 
energy division that markets would deliver on investment in and production of 
renewable energy (DTI 2001: 2). 
 
 
2.	  	   Emerging	  Challenges	  for	  Energy	  Policy 
The PEPP, characterised in Table 3 above, appeared by the start of 2000 in many senses 
to be firmly institutionalised.  The period following immediately after presented, 
however, a wide series of challenges, which served partly to underpin the competing 
climate perspective outlined in chapters one and two.  The UK Continental Shelf was 
depleting at a faster rate than expected thereby bringing closer the date that the UK 
would have to start importing oil and gas again.  In addition, various other events had 
started to raise doubts in some minds about energy supplies and the efficacy of the 
current political model to deliver.  
 
 
 
                                                
53	  The	  DETR	  had	  been	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Environment	  (DoE),	  and	  was	  merged	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Agriculture,	  Fisheries	  and	  Food	  in	  2001	  to	  become	  the	  Department	  for	  Environment,	  Food	  and	  Rural	  
Affairs	  (DEFRA).	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2.1 Mounting Challenges 
One of the first real problems that Labour had to face in the energy sector was the 
expiry in 1998 of the coal contracts, which had supported the price and quantity of coal 
purchased by generators.  A new deal needed to be done and Labour, as the traditional 
and vociferous supporter of coal in opposition, were put on the spot.  A white paper was 
drawn up to address this issue, which committed to further support for the coal industry 
whilst stating that such measures would be temporary (DTI 1998b).  This was a difficult 
position to take given theoretical commitment to keeping state intervention low, but 
also given the energy policy aim of keeping energy affordable.  This can be taken as an 
example of the New Labour trying to maintain its newly acquired wide coalition of 
interests and of trying to maintain the support of all parties (Helm 2003: 302; cf. 
Watson 2002; Bevir 2005).54 
 
As already suggested, as the early 2000s progressed it became increasingly apparent 
that oil and gas supplies from the UK Continental Shelf were in quite rapid decline.  It 
was expected that the UK would become an importer of both gas and oil by around the 
mid-2000s, with imports rising very quickly over time (JESS 2002; Helm 2003).  This 
reasonably significant change to the UK position within the international trade of oil 
and gas prompted, in part, the formation of a new group called the Joint Energy Security 
of Supply (JESS).  JESS was made up of officials from the DTI and Ofgem and was 
formed in 2001 (JESS 2002: 3).   
 
Around this time questions started to emerge about the UK’s capacity to import gas in 
large quantities, partly due to a lack of storage facilities, and about levels of ongoing 
investment in energy infrastructure (JESS 2002: 4; Interview 13; RAE 2002: various; 
cf. Rutland 2007: 921).  The Royal Academy of Engineering  (RAE) issued a report 
suggesting that change was needed in order to facilitate substantial investments: 
The Government should reassess the limitations of the market and market mechanisms 
as the basis for planning and funding new capacity that would lead rather than lag the 
needs of network users (RAE 2002: 5) 
Rutledge’s analysis of UK energy policy at this time suggests that New Labour, and the 
DTI, ignored this advice (Rutledge 2007: 921).  Certainly specific JESS responses to 
                                                
54	  For	  commentary	  on	  Labour’s	  continuing	  understanding	  of	  the	  ‘importance’	  of	  appealing	  to	  the	  middle	  
class	  vote	  see:	  http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/may/21/ed-­‐miliband-­‐labour-­‐middle-­‐classes.	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growing perceptions of the need for more investment were based around the need to 
further reduce “barriers or distortions” to market investment (JESS 2002: 4).   
 
The international context was also changing, although New Labour remained 
remarkably complacent about these changes until well into the mid 2000s (PIU 2002; 
DTI 2003).  Venezuela, under Hugo Chavez, rejoined OPEC in 1999 and OPEC were 
committing themselves, again, to genuine production constraint supported by non-
OPEC producers such as Mexico, Norway, Oman and Russia (Rutledge 2007: 908).  By 
the end of 1999 oil prices had doubled, albeit from an all time low at the start of the 
year.  In 2001 the Venezuelan National Assembly had passed a new Hydrocarbon Law 
effectively re-nationalising Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA). 
 
Concerns about prices, capacity, and levels of excess stocks available, were highlighted 
at the time of the ‘mini’ energy crisis during the cold winter of 2000.   In scenes not 
untypical of historical moments when energy had become subject to raised levels of 
public interest, protests had flared up about rising petrol prices which, in September 
2000, were the highest they had been for ten years.  Fuel protesters started to picket 
refineries, described by Tony Blair as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the UK fuel industry, and 
real fears that supplies would be affected started to mount (Blair 2010: 292).  The 
pickets, combined with the shock of high prices after such a prolonged period of falling 
prices, caused a rush to petrol stations and considerable pressure on surplus stocks 
(Helm 2003: 390). 
 
It is briefly worth noting how Prime Minister Blair claims to have responded, 
politically, to the pickets in that it signals a clear contradiction with prevailing ideas 
about energy governance and markets.  Blair was highly aware of public fears about 
supplies and harboured genuine concerns that petrol would not be able to flow properly 
from refineries to petrol stations, which generally require re-stocking every 48 hours.55  
In his words “…(w)ithout the refining plants, no blood flows to the arteries…” (Blair 
2010: 292).  His response was to “…stamp his political authority all over the 
situation…” with the help of the army and police.  His proposal to the police was that 
                                                
55 Blair	  thought	  that	  the	  Winter	  fuel	  protests	  of	  2000	  resulted	  in	  a	  strong	  dip	  in	  Labour’s	  performance	  in	  
the	  polls	  which,	  just	  ahead	  of	  the	  general	  election	  in	  May	  2001,	  was	  seriously	  bad	  news	  (Blair	  2010:	  
297).	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drivers should be instructed to cross picket lines with the help of the police, or be 
‘sacked’.  In addition, if necessary, the army would be drafted in to drive lorries and 
deal with any violence from protesters (Blair 2010: 296).  The treatment of the 
perceived threat to the UK’s ‘lifeblood’, i.e. supplies of energy, marks a strong contrast 
with the idea of energy as replaceable commodity, and to faith in the ability of markets 
to supply.  It suggests the continued existence at this time of the more old fashioned 
notion that threats to energy supplies can be viewed as a national security issue which 
requires the state, or in this case Prime Minister, to take ultimate responsibility.  This, in 
turn, raises questions about the degree to which the PEPP was perceived as such a 
successful model because of low energy prices, rather than because it was a particularly 
appropriate system for energy governance.  
 
This was, in addition, interpreted by some as an early warning to Ofgem and the DTI 
where assumptions were being made both about lower prices being a direct outcome of 
liberalisation and about this being an ongoing condition (Helm 2003: 390).  Depletion 
policy under the PEPP was now also beginning to open up to debate, especially given 
rising prices and the UK’s changing import-export position.  It was observed that 
privatisation, and private sector companies’ tendency towards shareholder returns, had 
encouraged “…producers to produce and sell as much gas as possible as fast as 
possible…” (Stern 2004: 1968; see also Kemp & Stephen 2007; Interview 13).  
Connections started to be highlighted between competition, liberalisation and an energy 
sector driven by cost reduction and the risks of local shortages to consumers through a 
lack of additional stocks being held by private companies (Mitchell 2002: 6). 
 
A couple of higher profile events, the ‘Enron scandal’ and the ‘California electricity 
crisis’, served to highlight the energy sector on a wider basis, beyond those institutions, 
and their advisors, directly involved in energy governance (Helm 2005).  California in 
particular raised questions about security of supply (PIU 2002: 7).  As California’s 
electricity sector had been liberalised in 1996, largely following the ‘UK model’, so 
when the blackouts of 2000 hit concerns were raised about the UK model (PIU 2002: 
15; Helm 2003: 387).  Further critiques, although not particularly high profile, followed 
of privatisation and liberalisation in energy – particularly marking electricity out as an 
area where such models do not function well (Borenstein 2002; Timney 2004).  These 
critiques could be seen as important given the degree to which the market model was 
being encouraged via various IGOs in the developing world. 
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The ‘Enron scandal’, however, was less referenced in energy circles, despite the interest 
shown from academics and other analysts interested the corporate and financial systems 
and market manipulation (see Friedrichs 2004; Widmaier 2005; Watson 2008).  Gross 
accounting malpractices, amongst other illegal dealings, were uncovered towards the 
end of 2001 and Enron plunged from its position as the largest international energy 
trader, and significant political lobbyist (Rutledge 2007: 903), to filing for bankruptcy 
by December 2001 (Hogan 2003: x).  Enron, primary amongst the ‘Mega Btu-
Marketers’, was seen as a primary enabler of the marketisation of energy.  Certainly its 
management had claimed that it was “leading the fight for competition” and that it was 
capable of allowing customers and suppliers to strike whatever bargains they found 
mutually advantageous (Stelzer 2002 in Rutledge 2007: 903).  Its demise, in such 
shocking circumstances, was widely covered, and its business practices condemned 
(Eichenwald 2002; Smith and Emshwiller 2003; McLean and Elkind 2003).   
 
This scandal, however, raised more questions in political circles about white-collar 
crime (Friedrichs 2004), and the popular prosecution of individuals, than it did lasting 
investigation into systems of energy regulation or into pro-market energy trade and 
governance.56  It was barely mentioned in UK energy policy documents except to 
comment that Enron’s collapse, as the largest energy trader, had impacted on the supply 
of electricity to the market (JESS 2002: 5; PIU 2002: 77). 
 
2.2 Concerns about Climate Policy 
New Labour came to office with the luxury of a decade of falling carbon dioxide 
emissions caused by the growth in gas over coal usage for electricity generation.57  They 
could, therefore, afford to maintain a high profile pro-climate narrative whilst not 
needing to address much change to existing structures of governance.  However, as the 
new century dawned it started to be suggested that the easy gains of the past were going 
to be difficult to replicate in future (DTI 2000a: 48; RCEP 2000: various; Helm 2003b: 
4). 
                                                
56 The	  new	  play	  ‘Enron’,	  on	  Broadway	  and	  London’s	  West	  End,	  is	  lasting	  testimony	  to	  the	  popularity	  of	  
this	  scandal,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  portrayals	  of	  white-­‐collar	  crime	  have	  broad	  appeal.	  
57	  Coal	  usage	  had	  dropped	  from	  74%	  of	  overall	  energy	  in	  1960	  to	  18%	  in	  1998,	  gas	  had	  risen	  from	  zero	  
to	  34%	  in	  the	  same	  time	  period	  (RCEP	  2000:	  67).	  	  Gas	  represented	  43%	  of	  the	  UK’s	  primary	  fuel	  mix	  by	  
2000	  (PIU	  2002:	  20).	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Even Government projections about future emission reductions did not, by 2000, look 
positive. A DTI paper reiterated that previous gains had been due to the reduction of 
coal in the energy mix, supporting again arguments for gas as the transition fuel.  It 
also, however, noted that in 2000 electricity produced from renewable sources was still 
5% - exactly the same as it had been in 1990 despite a decade of claimed support for 
renewables, read low carbon energy, via the NFFO (DTI 2000a: 32).  As already 
suggested, the vast majority of NFFO support had gone to underpinning costly nuclear 
electricity production. The future for emissions from the transport sector looked 
negative (DTI 2000a: 48). 
 
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP), which had been set up in 
1970 to advise the Queen and Parliament on environmental issues, and contribute to 
policy development, produced a significant report in 2000 (RCEP 2000).58  Overall the, 
incredibly detailed and long-term report outlined a negative picture of UK achievements 
in terms of climate policy and its ability to meet emissions reduction, energy efficiency 
and renewable energy targets.  Its concerns over UK policies were introduced thus 
(a)ccess to abundant and instantly available energy underlies our entire way of life, 
yet its impact on the environment is growing. This poses a radical challenge for the 
UK; a challenge that cannot be met successfully unless the government's energy 
policies and its environmental policies are coherent. A sustainable energy policy for 
the UK should protect the interests of generations to come, but it must also seek to 
achieve social justice, a higher quality of life and industrial competitiveness today.  
Achieving the right balance is formidably difficult; current policies do not strike it.  
(RCEP 2000: 1) 
 
The report clearly suggested that positive climate change mitigation could not be 
achieved through the current PEPP.  Ideas contained in this report about the requirement 
for energy and climate policy to be devised coherently, and about the profound 
difficulties of balancing needs of consumers, business and environmental objectives 
will be returned to later.59  As suggested by Rutledge the deep complexities 
associated with meeting various aspirations around energy and climate policy were, 
                                                
58	  The	  RCEP	  was	  ‘independent’,	  but	  funded	  by	  DEFRA.	  
59	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  electricity	  would	  go	  up	  as	  renewables	  grew	  in	  the	  fuel	  mix,	  but	  there	  
were	  still	  nearly	  four	  million	  homes	  living	  in	  ‘fuel	  poverty’	  as	  of	  2000	  (PIU	  2002:	  29).	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at this time, grossly underestimated (Rutledge 2007).  Despite their overt 
commitment to achieving climate goals Labour did seem happy to rely on the 
existing system to deliver goals, such as those committed to at Kyoto, which was a 
position increasingly at odds with other environmental and climate groups.  
 
Claims of multiple failings in UK energy and climate policy from such an established 
group were seen, in addition to the UK’s changing import-export status, as requiring a 
response from Government (Helm 2003: 392).  Environmental critics started at this 
time, particularly in the light of Labour’s failure to make changes despite their ‘green’ 
stance in opposition, to lament.  It seemed as if government believed that “…there is 
nothing that cannot be solved by the market” (Carter 2001: 63).  This was at a time 
when countries such as Germany, Sweden and Denmark were already producing 
positive results, in terms of renewable energy production as well as emissions 
reductions, as a result of policies previously adopted (cf. Mitchell 2008; Giddens 2009). 
 
 
3.	  	   The	  Performance	  and	  Innovation	  Unit	  (PIU)	  Energy	  Review	  2002	  
The need to respond to mounting concerns about becoming an oil and gas importer, 
accompanied by increasing pressure to address climate concerns, were suggested as 
being responsible for a Review of Energy Policy conducted in 2001 (Blair in PIU 2002: 
3).60  The review was conducted by the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), set up 
in July 2000 as an independent think-tank which would, however, report directly to the 
Prime Minister’s office.  Furthermore, the ‘Sponsor Minister’ for the energy review was 
Brian Wilson, Minister for Industry and Energy, who also acted as chair to the Advisory 
Group (PIU 2002: 17).  Hence claims that the PIU was, in practice, somewhat less than 
independent with only “…about half of the unit’s project teams staff…” drawn from 
outside Whitehall (Interview 13; cf. PIU 2002: 168).  There were further claims that the 
PIU energy review team was under-staffed and therefore too small to complete a really 
                                                
60	  One	  interviewee,	  very	  closely	  involved	  in	  the	  PIU	  energy	  review,	  has	  suggested	  that	  the	  idea	  for	  the	  
PIU	  came	  ‘from	  number	  10’	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  concern	  about	  dwindling	  UKCS	  supplies	  (Interview	  13).	  	  
Certainly	  the	  PIU	  does	  state	  that	  the	  review	  was	  requested	  by	  Tony	  Blair	  (PIU	  2002:	  15).	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thorough review which speaks to the idea of energy governance institutions being under 
capacity (Helm 2003: 397).61 
 
The review had three primary functions, “…to set out the objectives of energy policy… 
to 2050…”, “…to develop a framework for reconciling trade-offs among different 
objectives of energy policy…” and, most importantly, “…to develop a vision and 
strategy for achieving these objectives” (PIU 2002: 15).  Although some have suggested 
that a further function of the report was to disarm political opposition by showing that 
government was, indeed, addressing these issues (Helm 2003: 394).  Some members of 
the review team, including the team leader considered it to be a viable alternative to the 
PEPP and had hoped that it would result in policy change (Interviews 13 and 14). 
 
3.1 The PIU Energy Review: Challenging the PEPP 
The core stated aims of the review report were to consider how to address any 
challenges arising from the UK becoming increasingly dependent on imported oil and 
gas and the desire to deliver on increasingly demanding carbon reduction aims (PIU 
2002: 6).  As will be seen below, however, the primary focus of policy 
recommendations overall was on the area of meeting climate targets as it was 
considered that little change was needed to current systems to address energy security 
given the rather ‘benign’ international energy context (PIU 2002: 53; see also Rutledge 
2007: 909).  The review represented a curious mix of ideas from within climate 
narratives on energy, which challenged the PEPP, and ideas consistent with the PEPP.62 
 
As with other government documents on energy policy around this time, the PIU report 
dedicated much time and space to highlighting the importance of addressing climate 
change, but this review went further in terms of recommending governance changes to 
reflect these priorities.  The review openly addressed some of the key issues which had 
been raised in the RCEP 2000 report by suggesting new targets for energy efficiency 
                                                
61	  This	  view	  contrasts	  with	  that	  held	  by	  some	  within	  the	  review	  team	  who	  insist	  that	  the	  review	  was	  able	  
to	  offer	  the	  first,	  and	  last	  for	  some	  time,	  significant	  alternative	  to	  the	  PEPP	  (Mitchell	  2008:	  71;	  Interview	  
14).	  
62	  This	  represents	  a	  rather	  different	  view	  to	  Ian	  Rutledge	  whose	  analysis	  of	  the	  PIU	  report	  suggested	  
that	  it	  was	  an	  entirely	  pro-­‐PEPP	  exercise	  (Rutledge	  2007:	  910).	  	  This	  analysis,	  however,	  of	  the	  PIU	  
focuses	  in	  more	  detail	  on	  the	  climate	  policy	  sections	  of	  the	  report	  which	  suggest	  some	  quite	  significant	  
challenges	  to	  ‘business-­‐as-­‐usual’	  –	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  renewable	  energy	  sources.	  
 138 
and for renewables as a percentage of overall energy produced.  It recommended that 
the target for the proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources should be 
doubled to 20% by 2010 and with a further 20% in the following decade (PIU 2002: 6). 
On their estimations meeting the 2020 renewables target would result in electricity 
prices of only 5-6%, higher than otherwise expected (PIU 2002: 11).63  It was further 
recommended that energy efficiency targets should be changed such that an 
improvement of 20% should be achieved between 2002 and 2010 and a further 20% 
between 2010 and 2020 – this would serve to double the existing rate of improvement 
(PIU 2002: 10). 
 
The emphasis on renewable energy marked this report out from UK energy policy, 
particularly given the ongoing debate, referenced above, about whether or not to even 
continue with a renewables policy.  The PIU also represented a direct challenge to three 
of the existing levels of the PEPP – notably those of the objectives and instruments of 
energy policy and the physical structures of governance.  The report suggested that the 
DTI should adopt a new energy policy objective: 
…the pursuit of secure and competitively-priced means of meeting our energy needs, 
subject to the achievement of an environmentally sustainable energy system (PIU 
2002: 52).64 
 
What is of particular note is the clear use of the term ‘environmentally’ in the objective.  
As we saw above both Conservative and Labour governments had been able to pursue 
climate policy which reflected Bernstein’s compromise of liberal-environmentalism by 
adopting an understanding of ‘sustainable’ energy which encapsulated a strong element 
of economic growth.  The PIU review specifically recommends that the economic 
element be subordinated to the environmental element of sustainability within the new 
framework: 
Energy policy trade-offs affecting the period to 2012 should generally give priority to 
carbon reduction if there is a material risk of failing to meet internationally-agreed 
emissions targets (PIU 2002: 52). 
 
                                                
63	  This	  estimation	  was	  challenged	  by	  Dieter	  Helm	  who	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  did	  not	  include	  core	  hidden	  
costs	  (Helm	  2003:	  395).	  
64	  Emphasis	  author’s	  own.	  
 139 
This, in addition to changing the emphasis of energy policy, presented a direct challenge 
to the existing relationship between energy and climate policy whereby climate 
objectives could, and should, trump other energy policy objectives.  The suggestion that 
environmental considerations should trump financial ones was an entirely novel 
suggestion within elite energy politics at this time (cf. Interview 14).  Climate policy 
would, in addition, in practical terms have to be integrated within energy policymaking 
processes. 
 
Reflecting this idea, in chapter eight on institutions, the PIU recommended the creation 
of a single government department for climate change, energy and transport policy (PIU 
2002: 144).  The report did, however, recognise that as this “…fundamental change to 
existing departmental structures…” might take some time to achieve, in the meantime a 
‘Sustainable Energy Policy Unit’ should be established (PIU 2002: 6 and 144).  
Alongside energy and climate being re-politicised, or taken one step closer to public 
deliberation via direct representation at Cabinet level, the report also suggested much 
wider public involvement in energy.  Specifically they recommend that an extensive and 
extended process of public review should be initiated before any commitments were 
made to implement findings – a review that would take energy out of the narrow realm 
of Departmental policymakers and associated experts (PIU 2002: 13).  It was noted that 
the nation must not be “lulled into inaction” by the focus on long timescales in expert 
debates about energy and climate change.  Instead they must be made aware of the need 
to act now (PIU 2002: 14).65 
 
In addition to this core institutional change the PIU dedicated a whole section of the 
report to providing “…justification for government involvement in energy markets…”, 
specifically to meet environmental goals (PIU 2002: 32-52).  In terms of the PEPP level 
of instruments of policy, the report suggests the need for direct political intervention: 
(m)ultiple policy interventions are likely to be required to achieve energy efficiency 
objectives, with a mix of regulations, negotiated agreements and incentives (PIU 2002: 
111). 
                                                
65	  This	  suggestion	  reveals	  the	  extent	  of	  frustration	  experienced	  by	  climate	  analysts	  about	  public	  inaction	  
to	  respond	  to	  climate	  concerns	  which	  might	  be	  an	  indication	  of	  why	  some	  political	  protagonists	  later	  
started	  to	  utilise	  fears	  about	  energy	  security	  to	  underpin	  arguments	  for	  change.	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For example, direct government spending in research and development to support new 
energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies, taxation to raise the ‘cost of 
carbon’, and further regulation (PIU 2002: 42). 
 
The report also raised the important, but politically ‘hot’, question of growing road and 
air transportation and its impact on carbon dioxide emissions.  It suggested a tax on 
aviation (PIU 2002: 12) that Government should work to reduce transport demand (PIU 
2002: 94) and new policy to support improved energy efficiency in vehicles (PIU 2002: 
110). 
 
3.2 The PIU Energy Review and Signs of Continuity 
Alongside the changes to energy governance structures and policies suggested in the 
2002 review, a dialogue persists in support of market liberalisation, competition and 
cost efficiency.  The review does, in some senses therefore, also represent support for 
certain pro-market ideas and, as a result, for the PEPP level of ideas about energy 
governance (Rutledge 2007: 909).  The report claims up front that the introduction of 
liberalised and competitive energy markets in the UK “…has been a success, and this 
should provide the cornerstone of future policy…” (PIU 2002: 5).  Some specific 
benefits of liberalisation, it is stated, have been experienced by the ‘fuel poor’ as 
competition has driven down prices for end consumers (PIU 2002: 6). The report 
suggests, in line with usual DTI thinking, that liberalised markets and their extension to 
Europe have represented “…an important contribution to energy security...” (PIU 2002: 
5, and 7).66 
 
What is particularly noticeable, when considering continuity in energy policy, is the 
various references to the “benign” and “healthy” environment for energy security, even 
given the UK’s move to importer of oil and gas (PIU 2002: 6 and 53-54).  For example 
this observation that “… there appear to be no pressing problems connected with 
increased dependence on gas, including gas imported from overseas”’ (PIU 2002: 53).  
What is surprising is that the renationalisation of PdVSA, the Venezuelan oil and gas 
enterprise, and Venezuela’s re-entrance into OPEC are not mentioned as constituting a 
                                                
66	  The	  language	  favourable	  to	  pro-­‐market	  ideas,	  and	  achievements	  under	  the	  PEPP,	  might	  be	  viewed	  as	  
a	  sign	  of	  the	  political	  awareness	  of	  those	  who	  wrote	  the	  report.	  	  They	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  changes	  that	  
they	  were	  requesting	  to	  ‘business	  as	  usual’,	  but	  may	  have	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  temper	  these	  challenges	  with	  
recognition	  of	  past	  achievements.	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possible threat.  The September 11 attacks, escalating energy prices and the 2000 
refinery pickets are recognised but only in passing and as a signal to start thinking about 
future security.   This, rather sanguine, perception of the international energy 
environment compares markedly to the narrative which emerges in the mid-2000s post 
the renationalisation of Russian energy assets and the Russia-Ukraine gas transit 
dispute.  
 
The report could be read as a little lukewarm in parts about meeting emissions targets.  
For example it suggests at one stage that 
…it would make no sense to incur abatement costs in the UK and thereby harm our 
international competitiveness, if others were not contributing (PIU 2002: 9). 
The report does, by the same token, expect that the ‘international community’ may well 
start to set stringent carbon emission reduction targets that the UK would need to be 
ready to meet (PIU 2002: 5).  In addition targets suggested appear still to be ‘aims’ 
which are not legally binding which would, in turn, not force change upon those less 
willing to be involved.  These recommendations about emissions targets run alongside 
the rather different approach, referenced above, taken to adopting a serious approach to 
facilitating energy production from renewable sources. 
 
Environmental observers, such as the Green Party, were also keen to point out other 
non-environmental aspects of the review (Green Party 2003).  They point in particular 
to the decisions taken to keep the nuclear option open (PIU 2002: 6 and 12) and to the 
lack of commitment to making clear decisions which would lead to generators 
favouring renewable over fossil fuels.  The PIU refers, in line with PEPP thinking, 
directly to this question: 
(s)ome submissions to the review have suggested that Government should decide the 
fuel mix to be used for electricity generation.  This review has rejected these proposals 
on the grounds that they would seriously distort the efficient functioning of the energy 
markets (PIU 2002: 7) 
 
3.3 Competing Narratives within the PIU and Beyond 
This mix of challenges to and support of the existing system reflects, perhaps, the mix 
of people involved in the review process and the need to balance views (Interview 13; 
Interview 14).  Even within the review team individuals had different goals in mind 
reflecting competing energy perspectives – largely pro-market and climate.  Some were 
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angling for quite significant change, while others were more comfortable with 
amendments around the existing status quo (Interview 13).  On balance, however, the 
PIU review appears to have been the first directly Government sponsored report which 
raised serious questions about the existing energy governance structure but primarily in 
terms of how energy and climate policy should inter-relate in practice (cf. Mitchell 
2008). 
 
However, what ultimately happened to the PIU review suggestions shows that those 
involved in UK energy policymaking were not ready for change – from Number Ten 
down to Ofgem and the DTI (Interviews 13 and 14).  The fate of the review is already 
hinted at in the introduction by Tony Blair, wherein he emphasises ‘choices’ faced by 
government and the idea of “keeping our options open” (PIU 2002: 3).  This approach is 
re-iterated at the end of the introduction when the Prime Minister states that this report 
“…is not a statement of government policy…” (Blair in PIU 2002: 4). 
 
One of those involved in conducting the PIU review, Professor Catherine Mitchell, has 
suggested that resistance to the PIU’s recommendations kicked in between the 
publication of the report and the 2003 White Paper which firmly returned “…energy 
policy to the current paradigm fold…” (Mitchell 2008: 122; cf. Interviews 13 and 14).  
Another analysis of energy policy at the time points out that the Treasury, DTI and 
Ofgem each became involved between the PIU and subsequent White Paper, in an effort 
to undermine support for its suggestions.  Specifically it has been suggested that Callum 
McCarthy, then Chairman and Chief Executive of Ofgem, resisted the addition of a firm 
renewable energy objective or strategy (Helm 2003: 343; Interview 13). One insider 
suggested that Blair had considered the report to be a ‘step too far’ (Interview 13), 
others that it was only ever an exercise in ‘buying time’ (Helm 2003: 394).67  
 
 
4.	  	   ‘Our	  Energy	  Future:	  Creating	  a	  Low	  Carbon	  Economy’:	  2003	  Energy	  
White	  Paper	  
 
                                                
67	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  observation	  made	  in	  hindsight	  reflecting	  the	  period	  of	  negotiation,	  referenced	  
here,	  that	  had	  gone	  on	  between	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Energy	  Review	  and	  the	  production	  of	  the	  DTI’s	  
White	  Paper	  in	  2003.	  	  In	  2002	  Dieter	  Helm	  had	  claimed	  that	  the	  energy	  review	  marked	  ‘…	  a	  turning	  
point	  in	  energy	  policy’	  (Helm	  2002:	  5).	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Liberalised and competitive markets will continue to be a cornerstone of energy 
policy (DTI 2003: 11; cf. DTI 2003: 15) 
 
The Government neither immediately endorsed nor carried forward the majority of the 
PIU’s recommendations of change to existing energy governance although it did follow 
more closely suggestions made with regard to energy supply which, anyway, did not 
imply much change.  The 2003 White Paper overall reflected a combination of overt 
commitment to a lower carbon economy without adopting new ideas about how to 
achieve such a future, despite the range of alternative suggestions received from the 
RCEP and PIU reports.  As such this White Paper was criticised as appearing to be 
‘radical’ whilst, in effect, lacking in substance or any profound policy change (Helm 
2003: 401; Mitchell 2008: 131; cf. van der Horst 2005).68   
 
4.1 The New Objectives of Energy Policy 
In his introduction to the 2003 Energy White Paper, Tony Blair states that “(o)ur 
country needs a new energy policy…” primarily in order to meet the environmental goal 
of shifting the UK towards a low carbon economy but also in recognition of becoming 
an importer (DTI 2003: 6).  This claim of new energy policy was met, however, almost 
exclusively through including new ‘objectives’ for energy policy.  Under Hall’s version 
of paradigm shift, and under the definition of the PEPP used here, new objectives ought 
to have been significant given the emphasis placed on the requirement for objectives to 
change for paradigm shift to take place (Hall 1993: 279).  In this instance, the new 
objectives seemed to have appeared more as a means of buying time and nodding in the 
direction of climate protagonists seeking a greater degree of change, whilst otherwise 
maintaining the status quo. 
 
In 2002 the primary stated objective of energy policy had remained the maintenance of 
a secure, reliable and competitive energy system.  In the 2003 White Paper two 
important new objectives were added, arguably complicating, at least in theory, that 
which the DTI was committed to deliver: 
• to put ourselves on a path to cut the UK’s carbon dioxide emissions… by 
some 60% from current levels by about 2050;  
• to maintain reliability of energy supplies;  
                                                
68	  The	  White	  Paper	  was	  reportedly	  written	  by	  Tony	  White,	  a	  former	  City	  broker	  (Interview	  13).	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• to promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, helping to raise the 
rate of sustained economic growth and productivity; 
• to ensure that every home is adequately and affordably heated (DTI 2003: 
11) 
The two new goals, climate and energy poverty related, represented some change from 
the relatively limited goal of providing secure and reliable energy via competitive 
markets and improving cost structures that had previously been actively pursued (DTI 
1998: 5).  
 
4.1.1 Cut Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
The environment at this point became one of the above ‘four pillars’ upon which energy 
policy would, according to Prime Minister Blair, rest (Blair in DTI 2003: 3).  This does 
represent a departure from previous energy policy which did not include climate targets 
as formal objectives and as such should be significant, as discussed below, in terms of 
measuring profound governance change.  
 
However, we can cast doubt on the significance of this particular new objective in a 
number of ways.  The climate target formally adopted, again with direct reference to the 
RCEP, but not the PIU report, was nothing if not vague.  Instead of just stating that the 
UK would meet a new, specific emissions reduction target, the actual commitment 
given was to “put ourselves on a path” to cut carbon dioxide emissions (DTI 2003: 11).  
The target itself, to cut by some 60% by about 2050, is equally vaguely worded leaving 
it open to interpretation as to whether it is a firm commitment or just an aim (DTI 2003: 
11).69  As will be seen more clearly in the next chapter, five, the DTI did not take this 
new target as necessarily precise or binding when considering energy policy (Interviews 
5, 13, 14, 15, and 16). 
 
Aside from the superficially exacting, but in reality rather vague, carbon emissions 
target the White Paper did not commit to the recommended renewable target of 20% of 
energy by 2010 – the commitment was maintained instead at 10% by 2020 (DTI 2003: 
45).  It has been suggested that DEFRA gave up on the 20% target in order to gain the 
DTI’s agreement that there would have to be a full White Paper review before actively 
supporting any nuclear new-builds (Interview 14).  It has also been claimed that the 
nuclear lobby, which has been politically influential over time, was vociferously against 
                                                
69	  Emphasis	  author’s	  own.	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the 20% target and that they also battled hard to keep the target at 10%.  This lobby is 
also understood to have been instrumental in reducing the five year moratorium on 
nuclear, recommended in the PIU report, down to an agreement that there would have to 
be a white paper (Interview 14). 
 
The White Paper does little to suggest active genuine engagement at this stage, 
therefore, with those alternative narratives which had suggested different 
methodological approaches to achieving a low carbon future.  As such, continuity of 
governance institutions, instruments and ideas was largely maintained at this time in 
that both the 2003 White Paper and the later, 2004, FCO report on energy almost 
exclusively emphasise the role of markets, competition and the private sector in 
delivering climate change goals (DTI 2003; FCO et al 2004).  One more specific 
example of methodological continuity is the approach suggested to encourage 
renewable energy and energy efficiency: 
 … by making our intentions clear we aim to provide the signals needed for firms to 
invest – and to help British manufacturers to be ahead of the game in developing the 
green technologies that we expect to play a large part in the world’s future prosperity 
(DTI 2003: 13). 
 
Other strategies, focused on international energy and climate relations, again displayed 
continuity.  The paper made much of the role that the UK would play in international 
climate negotiations in terms of “showing leadership” in the attempts to bring more 
countries into the Kyoto Protocol (DTI 2003: 25).  The UK’s limited, 2%, contribution 
to overall carbon dioxide emissions is re-iterated thus emphasising the idea that slowing 
climate change is a global, not precisely UK project (DTI 2003: 25).  The other major 
commitment made is the adoption of the new EU emissions trading scheme (ETS), the 
first phase of which was due to start in January 2005, and making it “…a central plank 
of our future emissions reductions policies…”.  Thereby again committing the 
responsibility of delivering carbon savings to “market signals” (DTI 2003: 29). 
  
It is apparent, therefore, that only certain climate ideas were at this time taken up, many 
of them are used in the lengthy sections dedicated to showing that climate change is 
‘real’ (DTI 2003: 6-9 and 22-24).  Meanwhile, other specific climate policy ideas, such 
as those that challenge existing market-oriented governance structures as well as the 
20% renewables target, were not followed.  This approach chimes remarkably well with 
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Steven Bernstein’s observations about the compromise of liberal-environmentalism 
discussed in chapters one and two (Bernstein 2001: 187).  There is certainly no mention 
of allowing climate objectives to trump others within instances wherein ‘trade-offs’ 
arise, of significant political intervention to achieve climate goals, or of creating a new 
department combining responsibility for both climate and energy policymaking.70  The 
emphasis was, in addition, more on future strategies, such as the EU ETS and further 
international negotiations, and less on adopting strategies now, thereby delaying 
possible judgement of success. 
 
The White Paper did suggest continuing with a few non-economic, or more 
interventionist, instruments employed in the drive to reduce emissions, such as small 
capital grants and a more supportive approach to planning.  The paper stated continued 
commitment for the Renewables Obligation (RO) whilst also leaving it open to review, 
but not until 2005 (DTI 2003: 46; Mitchell 2008: 131).71  The only practical difference 
in support for renewable energy at this point was an additional £60m of capital grants in 
2002-05 spending review period (DTI 2003: 46), in spite of the emphasis placed on the 
desperate need for investment in renewable, and energy efficiency, research and 
development in both the PIU and RCEP reports.  Certainly £60 million over four years 
looks like a drop in the ocean next to White Paper estimates that between £1.1 billion 
and £1.5 billion each year would be required to boost renewable energy only (Mitchell 
2008: 131).  
 
4.1.2 Ensure Every Home is Adequately and Affordably Heated 
As has already been discussed, New Labour represented a wide coalition of interests 
and in energy, as other areas, policymaking needed in theory to address this range of 
constituents, including those less financially endowed.  The second new policy 
objective for energy more specifically committed the DTI to addressing issues around 
energy poverty, which had been more indirectly alluded to in the previous objective by 
targeting affordable, as well as stable and reliable, supplies of energy.   
                                                
70	  Although	  a	  new	  Sustainable	  Energy	  Policy	  Network	  was	  suggested,	  to	  be	  based	  in	  the	  DTI’s	  Energy	  
Strategy	  Unity	  but	  to	  be	  made	  up	  of	  representatives	  from	  the	  DTI,	  DEFRA,	  the	  FCO,	  the	  Treasury,	  the	  
OPDM,	  DfT,	  the	  Scotland	  Office,	  the	  Wales	  Office	  and	  the	  Devolved	  Administrations	  (DTI	  2003:	  113).	  
71	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  NFFO	  which	  had	  effectively	  supported	  nuclear	  (Mitchell	  and	  Connor	  2004;	  van	  der	  
Horst	  2005).	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  RO	  was	  described	  by	  one	  analyst,	  and	  government	  advisor,	  as	  an	  even	  more	  
market-­‐oriented	  system	  than	  the	  NFFO	  providing	  little	  real	  support	  for	  renewables	  (Mitchell	  2008:	  128).	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The wording of the energy poverty objective is less vague than that used in 
communicating the climate objective but still contains a possible ‘get-out-clause’: 
We aim that as far as reasonably practicable no household in Britain should be living 
in fuel poverty by 2016-18 (DTI 2003: 107). 
Action on meeting energy poverty objectives, however, was slightly less focused on the 
future than that planned for climate targets as legal obligations had already been made 
under the ‘Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act’ of 2000 (Rutledge 2007: 906).  
This White Paper formalised the target date(s) by which fuel poverty was to be, where 
practicable, eradicated (DTI 2003: 107).72   
 
It was claimed that achievements thus far in reducing energy poverty, to 3 million 
households in 2003 from 5.5 million in 1996, had been reached via ‘competitive’, read 
low, energy prices (DTI 2003: 107; see also Rutledge 2007: 913). And, to the extent 
that New Labour continued to ascribe such low prices to liberalisation and competition, 
the understanding was that maintaining such a framework would contribute, certainly 
theoretically, to further reductions.  Of the 3 million households measured as being ‘fuel 
poor’ as of 2003 it was also suggested that “economic growth” could be expected to 
take 1 million out of fuel poverty by 2010 (DTI 2003: 107).  Again, implying that 
specific energy policies would not be needed to ride to the rescue. 
 
Ian Rutledge has claimed, however, that some slight complications were starting to arise 
between the laudable energy poverty objectives, and emerging views that energy prices 
would start to rise.  To address this potential conflict the DTI had changed its 
commitments.  As such the DTI’s mandate to deliver electricity prices that are in the 
lower half of the EU/G7 price basket was, at this stage, discarded.  Instead what was 
instituted in its place was a commitment to ensure that the UK “…ranks in the top three 
most competitive energy markets in the EU and G7…” (Rutledge 2007: 913).  This 
would, again, not require changes to policy as usual, nor to the commitment to the 
internationalisation of marketised energy. 
 
No mention was made, however, of the potential trade-offs that might arise between 
growing the percentage of electricity from renewable energy sources, which are more 
                                                
72	  Emphasis	  author’s	  own.	  	  The	  ‘fuel	  poor’	  were	  defined	  as	  those	  needing	  to	  spend	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  
their	  income	  to	  heat	  their	  homes.	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expensive to deliver, and energy poverty (Rutledge 2007: 907).   As we have seen, the 
PIU had suggested a 5-6% increase in electricity prices over expected levels if 
renewable targets were to be met, and these were viewed by others as being very much 
at the low end of expectations (PIU 2002: 11).  The positive relationship between 
energy poverty and environmental measures is regularly highlighted – for example 
energy efficiency gains would serve to lower fuel poverty (DTI 2003: 107).   
 
The effectiveness of this ‘new’ energy poverty commitment could really only be 
measured at some point in the future – but if measures adopted were not successful this 
would, if widely noticed, leave energy policy even more open to challenge.73  This is all 
the more so as the 2003 White Paper committed so openly to existing instruments in 
achieving new objectives and it also committed the DTI to formally reporting on 
progress made in terms both of environmental and social, or energy poverty, objectives.  
In terms of considering the willingness of Government to commit energy policy to 
eradicating energy poverty, it is also worth noting that the number of households 
considered energy poor had fallen annually since 1996 and were, in 2003, at the lowest 
point for some considerable time (DTI 2011: 3). 
 
4.2 The UK’s Fuel Mix Projections 
It is worth spending some short time here considering the question of fuel mix.   This 
was an important question as the Energy Directorate within the DTI was outwardly 
adamant that policy should be “technology blind” in strict contrast to previous planning 
practices (Mitchell 2008: 122).  The 2003 White Paper overtly confirms, as have 
interviews undertaken in DECC and Ofgem, that it was widely understood that it was 
not the place of government to set targets for the share of total energy to be met by 
different fuels due to the belief that “Government is not equipped to decide the 
composition of the fuel mix” (DTI 2003: 11 and 87; cf. Interviews 1 and 15; Lawson 
1989). The likely future UK fuel mix is by contrast, however, discussed at some length 
including, as above, the role of renewable electricity. 
 
The objective of reducing emissions had placed the emphasis on relatively clean and 
sustainable energy– but renewables were only predicted to provide 20% of UK energy 
                                                
73	  As	  it	  has	  transpired,	  DECC	  has	  reported	  that	  in	  2009	  5.5million	  households	  are	  still	  living	  in	  fuel	  
poverty	  –	  a	  marked	  increase	  from	  3m	  as	  of	  2003	  when	  the	  fuel	  poverty	  objective	  was	  added	  as	  a	  
commitment	  for	  energy	  policy	  (DECC	  2011)	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requirements by 2020 and were not formally targeted to do so (DTI 2003: 12).  
However, other objectives of energy policy such as secure and reliable energy bring 
with them other commitments, commitments seen as fundamental (Interview 16).  In 
response to the need for reliable energy the 2003 White Paper underpins the role of gas 
as a transition fuel. Gas had over the course of the 1990s been considered secure and 
reliable, not to mention convenient, due to indigenous production.  The replacement of 
much coal with gas-fired electricity generation in the 1990s had already had a positive 
impact on carbon dioxide emissions (DETR 2000; RCEP 2000; PIU 2002), allowing 
New Labour in the 1990s to be vociferously pro-climate while not adjusting policy.   
 
Gas was expected to play a major role in future UK electricity generation due to the 
relatively lower carbon emissions but also due to cost considerations (Helm 2003: 
365).74  The anticipated role of gas was also to be boosted both by carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) and new efficient boiler technology – both of which were expected to 
come online in the short to medium term.  This perception of gas as the transition fuel, 
as will be argued in chapter five, was to be significantly challenged around the middle 
of the 2000s, specifically post the Russo-Ukrainian gas transit dispute.   
 
Coal, as highlighted in chapter three, had historically been the British fuel, large 
indigenous supplies having facilitated the Industrial Revolution, and had been protected 
by state policy throughout much of the 20th century.  The DTI in 1998 had done an, 
albeit temporary, deal to support coal further.  However, the 2003 White Paper 
attempted a break with this tradition by suggesting that coal could only remain a 
significant part of the UK fuel mix in future “…if ways of reducing carbon emissions 
can be found.” (DTI 2003: 12)   
 
Likewise nuclear was at this time out of favour, despite the indirect support it had 
continued to receive under New Labour via the non-fossil fuel obligation (NFFO) and 
consistent lobbying from pro-nuclear groups (Interview 13 and 14).  The 2003 White 
Paper, in pointing out its lack of cost effectiveness and environmental concerns about 
waste, basically puts nuclear ‘on hold’: 
Nuclear power is currently an important source of carbon-free electricity. However, 
                                                
74	  For	  an	  interesting	  report	  on	  the	  arguments	  supporting	  gas	  as	  the	  bridge,	  or	  transition,	  fuel	  between	  a	  
carbon	  and	  non-­‐carbon	  economy	  see	  ‘Natural	  Gas:	  a	  Bridge	  Fuel	  for	  the	  Twenty-­‐first	  Century”:	  
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/08/bridge_fuel.html	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its current economics make it an unattractive option for new, carbon-free generating 
capacity and there are also important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved.  These 
issues include our legacy waste and continued waste arising from other sources. This 
white paper does not contain specific proposals for building new nuclear power 
stations. (DTI 2003: 12) 
 
What the White Paper fails to mention in that in 2002, when the privatised nuclear 
generator responsible for around 20% of electricity in England and Wales, faced 
financial crisis the Government has been ‘compelled’ to partially re-nationalise it 
(Rutledge 2007: 911).  What can be taken from this is that an energy company was 
considered too important to fail, due to its position within UK electricity supply.  This 
shows another important contrast between the PEPP, which so deeply influenced the 
practice of technocrats in the DTI and Ofgem, and other political reactions to perceived 
threats to energy supply. 
 
The White Paper also raises the question of investment requirements, and not just in 
renewable energy and energy efficiency which has already been mentioned.  Specific 
assumptions were made which underpin the need for further high degrees of investment 
– namely a higher percentage of renewable energy in the electricity mix impacting upon 
distribution capabilities and lower coal and nuclear electricity production (DTI 2003: 
10).  In the introductory section of the 2003 White Paper it is stated that one of the three 
main challenges facing ‘us’, aside from climate and declining indigenous supplies, is 
growing recognition of the need to update much of the UK’s energy infrastructure.  
 
4.3 UK Foreign Policy and the Liberalisation Agenda 
A reading of the international energy section of the 2003 White Paper reads like a very 
particular homage to ‘good governance’ in energy, positive economic interdependence 
and the growth of ‘freely trading’ energy markets.  As Rutledge has suggested  
(t)he free market fundamentalism already eminent in previous statements of New 
Labour’s energy policy was given full throttle in the White Paper of February 2003…  
As usual it was all going to happen via ‘competitive markets’ (Rutledge 2007: 911) 
The PIU report had not recognised international energy events as requiring much in the 
way of policy response and the White Paper took the same approach. 
 
 151 
Any analysis of UK foreign policy post 2001 should also be understood within the 
context of the September 11 attacks, and the subsequent launch of the War on Terror, 
particularly in that political capacity was very much focused on them at this stage.75  In 
2002 the JESS working group on energy security had already began to build foreign 
policy considerations into its proceedings (Rutledge 2007: 911).  In 2003 the Foreign 
Office for the first time produced a document outlining the ‘UK’s International 
Priorities’ and included amongst those were securing environmental change and 
managing declining indigenous supplies of energy (FCO 2003). The emphasis of UK 
energy foreign policy, again such as it existed as a comprehensive foreign policy area, 
continued to be on multilateral co-operation to ensure open and competitive markets on 
a wider international scale (DTI 2003; FCO et al 2004). 
 
The overall picture painted of the international context within which the UK energy 
markets would increasingly operate was overall ‘benign’, which could be seen as 
surprising given recent OPEC declarations, volatile energy prices and military invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. Such a benign view might have been underpinned from a pro-
market perspective, however, by the development of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 
and its inclusion of two major energy exporters, Russia and Norway.  This development 
was expected to provide a good degree of support to the process of internationalising 
free trade norms in practice.  As has been suggested: 
An international agenda for oil and gas is a sine qua non however, given the UK’s 
increasing dependence on imports  (CEPMLP 2006: 19) 
 
The 2003 White Paper further suggested that oil and gas were in plentiful supply: 
(w)orld wide fossil fuel resources are very large.  Oil is the world’s most important 
fuel, accounting for 40% of global primary energy consumption.  That there is no 
                                                
75	  This	  chapter	  does	  not	  have	  the	  space	  or	  capacity	  to	  question	  in	  detail	  claims	  that	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  
for	  embarking	  on	  the	  Iraq	  War	  was	  because	  Iraq	  has	  large	  supplies	  of	  oil	  (see	  for	  example	  Rutledge	  
2007:	  912;	  Greenpeace	  2006;	  Kaldor	  et	  al	  2007).	  	  What	  can,	  briefly,	  be	  said	  is	  that	  fossil	  fuels	  seem	  to	  
have	  coincided	  with	  British	  military	  action	  on	  many	  occasions	  since	  the	  second	  World	  War:	  Suez	  (route	  
through	  which	  oil	  tankers	  travel);	  Iraq	  (large	  oil	  reserves);	  Afghanistan	  (major	  pipeline	  route);	  and	  now	  
Libya	  (large	  oil	  reserves).	  	  The	  lack	  of	  overt	  political	  mention	  of	  access	  to	  fossil	  fuels	  as	  a	  criteria	  for	  war	  
might	  be	  seen,	  however,	  as	  another	  example	  of	  ‘secretised’	  depoliticisation,	  and	  might	  serve	  also	  to	  
suggest	  the	  longevity	  of	  ideas	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  that	  access	  to	  Britain.	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shortage of oil and gas resources globally means that supplies are unlikely to be 
disrupted for long… (DTI 2003: 79) 
Assumptions about positive economic interdependence underpinned the idea that 
becoming an importer once more need not present too many difficulties (DTI 2003: 14).  
This was more particularly due to achievements so far in liberalising markets: 
(o)il and – currently to a lesser extent – gas are internationally traded commodities.  
And all countries, whether import-dependent or not, have a common interest in 
promoting open markets and predictable prices.  (DTI 2003: 78) 
 
It was also suggested that any potential future problems would most probably be based 
around “…global anti-competitive practices and illiquid markets…” (DTI 2003: 79).  
Underpinning the DTI/FCO energy strategy, therefore, were ideas about the need to 
actively push for further political uptake of market rules and good governance abroad 
(DTI 2003: 80; FCO et al 2004: 14).  The UK would continue to pursue economic 
reform in key producing areas and, as such, liberal markets would continue to serve as 
the most effective method of maintaining energy security (DTI 2003: 14 and 79).  EU 
energy ministers had agreed an energy liberalisation package in November 2002, a 
package that the UK was considered to have instigated, and this was seen as a major 
step towards the development of liquid international gas markets and a further boost to 
energy security (DTI 2003: 81-82; FCO 2004: 13).   
 
4.4 Suppliers and Diversity 
Some thought was given over at this time to considering where oil and gas supplies 
would come from in future. In terms of oil, a high degree of faith was placed in the 
ability of international oil markets to underpin reliable trade at ‘market’ prices.  In 
addition, some brief discussion was given over to UK support for IEA arrangements in 
the event of oil supply disruptions and to continuing to work to increase the 
transparency, diversity and liquidity in international oil market (DTI 2003: 81). 
 
Where gas comes from was more important to consider from a pro-market perspective 
than oil as it was, and still is, largely traded on long-term contracts rather than ‘at spot’ 
in international markets.  Norway is mentioned as the key provider of gas to the UK, 
given existing infrastructure in the North Sea, proximity to the UK and a new treaty 
which was, at the time of the 2003 White Paper, being put in place (DTI 2003: 79). 
Russia was also at this time mentioned as an important fossil fuel provider going 
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forward for Europe and the UK (PIU 2002: 64; DTI 2003: 80).  The rate of production 
and export growth in Russian oil and gas had been significant over the course of the late 
1990s and early 2000s and Russian fossil fuels had been filling the European supply 
‘gap’ as the North Sea declined helping to keep prices stable.  It was pointed out in the 
White Paper that  
Russia has the largest gas reserves… and has been exporting gas to Western Europe 
for over 30 years without interruption (DTI 2003: 79). 
 
In June of 2003 Vladimir Putin had paid an official visit to London and participated in a 
joint energy summit designed to progress the bi-lateral energy, and wider commercial, 
relationship.  At the public press conference, which accompanied this event, President 
Putin and Prime Minister Blair announced that they had both signed the ‘memorandum 
of cooperation’ on the project to build the North European gas pipeline, otherwise 
known as Nordstream (Number 10 2003).76  The idea was that Russian gas would reach 
the UK via the new pipeline system and a new interconnector between Belgium and the 
UK (DTI 2003: 80).77 Although some emphasis in the 2003 White Paper was placed on 
supply diversity, the reality was that Norway would be providing the lion’s share of UK 
gas, with the intention that Russia would come second (JESS 2006).   
 
In 2002 a House of Commons report on Russia raised the question of whether or not the 
EU should consider a more active role, on behalf of Member States, to “…lock in 
Russia as a major supplier of oil as well as gas over the next two decades, given 
uncertainties in the Middle East” (House of Commons 2002: 89).  This excerpt gives us, 
perhaps, some insight into thinking about Russia’s potential role as supplier – as a more 
reliable alternative to the Middle East (Leaver 2005: 15; Allison 2006: 167).  Russia’s 
progress, albeit slow, through a process of liberalisation and adoption of ‘best practice’ 
meant that they appeared to be a ‘more reliable’ supplier as much in terms of its 
previous track record as in terms of its adoption of a ‘better’ political system.  In 
                                                
76	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  Prime	  Minister	  Blair	  had	  been	  very	  keen	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  quickly	  
developing	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  new	  Russian	  President,	  Putin.	  	  Blair	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  foreign	  
dignitaries	  to	  visit	  Moscow	  and	  London	  had	  been	  one	  of	  Putin’s	  first	  official	  visits	  (Interview	  19).	  
77	  In	  2003	  it	  also	  appeared	  that	  Putin	  had	  given	  his	  personal	  endorsement	  of	  the	  TNK-­‐BP	  Production	  
Sharing	  Agreement	  (PSA),	  which	  was	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  in	  Russia	  (Locatelli	  2006;	  Brill	  Olcott	  2004).	  	  The	  
UK	  subsequently	  became	  the	  largest	  investor	  in	  Russia	  (Number	  10	  2003;	  Lee	  2007).	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addition, Russia was not a member of OPEC, and was signatory, as mentioned, to the 
ECT. 
 
Further liberalisation of Russian gas markets was, however, understood as being 
necessary and should be actively encouraged by the UK, mainly via multilateral 
relations through the EU and IEA (DTI 2003: 5).  This was important in terms of 
improving the investment climate for Russia and therefore the outlook for energy 
supplies:  
…(t)he biggest single issue on gas pricing involves Russia and its very low prices for 
domestic (both household and industrial) supply. The danger is that low prices will 
deter investors from entering the market and new production capacity will not be 
developed, with negative effects on our security of supply (FCO et al 2004: 15)78 
In such a way, ideas about what liberalisation, competition and free markets could 
achieve in terms of international energy security and important investment in fossil 
fuels firmly underpinned UK energy foreign policy and decisions about suppliers.  
Theoretically, of course, Government should not need to make specific decisions about 
suppliers but even at this stage, given Putin’s trip to London, it appears that some ‘top 
down’ involvement was understood to be required to secure supply deals.  The decision 
to encourage direct supply relations with Russia, on the strength of their increased 
reliability given their ‘pro-market’ progression, seems highly ironic in hindsight and 
perhaps highlights the degree to which energy policymaking had been taken for granted 
and left with minimal dedicated capacity. 
 
 
Conclusions	  
This chapter has emphasised an era, between 2000 and 2003, of consistency within the 
PEPP by painting a picture of a somewhat path dependent, conservative UK energy 
policy-making process.  What is particularly notable, given Hall’s emphasis on the role 
of changing objectives in measuring paradigm shift, is that the objectives of UK energy 
policy appeared to change whilst the other four levels remained consistent.  This 
consistency has been apparent within energy policy documents, in how international 
                                                
78	  Of	  course,	  by	  this	  stage,	  as	  already	  mentioned,	  the	  UK	  was	  already	  the	  largest	  investor	  in	  Russia	  due	  
to	  energy	  sector	  investments	  via,	  among	  others,	  BP.	  	  This	  idea	  that	  oil	  and	  gas	  investors	  would	  be	  put	  
off	  investing	  in	  Russia	  if	  they	  did	  not	  adopt	  ‘better’	  governance	  practices	  remained	  key	  to	  British	  
thinking.	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events were perceived, and in decisions made and not made.  The consistency of policy 
instruments and physical structures of governance are notable in the light of some 
reasonably serious challenges in the early part of the 2000s from quasi-government 
institutions and other political protagonists.  The new carbon dioxide emissions 
reduction target may well have been offered as a weak compromise, to quell political 
opposition emanating from a ‘climate’ perspective, and it appears to have been 
effective, at least for a few years.   
 
On the evidence of this chapter, it appears that the PEPP, and the particular way in 
which it was constructed, served not only to address new problems with old policies, 
but also within old structures.  The particular endurance of sets of ideas about energy 
and governance can be put forward as an explanation for why the objectives of energy 
policy changed while other levels remained constant, and this will be discussed in detail 
in chapter seven.  It might also be possible to question, given the vague wording of new 
objectives, the degree to which policymakers were actually expected to meet these 
objectives. 
 
The strategy adopted, whether it represented an attempt to ‘buy time’ or to compromise 
opposition, became increasingly higher risk.  By acknowledging the new problems, and 
by including them, no matter how vaguely, within the objectives of energy policy, the 
DTI and Ofgem were leaving themselves open to yet more convincing critique should 
they fail to meet those targets.79  These types of critique would be harder to make were 
the environment, and energy poverty, not objectives of energy policy but problems for 
other departments, such as DEFRA, to solve.  In this way the climate perspective, 
although it might seem to have been drowned out and effectively ‘compromised’ at this 
time, did leave a marker which could be returned to by critics of the PEPP at a later 
date. 
 
 
                                                
79	  See	  the	  2005	  Climate	  Change	  Programme	  Review	  which	  concluded	  that	  the	  UK	  would	  miss	  their	  
emission	  reduction	  targets	  (SDC	  2005).	  	  The	  Sustainable	  Development	  Commission	  was,	  at	  the	  time,	  an	  
‘independent’	  advisor	  to	  Government	  on	  sustainable	  development	  –	  funded	  by	  DEFRA.	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Chapter 5: The Energy Weapon, Russia and the Repoliticisation of 
Energy 2004-7 
 
Introduction 
Following on from chapter four, this chapter bridges the gap between the consistency of 
pro-market ideas and narratives in the face of various challenges, which we saw in 
chapter four, and chapter six where the pro-market energy policy paradigm (PEPP) 
undergoes more profound alteration.  This period from 2004 to 2007 can be 
characterised as one in which a security of supply crisis became widely perceived, that 
is in public, elite and some academic circles, but not one in which the PEPP was 
formally rejected.  It will be argued here, however, that the security of supply crisis and 
the degree to which it dominated crisis debates did lead to a re-politicisation of energy, 
particularly in a ‘deliberative’ sense.  The crisis narrative that emerged, based on 
geopolitical ideas about national energy dependence and vulnerability, stood in direct 
contrast to recent pronouncements about ‘benign’ international energy and positive 
energy inter-dependence in the 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI 2003).  
 
Section one of this chapter starts with a very brief consideration of Russian energy 
reforms. The crisis debate which ensued in response to these changes, with its emphasis 
on near-term supply insecurity, unreliable foreign producers and national energy 
dependence, was similar in tone and scale to UK oil crises debates of the 1970s.  The 
extent to which the geopolitical version of energy crisis came to dominate, and across 
society, infers the strength and legitimacy of simple arguments, based on uncertainty 
and fear, to both grip public imaginations and lend impetus for political action.  This 
chapter argues that it was partly the nature of the energy crisis narrative itself, the 
publically perceived threat to UK national energy security and Russia’s role in it, that 
resulted in the emergence of a process of energy repoliticisation, particularly of a 
‘deliberative’ kind, and of growing political calls for action.  
 
Processes of ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation were also arguably leading to a ‘re-think’ of 
energy.  Yet another Energy Review was undertaken in 2006, followed by an Energy 
White Paper in 2007.  Policy changes contained therein reflected another reiteration of 
PEPP ideas about energy and its governance but also some, perhaps incongruous, 
geopolitical ideas and solutions.  The majority of policies, domestic and international, 
 157 
aimed at addressing the supply crisis can be understood, with reference to Hall, as 
attempts “…to stretch the terms of the existing paradigm…” (Hall 1993: 280).  It will 
be argued that the degree to which ideas about energy governance remained dominant at 
this time might partly be assigned to understandings of the crisis as international or 
exogenous in nature, and not related to UK energy governance practices.   
 
The way in which the PEPP evolved in response to the start of this process of ‘re-think’ 
was, at this time, quite mixed.  The final section of the chapter will assess these 
responses with the ultimate conclusion that some changes to the PEPP had started to 
emerge particularly at the levels of ideas about energy and of objectives of policy.  It 
should also be noted, however, that the ‘re-think’ of energy policy continued well 
beyond 2007. 
 
1.	  	   The	  UK	  Security	  of	  Supply	  Crisis:	  Geopolitical	  Narratives	  Re-­Emerge	  
If we are to proceed below with claims that Russian energy re-nationalisation acted as 
an indirect catalyst for change, particularly in that it encouraged a high degree of debate 
and discussion about energy, then we need to understand why.  The below section will 
outline briefly, with reference largely to non-Russian, or ‘Western’, academics some of 
the elements of the Russian reform process which were perceived as most problematic 
within the UK.  Part of the emerging understanding that energy was entering another 
period of crisis was that Russian ‘resource nationalism’, as the reforms were perceived 
in political circles, was understood to represent a reversal of progress towards 
established neoliberal energy norms on an international basis.  Another important factor 
was that this apparent about turn was not anticipated, was surprising and perplexing in 
equal measure, and as such it challenged the assumptions that many in the UK had 
made about the success, and future direction of, international energy markets and 
associated energy security (cf. Interview 19).  Lastly, in terms of public reactions, it 
should also be emphasised that oil prices escalated from an average price of $32 per 
barrel, in the first quarter of 2004, to an average of $121 per barrel in the second quarter 
of 2008 (BP 2008). 
 
1.1 The Russian Federation and Energy Governance Change 
A cursory glance at Russian energy policy documents, such as the 2003 Energy Strategy 
of Russia, shows an overt commitment to natural resources as the engine of Russian 
economic and political growth as well as to collective control of the extractive industry 
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(Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation 2003).  Energy, from this perspective, is 
considered to be economically and politically important and it should, as such, be 
controlled by the state, particularly in the light of the previous decade, see below, of 
disinvestment. 
 
Beyond emerging arguments for establishing more state control over natural resources, 
lay a further important reason for reforming the extractive industry.  It had been quite 
widely argued that the oligarchs, who had gained oil and gas assets largely as a result of 
the ‘loans for shares scandal’ in the 1990s, were neither re-investing profits back into 
this sector, nor paying all taxes due to the state.  Some analysis has pointed to a policy 
of both “cash” and “asset stripping” being pursued in the extractive industry in the late 
1990s and early 2000s (Boussena and Locatelli 2005: 10).80  One of Putin’s early 
attempts to correct this situation was to call a meeting, in May 2000, with the oligarchs 
to outline three new rules: reinvestment of profits back into the Russian extractive 
industry, payment of taxes in full and, less relevant for arguments here but most 
controversially, a moratorium on oligarchs becoming involved in Russian politics (Bean 
2004: 348). 
 
When Mikhail Khodorkovsky, one of the most prominent and politically active 
oligarchs and CEO of Yukos, was imprisoned this came as a considerable shock to UK 
elites as well as to large energy corporations outside Russia (Erixon 2008: 2; cf. 
Interview 19).  On the 25th October 2003, in the run up to the December elections 
Khodorkhovsky was taken, in dramatic fashion, into custody on a charge of fraud and 
tax evasion.  A large portion of the Yukos Corporation’s stock was subsequently seized 
by the Russian Prosecutor General’s office to cover $2bn of back taxes (Brill Olcott 
2004: 11).81  A number of other state take-overs of private companies followed this 
initial seizure of Yukos assets, including the purchase by Gazprom, the 51% state-
owned gas monopoly, of Sibneft, Russia’s fifth largest company (Light 2006: 20).  The 
                                                
80	  Lack	  of	  reinvestment	  was	  considered	  extremely	  important	  given	  the	  huge	  estimates	  of	  investment	  
required.	  	  In	  2003	  the	  Russian	  Government	  predicted	  that	  $230-­‐240bn	  would	  be	  required	  in	  the	  oil	  
industry	  alone	  between	  2000	  and	  2020,	  whilst	  the	  IEA	  estimated	  requirements	  of	  $328bn	  to	  2030	  in	  the	  
same	  sector	  (Locatelli	  2006:	  1076).	  
81	  Less	  than	  two	  months	  after	  Khodorkhovsky’s	  very	  public	  arrest	  the	  Putin	  administration	  won	  another	  
general	  election	  with	  a	  comfortable	  margin.	  	  This	  attests	  arguably	  both	  to	  the	  unpopularity	  of	  oligarchs	  
and	  to	  the	  popularity	  and	  degree	  of	  acceptability	  of	  relatively	  ‘statist’	  ideas	  in	  Russia.	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share of oil output produced by majority state owned companies consequently rose from 
16% in 2003 to 43% in 2006, and the overall state share in the economy rose from 30% 
to 35% (Rutland 2006: 21).   
 
Not only were some energy assets in a process of moving from private to state control, 
but future access for international oil companies (IOCs) was being restricted once more.  
Although some limits on foreign investment had only recently been lifted, by the 
Decree of 4th November 1997, major changes were made in 2003 to Production Sharing 
Agreement  (PSA) law (Locatelli 2006: 1082).  PSAs had been, and remain, the primary 
mechanism through which international oil companies could access Russian oil and gas 
assets.  These changes meant, however, that only 30% of Russian oil reserves could 
now be developed under the PSA regime and by 2003 28% of Russian oil was already 
covered by a PSA (Locatelli 2006: 1082).  
 
There were, in addition, other operational limitations placed on IOCs over these years 
making it harder to conduct business in the natural resource sector.  Two major IOCs, 
Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil, faced re-deployment of large development licences 
(Locatelli 2006; Bradshaw and Bond 2004).  International companies felt that they were 
running up against, at best, a lack of transparency in the system of allocation of 
exploration and development licences by the Federal State, and by the Regions, as well 
as general institutional instability (Locatelli 2006: 12).  It was becoming increasingly 
important for IOCs to have, and be able to utilise, political connections both at home 
and within the Kremlin (Interview 7).82  These changes were significant given that the 
UK had become the largest inward investor into Russia, given the UK official line taken 
about the need to reduce state interference in the process of investing, and given the 
DTI’s mandate to support British businesses.83 
 
Although Russia had exhibited many signs by this stage of what is referred to in the 
West as ‘resource nationalism’, it had been contended among some analysts, prior to the 
Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2006, that Russia could, and or would, not knowingly 
                                                
82	  A	  House	  of	  Commons	  report	  on	  energy	  security,	  quoted	  at	  more	  length	  below,	  also	  confirmed	  that	  “…	  
political	  considerations	  have	  entered	  British	  energy	  companies’	  commercial	  relationships	  abroad…”	  
(House	  of	  Commons	  2007a:	  2).	  
83	  Although	  the	  large	  and	  high	  profile	  TNK-­‐BP	  PSA,	  formed	  in	  February	  2003,	  had	  been	  left	  relatively	  
unaffected	  by	  these	  events,	  thereby	  limiting	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  UK’s	  corporate	  interests	  in	  Russia.	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do anything to negatively affect supplies to Europe (Gotz 2004: 2).  Despite growing 
state control of energy assets, and re-regulation, the view remained widespread in 
Europe that Russia would remain, if not a ‘friendly’ country for investment, then at least 
a reliable and increasingly important supplier to Europe, as OECD supplies continued to 
decline.  Commitments had already been made to build a new gas pipeline system, 
NordStream, running from Vyborg, in Northwest Russia, under the Baltic Sea to 
Germany where it would inter-connect with other pipelines.  This would tie Europe 
more closely to direct supply from Russia and estimates were that Europe would, by 
2030, need to import more than 75% of its total energy needs (Finon and Locatelli 
2008: 428). 
 
As such the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute of 2006, and the deliberate three day reduction 
of gas throughput by Gazprom to Europe, surprised and shocked many European, and 
UK, observers and instigated a profound and widespread debate about energy, and its 
supply, security and future.84  Gazprom, now a majority state owned company, was 
widely perceived in the UK, and Europe, to be acting on Kremlin instructions thus 
showing how energy could be utilised as a weapon.  Although “…no EU country 
needed to interrupt supplies to customers…” (Stern 2006: 9), the psychological effect 
that this reminder of Russia’s ability to disrupt supply, and of Europe’s mounting gas 
dependence, was significant.  It also served as a reminder that gas, unlike oil, was still 
predominantly regionally traded, often on fixed, long-term contracts.85  Gas prices did, 
again, escalate at this time. 
 
Rather later on in the time-period covered by this chapter, it also started to become clear 
that Russia had also had a change of heart regarding the all-important Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT).  Although already a signatory to the treaty, which created binding 
obligations covering the trade, transit and investment in energy based on liberal market 
                                                
84	  To	  understand	  the	  extent	  of	  shock	  and	  uncertainty	  as	  this	  time	  in	  Europe	  particularly	  it	  is	  worth	  
noting	  that	  up	  to	  80%	  of	  Europe’s	  gas	  arrives	  through	  the	  Ukrainian	  pipeline	  system.	  To	  get	  a	  clearer	  
picture	  of	  pipeline	  interconnections	  between	  Russia	  and	  Europe:	  http://search.atomz.com/search/?sp-­‐
q=maps&sp-­‐a=sp10029401&sp-­‐p=all&sp-­‐f=ISO-­‐8859-­‐1	  
85	  Analyses	  of	  the	  Russia-­‐Ukraine	  gas	  transit	  relationship	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  far	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  
story	  portrayed	  in	  the	  UK	  media.	  	  In	  addition,	  again	  in	  contrast	  to	  many	  UK	  reports,	  ‘blame’	  for	  the	  
dispute	  can	  be	  assigned	  as	  much	  to	  the	  Ukrainian	  as	  Russian	  companies	  involved	  (Stern	  2006;	  Pirani	  
2007;	  Pirani	  et	  al	  2009).	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principles (Hadfield 2008: 326), Russia refused repeatedly to ratify the ECT.  One of 
the achievements of the ECT was that, for perhaps the first time, a significant oil and 
gas producer was to be tied into international energy market norms.  Without Russia’s 
ratification part of the importance and utility of the treaty was voided, and Norway was 
to follow in refusing to ratify the treaty.  To add insult to injury, attempts to apply ECT 
dispute settlement mechanisms during the Russia-Ukraine gas transit dispute had failed, 
from both sides (Pirani 2007).  
 
It is by no means claimed here that Russia’s actions alone prompted UK energy 
governance change but that the way in which they were perceived, coloured largely by 
the ideational context, did indirectly and importantly, lead to a considerable degree of 
energy repoliticisation.  Russia’s turn to the West had represented such an incredibly 
hopeful moment in the history of international, and energy, relations that this apparent 
about turn was profoundly felt.  Fears about Russian resource nationalism put other 
international events into a new light, somewhat different from perceptions evident from 
policy documents in 2002 and 2003.  As such, even as global hydrocarbon demand was 
growing, which had already been acknowledged in the 2003 White Paper (PIU 2002: 6; 
DTI 2003: 14, 78-79), supplies, increasingly coming from outside the OECD, became 
increasingly perceived as ‘less reliable’ or ‘stable’ (DTI 2006 and 2007; Victor 2006). 
 
1.2 The ‘Third Age of Energy Security’  
The third age of energy security is a reference to the re-emergence of the notion that 
energy supplies, at affordable prices, were perceived in the West as being potentially at 
risk, whilst also mindful that this perception is not new (Leaver 2005: 92).  This section 
analyses the return of geopolitically informed narratives within ‘public’ UK circles, i.e. 
the media, television, broadsheets and journals, some think-tanks as well as within 
academia.86  What is noteworthy is not just the extent to which this narrative, and 
associated ideas, re-emerged, but that a debate about energy security started to appear in 
the public realm in the most loud and persistent way since the 1970s oil crises (Leaver 
2005; Nuttall and Manz 2008; Jegen 2009; Friedrichs 2011).  It could be argued that the 
public nature of the Russia energy story, and the evocative way in which it was 
                                                
86	  The	  emphasis	  here	  on	  various	  media	  outlets	  as	  illustrative	  of	  the	  changing	  energy	  narrative	  recognises	  
arguments	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  media	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  getting	  issues	  onto	  the	  political	  agenda	  (Grant	  
2000:	  125),	  but	  also	  arguments	  that	  the	  media	  can	  often	  reflect	  popular	  public	  ideas.	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narrated, helped to establish the notion that energy supplies might, indeed, be under 
threat and that energy was, as a result, in crisis. 
 
There are a number of noteworthy aspects of the way in which Russian reforms were 
covered in the UK print and television media, not least the emergence of notions that 
energy is powerful and that Russia is to be feared.  The Economist’s ‘Special Survey: 
Russia’, of May 2004, was very much focused on Putin, energy and power.87  One 
article claimed that, prior to the Yukos affair, Putin’s rather more “steely grip” on 
power, as opposed to Yeltsin, was welcomed by Western investors who “flocked back” 
to this now more stable, resource rich economy (Economist 2004b: 3; cf. House of 
Commons 2002: 80).  However, post the arrest of Khodorkhovsky, and the seizure of 
Yukos assets, it was clear that preference for a stable Russia was being replaced with 
fears about Putin’s power and autocratic status (Economist 2004b: 3 and 5). 
 
This question of Russia and power was closely linked in media coverage to state control 
over large energy assets.  None of the articles read for this thesis claim anything but 
energy as a source of potential international influence for Russia (see in particular: 
Robinson 2006; Simpson 2006; Wagstyl 2006; Ostrovsky 2006; Kendall 2007; Hotton 
2007; Powell 2008).88  Russia was understood to be “…flexing its well-oiled 
muscles…” (Robinson 2006) and in possession of a “…natural resources bonanza…” 
(Powell 2008: 44-5).  Russia was roundly condemned for the arrest of Khodorkhovsky, 
for seizing assets from Western companies, and for bullying them, but sometimes also 
with the inference that Russia would suffer as Western investors would, as a result, 
withdraw investments (The Times 2006).  
 
A number of articles directly claimed that being a major energy provider brings global 
influence, and that Russia was fast becoming an ‘energy superpower’ (Wagstyl 2006: 3; 
Simpson 2006; Kendall 2007: 23; Hotton 2007; Ostrovsky 2006).  Not only, therefore, 
was Russia capable of wielding power, but it was also suggested that it was very much 
willing to do so, not least in reference to Putin’s assertion that Russia was, once again, a 
                                                
87	  There	  were	  number	  of	  ‘special’	  reports	  and	  surveys	  on	  Russia,	  and	  energy,	  over	  this	  time	  period.	  	  See	  
also	  the	  Financial	  Times’	  Special	  Report:	  Russia	  of	  April	  21st	  2006	  and	  the	  New	  Statesman’s	  special	  on	  
Energy	  of	  July	  2007.	  
88	  This	  suggests	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  energy	  in	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  
replaceable	  and	  of	  low	  intrinsic	  value.	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“super derzhava” (superpower) (Robinson 2006).89  This narrative intensified 
significantly after the Russia-Ukraine gas transit dispute.  Media reports claimed that 
Russia had “…turned off the taps…” (Robinson 2006) in open display that it was not 
only capable of using energy to gain influence, but also to exploit energy as a “weapon” 
to threaten the West (Wagstyl 2006: 3; Ostrovsky 2006: 5; Rodgers 2007: 5).  
Geopolitical notions of control over energy assets allowing for more political and 
economic power were reflected in articles such as that on ‘Who controls the tap?’ 
(Rodgers 2007).  It seemed, perhaps from this perspective, somewhat inevitable that 
Europe woke up to the new power of Russia when Gazprom turned off the gas taps to 
the Ukraine and Moldova (Robinson 2006) 
Europe was, in this way, also reminded of its hydrocarbon ‘dependency’ status 
(Ostrovsky 2006; Simpson 2006; Rodgers 2007: 5).  
 
What springs to mind when looking back over this coverage of Russia and energy is the 
question of whether perceptions of a security of supply crisis might not have emerged if 
the country restructuring its energy sector had not been Russia.  This is a question to 
which we will return, here below.  What is also striking, and perhaps related, is the 
degree to which these stories found popular purchase.  One BBC television programme, 
‘Have I Got News for You’, still includes in the opening titles a depiction of lights 
going out all over Europe as a Russian soldier turns a gas pipe off, with steely grin on 
his face.90  Another cartoon style depiction of Russia, energy and threat can be seen on 
the front cover of The Economist featuring a picture of Putin, dressed in Italian mafia 
style, wielding a petrol pump as a gun (Economist 2006) under the title ‘Don’t Mess 
with Russia’.  The cartoon, from an article in ‘The World Today’, represented here 
below is a useful illustration of these kinds of ideas – linking Russia, power and energy 
together (Sherr 2009).   
                                                
89	  The	  2003	  ‘Energy	  Strategy	  of	  Russia	  up	  to	  2020’	  also	  suggested	  that	  Russia	  was	  willing	  to	  use	  natural	  
resources	  as	  an	  engine	  for	  economic	  and	  political	  recovery	  (Ministry	  of	  Energy	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  
2003).	  	  	  Such	  a	  role	  for	  natural	  resources	  was	  seen	  as	  positive	  in	  that	  it	  would	  enable	  recovery,	  very	  
different	  from	  Western	  perceptions.	  
90	  See:	  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b00wbw6y/Have_I_Got_News_for_You_Series_40_Episode_7/	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As seen in the last chapter, the UK had anticipated its move to importer of oil and gas in 
a relatively sanguine manner.  This picture was about to change significantly.  Such 
energy coverage, suggesting insecurity of supply, was leading to more questions, about 
where supplies would come from, what UK capacities were (Leake 2005; CBI 2006), 
and of the potential hole in the Treasury’s budget (Porter 2005).  Phrases such as 
“…reliance on dubious regimes…” start to enter the debate (Leake 2005).  Energy’s 
socio-economic role starts to take on an alternative tone with references to energy as 
“…the lifeblood of a modern economy” (CBI 2006: 1).   
 
There were, however, a few dissenters in the pack.  Some argued, informed by the 
economic notion of the ‘Resource Curse’, that Russia’s over reliance on natural 
resources, to the detriment of a diversified economy, would ultimately result in a 
reversal once more of its economic and political fortunes (Shevtsova 2008: 34).  Others 
that Russia would not be in a position to be able to develop its natural resources 
sufficiently in future based on the idea that state interference in the economy always 
leads to sub-optimal results (Ostrovsky 2006: 5). 
 
Away from journals, newspapers and popular media, UK think tanks were starting to 
produce analysis informed by a quite geopolitical take on events.  In 2007 a politically 
prominent and influential UK think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Reform (IPPR), 
produced a report on the UK’s national energy security.  Likewise, the IPPR’s report 
acknowledged mounting fears about UK “…import dependency…” and about future 
“…supply disruption”.  It did also pick up on a perceived trend of emerging political 
importance for energy based in particular on Russian actions (Bird 2007: 13).  The 
Foreign Policy Centre produced a piece on the ‘Russian Energy Empire’ in September 
2004, which focused on Russia’s new role as an ‘energy superpower’.  This report 
suggested that Russia increasingly has the potential to achieve the economic and 
cultural predominance in Eurasia that the United States has in the Americas, with 
implications for access to Caspian Basin oil and gas reserves (Hill 2004: 57-8). 
 
In terms of academic circles and analysis of energy, security and Russia, what is most 
noticeable was the increase not just in terms of volume of work, but in analysis 
undertaken from alternative perspectives.  In chapter one, it was observed that academic 
energy analysis had been dominated in the UK by neoliberal economics and by 
technical analysis (CEPMLP 2006).  2006 served as a real turning point in that articles 
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about ‘energy security’, from a geopolitical perspective, started to become the norm 
once more, and according to some, to dominate analysis (Goldthau and Witte 2009).  A 
new journal was launched in 2008 entitled the ‘Journal of Energy Security’, which was 
intended to fill the perceived gap in energy research, but also to provide an outlet for all 
the new energy security research that was starting to emerge.91 
 
Much of this research has been referenced in chapter one, section two, but as a reminder 
of how energy in crisis was being explained from a geopolitical perspective we can turn 
to Paul Roberts:  
Energy has become the currency of political and economic power, the determinant of 
the hierarchy of nations, a new marker, even, for success and material advancement.  
Access to energy has thus emerged as the over-riding imperative of the twenty-first 
century (Roberts 2004: 6; see also Klare 2008) 
Within such a new depiction of the world, and energy’s role in it, countries heavily 
reliant on imports will increasingly be at risk from competitive practices, from the 
influence of exporters and prone to conflict (Klare 2008). 
 
It was around this time also that some academics, and other groups supporting change, 
started to re-visit arguments about ‘peak oil’.  It has been argued that the peak oil 
debates, which had been prevalent previously in the 1970s, had not found public, or 
political, traction until renewed energy security fears erupted in this time period 
(Friedrichs 2010).  The re-emergence of this debate, however, served to throw further 
fuel on the fire of, sometimes quite popular, fears about being able to access sufficient 
energy supplies in future (Heinberg 2003; Simmons 2005; Leggett 2005; Kunstler 2005; 
Klare 2008). Peak-oil arguments can be applied in conjunction with zero-sum game 
assumptions about global energy to instigate debates about who has access to 
hydrocarbons and who does not (Reihing 2007; Clarke 2007; Klare 2008).   
 
What is also particularly noticeable about academic analysis of energy at this time is the 
emergence of the notion of ‘politicisation’.  Again, as with paradigm and paradigm 
shift, the term is often used without any explanation of what it means, let alone formal 
definition.  However, some were claiming that Russian energy actions were responsible 
for “repoliticising” energy in Europe (Jegen 2009: 18).  Examples of this argument are 
                                                
91	  See:	  http://www.ensec.org/.	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the suggestion that Russia played a role in putting energy security at the top of political 
agendas, both in terms of their behaviour and in terms of the way in which they 
designed the agenda for the St Petersburg G8 Summit of 2006 (Offerdahl 2007; Nuttall 
and Manz 2008).  Other prominent UK analysts, and government advisors, have also 
argued that the notion of ‘energy security’ only really gained political legitimacy again 
from 2006 onwards (Interviews 14, 15 and 16). 
 
At this point we can return to the argument, above, that the narrative of a security of 
supply crisis was successful precisely because it was Russia in particular, the old arch 
enemy, which was renationalising its energy assets.  By contrast the return of Venezuela 
to OPEC and the renationalisation of Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA) had not 
evoked such responses.  The narrative of ‘fear’ and of Russia as threatening contained 
within it vital elements of credibility and legitimacy drawing as it did upon deeply 
embedded Cold War perspectives.  It became commonplace to start an article, or paper, 
on energy and Russia by referring to the past.  For example an article in the Economist 
started by suggesting that “…Russia-watchers had looked on in elation as communism 
crumbled and the Soviet Union collapsed…”, and then contrasting this position of 
elation with Russia’s re-emergence as potentially threatening (Economist 2004a: 11).  
There were references back to the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” (Robinson 2006), 
and to the understanding that “…(t)he Cold War was supposed to be history…” (Powell 
2008: 44).  One new book, written by a journalist from the Economist, was entitled ‘The 
New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West’ (Lucas 2009). 
 
This mentality was easy to mine using such terminology in that it had long-standing 
antecedents – Russia had long been perceived at best as somewhat incomprehensible 
(Browning 2008), as representing a completely different, read lower, set of morals and 
values (Kennedy-Pipe 1998), and as evil and threatening (Robinson 2006).  Chapter two 
had suggested that crisis narratives, if they are to find purchase, need to be simple and 
to have a degree of popular appeal, as well as an equal measure of credibility.  Arguably 
the notion that energy supplies might be threatened was entirely credible for UK 
audiences given the high degree of existing inter-subjective meaning and the long 
history of believing that Russia, and oil, can pose a threat.  This narrative is, 
furthermore, predominantly about Russia doing something ‘wrong’ but not necessarily 
about offering credible solutions to this problem.  
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2.	  	   Geopolitical	  Narratives	  in	  ‘Elite’	  Political	  Circles 
This observation brings us on to the way in which debates and narratives within 
political circles, particularly within parliament and amongst policymakers, started to 
shift.  As with the bulk of the popular narrative at this time, the emphasis from the pro-
market perspective was very much on the actions of others and not directed at the PEPP.  
As time elapsed the narrative became increasingly focused on the question of future 
supplies and the extent to which they would prove problematic given the growing 
degree of political intervention.  In chapter four we saw that the official definition of 
energy security current to this emerging crisis debate was “…reliable supplies at 
affordable prices…” (DTI 2003), but as argued above what was happening in Russia, 
from the pro-market perspective, would theoretically serve to challenge both the 
reliability and affordability of future supplies.   
 
2.1 UK Elite Narratives 
A plethora of new papers, debates and policy documents on energy emerged over this 
time, despite the round of energy reviews and the new White Paper that had already 
been produced immediately prior to this period (see in particular Havard 2004; Ofgem 
2004; DTI 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b and 2006c; JESS 2006).  What was also evident 
over this time, however, was the rising amount of reports produced by political 
institutions outside of those directly responsible for policymaking, the DTI and Ofgem.  
The Foreign Office, House of Commons committees and parliamentary offices, such as 
that of Science and Technology, all started to produce reports on energy, and energy 
security (FCO 2004; POST 2004; Fox 2006; House of Lords 2006; House of Commons 
2007; FAC 2007). 
 
The energy sector became increasingly referenced in policy and other government 
documents in terms of potential supply insecurity not because sufficient supplies were 
not understood to exist, but because they were increasingly coming from countries with 
a high potential risk of internal instability (FCO 2004; Straw in Plesch et al 2004).  
Specifically, also, there was now a focus on political arrangements in that it was 
suggested that international frameworks, particularly in Russia, may not allow new 
reserves to be developed properly (Havard 2004; FCO 2004).  This trend of fossil fuel 
production increasingly taking place outside the OECD had been overtly noted in the 
2003 White Paper but it was then more of a passing comment.  But by 2007 energy was 
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understood as becoming internationally more ‘politicised’ with potentially negative 
implications for energy prices (Straw in Plesch et al 2004; DTI 2007: 19).  These 
comments imply more than a nod in the direction of geopolitical ideas of a zero-sum-
game in energy trade and of negative energy dependencies over positive economic 
interdependence.   
 
There was particular emphasis, also, on the UK switch from exporter to importer of 
hydrocarbons within this new international context (POST 2004; DTI 2006c and 2007; 
House of Commons 2007).  Language of self-sufficiency, risk, socio-economic reliance 
on energy and growing dependencies starts to emerge (POST 2004: 1; see also DTI 
2006c and 2007).  The DTI White Paper of 2007 points out that 
…with the UK increasingly reliant on imported energy, we need to manage the risks 
arising from the concentration of fossil fuel reserves in fewer and further away 
places, some of them in less stable parts of the world. (DTI 2007: 7) 
The emphasis, as will be argued in more detail below, in terms of what UK energy 
policy should be set to achieving alters with the return of supply concerns and the re-
emphasis on the importance of energy, and getting it right.   
 
Echoing media, academic and think-tank narratives, direct links can be found between 
fears of supply insecurity and Russia (FAC 2008; see also House of Commons 2007; 
Ofgem 2009: 1).  In particular, in 2007 the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) produced 
a report entitled ‘Global Security: Russia’ (FAC 2008).  In this report the various ways 
in which Russia represented a global threat, including through threats to energy 
security, are outlined and various policies recommended.  It broadly concludes that  
…the Government… continue to encourage its EU partners to take a robust and united 
approach to dealing with Moscow, in the energy field and beyond (FAC 2008: 14) 
Much can be taken from this document, not least the growing emphasis in political 
circles on the risks Russia represented to energy security, and the, arguably related, 
growing involvement of the FCO in analysis of Russia and energy, but also in 
diplomacy with Russia.92  Increased FCO involvement might also be an expected follow 
on to perceptions that energy security should be considered at a national level (see Helm 
2005).  What can also be understood from this document is the ways in which the pro-
market paradigm, and its institutionalisation over time in the UK, caused the UK to 
interpret Russian actions so negatively.  
                                                
92	  It	  was	  around	  this	  time,	  in	  2006,	  that	  the	  ‘UK-­‐Russia	  Energy	  Dialogue’	  was	  established.	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This new awareness of political risks, of Russia and its relationship to the energy sector 
is also evident in the House of Commons 2007 research paper on energy security and in 
Liam Fox, Shadow Defence Secretary’s, paper ‘Over a Barrel: the Challenge of 
Defence and Energy Security’ (Fox 2006; House of Commons 2007a).  Growing 
political interest in and attempts to research and understand energy better, outside of the 
DTI and Ofgem, indicates the extent to which energy was subject, once more, to 
political debate, deliberation but also, potentially, challenge.  These reports take a 
stronger tone on Russia, and energy, than the more qualified language used in the policy 
documents referenced above.  For example, by directly referring to Russian control of 
energy resources being used as a tool of foreign policy to further their own strategic 
interests (House of Commons 2007a: Summary).  The House of Commons report also 
suggested that “…energy policy is inextricably linked to the availability of resources…” 
and goes on to refer at length to arguments about peak oil (House of Commons 2007a: 
Summary).  Liam Fox’s report takes the narrative one step further by referring directly 
to “resource nationalism” in Russia, to Russia’s lack of “natural warmth” toward the 
West, and to the need to spend on defence in order to protect supplies (Fox 2006). 
 
As evidence of, and perhaps in response to, this renewed political interest energy 
security is added, by the UK, to formal forums for international negotiation.  In 2005, 
during the October EU Summit at Hampton Court, the issue of ‘energy security’ was 
added to the agenda (Offerdahl 2007).  In his paper prepared for the conference, the 
ubiquitous Helm, characterised energy as a sector which was by then becoming an issue 
of national security (Helm 2005b: 2).  Helm’s paper specifically refers to an increasing 
dependence on Russia for supplies of, particularly gas, as a source of threat to the 
security of EU, and by extension UK, energy supply.  Likewise, energy security was top 
of the agenda in the G8 Summit of 2006 (G8 2006).  In 2006 Tony Blair used his annual 
Lord Mayor’s speech to highlight energy security concerns (DTI 2006c: 4).  All of this 
indicates a high degree of ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation. 
 
It could be argued that the way in which Russia’s energy restructuring, and associated 
actions, were perceived has an element of Ole Wæver’s ‘societal security’ about it 
(Wæver 1995: 67).  This is because the UK officially considered energy security to be 
contingent upon further liberalisation, competition and good governance in energy – 
therefore Russia’s about turn away from this path constituted a threat to this end goal, 
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potentially causing the UK not to be able to live “as itself” (Wæver 1995: 67 in 
Williams 2003: 519).  This is another instance where we can see the relationship 
between material events and ideational interpretations.   
 
As Matthew Watson has argued with regard to specific neoliberal interpretations of 
globalisation driving particular policy changes in Britain (Watson 1999), so too have 
pro-market interpretations of Russian actions driven the emergence of a national energy 
security narrative, and some associated responses.  Arguably, therefore, and perhaps 
somewhat contradictorily, the mounting credibility of the geopolitical perspective can 
be closely related to the dominance of neoliberal ideas about how energy should be 
governed.93  It is, perhaps, for this reason that some of the other geopolitical arguments, 
referenced in chapter one, which imply a critique of existing governance arrangements 
and assumptions about what markets can achieve, were not so much reflected in the 
elite political debate. 
 
2.2 The European Energy Debate 
The UK energy debate was both part of, and impacted by, the European energy crisis 
debate.  The EU had, by the mid 2000s, finally been able to reach some agreement 
about energy market deregulation and the importance of competition, and had, as seen 
in chapter four, very recently liberalised gas markets.94  The UK had considered itself as 
having been influential within the EU on energy matters, and specifically successful in 
encouraging EU gas market reform (Davies 1996; DTI 1998; DTI 2003: 10; FCO et al 
2004).  In addition, UK policy documents had repeatedly emphasised the importance of 
multilateral, as opposed to bi-lateral, negotiating channels, particularly via the EU, in 
pursuing its objective of expanding liberal, transparent market rules globally (DTI 2003; 
FCO et al 2004; FAC 2008).  
 
The EU, however, being an amalgamation of a large number of countries, had long 
included a range of different ideas about energy, governance and international relations.  
Some countries, such as Germany, conducted a much more direct energy relationship 
with Russia than, say, the UK.  The EU as a whole was expected to import rapidly 
increasing quantities of gas, and oil, directly from Russia often, most of which would be 
                                                
93	  This	  analysis	  will	  be	  extended	  in	  chapter	  seven,	  section	  two.	  
94	  Energy	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  sectors	  specifically	  excluded	  when	  the	  ‘internal	  market’	  was	  set	  up	  in	  
1992	  (EC	  2011:	  editorial).	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traded on long-term contracts (Correlje and van der Linde 2006).  Ex-Soviet states such 
as the Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus imported almost all their hydrocarbon needs from 
Russia as a result of long-standing political and infrastructure arrangements (Raszewski 
2012 forthcoming).  Many of them continued to receive large discounts on their gas, 
which lay at the core of worsening energy relationships between ex-Soviet Europe and 
Russia. 
 
European fears about Russia’s energy policy were overtly palpable at the time Russia 
began the process of restructuring and re-regulating its energy sector, but they were 
magnified intensely in the period immediately after the Russo-Ukrainian gas dispute 
(Light 2006: 20).  Clearly supplies of gas, vital to electricity production, to the most 
directly dependent states might have been severely impacted by the dispute, particularly 
as a number of these states had little or no storage of reserves (Stevens 2009).  What 
ensued was an escalation of geopolitical argument, debate and posturing between the 
EU and Russia.95  In response the EU tried, again, to develop an ‘Energy Policy for 
Europe’ (McGowan 2008: 91), so that Europe could speak, on energy, “…with a single 
voice on the international stage…” (EC 2007; see also Bromley 2008: 6; Umbach 2010: 
1234). 
 
The EU began to claim that they would act to reduce further dependence on Russian 
gas, and pipeline systems, by developing and investing directly in Caspian Basin energy 
and transport routes, such as the controversial Nabucco pipeline system (Hadfield 2008: 
328; Monaghan 2009: 16).  Russia responded with claims about expanding their exports 
to the increasingly energy hungry Asian, read Chinese and Indian, markets (Boussena 
and Locatelli 2005: 21-22; Sevastyanov 2007: 4).96  Russia continued to extend its 
influence through the Caspian and Central Asian energy sectors, however, via state 
owned energy companies thereby diverting much Caspian gas and oil via Russian 
transport networks (Boussena and Locatelli 2005: 14).   Direct EU-Russia energy 
relations had been further complicated in that although the EU, like the UK, had been 
                                                
95	  The	  Turku	  Energy	  Conference,	  of	  November	  2008,	  included	  senior	  EU	  energy	  officials	  as	  well	  as	  
leading	  Russian	  energy	  academics.	  	  The	  tone	  of	  outright	  hostility	  was	  palpable	  as	  these	  two	  groups	  
exchanged	  views.	  	  Clear,	  also,	  was	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  views	  on	  energy	  governance	  differed.	  
96	  It	  was	  also	  around	  this	  time,	  2007,	  that	  Russian	  submarines	  planted	  a	  Russian	  flag	  at	  the	  bottom	  of	  
the	  Arctic	  Ocean	  to	  claim	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  continental	  shelf	  wherein	  an	  estimated	  
25%	  of	  potential	  global	  oil	  and	  gas	  reserves	  lie	  (Umbach	  2010:	  1229).	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pursuing market opening in Russia, many of its own member states were in breach of 
EC Energy directives in maintaining near monopolistic control over national gas and 
electricity companies  (Hadfield 2007: 23). 
 
Moreover, however, the differing perceptions of Russia and energy within Europe, often 
based on historical relations and dependencies, fed into already existent internal EU 
disagreement about energy (Barych 2007: 1; see also Belyi 2006; Youngs 2009).  This, 
in turn, resulted in varied support for the EU’s emerging plans to act as one large, 
importing bloc to counter perceived Russian energy power and threats (EC 2006).  As 
such it has been argued that  
The energy policies of EU member states are not yet consolidated enough to represent 
a ‘collective interest’ of the EU and therefore have not been endogenously activated 
and deployed as a central foreign policy feature of the EU (Hadfield 2007: 9). 
 
As with the UK, the sheer scale of the emerging energy security debate prompted 
growing political interest in Europe such that it was considered to be at the top of the 
EU political agenda (Barton et al 2004; McGowan 2008; Jegen 2009; Natorski and 
Surralles 2010).  Francis McGowan suggests that although the EU energy initiative has 
been  
…equally concerned with ‘climate change’ as another major, possibly existential, 
challenge for energy policy, …it is ‘energy security’ that has given the policy debate a 
particular immediacy and profile… (McGowan 2008: 91) 
In her article on potential paradigm shift in EU energy security policy, Maya Jegen, 
quotes Andris Pielbalgs, the then EU Energy Commissioner, as joking that the best 
thing that happened to him in his job was Gazprom’s restriction of gas deliveries to the 
Ukraine.  This was because it brought to mind the vulnerability of energy supply and 
infrastructure, thus forcing political attention onto this area (Jegen 2009: 1). 
 
2.3 Public and Political Debate and ‘Re-thinking’ Energy 
The escalation of the energy security debate within the UK, and Europe, arguably 
revealed the extent to which the UK lacked dedicated energy analysis and policymaking 
capacities.  Much as it has been suggested that the repoliticisation of energy in Europe 
led to new impetus for reforms to energy policies (Jegen 2009: 18), so too was a process 
of repoliticisation taking place in the UK, in a ‘deliberative’ as well as ‘technocratic’ 
sense.   
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In July 2004, in the immediate aftermath of the Yukos affair, the new Energy Act had 
conferred on the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry a fixed duty to report 
annually on energy security matters to Parliament (DTI 2005a).  Thus a specific 
political process was put in place to revisit energy security at least annually, which 
implied that the DTI’s Energy Directorate needed to have the capacity to do so.  The 
research paper produced for the House of Commons in 2007, referenced above, is 
another clear example of an attempt being made to understand better the international 
dynamics of energy (House of Commons 2007a).  Certainly some policymakers and 
analysts were noticing an escalation in direct political pressure to respond in some way 
to newly perceived threats.  This was not well received in that it was seen as direct 
political interference in economics (Interviews 2 and 15).   
 
Clearly, however, the DTI and Ofgem did feel compelled to respond as can be inferred 
from the production of yet another round of energy reviews and the new White Paper, 
just a few years after the last round.  Changes also started to take place within the DTI 
and FCO at this time as new resources were allocated to energy analysis.  There 
emerged an ongoing joke within the DTI about a new project initiated in 2006/2007 
called ‘The Project Pool’ which was designed to make staff more flexible within the 
Department.  The joke was that instead of flexibility it resulted, ultimately, in most 
available staff being moved into the energy division (Interview 5).   
 
The 2007 White Paper also acknowledges that energy had not up until the mid 2000s 
existed as a discrete area of foreign policy.  Again, as such, it had less dedicated 
capacity assigned to it.  The paper announced that, for the first time, the UK has 
...an integrated international energy strategy which describes the action we are taking 
to help deliver secure energy supplies and tackle climate change. (DTI 2007: 8) 
Together the overview, above, of the geopolitical way in which energy had come to be 
perceived in public, European and elite circles suggests a reversion to perhaps more 
traditional ways of thinking.  Thus in a time of shock, uncertainty and frustration it 
seems that the instinctive reaction was to return to ideas that had had major historical 
credibility.  As we have seen in chapter one, these ideas had been discussed within some 
circles but they had not dominated either elite political circles nor had they been 
widespread within the media and public immediately prior to the mid 2000s.  
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Whilst by no means suggestive of a profound change to the level of physical structures 
of governance, all of this does imply at least a small degree of reversal in ‘technocratic’ 
depoliticisation.  It also suggests, as will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven, 
that the degree to which energy was understood to be problematic once more would 
require political responses in the form of the ability to deliberate and deal with these 
problems.   
 
This is what this thesis will call a political ‘re-think’ of energy, a process which will 
emerge as important to the willingness of government to make further changes, and 
which will be assessed in more detail in chapters six and seven.  This is because, as it 
transpired, the more capacity that was given over to deliberating energy, the more it 
became clear that anomalies existed between objectives and outcomes of policy, and 
that further political commitment would need to be made to address these anomalies.  
The process of ‘re-thinking’ energy and its governance is also understood to be 
important to understanding how profound governance change can unfold over time. 
 
 
3.	  	   UK	  Energy	  Governance:	  Change	  	  
It was suggested in chapters two and three that previous eras of perceived energy crisis 
had resulted in a varying degree of policy, and structural, change, if not paradigm shift.  
The narrative of UK policy documents had started to alter somewhat and to reflect some 
of the geopolitical ideas about energy which had come to dominate the public crisis 
narrative.  Largely the terminology used in DTI and FCO papers is less sensational than 
within the print and television media, but unreliable foreign suppliers and the desire to 
avoid ‘dependency’ marked the mid 2000s papers and reports out from their 
predecessors.  This is unsurprising given that it was widely claimed that both the 2006 
Energy Review and 2007 White Paper were researched and compiled specifically 
because the DTI and Ofgem understood the political need to respond to the crisis 
(CEPMLP 2006; House of Commons 2007a).  
 
This section argues that, concurrent with the degree to which energy was re-entering 
elite political debates at both the national and international levels, there were a number 
of policy alterations made relating to changing interpretations of energy and 
international markets.   As will be seen below although most levels of the PEPP 
remained largely in place there were also new policies announced which affected the 
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PEPP levels of objectives and instruments of policy.  Ideas about energy had arguably 
already been challenged as part of the return of the geopolitical energy debate, with its 
greater emphasis on energy’s role in, and value to, society.  What ensued, therefore, was 
a more mixed approach whereby various institutions of state took a more direct interest, 
some more geopolitically informed policies were pursued, whilst ‘markets’ and 
‘competition’ remained fundamental to energy policy and to many of the solutions 
offered. 
 
3.1 Re-focus Objectives: Security and Climate Change 
It appeared at this time that the objectives of energy policy were again showing signs of 
alteration.  It could be argued that energy security had, in 2003, been assumed to exist, 
especially given the degree to which energy governance was still understood to be 
heading in a pro-market direction (Thomas 2006: 583; Jegen 2009: 1; Lesage et al 2010: 
6; EC 2011: 14).  Energy security, although still an objective, had been an assumed 
outcome.  For example the energy supply objective is worded such that the UK should 
continue to “maintain the reliability of… supplies” (DTI 2003: 11).  By contrast, 
however, by 2007 energy security is understood to be something that needs to be 
established and to require further political action to achieve (DTI 2006c: 4).  Energy 
security is now understood to be one of the ‘immense’ challenges facing the UK as a 
nation (DTI 2006c: introduction).   
 
This puts a different complexion on the objectives of policy in that security has moved 
to the top of the hierarchy of energy objectives.  Peter Hall, in emphasising the role of 
new objectives in policy change, also suggested that the hierarchy of goals was 
important in understanding change (Hall 1993).  There had already been suggestions 
that energy policy was, as of the early 2000s, over committed in terms of objectives and 
that there might be ‘trade offs’ between them.  The return of security to the top of the 
agenda arguably had implications for which objectives might be given up in the case of 
a trade off situation, and which would win out.  What needs to be remembered at this 
point is the relationship, suggested above, between public interest in energy, security 
and prices, and political interest.  The close relationship between the three implies that 
‘reliability’ of supply might trump other commitments, except perhaps climate change 
(Interview 16). 
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Energy objectives changed in 2007 in another way also, and the combination of these 
two changes would bring significant pressure to bear on energy policymakers. Tony 
Blair, at the 2007 EU Summit, committed the UK to a set of targets, referred to as the 
’20-20-20’ targets (Mitchell 2008: 131).  Renewable energy even by 2009 remained 
under-invested in the UK, but specifically in transport where only 2.6% of energy came 
from renewable sources, and in heating, where the UK was still generating “very low 
levels” from renewables (DECC 2009b: 8).  In order to meet the, by 2009 already 
reduced, renewable target of 15% of overall energy consumed, the UK would have to 
engineer a situation within which electricity generation from renewables would reach 
30% by 2020 (DECC 2009b: 8).97  The pressure was now starting to mount on energy 
policy to deliver on climate and security objectives. 
 
It has been suggested that the EU climate targets, which incidentally were not reflected 
in the May 2007 White Paper, were initially agreed to without much discussion with the 
DTI and reportedly without the Energy Directorate’s buy-in (Interview 5; Interview 13).  
The argument went that Blair had attended the EU meetings with representatives from 
DEFRA, not the energy division of the DTI.  This might be interpreted as a case of 
change being forced on the DTI’s energy division, and their energy policymaking 
practices to facilitate renewable energy, from ‘the top’. Whilst this explanation might 
appear credible with regard to Blair’s tendencies for ‘top down’ interference in 
Departments, 98 it is less credible with regard to the Prime Minister’s intentions 
regarding specific renewable energy policy.  This is because it was widely rumoured 
that Prime Minister Blair may not have understood that new climate targets would 
imply much policy change. Specifically, at the time, many believed that he had 
understood the 20% renewables targets to refer only to the electricity sector, rather than 
across all sectors of the economy including transport, thereby implying little change to 
existing policy to meet targets.   
 
                                                
97	  The	  UK’s	  renewable	  target	  had	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  15%	  before	  the	  EU	  20-­‐20-­‐20	  targets	  became	  binding	  
early	  in	  2009.	  
98	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  a	  former	  senior	  policy	  advisor	  to	  10	  Downing	  Street	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  Tony	  
Blair	  was	  partial	  to	  ‘top	  down’	  governance.	  	  It	  was	  also	  suggested	  that	  because	  David	  Miliband,	  a	  key	  
Blair	  ally,	  was	  at	  DEFRA	  at	  the	  time	  this	  might	  have	  been	  why	  that	  Department	  had	  more	  influence	  
(Interview	  20).	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It is difficult to prove empirically the extent to which Blair had intended to force the 
Energy Directorate of the DTI to change, just as it is hard to prove whether or not 
renewable energy targets were adopted largely, or partly, in response to popular desires 
to remain reasonably ‘self-sufficient’ in energy.  It has been suggested, however, that 
this had been the case in other countries, with more advanced renewable energy sectors, 
in response to the 1970s crises (Giddens 2009).   It might be sheer coincidence that 
firmer commitments to carbon dioxide emission reduction and renewable energy targets 
came about at the time of widespread perceptions of energy supply crisis.  Again, this 
argument will be taken up in more detail in chapter six. 
 
3.2 Planning the UK Fuel Mix and Indigenous Supplies 
By the time of the publication of the 2007 White Paper research undertaken within the 
DTI, and other associated bodies, started to acknowledge more openly a striking degree 
of underinvestment in energy systems within the UK, particularly in electricity and gas 
storage capacity (CBI 2006; DTI 2007).  In order to address underinvestment, and in 
direct contrast to opinions expressed in the 2003 White Paper about state involvement 
(DTI 2003: 11 and 87), the 2007 White Paper displays a greater pre-occupation with 
making active decisions about the UK’s energy mix.  In particular with decisions which 
would facilitate a greater ability to produce energy from UK sources, thereby also 
lowering the expected trajectory of dependence on imports.  Alistair Darling was quoted 
at this time as saying that 
…if we do nothing else, we will need to import substantial quantities of oil and gas 
from different parts of the world, and some of those parts of the world have obvious 
political difficulties (Darling quoted in The New Statesman 2007: 210). 
These policies can be seen as Government not ‘doing nothing else’.  
 
The Paper includes long sections on what might need to be done to facilitate production 
of domestic energy sources such as nuclear, coal and renewables, primarily in the form 
of wind.99  What is evident is growing political support for supplies indigenous to the 
UK, which had been de-emphasised previously (Kemp and Stephens 2007: 189).  The 
official line was to maximise “…economic production from our domestic fossil fuel 
reserves…” and this applied both to North Sea oil and gas, and coal production (DTI 
                                                
99	  This	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  mid	  1970s	  when	  nuclear	  energy	  received	  a	  boost	  in	  response	  to	  the	  first	  ‘oil	  
shock,	  as	  well	  as	  domestic	  production	  of	  oil	  and	  gas	  from	  the	  North	  Sea.	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2007: 20).  These domestic industries would be ‘maximised’ using the government’s 
regulatory powers if necessary (Bird 2007: 17).  
 
In line with this emphasis was being placed once more on facilitating the production of 
domestic nuclear and coal on the grounds of ‘diversity’ (DTI 2006c).  This is an about 
turn from the position taken in the 2003 White Paper, see chapter four, where both coal 
and nuclear were effectively “…put on hold…” (DTI 2003; see also Mitchell 2008). 
The 2007 White Paper whilst recognizing that “…imports are not in themselves a threat 
to the security of supply… higher levels of import dependency will bring associated 
risks…”, including disruption of supplies (DTI 2007: 107). 
 
Coal-fired electricity emerges as making “…an important contribution…” to the UK’s 
energy security (DTI 2006c: 85).  The emphasis changed from a position whereby coal 
would be phased out over time, to one where it could continue to be an important part of 
the energy mix.  This position would have to be made more acceptable, given climate 
targets, by managing the ‘environmental impact’ effectively.  Hence the emerging focus 
in policy documents on developing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) in order to bring 
emissions from coal, and gas, down and the establishment of the ‘Carbon Abatement 
Technology’ demonstration programme (DTI 2006c: 107 and 112; see also Bird 2007: 
17). 100  A new Coal Forum was to be initiated in order to bring together stakeholders 
within the industry and “…to secure the long-term contribution of coal-fired power 
generation…” (DTI 2006c: 85; DTI 2007: 112).  
 
Alistair Darling, then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, refers to the nuclear 
option at this time thus: 
(o)ur analysis suggests that, alongside other low carbon generating options, a new 
generation of nuclear power stations could make a contribution to reducing carbon 
emissions and reducing our reliance on imported energy (House of Commons 2007a: 
3). 
Nuclear was emerging, once again, as a politically acceptable option not just because of 
its ‘low carbon’ credentials, but arguably more importantly, because fears about energy 
security could now justify this otherwise unpopular and expensive choice.  The 2006 
Energy Review suggested that regulatory barriers to the construction of nuclear plants 
                                                
100	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  even	  the	  strongest	  supporters	  of	  CCS	  considered	  it	  to	  be	  many	  years	  away	  
from	  viability	  (Economist	  2008:	  38).	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should be reviewed and that a new framework should be established (DTI 2006c: 113).  
It was also suggested that there might be some extensions to the scheduled lives of 
existing nuclear power plants, in recognition that new nuclear builds are a vast expense 
(DTI 2006c: 116).  Renewed interest in facilitating nuclear and coal is reminiscent of 
arguments outlined in chapter two that securitising a subject can allow for policy 
choices outside ‘normal’ Government decisions. 
 
What is also notable from the growing emphasis on the role of nuclear and coal is the 
relative reduction in emphasis on gas as ‘the transition fuel’.  Gas-fired electricity under 
the PEPP would be the clear choice given its relatively low cost of production, and it is, 
in addition, lower carbon than coal production.  Perhaps the primary outcome of 
Russia’s dispute with the Ukraine had been to cause countries, including the UK, to re-
think the degree to which they would become, in future, dependent on gas for electricity 
production.  The desire to avoid a future wherein ‘imports’ could make up 80% of the 
UK’s gas demand is clear in the 2007 White Paper and is the reason for supporting 
‘diversity’, from domestic sources of energy (DTI 2007: 106). 
 
Given, however, that fossil fuels would continue to provide for the bulk of UK energy 
demand substantial new contracts were at the same time being signed for supplies of gas 
with countries considered as more ‘reliable’ than Russia, i.e. Qatar and Norway (DTI 
2005a: 2).  The Government had begun lobbying Oslo in May 2007 for a new pipeline 
to bring another 20 billion cubic metres to mainland UK by 2012.  It was understood 
that increased Norwegian and Qatari supplies would give “…British politicians and 
diplomats room to manoeuvre the next time the Russian bear roars…” (Rodgers 2007: 
8).  Clearly these supply relationships inferred a high degree of direct state contact 
between the UK and Norway, and Qatar, not entirely in line with the idea that ‘markets’ 
should decide on where energy comes from. 
 
3.3 Protectionist Practices 
Perceived uncertainties associated with importing from ‘unstable’ energy producers, 
and the associated desire to avoid ‘import dependency’ were soon augmented by a 
growing sense of vulnerability associated with non-EU, particularly Russian, 
companies’ interest in purchasing UK energy providers.  The House of Commons 
energy security paper summarises well the growing sense of vulnerability, present at the 
highest levels: 
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… liberalisation in Europe has made companies potentially vulnerable to cross-
border mergers and takeovers from outside the EU, and this development seems to 
have taken Europe by surprise. In the UK there was much speculation in 2006 that 
Centrica, Britain's largest energy supplier, could be bought by Gazprom, the Russian 
state gas company; and UK Coal has been the target of interest by the Russian 
minerals group, Kuzbassrazrezugol (House of Commons 2007a: 1-2).101 
It is worth highlighting the association implied in this extract between liberalisation and 
vulnerability which, albeit fleeting, can be seen as political acknowledgement of 
endogenous reasons for crisis. 
 
Although theoretically, within the confines of the PEPP, questions of who owns energy 
companies and who provides supplies would be for markets to decide upon, political 
decisions made around the time contradict this idea.  It was widely rumoured in the UK, 
and Russian, press in 2006 that Gazprom was interested in purchasing the UK’s premier 
integrated energy company, Centrica.  What was most remarkable was the reported 
response of the UK Government.  In 2006 the Financial Times ran an article which 
indicated that Gazprom had been informed, in no uncertain terms, that if they went 
ahead with their bid for Centrica then UK legislation would be altered to prevent its 
success (Eaglesham 2006; see also Putin in BBC 2006).102  Likewise in March 2007 the 
Observer ran an article claiming that the Foreign Office had advised Centrica Energy 
not to buy gas from Iran, a move which, in an ironic reversal of positions, the Russians 
overtly regarded as politics meddling in the private, energy sector  (House of Commons 
2007a: 2).  The degree to which such political actions were ‘rumoured’ rather than 
overtly stated in policy documents, or Parliament, is evocative of the notion of 
‘secretised’ depoliticisation in energy policy. 
 
Lastly, in response to increased fears about Russia’s growing ability to impact, 
negatively, on energy markets the UK actively supported the EU’s policy of 
                                                
101	  Interviews	  conducted	  have	  confirmed	  that	  ideas	  about	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  UK	  assets	  from	  Russian	  
purchases	  had	  emerged	  at	  the	  highest	  levels.	  	  	  These	  ideas,	  again,	  were	  not	  new	  in	  the	  West	  –	  see	  
successful	  attempts	  to	  protect	  US	  energy	  assets	  from	  Chinese	  purchases	  (Stanislaw	  2006).	  
102	  The	  Gazprom-­‐Centrica	  ‘affair’	  led	  to	  more	  escalation	  of	  rhetoric	  from	  Russia	  about	  finding	  alternate	  
consumers	  for	  its	  energy.	  	  Alexei	  Miller,	  Gazprom	  CEO,	  was	  reported	  to	  have	  responded	  by	  saying	  
“…that	  unless	  Europe	  was	  more	  responsive	  to	  Gazprom’s	  ambitions	  to	  acquire	  downstream	  assets…	  
Gazprom	  would	  take	  its	  business	  to	  China	  and	  North	  America”	  (Light	  2006:	  20).	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encouraging and facilitating exports from the Caspian Basin to Europe (House of 
Commons 2006; FAC 2008).  The Caspian Basin had been growing steadily in proven 
and probable oil and gas reserves over the course of the 2000s, and their relative 
proximity to Europe signalled this region out as a possible alternative supplier to 
Russia.  This was to be achieved both via direct EU financial and diplomatic support for 
the Nabucco pipeline and for progressive “…integration of the energy markets of the 
regions into the EU market…” via preferential trading agreements (BERR 2006: 29; see 
also FAC 2008; Klare 2008).  Open support of processes to access Caspian resources by 
the UK Government, even if it took place largely via the EU, is a direct departure from 
previously stated policy of allowing markets to determine supply (Wicks in Henley 
2008).  In the 2003 White Paper the DTI had overtly explained that “…Government is 
not in a position to make decisions about supplies of energy…” (DTI 2003: 11).  The 
contrast between UK, and EU, rhetoric and negotiating position on how to govern 
energy and some policies adopted around the mid 2000s was not lost on Russian 
commentators (Hadfield 2008). 
 
Some of these policies, more protectionist in orientation, emerged in a somewhat 
piecemeal and incoherent fashion.  There were also met with a degree of disapproval 
within elite energy, particularly policymaking, circles in that these types of policy had 
long been discredited.103  It appears, therefore, that geopolitically informed policies 
were perceived as representing more of a reflexive, or knee-jerk, reaction rather than a 
credible, long-term solution. They seemed, furthermore, to represent geopolitical 
methods of achieving longer-term neoliberal aims in that the internationalization of 
freely trading energy markets remained the overall aim.104  Some consistent new 
direction, however, was discernable at this time in the form of the renewed emphasis on 
establishing a more secure energy system, and the concurrent commitment to avoiding 
the risks associated with becoming too dependent on imports.  This was to prove 
particularly complex in the light of the UK’s commitment, at the same time, to specific 
renewable energy targets. 
 
                                                
103	  This	  was	  confirmed	  in	  various	  interviews	  between	  2008	  and	  2010	  
104	  This	  is	  not	  unlike	  observations	  made	  about	  some	  UK	  reactions,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  more	  interventionist	  
policies,	  to	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis.	  	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  although	  these	  policies	  could	  be	  
ascribed	  more	  to	  Keynesian	  than	  classical	  economic	  ideas	  they	  were	  implemented	  in	  order	  to	  maintain,	  
not	  change,	  the	  current	  “growth	  model”	  (cf.	  Hay	  2010:	  23).	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4.	  	   UK	  Energy	  Governance:	  Continuity 
Despite the changing hierarchies of objectives, and the advent of a number of more 
geopolitically informed energy policies, there remained a high degree of continuity in 
energy governance practices.  It is worth referring back to Hall’s observations about the 
tendency for ‘institutionalised subjects’ to stretch “…the terms of the existing policy 
paradigm…” when faced with new problems (Hall 1993: 280).  New challenges had 
been recognised, particularly in that a security of supply crisis was understood to exist, 
but these challenges were largely still perceived as exogenous to UK energy governance 
practices would not therefore imply any particular discrediting of PEPP practices.  As it 
turned out, however, this tendency to pave over the emerging fissures with pro-market 
paste did result ultimately in a growing lack of credibility in the PEPP, and in policy-
makers’ ability to address security, and climate, problems. 
 
4.1 Neoliberal Perspectives and the ‘International Energy Strategy’ 
The 2006 Energy Review and 2007 White Paper showed a growing awareness of 
potential problems associated with growing exposure to international energy markets 
and, as mentioned above, the 2007 White Paper included the first UK International 
Energy Strategy.  Both, however, reinforced the UK’s commitment to promoting open, 
competitive energy markets in order to ensure security of supply (DTI 2006c and 2007: 
35; see also JESS 2006: 4).  Producer countries, including Russia, were to be 
encouraged and supported to liberalise and improve governance (FCO 2006; Kirkup 
2006; DTI 2007).  The DTI continued to commission reports, from third party 
consultancy groups, that would set out in detail the case, and conditions, for 
liberalisation and liberal markets (DTI 2005b; Ernst & Young 2006).  The policy of 
internationalising liberal energy markets continued to find support from various 
domestic interest groups, not least among which is the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) which has put forward its request that the Government promote open and 
competitive markets internationally (House of Commons 2007d).   
 
The FAC report on Russia as a global security concern interestingly also underpins 
PEPP ideas.  The report emphasised the need for bi-lateral negotiations with Russia 
over energy supply to be discouraged “…particularly as any agreements should be 
between commercial undertakings and not between Governments…” (FAC 2008: 
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15).105  Therefore the idea that energy should be traded on free markets between 
interdependent companies continued to inform energy foreign policy to the extent that 
other ways of negotiating supply are understood as simply wrong.  
 
Part of the reason for this degree of policy continuity, as suggested briefly above, is that 
the challenges being faced by the UK were understood as being externally generated, 
and not to do with the pro-market energy policy paradigm per se.  Problems were 
associated with other countries not following a proper course of energy market 
restructuring, resulting in a lack of transparency and institutional underpinning (JESS 
2006; DTI 2006).  It might also reflect the lack of political and departmental capacity 
given over to deliberating energy under the PEPP, continued support from organisations 
such as the International Energy Agency (IEA), and to a lack of belief in alternative 
solutions.  Such reasons for continuity will be discussed in greater length in chapter 
seven. 
 
4.2 Neoliberal Perspectives and the Russian Federation 
The UK’s initial policy towards Russia, immediately post-Yukos, was to communicate 
a strong and clear message to the Kremlin through traditional Foreign Office channels 
ploughing on with the same pro-market narrative.   The message was that growing 
Russian ‘resource nationalism’ would result in profound disinvestment by international 
oil companies and investors in the Russian equity and bond markets, or put more simply 
that the ‘markets’ would punish Russia (Interviews 1, 6 and 19). This position taken is 
similar to that reportedly taken by the US.  Condoleezza Rice was quoted around this 
time as saying that Russian actions in respect of Yukos would have a negative effect on 
business investment in Russia (Guardian 2005).  These diplomatic endeavours took 
place within the context of UK-Russia relations which had already soured considerably 
given Russian condemnation of the UK’s decision to offer asylum to Russian oligarchs, 
particularly Boris Berezovskii, considered in Russia to have acted against the interests 
of the state (Interview 19; cf. FAC 2008). 
 
What was remarkable about this policy line is that it shows the extent to which UK 
energy policymakers appeared to believe in the role of the market in disciplining, non-
                                                
105	  This	  pronouncement	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  somewhat	  ironic	  given	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  ‘UK-­‐Russia	  Energy	  
Dialogue’	  referenced	  below.	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market, behaviour.106  This argument found little purchase with Russian counter-parts 
but was repeated again by Alistair Darling, as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, 
during his 2007 trip to Moscow when he emphasised that “…open and liberalised 
markets are in our and Russia’s business interests…” (AFX News 2007).  The 
assumption that ‘the market’ has an interest of its own, and the will to ensure that 
interest, can be critiqued (see Watson 2005), and it certainly did not live up to its role of 
‘judge and jury’ during the 2004 Russian energy restructuring process.  The markets did 
not ultimately ‘punish’ Russian resource nationalism through disinvestment on any 
sustained basis.  International oil companies, even those such as Shell and Exxon-
Mobil, which had had contracts renegotiated, continued to invest in Russian resources, 
much to the frustration of some policymakers and analysts (FAC 2007; Interviews 6, 7, 
8, 9 and 10).107   
 
The UK did start up a new bi-lateral forum for negotiation with Russia called the ‘UK-
Russia Energy Dialogue’ (Interviews 1 and 6; FAC 2008: 17; cf. AFX News 2007).  
Information about this dialogue, and the associated forum, are very thin on the ground 
however interviews have confirmed its existence and some details (Interviews 1, 2 and 
19).  Representatives from the UK side were the Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, DTI staff and members of the business community, in the hope of reinforcing 
the UK message about international ‘good governance’ norms.  It appeared as if UK 
representatives felt that, once explained more clearly, Russia might still come to its 
senses regarding the benefits of liberal, competitive energy governance (Interviews 1 
and 6).  This approach also assumes that Russia would remain a ‘rule taker’ in this 
sphere, underestimating perhaps Russian intentions to “…negotiate on its own terms…” 
(Interview 19; see also Aalto 2007; Romanova 2008).  Some academic analysts were, at 
this time, critical of UK, and EU, inability to understand Russian approaches to energy 
                                                
106	  This	  negotiating	  position	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  underpinned	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  UK	  had	  become	  the	  
largest	  single	  foreign	  investor	  in	  Russia	  (Lee	  2007),	  largely	  via	  BP-­‐TNK.	  	  Conversely,	  Russia	  is	  reported	  to	  
have	  been	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  UK	  would	  not	  risk	  endangering	  political	  relations	  with	  Russia	  for	  fear	  
of	  having	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  BP’s	  business	  in	  Russia.	  	  
107	  Many	  industry	  participants	  consider	  Russia	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  better	  countries	  to	  invest	  in	  energy	  and	  
the	  FAC	  report	  of	  2008	  also	  recognises	  this	  (FAC	  2008).	  	  See	  also	  a	  recent	  Economist	  article	  about	  Exxon-­‐
Mobil’s	  considerable	  new	  investments	  in	  the	  Russian	  energy	  sector,	  which	  argues	  that	  as	  long	  as	  a	  
country	  sits	  on	  large	  reserves	  of	  energy	  companies	  will	  always	  want	  to	  do	  business:	  	  
http://www.economist.com/node/21528304	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governance, and to continue a dialogue based on ideas and solutions largely opposite to 
Russian perspectives (Monaghan 2005; Light 2006).  Again all this might serve to 
underline arguments made thus far about a lack of capacity within UK energy 
governance institutions.   
 
4.3 Climate Change Objective but Consistent Methods of Delivery 
Again, in terms of throwing old solutions against new problems, there was remarkable 
consistency still in the instruments being applied in attempts to achieve new climate 
targets via energy policy.  In May 2005 the Climate Change Programme Review 
(CCPR) had concluded that various climate targets might be missed, but the publication 
of the report was delayed for almost a year, until March 2006 (House of Commons 
2007b).  This critique of the ability of existing policy to deliver on targets seems to have 
been missed by the 2007 White Paper and there remained a “…continued belief in the 
importance of maintaining an economic design of mechanisms of support…” (Mitchell 
2008: 123).   
 
Therefore measures such as “…putting a price on carbon…” and EU emissions trading 
schemes persisted as the core elements of climate policy (DTI 2007: 47).  Establishing a 
global carbon market would, theoretically, “…ensure emissions to be reduced in the 
most cost-effective way…” (DTI 2007: 8).  The Renewables Obligation (RO) continued 
to represent the main mechanism for directly supporting renewable energy production, 
and it was suggested that more information should be made available about energy 
efficiency, for individuals and businesses, and measures should be taken to reduce 
uncertainty for business to enable investment in renewable technology (DTI 2007: 8-9).  
Taken together this showed, again, a lack of willingness to adopt alternative solutions 
for meeting climate targets. 
 
Some DTI officials were reportedly, and perhaps understandably given that they had 
advised against it and given the low levels of renewable energy production at the time, 
shocked by the adoption of a specific renewables target as part of the 20-20-20 
commitment (Interview 5; cf. Macalister 2010). This takes place within the context, 
referenced in chapter four, of reluctance within the DTI to commit to a renewables 
strategy (Interview 14).  Some reportedly believed that a politically instigated switch to 
renewable energy might present a threat to energy security and could not, furthermore, 
prove cost efficient (Interview 5).   
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There was, furthermore, a tendency to think that targets, particularly for renewables, 
might not have to be specifically met, in that if the target were missed it could be made 
up for it via ‘safety valves’ and/or ‘compensation mechanisms’ (Interview 5).  So, if the 
understanding was that there was ‘wriggle room’ around targets then no profound 
changes would need to be made to existing policy yet.  Indeed the 2007 White Paper 
maintains the vague carbon dioxide reduction aims and the 10% renewables target, but 
with ‘…an aspiration to double this by 2020’ (DTI 2007: 14).  The Paper does suggest, 
however, that in future these targets will need to be made legal and more specific (DTI 
2007: 8).   
 
What is apparent therefore is a growing commitment to using energy policy to slow 
climate change, whilst maintaining faith in the market model, and specifically in the 
private sector, to achieve that aim but with a bit more ‘direction’ from Government 
(DTI 2007: 9).  Recognition that climate targets would need to be made more binding in 
future suggests that the degree of ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation taking place was 
allowing policymakers and analysts to understand some of the extent of what was being 
taken on. What might also be suggested however, and this will be expanded upon in 
chapter six, is a continuing degree of ignorance still of how large a task these targets 
might represent.  This is both in terms of the costs of renewable electricity, and how 
these might impact upon energy ‘affordability’, as well in terms of the degree of 
underinvestment across the sector (Interview 12; see also Rutledge 2007).  
 
 
Conclusions	  
This chapter has analysed in some detail processes of UK energy governance between 
2004 and 2007, remarking on evidence of both consistency in and change to the PEPP, 
and how and why these may have occurred.  Energy policy responses, where they 
departed from the PEPP, appear to have reflected crisis perceived as a security of supply 
crisis.  It has been argued that the fast changing political economy of energy in Russia 
did have an impact on the way that energy was perceived and governed in the UK over 
the mid 2000s versus what had gone immediately before.  It would be naive to suggest 
that Russia’s new energy and foreign policy might have impacted UK energy policy to 
the degree that it did, had it not been developed at the same time that the UK was 
becoming an importer once more.  In addition, it is argued here that had the PEPP not 
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been so deeply embedded politically new Russian policy would not have been perceived 
as quite so ‘wrong’ or threatening to the UK way of doing things.  This suggestion of a 
relationship between UK perceptions of unfolding events and political actions serve to 
underpin the notion that ideas can provide a link between context and conduct (Hay and 
Wincott 1998: 953).  
 
It is also important, in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness, that the emergent 
geopolitical narrative was able to draw on a long and strong tradition, in the UK, of both 
fearing and disapproving of Russia and of associating energy with political and 
economic power.  Understandings that energy might not be ultimately replaceable, but 
subject to fixed geographic and political structures appeared to be taking hold across 
public, and some political, circles.108  The geopolitical narrative drew on evocative 
language emphasising energy security specifically as a national and short-term issue.  It 
appears that by bringing potential dangers associated with the world of energy down to 
these arguably more tangible levels that more people responded in a way not 
experienced by climate protagonists who had so long stressed a global, long-term 
energy and climate crisis. The success of this narrative in explaining the crisis is 
indicative of the importance of popular attention in evoking political response.  
 
It is lastly worth noting, that although the objective of energy security perceived in 
terms of threat and insecurity had driven some related policy responses, the process of 
‘re-think’ initiated during this period continued.  The sense of uncertainty, triggered by 
events and perceptions of them, remained strongly in place despite the 2007 White 
Paper.  This partly reflects the degree to which piecemeal, protectionist style policies 
appeared not to enjoy much support among policymaking teams.  The addition of a 
more specific climate objective for energy policy, towards the end of this time period, 
would serve to complicate matters considerably. 
 
                                                
108	  This	  is	  reminiscent,	  perhaps,	  of	  the	  notion	  that	  when	  we	  think	  something	  is	  readily	  available	  to	  us	  
that	  we	  take	  it	  for	  granted,	  but	  when	  we	  lose	  it	  we	  realise	  its	  importance.	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Chapter	  6:	  Unravelling	  the	  Ties	  that	  Bind:	  2008-­10	  
 
Introduction 
Chapter five suggested that the widely perceived security of supply crisis prompted a 
sense of urgency and renewed debate about energy governance.  Assumptions about the 
existence of energy security, in a positive sense, were replaced by a new focus on 
energy supply security as an objective of energy policy – as something yet to be 
established.  This in turn fed into the start of a process of re-engaging politically with, 
or ‘re-thinking’, energy and how it should be governed, a process which extends into 
this chapter.   
 
The establishment of the idea that the UK was facing a security of supply crisis, 
combined with climate targets, and the continuing sense of uncertainty allowed for 
critiques of the UK pro-market energy policy paradigm (PEPP) to emerge more visibly 
across academia as well as in public fora.  This body of work, which will be reviewed in 
section one of this chapter, sought to highlight not only reasons why UK energy policy 
needed to change, due to policy failure, but also suggested a range of solutions.  
Interestingly, some of the ideas suggested within these alternative narratives do become 
replicated in policy documents and decisions taken by Government around this time.  
As such there is a more audible narrative in support of the notion that problems being 
experienced may be endogenous to energy governance structures. 
 
It appears that in the face of this mounting body of evidence suggesting that the PEPP 
was not adequate to meet the current challenges that further changes started to occur on 
other levels of the PEPP.  Growing political contestation was taking place at the same 
time as the ongoing period of political ‘re-think’ referred to in the last chapter, leaving 
policymakers and politicians more susceptible to new ideas and solutions.  What 
emerged first from the process of ‘re-thinking’ energy and its governance was the 
Climate Change Act of 2008 which made specific and legally binding commitments to 
carbon dioxide emission reduction and the production of energy from renewable 
sources.  The Act was, as will be seen below, again low on details in terms of how these 
targets might be met. 
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The second real outward manifestation that New Labour had come to consider more 
profound change to be necessary was the decision to create a new Department for 
Energy and Climate Change (DECC).  This Department for the first time combined 
responsibility for analysis and decision making for these two separate, but long argued 
as intrinsically interlinked, policy areas.  The creation of DECC is considered here as a 
reasonably significant change to one of the levels of the PEPP, physical structures of 
governance.  What is also noteworthy is that the narrative emanating from DECC 
showed some desire break with the PEPP, understood as the ‘markets only’ model of 
energy governance.  Alongside this critique of the previous model another narrative 
emerges, but with the emphasis on energy security concerns as a direct reason for 
pursuing climate objectives. 
 
What ensues after the formation of DECC is yet another a series of Energy and Climate 
Acts and Bills – an era of high output in terms of energy and climate decision-making 
reflecting also the process of ‘re-thinking’ initiated in the aftermath of the perceived 
security of supply crisis and which was still ongoing.  These will be analysed in some 
detail below to ascertain whether or not profound change can be considered as 
happening on other levels of the PEPP, namely understanding of energy, the dominance 
of pro-market ideas, objectives and instruments of policy.  
 
1.	  	   Problems	  Endogenous	  to	  the	  Pro-­Market	  Governance	  System	  
As discussed at length in chapter two, paradigm shifts are understood to occur when the 
existing paradigm, including the ideas upon which it rests, has entered into a process of 
credibility loss such that it can be rejected (Hall 1993; Hay 1999a and 2001; Blyth 
2002; Greener 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  Although a process of elite political 
‘re-thinking’ was ongoing at this time and objectives had been changing, what had not 
been visible up until 2008 was much overt political rejection of other levels of the 
PEPP.   
 
This seemed partly because alternatives offered, for example those offered by the Policy 
and Innovation Unit energy review of 2002 (PIU 2002), were not yet taken as being 
credible.  By overtly claiming that the existing paradigm, including within it prominent 
roles for markets and ‘competition’, was sufficient to answering new challenges the DTI 
and Ofgem had arguably left themselves open to further challenge, and potentially 
dwindling credibility, should this not prove to be the case.  What is highlighted in this 
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section is that the continuing sense of energy uncertainty, despite the new White Paper 
of 2007, appears to have opened up a space for the emergence of a wider and more 
politically credible, critical debate. The sense of uncertainty was heightened by 
mounting evidence of policy failure, and by the sharp escalation of oil, and gas, prices 
in 2008.  This later was referred to as the “2008 oil price shock” with crude oil hitting 
an unprecedented $140 per barrel (Youngs 2009: 1; see also Behr 2009).   
 
1.1 Mounting Evidence of Failure: Energy Security Critique 
Policy documents, and some prominent analysts, had thus far largely concentrated on 
problems exogenous to the pro-market system as being responsible for the security of 
supply crisis (FCO et al 2004; DTI 2006c; DTI 2007; Helm 2005a and 2007a).  At 
around this time geopolitically informed critics, largely within academia and think 
tanks, were emphasising the limited capacity of the markets to provide for certain 
outcomes and system properties.  As such these criticisms implied that the insecurity of 
supply crisis could be traced also to elements of the pro-market governance system and 
not just to changing ‘external contexts’ (Gault 2004; Myers-Jaffe 2005; Reihing 2007).  
This narrative had, as argued in chapter five, not gained ground in political circles by 
this stage, but critique continued to escalate into the late 2000s.  
 
There were a few publications which started to question certain aspects of the UK PEPP 
specifically with the central question again being that of the capacity of markets to 
deliver objectives but this time with the emphasis on the ‘national’ scale (Stern 2006; 
CEPMLP 2006; Kemp and Stephen 2007).  The CEPMLP report, funded by the ESRC, 
suggested that the UK had experienced a loss of surplus energy, and gas storage, 
capacity as a direct consequence of the privatisation process of the 1980s:  
(t)he widespread unease about energy security is frequently driven by concerns about 
the impacts of liberalisation and the market reforms of recent years.  This has 
removed the comfort zones or cushions of excess supply, storage, etc, built up by 
government investment a generation ago... (CEPMLP 2006: 18). 
In addition, it was noted that as privatised electricity companies have been motivated by 
financial returns and cost efficiency, particularly within the RPI-X pricing formula, they 
had not therefore been inclined to invest in the spare capacity required by the national 
energy system (CEPMLP 2006: 6; see also Helm 2003; McGowan 2008).  Some 
confirmed supporters of the market system ultimately started to suggest that liberalised 
markets had under-delivered on investment (Mabey and Mitchell 2010). 
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Such arguments about market failure in terms of investment are related to others about 
oil depletion rates, specifically in the UK.109   It has been noted that the UK Continental 
Shelf (UKCS) assets were depleted at a fast pace and this was attributed to the tendency 
of private sector oil companies to want to maximise profits on a more short-term 
oriented basis, partly to please shareholders (Stern 2004; Kemp and Stephen 2007).   
Arguments about the rate of decline of UK, and other Western, fossil fuels relate to 
those discussed in chapter one about the changing geography of production versus 
demand, and to other emerging arguments about peak oil referenced in chapter five 
(Simmons 2005; Leggett 2005; Kunstler 2005; Heinberg 2006; Klare 2008a; Gppi 
2008; Aleklett et al 2010).  The dusting off once more of the peak oil thesis which, like 
man-made climate change arguments, had been around for decades attests to the degree 
to which widespread concerns about energy supplies were leading to spaces which 
previously less credible voices could fill. 
 
The CEPMLP report further observes that energy liberalisation, and the process of 
devolving responsibility to the market, had resulted in the reduced capacity of the UK 
Government to address national energy security concerns.  The thinking here was that 
in-so-far-as energy security can be understood as a national problem then the PEPP, 
having devolved so much responsibility to the private sector, had left UK state 
institutions with diminished will and capacity to act in energy markets (CEPMLP 2006: 
18).  This argument serves also to highlight claims made above about the ‘deskilling’ of 
government with regard to energy, which will be discussed at length in the next chapter.  
 
Lastly, from within this body of research focused on questions of energy (in)-security it 
is worth also highlighting a new body of work, again not just within academia, 
concerned with the impact of financial market speculation on fossil fuel prices. The 
work of such analysts became increasingly pertinent as oil and gas prices spiked to 
previously unprecedented levels in mid 2008 (Cho 2008; Sornette et al 2009; Kaufmann 
2009; Davidson 2009).  This debate found a central focal point in a 2008 investigation 
by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which had concluded that 
at one point speculators held 81% of the total of available oil futures contracts.  This 
                                                
109	  The	  depletion	  rate	  is	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  oil,	  and	  gas,	  is	  recovered	  from	  the	  ground.	  	  Historically	  
‘Western’	  oil	  companies	  have	  tended	  to	  deplete	  at	  much	  faster	  rates	  than	  companies	  based	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East.	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was understood as distorting the, already by this stage very tight, supply and demand 
fundamentals and in turn contributing to the unprecedented price of oil (Cho 2008: 
A01).110  Recent work on the UK financial crisis has also highlighted the extent to 
which spiking oil prices were amplified by “speculative dynamics” within UK financial 
markets (Hay 2010: 11).   Such evidence of market speculation and its impact on prices, 
and volatility, has often used by producer states to argue against the marketisation of 
energy (Presentation 6; cf. Tretault 2009). 
 
1.2 Mounting Evidence of Failure: Climate Focused Critique 
For a decade or so climate analysts, within academia, thinks tanks and NGOs, had been 
writing, with mounting frustration, of the UK Government’s lack of ability to change 
policy and its tendency to always seek market-based solutions, no matter what the 
problem (Carter 2001; Foxon et al 2005; Toke and Lauber 2007; Rutledge 2007; 
Mitchell 2008; Scrase et al 2009).  New Labour, having been so vocal about ‘showing 
leadership’ in climate change policy, but by claiming that competition and markets were 
the credible routes to achieving climate goals, had left themselves open to critique in the 
event that targets were not being met.  As such, although the objective of a lower carbon 
economy had been identified the question of how this might be achieved had not, for 
these critics of the PEPP, been adequately answered. 
 
By this stage it was becoming increasingly easy to challenge existing policy due to the 
fact that results in terms of reducing carbon dioxide emissions were in fact 
deteriorating, particularly as the ‘easy gains’, from the switch in electricity production 
from coal to gas in the 1990s, were past (van der Horst 2005; Carbon Trust 2006; 
Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 2009; Jha 2009; Helm 2010). The UK had been missing 
climate targets and this was being increasingly noticed and commented upon, building 
on early work by the Royal Commission on Environmental Protection (RCEP) and the 
PIU (RCEP 2000; PIU 2002).  For example, the UK had missed their 2003 renewables 
target of 5% of electricity by 40% and it was expected that it would miss the carbon 
emissions reduction target of 20% by 2010 (Van den Horst 2005: 706; cf. Greenpeace 
2006: 3; House of Commons 2007b: 3).  One report suggested that, corrected for the 
outsourcing of energy-intensive industries and coal to gas substitution and adding back 
shipping and aviation, carbon consumption had risen almost 20 percent between 1990 
and 2005 (Helm 2010: 183). 
                                                
110	  The	  CFTC	  investigation	  contributed	  to	  the	  ‘US	  Energy	  Markets	  Emergency	  Act’	  2008.	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What was also clear, however, was that claims that markets and competition would 
deliver an increase in the percentage of renewable energy and energy efficiency could 
increasingly be argued as being less than credible.  Tendencies to rely on market-
oriented energy policy instruments were increasingly highlighted as part of the problem 
(Scrase et al 2009: 6; see also Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Kern 2009; Giddens 2009; 
West et al 2010).  The UK was being compared with European neighbours who, having 
pursued very different approaches to climate policy, had achieved much greater results 
specifically in the generation of renewable energy, but in carbon-dioxide emissions 
reduction also (Mitchell 2008: 122; see also Ragwitz et al 2005; Giddens 2009; Policy 
Network 2009; Macalister 2010; WWF 2010).111   This was all the more ironic given 
the UK’s regular claims to be taking ‘leadership’ in climate policy (Blair in DTI 2007; 
Brown in Cabinet Office 2008).   
 
Arguments about a larger role for the state in energy policy started, as with the security 
narrative above, to make a greater impact within the widening energy debate, 
particularly with regard to investing in new technologies (Foxon et al 2005; Sauter and 
Watson 2007; IEA 2007).  It was increasingly argued that direct Government 
involvement and or intervention should be seen as an answer to the perceived failures of 
the market-oriented policy framework (Held 2006; Mitchell 2008; Giddens 2009; 
Macalister 2010).  Related to such suggestions of institutional change was the proposal 
that climate policy be integrated more thoroughly with energy policy in praxis (Carter 
2001; PIU 2002; Held 2006; Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 2009; Scrase et al 2009).  
 
In addition to failures to produce climate results which could now be emphasised, and 
reasons for which could be discussed, there also emerged some research suggesting 
inconsistencies between objectives (Rutledge 2007: 902).  The PIU Energy Review of 
2002 had suggested that there might well be ‘trade-offs’ between the multiple objectives 
of energy policy, although this point was not taken up in the ensuing 2003 or 2007 
White Papers.  However, recent research was suggesting escalating energy costs as the 
UK attempted to switch to lower carbon energy production (Interview 13; Rutledge 
2007; cf. Boardman 2011), which would be politically difficult in the light of energy 
poverty objectives.  Analysts bemoaned the lack of recognition of such trade-offs by 
                                                
111	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  the	  German	  ’full’	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariff	  was	  largely	  responsible	  for	  Germany’s	  high	  
percentage	  of	  energy	  generated	  from	  renewable	  sources	  (Mitchell	  2008;	  Toke	  and	  Lauber	  2007).	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energy policymakers (Rutledge 2007: 907; Interview 13), especially given rising, not 
falling, fuel poverty numbers (BBC 2009).  In 2008 18.5 percent of households were 
still measured as being ‘fuel poor’, despite the target set in 2003 that fuel poverty be 
eradicated by 2016-18 (DTI 2003: 107).112 
 
Some analysis, whilst recognising high near-term economic and political costs, also 
suggested that emphasis on such costs should be overtly recognised but that this should 
not prevent radical change from being adopted (Green Alliance 2010: 7).  This would 
require new energy policy design not predicated largely, as was the case within the 
PEPP, on near-term cost efficiency. 
 
1.3 Narrative Appropriation: Energy-Security-Climate Narrative Develops 
At around this time a new narrative emerged which appropriated arguments from the 
geopolitical ‘national security’ narrative and utilised them to underpin long-standing 
claims about the need for policy change, specifically to boost investment in renewable 
energy.  This narrative, referred to below as the energy-security-climate narrative, in 
combining elements of geopolitical and climate narratives, seems to have been more 
effective in providing impetus for change than either of the two above narratives alone. 
 
It has been observed that narratives emphasising the need to act in order to avoid 
climate change had often in the past utilised evocative language of “catastrophe” 
evoking Doomsday type images of the world’s future if we continue with business-as-
usual energy and climate politics (Giddens 2009: 28; cf. Bernstein 2001).  This thesis 
has observed in previous chapters that this narrative might have found more purchase 
amongst those with the ability to think in terms of la longue durée (cf. Braudel and 
Matthews 1982), but might be less tangible for those who view the world through more 
short-term, and/or culturally localised, lenses.  The argument here is that elements 
within climate groups strategically changed their narrative because they understood 
aspects of the geopolitical narrative to be capable of evoking political reaction, and 
change (Interview 18).  
 
Specifically climate groups, such as NGOs, climate teams within think tanks, and some 
academics started to actively utilise fears about dependency on ‘unstable’ foreign 
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  Put	  differently,	  in	  2003	  when	  the	  fuel	  poverty	  target	  became	  an	  objective	  of	  energy	  policy	  1.2	  million	  
households	  were	  considered	  ‘fuel	  poor’,	  by	  2008	  this	  had	  risen	  to	  3.3	  million	  homes	  (DECC	  2011b).	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suppliers and related conclusions that the UK needed to focus on increasing its domestic 
energy production (Interview 18; Plesch et al 2005; Roberts 2004; Greenpeace 2006; 
Bird 2007; Ochs 2008; Giddens 2009). One example is a report for Greenpeace entitled 
‘Oil and Peace Don’t Mix’ which overtly used geopolitical ideas about energy and 
conflict, and growing UK reliance on imported fossil fuels, to argue for change to UK 
energy policy (Greenpeace 2006).113  Interestingly, analysts from within the ‘blood for 
oil’ school referenced in chapter one, had also started to use their evocative geopolitical 
visions of future conflict over fossil fuels to make arguments for an end to the industrial 
paradigm (cf. Klare 2008a). 
 
Others started to formulate arguments linking the notion of upcoming peak oil with the 
need to invest heavily in renewable energy for electricity and transport, as well as 
further changes to energy policy (Hodge 2010).  A particularly politically active 
example of the use of such arguments is the UK Industry Taskforce on Peak Oil & 
Energy Security (ITPOES) which included amongst its members Richard Branson and 
Jeremy Leggett, formerly of Greenpeace (ITPOES 2008 and 2010).  The specific notion 
behind this group is to provide wider publicity for the argument that the world is 
already facing peak oil in order to remind government, and the populace more 
generally, about the finite nature of fossil fuels and to promote sustainable energy 
transition.  As the report states: “(o)ur message to government and business is clear: Act 
now” (ITPOES 2010: 5). 
 
As such, the growing political purchase of the geopolitical narrative, which concluded 
that the UK should reduce future foreign supply dependency, was held to be capable of 
provoking responses in a way that arguments about the urgent need to invest in and 
facilitate renewable energy sources for climate reasons had not.114  This perception 
might be particularly evident in the UK where public support for the notion that energy 
security represents a national security threat far outstrips interest in climate change as a 
threat (Niblett 2011).  
 
This form of narrative appropriation was clever, however, in that many of these groups 
were also arguing, and showing empirically as seen above, that continuing to assign 
                                                
113	  The	  report	  also	  makes	  specific	  claims	  about	  the	  Iraq	  War	  being	  about	  access	  to	  oil	  for	  Western	  oil	  
companies	  and	  about	  the	  de-­‐stabilising	  effect	  that	  this	  war	  had	  on	  the	  world	  (Greenpeace	  2006:	  5).	  
114	  Emphasis	  author’s	  own. 
 197 
responsibility to the private sector to produce these investments was already resulting in 
poor renewable results (van der Horst 2005; Mitchell 2008; WWF 2010).  DTI 
assumptions, as seen in the 2007 White Paper, that the European emissions trading 
scheme would take much of the burden of incentivising business and industry to lower 
carbon emissions were increasingly seen as insufficient (Green Alliance 2010: 8).   
 
As we have seen above, a number of changes had been proposed from within the 
climate narrative, many of which would constitute greater state intervention, 
specifically to boost renewable production.  They ranged from new green taxes 
(Greenpeace 2006; Sentence 2009), to ‘real’ feed-in-tariffs (FITs) which would remove 
the risk for renewable energy producers (Mitchell 2008), to a radical overhaul of the 
electricity system whereby a central, single buyer would be put in place who would 
discriminate over type of energy technology bought (White 2009).   Suggestions about 
the need to integrate energy and climate policy remained an ongoing part of the 
solutions offered (Greenpeace 2006; Held 2006; Carter 2007; Giddens 2009; Scrase et 
al 2009; cf. PIU 2002). 
 
This might be characterised as an instrumental process of ‘narrative appropriation’ and 
in this way the supply crisis becomes, in some respects only, consistent with the climate 
crisis.  As such it managed to encapsulate both elements of the dominant, geopolitical 
crisis narrative whilst also offering non-business-as-usual solutions which challenged 
the PEPP.  There might, however, be some irony involved in climate campaigners, who 
had so often in the past been more overtly focused on the ‘shared commons’ and long-
term issues, now using national security and domestic production needs to underpin 
their campaign.  Questions were being raised, for example, about the degree to which 
the notion that energy independence was indeed constitutive of energy security was 
accurate (Watson and Scott 2009: 5098).  But by conflating energy security with 
climate change solutions these questions remained sidelined.   
 
There were other difficulties associated with this ‘narrative appropriation’ specifically 
for those proposing clean, renewable energy.  Arguments about the need for more 
domestic, or home grown, energy production were just as easily utilised by those who 
supported the building of a new generation of nuclear plants in the UK (Blackhurst 
2004; Helm 2007; Wheeler 2007; Interviews 13 and 14).  The emergence of nuclear as a 
‘low carbon’, domestic source of energy is just one of the areas of conflict which can 
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arise when combining narratives, based on different historical perspectives, in such a 
way. 
 
As one report put it,  
…those concerned with ecological stability and those concerned for geopolitics and 
defence are sometimes not amiable acquaintances and generally operate in different 
spheres (Nuttall and Manz 2008: 1250). 
Such differences can be pinpointed on the different ontological positions underlying the 
perspectives that inform climate and geopolitical security narratives.  By utilising 
geopolitical arguments about energy security to further climate ends there has arguably 
been ample room for policies to ensue that might not sit well with traditional climate, 
read ecological, understandings of the world, nuclear energy being just one example.  
Such a notion ties in with those who have criticised the use of securitising language in 
respect of climate change specifically in that it might shift the issue into the realm of 
national security and zero sum political conceptions (cf. Deudney 1990 and 2006; 
Barnett 2001; Dalby 2009).  Such conceptions have often in the past lead to state-centric 
nationalism, conflictual and, at times, militaristic solutions, at the cost of notions such 
as inter-dependence within a global commons (cf. Deudney 2006: 249-50).  This thesis 
suggests, in line with recent critical security analysis, that ‘speaking security’ can 
(re)politicise subjects, in that it has implied greater state interest and involvement, but 
does not necessarily lead to militaristic solutions (cf. Browning and MacDonald 2010). 
 
The way in which this alternative narrative developed is significant also in a number of 
other ways, not least in that it is echoed, see below, in important policy documents and 
decisions made around this time.  It built on the idea, already noted by policymakers, 
that domestically produced, low carbon energy production will serve as a solution to 
both the security of supply and climate crises (DTI 2006c and 2007).  But it also 
presented an interesting challenge in that it provided a further degree of urgency to the 
question of how this could be better achieved, given that existing policy was at the same 
time being shown not to be effective in providing for investment in renewables.   
 
As Anthony Giddens had pointed out in his 2009 book on the politics of climate change 
what was starting to emerge was not the question of where energy needed to be going as 
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the hierarchy of objectives had already been rearranged (Giddens 2009).115  Instead the 
question was fast becoming how such objectives should be met and this was emerging 
as the area of contestation – should the UK continue to follow a market model, or, like 
various European neighbours before, pursue a more state interventionist policy?  The 
question which will arise over the rest of this chapter is the extent to which arguments 
about the failure of pro-market systems would find buy-in from political elites to the 
extent that the neoliberal ideas upon which the PEPP largely rested could be seen as 
failing.  Or whether, if change did come to be deemed necessary, it would be because of 
newly perceived, ‘external’ challenges rather than in recognition that the PEPP itself 
had partly contributed to those problems. 
 
 
2.	  	   ‘Re-­Thinking’	  Energy	  as	  a	  Continuing	  Process 
Having committed, in the 2003 and 2007 White Papers, to reaching evolving energy 
policy goals largely via the existing pro-market model, the DTI and Ofgem found 
themselves in increasingly difficult waters.  As can be seen from the above section, 
from 2008 onwards pressure to move away from business-as-usual was mounting, and 
importantly, increasingly supported by evidence of failure.  For some within the DTI 
and Ofgem, confirmed in their pro-market views, this was still not necessarily a 
question of the failure of neoliberal economics but of doing something to address 
mounting political pressure (Interview 15).  
 
This pressure was, of course, taking place whilst political elites were not only more 
aware of energy as a national issue, reflecting public concern, but had also instigated 
processes of ‘re-thinking’ energy.  This process of ‘re-thinking’ was resulting in an 
increased awareness of the need to address various areas of energy and climate policy as 
well as in some further organisational re-structuring.  This indicated that as energy 
governance was being re-thought in order to respond to important questions around how 
to improve domestic energy production, a whole range of new ‘sub’ problems emerged, 
feeding into the sense of uncertainty about energy governance.  
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  Although	  debate	  continued	  over	  time	  about	  the	  level	  of	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  targets	  –	  should	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  or	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  –	  a	  
policy	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  of	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  CO2	  emissions	  was	  now	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  (cf.	  IPPR	  et	  al	  2007).	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2.1 ‘Re-Thinking’ Energy: Physical Institutions of Governance 
A number of changes had been taking place reflecting the process of ‘re-think’.  As 
already mentioned in chapter five, more capacity had been put into the energy division 
within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which during 2007 changed its 
name to the department for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR).  In 
addition processes had been put in place whereby BERR, and the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), would have to report on an annual 
basis to Parliament on progress in terms of energy and climate security (DTI 2005a).  
The Research Council UK’s ‘Energy Programme’ is an example of the additional 
funding that was, by this stage, starting to go into energy research and development.116 
 
As it became more widely reported that the UK was missing its targets, and as it became 
clear that the UK was indeed committed to specific renewables targets, it started to 
become apparent even within the DTI that a policy overhaul would be required 
(Interview 5). What had ensued, late in 2007, was a further process of structural re-
organisation within BERR’s energy division with the creation of a separate 
‘renewables’ team, called the Renewables Directorate.  This was significant in a number 
of ways, partly because it was formed by bringing civil servants from DEFRA’s and 
BERR’s ‘renewables’ desks together, but also because it showed a specific effort to 
address a lack of progress in terms of investment in, and production of, renewable 
energy in the UK. 
 
It also marked a small change in operating practices within the energy division.  
Previously those working on ‘renewables’ within the DTI had been ‘tolerated’ but 
largely ignored and this was partly due to the DTI’s reluctance to commit seriously to 
carbon reduction targets for fear that doing so, particularly via renewables, might 
endanger the reliability of supplies (Interview 5; Interview 16).  In chapter five it was 
suggested that some BERR officials had expected there to be some ‘wriggle room’ in 
meeting the 15% renewable target (RES target).  However, it was decided as 2007 
progressed, and in regular contact with Her Majesty’s Treasury, that the RES target 
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  The	  Programme	  invested	  £530m	  in	  research	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  to	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  part	  of	  this	  spending	  which	  provided	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  information	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  renewable	  energy	  in	  the	  UK,	  peak	  oil,	  target	  hitting	  and	  other	  
subjects.	  	  See:	  http://www.rcukenergy.org.uk/home/research-­‐councils-­‐energy-­‐program.html.	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would have to be met without ‘safety valves’ or compensation mechanisms (Interview 
5).  By late 2007, early 2008, therefore, these changes had the effect of institutionalising 
the new climate targets as well as representing a more concerted effort to figure out how 
to reach them (Interviews 5 and 15). 
 
Likewise, at Ofgem political pressure was being brought to bear.  Higher oil and gas 
prices had prompted consumer responses and these served to underline the notion that 
political awareness and willingness to act rises at times of public interest in energy, 
often via increasing energy costs (Interview 15).  In response to this political pressure, 
in turn emanating from “…mounting consumer and public concern…”, Ofgem launched 
the ‘Energy Supply Markets Probe’ in February 2008 (Ofgem 2008: 1).  This probe was 
couched in terms of measuring the degree to which gas and electricity markets were 
proving ‘competitive’ and was, as such, underpinned by pro-market ideas.  In addition, 
some within Ofgem felt that some sort of response was necessary lest they face a greater 
degree of Government ‘interference’ (Interview 15).  As such this can be seen as part of 
the process of ‘re-thinking’ energy due to political pressure albeit, at this stage, coming 
up with a review couched in the usual terms. 
 
What was significant, in terms of internal Ofgem thinking, was the degree to which 
some staff were amazed at the level of political interference being experienced and the 
mounting realisation that this might indicate that things would have to change 
(Interview 15).  Ofgem was increasingly facing specific criticism within the British 
media such as this attack, taking an energy security perspective, in the Telegraph 
newspaper: 
(i)n experimenting with unproven free-market ideology, much of which defied common 
sense, Ofgem seemed to forget about security of energy supply and the national 
interest (Warner 2009) 
It was around the time, of the market probe, that some pro-market personnel left Ofgem 
and it has been suggested that this was because they could see more political 
intervention coming which was understood by them as negative per se (Interview 15). 
This ‘moment of realisation’ within Ofgem mirrored that within the energy division of 
BERR, above, when realisation dawned that things might have to change in order to 
meet the now more serious carbon dioxide and renewables targets. 
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It was also around this time, 2008, that Ofgem created a dedicated ‘sustainability’ team 
partly in response to the 2008 Energy Act.  The Act had raised Ofgem’s responsibilities 
in terms of contributing to a sustainable energy system such that they were now on an 
equal footing with duties to meet reasonable demand (Interview 15; HMG 2008b).  This 
change to Ofgem’s mandate extended specific duties in terms of achieving sustainable 
energy and climate goals but it did not put these duties on a par with the principal goal 
of protecting the interests of consumers via maintaining competitive markets.  Although 
it suggested a higher degree of importance for sustainability, and associated goals, it did 
not yet suggest to those within Ofgem specific changes to operational practices. 
 
2.2 The 2008 Energy and Climate Change Acts 
Outside of these initial institutional changes there was a discernable upping of the pace 
of energy governance change in terms of new Acts of Parliament.  2008 bore witness to 
the new Energy Act (HMG 2008b), emanating out of the 2007 White Paper and the 
Climate Change Act (HMG 2008a), both of which will be analysed in more detail 
below.   
 
There was also a new Planning Act in 2008 directed at streamlining the planning system 
for nationally significant infrastructure projects including energy infrastructure (HMG 
2008c).  This Act also put into place a new independent, but government funded, 
institution in the form of the Infrastructure Planning Commission whose role it was to 
oversee these changes to planning on a national basis.  As Anthony Giddens has 
suggested, the bill empowers the government periodically to issue national policy 
statements, some of which would identify major developments on specific sites, where 
it considers them to be in the public interest - such as the building of a new nuclear 
power station (Giddens 2009: 97).  This indicates the degree of understanding that 
nationally important energy infrastructure was needed, but is clearly designed to better 
enable private sector investment in low carbon energy.  Thus not indicating, at this 
stage, much reversal of ‘marketised’ de-politicisation, although overall political activity 
in energy was clearly on the increase. 
 
The Energy Act, in addition to changes to Ofgem’s mandate, was largely designed to 
update energy legislation such that renewable energy, and other energy infrastructure 
such as nuclear and gas storage capacity, could be facilitated (HMG 2008b). The Act 
addresses arguments outlined above, from those concerned with security of supply, that 
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the UK’s infrastructure was not sufficient to meet either new energy import needs nor 
domestic electricity demand projections.  The response was overall, however, to 
strengthen regulation in order to allow for private sector investment to help maintain the 
UK’s reliable energy supplies.  This was, in part, because the Act was mainly designed 
to implement the legislative aspects of the 2007 White Paper, which, in turn was limited 
in alternative ideas about how to govern energy.117 
 
It appears at this stage in the energy ‘re-think’, and having accepted that domestic 
renewable production needed to be boosted, that more serious thought had also been 
going into how to facilitate this.  The Act introduces a new feed-in-tariff (FiT), albeit a 
far cry from the kind of full FiT being called for among climate groups, tinkers again 
with the Renewables Obligation (RO) and makes provisions regarding other measures 
to boost energy efficiency (HMG 2008b: various).  The Act did, however, allow for 
some strengthening of the powers of the Secretary of State.  This was to facilitate the 
provision of a financial support programme for ‘renewable heat’, the first of its kind, 
and to modify business licences such that gas and electricity distribution companies 
would have to install ‘smart meters’.118  It also allowed for some regulatory 
responsibilities to pass back to the newly formed Department for Energy and Climate 
Change (DECC), away from Ofgem. 
 
The Climate Change Act of 2008 is another case in point of the intensification of 
political interest in climate and energy policy as well as of outcomes of ‘re-think’ 
(HMG 2008a).  This Act was held up as being the first of its kind in that it not only set 
legally binding carbon dioxide reduction targets up until 2050, of at least 80%, but it 
also set out a series of 5 year carbon budgets to 2022: 
The Bill would put the UK’s post-2010 carbon reduction targets into statute, define 
pathways towards these targets by setting successive five-year carbon budgets, make 
annual reporting to Parliament of progress towards these targets mandatory, and 
                                                
117	  For	  more	  information	  see	  also	  DECC’s	  webpage	  on	  the	  Energy	  Act	  2008:	  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/energy_act_08/energy_act_08.aspx	  
118	  Smart	  meters	  are	  designed	  to	  improve	  energy	  efficiency	  by	  allowing	  users	  to	  monitor	  their	  electricity	  
usage.	  	  Modified	  smart	  meters	  could	  also	  allow	  distributors	  to	  switch	  supply	  off,	  for	  a	  second	  or	  so	  at	  a	  
time,	  during	  lowest	  demand	  times.	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create an independent Committee on Climate Change…. (House of Commons 2007b: 
2-3).119 
 
This is, as such, an extension of the energy objective setting exercise which had really 
started in 2003 when the much more vaguely worded aim of putting the UK on a path 
towards reducing carbon dioxide emissions by some 60% by about 2050 was added 
(DTI 2003).  These legally binding targets, building on the decision in 2007 to sign up 
to the EU 20-20-20 scheme, were clearly a significant step on from 2003, making 
climate a significant and real objective of energy policy. This, in and of itself, does 
suggest a genuine new direction for energy policy.  Still, however, it remained to be 
seen how targets would be achieved in that this was left somewhat open within the Act, 
although it was suggested that by setting legally binding targets solutions would have to 
be found (House of Commons 2007b).  And there were dangers increasingly being 
associated with setting targets and not achieving them particularly with regard to 
credibility (House of Commons 2007b: 52).   
 
It was also becoming clearer that the reasoning behind this concerted drive to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions was based within the potent combination of security and 
climate fears, which was also apparent in the energy-security-climate narrative 
referenced in section 1.3 above (DTI 2007; DECC 2008b).  One DECC presentation on 
the new ‘renewables strategy’, from the end of 2008, clearly states that renewables are 
being pursued in order to deliver carbon dioxide emission reductions but in order to 
provide also for “…(d)iversity of fuel sources and reduction in dependence on fossil 
fuel imports” (DECC 2008).   The renewable strategy was furthermore being pursued in 
spite of the emerging realisation that this would be at a significant cost to consumers, 
domestic gas bills were expected to rise by 18-37% and electricity by 9-15%, barring 
any government subsidy or incentives (DECC 2008: slide 10).  
 
These are all examples of the way in which new ‘sub-problems’ started to emerge as 
increasing amounts of political capacity was put behind thinking about energy and 
climate issues.  
 
 
                                                
119	  For	  more	  information	  see	  the	  appropriate	  DECC	  webpage:	  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/legislation/cc_act_08/cc_act_08.aspx	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2.3 New Organisations 
Another important offshoot of the Climate Change Act was the creation of one more 
new, again independent, climate institution, the Committee on Climate Change (CCC) 
(House of Commons 2007b: 3).  The task of the CCC was to provide external challenge 
and expert input into Government policy and, in addition to annual reports to 
Parliament, to regularly measure progress in terms of meeting the carbon budgets and 
targets.  It is worth noting that the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 
observed that this new body would help to “…depoliticise the consideration of 
potentially necessary but controversial measures…” (House of Commons 2007b: 3).  
This suggests not only that it was becoming increasingly understood that aspects of the 
transition to a lower carbon economy might well be politically unpopular, but also that 
paradigmatic frameworks of ideas are hard to dispense with.  
 
What is, however, also interesting to note is the way in which the series of quasi-
government bodies set up over the course of the 2000s, but escalating in the last third of 
the decade, started to challenge the PEPP, partly through providing evidence of failure. 
In chapter four we saw that the Royal Commission on Environmental Policy (RCEP) 
had provided evidence of climate policy failure upon with the Performance and 
Innovation Unit (PIU) drew in their review of energy policy in 2002 (RCEP 2000; PIU 
2002).   
 
In 2006 the report of the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC),120 which 
reported to DEFRA not the DTI/BERR, observed in detail the degree to which the UK 
was due to miss emission reduction targets and suggests measures to fill in these gaps 
(SDC 2005).  In fact this ‘formal review’ was launched by DEFRA in September 2004, 
but it failed to publish until March 2006, a delay of over a year, because of findings 
about the degree to which climate targets would be missed (HoC 2007b: 7).  
 
The House of Commons Environmental Committee, directly referencing the SDC 
report, also pointed to “…weaknesses in UK climate change policy…” and called for 
change to existing energy policy (House of Commons 2007b: 3).  It raised the 
interesting question of the degree to which politics, and publics, had really engaged so 
far with climate change and associated policy.  Certainly up until now it appeared that 
                                                
120	  The	  SDC	  had	  been	  set	  up	  under	  DEFRA	  as	  a	  non-­‐departmental	  advisory	  body,	  but	  became	  an	  
executive	  non-­‐departmental	  body	  in	  February	  2009.	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publics more widely responded to rising energy prices but not to arguments about 
climate change this could serve to make the higher prices necessary to achieve 
decarbonisation politically difficult in future.  The Committee did anticipate that 
(t)he proposed new framework should, however, exert a very powerful influence on 
policy-making at all levels of government (House of Commons 2007b: 4). 
The suggestion that firm objectives could, and would, drive policy change might be 
partially explained with reference to Hall’s observations about third order change, or 
paradigm shift, occurring only when the goals, or objectives, of policy change (Hall 
1993: 279).121 
 
The CCC may have been set up with the intention of depoliticising unpopular climate-
driven policy, but it also served to provide further evidence of failure, to challenge 
policy and to suggest much more profound change.  The first mandated CCC report, in 
October 2009, observed that current electricity arrangements together with the European 
emissions trading scheme (ETS), the central component of existing climate policy, were 
unlikely to deliver decarbonisation of electricity generation.  It further suggested that as 
the market was failing what was needed was a more forceful role for government (CCC 
2009).  This report, and its damning of aspects of the PEPP, was given wide media 
coverage (cf. Warner 2009) 
 
To the extent that these institutions questioned the ability of business-as-usual to meet 
decarbonisation goals they offer an ongoing, quasi-government challenge to the Energy 
Directorate within the DTI and Ofgem.  There is a degree perhaps of ‘institutional 
struggle’ which takes place here in the attempt to show that the PEPP was failing and 
needed to change (cf. Oliver and Pemberton 2004: 419).  Targets are offered as a 
solution, albeit whilst overtly recognising that these can only be ‘first-steps’ in that 
policy would have to change in order to meet targets: 
…it is policies that will achieve the CO2 savings, we believe appropriate targets are a 
strong motivator for developing policies to deliver the required savings (SDC 2005: 
3).   
 
Whilst Government, and civil servants, would have been within their rights not to 
follow this advice, as largely happened with the PIU review of energy policy in 2002, 
                                                
121	  See	  chapter	  seven	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  objectives	  in	  profound	  governance	  
change.	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continuing to ignore ‘expert’ advice from bodies set up by Government specifically to 
provide such advice might prove more difficult over the long-term.  Quite apart from 
whether civil servants followed this advice, these new institutions provided information 
upon which other political protagonists could mount their arguments for change, as 
already seen with the RCEP 2000 report.  
 
 
3.	  	   The	  New	  Energy	  Department	  and	  Elite	  Narrative	  Changes 
The first significant sign, however, that government was prepared to make changes to 
existing structures of governance on any significant scale came at the end of 2008 with 
the establishment of the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC).  The 
decision to form a new Department to take responsibility for energy, and climate, 
policymaking can be taken as significant in terms of this analysis of profound 
governance change in that it represented a relatively high degree of change to the level 
of physical structures of governance.  Chapter five had outlined a number of new 
policies put forward in the 2007 White Paper, which were informed by a more 
geopolitical perspective.  The changes analysed below seem to be informed more, 
however, by a climate perspective. 
 
3.1 The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
In chapter three the changing fortunes of dedicated energy ministries, or departments, 
was referenced.  During the 2000s, escalating in the mid 2000s, constant changes were 
made in terms of which political figure would have outright responsibility for the 
energy portfolio and where they would sit in the hierarchy of Government.  Generally, 
however, no particular emphasis had been placed on this role and, in 2005, the job of 
energy minister had been described as a ‘junior backwater’ position (Leake 2005).  This 
was all about to change radically.  Towards the end of 2008 a number of departmental 
and ministerial changes were made, not least amongst them the creation of the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC).  Alongside the new Department 
the first Commons Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change was established.122  
As outlined above, some smaller organisational amendments had already been made 
within the energy divisions of the DTI but this was a change on a quite different scale 
and of far greater significance. 
                                                
122	  See:	  http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-­‐a-­‐z/commons-­‐select/energy-­‐and-­‐
climate-­‐change-­‐committee/role/	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According to the ‘Machinery of Government’ paper which accompanied these changes, 
part of the reasoning behind the formation of DECC was to focus “…ministerial 
responsibility on today’s challenges…” which should, in turn, facilitate a unified 
Government response (Cabinet Office 2008: 1).123  Energy security and climate change 
are identified as key issues facing the UK, and DECC was specifically designed to take 
responsibility in addressing them.  This appears to raise energy security and climate 
change not just up the hierarchy of energy policy objectives, but also up a broader scale 
of UK national priorities.  The new Department’s Public Service Agreements (PSAs) 
and Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSOs) reflected this mandate such as to 
“…(l)ead the global effort to avoid dangerous climate change…”, and to “…(e)nsure 
the reliable supply and efficient use of clean, safe and competitively priced energy…”.  
Interestingly, however, there remained, alongside new mandates, a DSO to contribute to 
BERR’s DSO to deliver free and fair markets, with greater competition, for business, 
consumers and employees (Cabinet Office 2008: 4). 
 
The establishment of DECC marked a significant claw back of energy’s political status 
from a division within a Department, to a Department of Government with 
representation at Cabinet Office level via the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change (SSECC).  This marked an end to the uncertainty that had surrounded what 
position energy should hold ministerially.  It also signified the placement of energy in 
more direct proximity to Government institutions and responsibility and, as such, some 
reversal in ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  DECC was the strongest sign yet that energy 
was being re-conceptualised, and no longer just a ‘commodity’.  Furthermore, DECC’s 
new mandates can be considered relevant with regard to the measurement of change due 
to the clear contrast that can be drawn with previous institutional mandates.  The 
primary PSAs, and DSOs, of the DTI/BERR were, are still are, focused much more 
around the provision of free and fair markets particularly to support business.124  As 
                                                
123	  The	  Machinery	  of	  Government	  Act	  also	  included	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  ‘National	  Economic	  Council’,	  to	  
‘co-­‐ordinate	  economic	  policy	  across	  government	  (Cabinet	  Office	  2008:	  1).	  	  There	  had	  been	  some	  
Parliamentary	  opposition	  to	  this	  departmental	  restructuring	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  –	  questions	  were	  
raised	  about	  whether	  ‘…the	  Prime	  Minister	  should	  continue	  to	  exercise	  near-­‐absolute	  power	  to	  
reorganise	  the	  Civil	  Service	  Departments	  (House	  of	  Commons	  2008:	  3).	  
124	  Although,	  to	  complicate	  matters,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  BERR	  has	  since	  been	  restructured	  and	  has	  
become	  the	  Department	  for	  Business	  Innovation	  and	  Skills	  (BIS).	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such, DECC was the first organisation in British history with a specific mandate 
focused on achieving climate goals.  
 
The way in which DECC was structured also, in effect, reflected one of the key climate 
arguments of the past decade or so.  As referenced in chapter two, and here above, many 
had argued for some time that energy and climate policy could, and should, not be 
considered separately from one another (Carter 2001; PIU 2002; Held 2006; 
Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 2009; Scrase et al 2010).  Although the PIU review of 2002 
had suggested that a new institution be created to take responsibility for climate, energy, 
and transport, policy the 2003 White Paper had overtly rejected this idea (DTI 2003: 
113).125  DECC’s webpage, under ‘About Us’, now claims that “DECC… reflects the 
fact that climate change and energy are inextricably inter-linked…” (DECC 2011).  As 
such this appears to be the institutional formulation of an idea which had emanated from 
within the climate narrative, perhaps suggesting a willingness and ability to listen to 
alternative narratives in the search to meet new objectives.   
 
In effect DECC was created by bringing together the energy divisions from within the 
DTI/BERR with DEFRA’s “…international and domestic climate change policy, energy 
efficiency, fuel poverty, and radioactive waste teams as well as the Office of Climate 
Change” (Cabinet Office 2008: 3).  As mentioned in chapter four, there had been a 
history of institutional struggle between the DTI’s energy division and DEFRA climate 
policy teams and this had been a question not only of methodology but also, arguably, 
of objectives and mandates.  Clearly, prior to 2007 the DTI did not have to treat de-
carbonisation targets as a binding objective of energy policy.   
 
Ex-DTI civil servants now found themselves not only having to work together with the 
“woolly”, non-economic DEFRA civil servants, but also driven by a specific climate 
PSA (Interview 5).  Not only this, but more resources were assigned to the climate 
change teams over the energy security team, roughly 100 to 35 staff (Conversation 2).  
Some energy analysts, as had been the case with Ofgem, were fearful of increased 
“political involvement” in energy policy-making, and some therefore stayed within 
BERR and did not move to DECC (Interview 2).  The intention appears to have been 
                                                
125	  This	  is	  because	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  Government	  needed	  ‘…to	  concentrate	  (its)	  energies	  on	  following	  
through	  the	  commitments	  we	  have	  made,	  not	  on	  creating	  new	  machinery’	  (DTI	  2003:	  113).	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not only to force some exposure to new ideas from both sides, but to also attempt to 
reduce the level of institutional struggle by assigning common goals and objectives. 
 
Together these are taken as being institutional changes with a degree of profundity and 
staying power.  Although the office of the Prime Minister could exercise “near 
absolute” power in the reorganisation of Civil Service Departments (House of 
Commons 2009: 3), further major departmental re-organisation would still be politically 
difficult, in terms of capacity and cost.  The way in which this change to the physical 
institutions of power was enacted hints strongly at change being directed at energy 
policymaking teams from above.  One interview conducted with a former senior policy 
adviser to the Prime Minister has suggested that under both Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown there were strong tendencies for, at least attempting, top down governance 
(Interview 20).  It might be suggested that this took place particularly at times of 
perceived crisis, as suggested in Tony Blair’s response to the 2000 pickets discussed in 
chapter four (Blair 2010).  The role of narratives and alternative ideas is, arguably, just 
as important within this understanding of change in that they can inform the type of 
change pursued and well as providing reasons to change. 
 
3.2 Elite Narrative Changes 
In terms of policy paradigm change what has been observed thus far, as a reminder, has 
been a change in the objectives of energy policy, with the re-emergence of security as 
an objective and legally binding climate objectives, underpinned by a profound change 
in the physical institutions of governance.  What will be outlined below is the 
emergence of a new narrative within DECC which was concentrated at the ‘top’, but did 
not necessarily descend too far into the ranks of the new department.  This narrative 
overtly raised the question, long discussed amongst geopolitical and climate analysts, of 
the role of state and market within energy and climate governance. 
 
It is worth noting, at this point, that the end of 2008 also saw the real unfolding of the 
financial crisis.  It has been observed, in the crisis response of Gordon Brown in 
particular, that there has been a change of narrative, and a growing willingness to be 
overt, about the notion of market failure (Hay 2010: 22).126  Given the degree to which 
                                                
126	  It	  is	  worth	  noting,	  briefly,	  other	  interpretations	  of	  Brown’s	  political	  thought.	  	  McLean	  and	  others	  have	  
suggested	  that	  ‘market	  failure’	  was	  always	  there	  in	  Brown's	  thinking,	  despite	  the	  narrative	  about	  being	  
the	  'Iron	  Chancellor'	  (cf.	  McLean	  2006).	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New Labour had managed not to challenge neoliberal economic orthodoxy up to this 
point the narrative of government intervention and market failure was noteworthy:  
…in a sense it is quite remarkable that it is even credible, as I think it is, to pose the 
question of whether the public rescue of the banking sector heralds the return to an 
era of Keynesian economics: a paradigm shift made in the context of crisis (Hay 2010: 
22). 
 
Hay concludes that a return to Keynesian economics has not occurred as a result of the 
financial crisis, but this context of wider narrative alteration made it easier, perhaps, for 
the new SSECC, Ed Miliband, to pose questions about the UK’s energy governance 
structure. An early speech from Mr Miliband outlined his views on the role of the state 
in energy governance (Miliband 2008).  He contrasts the ideas underpinning Nigel 
Lawson’s version of energy strategy, namely based on the notion of “markets only”, to 
the new framework that would be required to meet the twin goals of energy transition 
and energy security (Miliband 2008: 3).  Lawson’s successful attempt to fundamentally 
challenge received doctrines about the market and the state in energy policy through the 
imposition of a ‘markets only’ view of energy policy, was suggested, by Miliband, as 
being passé.  It is worth noting that these ideas were not presented as being ‘wrong’ in 
and of themselves, but in that they were now considered unfit to meet today’s 
challenges. 
 
Miliband suggested that dynamic markets on their own were no longer enough for a 
successful energy policy, particularly in that we can no longer assume that private 
incentives add up to the public good of decarbonisation and energy security (Miliband 
2008: 4).  Again the language here is notable in that energy, albeit in the form of 
security and low carbon, appears once more to be understood as being of intrinsic value 
to publics as opposed to a replaceable commodity.  Thus, a ‘strategic role for 
government’ is suggested in that it provides  
(s)trategic policy that takes action where there are market failures and provides the 
right incentives for the public good (Miliband 2008: 4). 
 
This speech was given to a particular audience, at Imperial College London, and might 
therefore be designed in a different way to, say, a Government White Paper.  It is, 
however, an overt challenge to some of the assumptions underpinning the PEPP also in 
that it presents energy as more akin to a public good than to a commodity or traded 
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good.  This is relevant in assessing change to the PEPP level of understandings of the 
nature of energy. 
 
In 2009 Malcolm Wicks, twice former Energy Minister at the DTI, produced a report 
which also reflected elements of alternative energy narratives.127  Wicks had been 
requested, by the Office of the Prime Minister, to become the new ‘Special 
Representative of the Prime Minister’ in energy security and to compile a report on the 
UK’s energy security.  The resultant report, ‘Energy Security: A national challenge in a 
changing world’, was specifically designed to review implications of developments in 
international energy markets for the UK’s future energy security – the most obvious 
sign thus far that Government felt the need to understand more about the international 
energy context and of the ongoing process of ‘re-think’ (Wicks 2009).   
 
Overall the report sounds very similar to arguments put forward within the energy-
security-climate narrative analysed above, and has further undertones of ‘speaking 
security’ about it.  He opens with the suggestion that the “… geopolitics of energy 
insecurity will be a key theme for the 21st century…” underpinning this assertion with 
many arguments familiar from within geopolitical narratives regarding peak oil, 
insecure foreign suppliers and growing competition for fossil fuels which would 
accelerate as the world moves out of recession (Wicks 2009: 1). Wicks’s regular 
reference to the need to reduce import dependence and for “home grown”, renewable 
energy as a part cure for energy insecurity, as well as to mitigate climate change, might 
have come directly from within the security-climate narrative discussed above (Wicks 
2009: various).  This approach clashes considerably with pro-market notions of secure 
energy supplies as taking place on open markets within a positively economically inter-
dependent world (Mitchell et al 2001: 177). 
 
Much of this also echoes closely the idea, also outlined in the section on the energy-
security-climate narrative, that an insecure energy future has profound and nationally 
significant implications. Evocative images of energy insecurity seem to be used in that 
they most effectively underpin the need for change and for increased production of 
domestic energy.  It may be that this narrative was being utilised in that governance 
change, which often implies new winners and losers, in order to support climate change 
                                                
127	  The	  Wicks	  Report	  was	  published,	  and	  given	  significant	  media	  coverage,	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Climate	  Change	  Conference	  in	  Copenhagen.	  
 213 
mitigation was less likely to find popular support in the UK, than change proposed in 
order to boost the more popular notion of energy supply security. 
 
The Wicks Report also observed, perhaps more controversially, that 
… the era of heavy reliance on companies, competition and liberalisation must be re-
assessed (Wicks 2009: 1) 
This report did, therefore, also overtly suggest that the current model, particularly in 
that it over-relies on competition and liberalisation, needed a further and radical re-
think.  This is an early sign of elite political recognition of questions, raised in 
alternative narratives, about the ability of markets to deliver energy and climate security 
and is also symptomatic of the ongoing process of ‘re-think’.  Together the way in 
which the ‘official’ narrative was emerging at this time shows momentum behind the 
process of change and, in addition, direction away from the previous orthodoxy that 
markets could be relied upon to provide secure and low carbon energy.  This may 
therefore, suggest more open questioning of the merits of ‘marketised’ de-politicisation.   
 
Both the Wicks report, and the subsequent ‘Response to the Wicks’ report, produced by 
DECC, underpin movement away from thinking about energy as replaceable and as less 
nationally important (DECC 2009c).  Miliband specifically suggests, with reference to 
Malcolm Wicks that “…energy security be seen as much as a national security issue as 
an economic issue…” (Miliband in DECC 2009c: 1).  These understandings challenge 
the notion that politics should not intervene in energy whilst upholding arguments put 
forward that energy supplies, once threatened, had grown in significance and had come 
to be understood on the national level.  These conceptualisations of energy and security 
build on observations made in the previous chapter about emerging changes in the 
PEPP level of ideas about energy. 
 
Partly in reflection of new understandings of energy security as a national issue yet 
another energy institution was formed, the cross-departmental International Energy 
Committee, to provide a mechanism for improved “…senior level co-ordination of 
international energy policy” (DECC 2009c: 31).  Strengthened Ministerial oversight 
was also to be provided, including an annual assessment of energy security issues. 
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4.	  	   Governance	  Outcomes	  of	  ‘Re-­think’	  to	  May	  2010	  
This section examines policy documents produced by DECC with the aim of assessing 
not only the degree of substantive policy change, but also to assess the degree to which 
alternative ideas, reflected already in Miliband and Wicks’ public communications, 
disseminate through these documents and impact upon how governance developed.   
Clearly, some of these documents directly address work carried out prior to the 
formation of DECC, but they by and large progress policy in a direction away from the 
previous paradigm. 
 
What was immediately noticeable is the scale of difference in terms of output on energy 
and climate policy.  DECC, whatever other kind of change it represented versus the 
PEPP, did seem to participate fully in the process of trying to understand and address 
the difficult questions, and related sub-issues, that climate and energy security posed.  
The new DECC website also represented a steep step-change in how information about 
UK energy policy was disseminated and, as such, marked a serious improvement in 
transparency and access to background research.  This could be taken an outcome of the 
ongoing process of deliberative re-politicisation. 
 
4.1 Policy Documents and Legislation 
This period, between the formation of DECC at the end of 2008 and the general election 
of May 2010, saw a very high level of analysis, the publication of yet more policy 
documents as well as new legislation.  It seemed to mark a step up in the attempt to get 
to grips with the question of how to transition to a low carbon economy, now that new 
objectives had been structurally incorporated legally, whilst maintaining secure 
supplies.  Part of figuring out how to transition had necessitated a much higher level of 
commitment to deliberating energy, ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation, partly through the 
creation of a range of new institutions, and partly through actively searching for 
solutions.  What is noticeable in this ongoing search is that certain solutions previously 
not deemed worth considering, such as having a ‘single buyer’ of electricity, started to 
become part of a range of possible changes being considered (i.e. Ofgem 2010). 
 
4.1.1 The Low Carbon Transition Plan 
In the Summer of 2009 DECC produced ‘The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan’ which 
was the first attempt to respond to the mandate laid down by the Climate Change Act to 
start providing policy solutions to enable meeting carbon emission reduction and 
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renewable energy production targets (DECC 2009a).128  The Carbon Budgets, 
administered by DECC, had implications for all UK government departments and were 
understood to put DECC in a central position within this process of ‘culture change’ 
across Government (Miliband 2010).   
 
The Low Carbon Transition Plan marked an increase in the level of state financial 
support being offered to facilitate the production of renewable technologies, including 
research and development, and improve energy efficiency. DECC announced their 
intention to directly fund four new demonstrations of capturing and storing emissions 
from coal power stations, to channel about £3.2bn to help households become more 
energy efficient, to roll out smart meters in every home by the end of 2020 and to 
provide further state investment in offshore wind (DECC 2009a: 4).  In addition, it was 
announced that the legislation would be further amended to make Ofgem’s 
responsibilities clear.  Specifically, although competition was still recognised as a 
valuable mechanism for protecting consumer interests, Ofgem’s mandate was further 
clarified such that it should in future recognise that there are other means which can be 
utilised to protect these interests (DECC 2009a: 4).129 
 
This new plan went further in underpinning the idea that energy and climate change are 
inter-related, this time in that transition to a low carbon economy had become the 
agreed solution for both climate change and energy security (DECC 2009a: 
Introduction).  The report also openly admitted that there would be ‘costs’ associated 
with this process of transition (cf. DECC 2008).  This is a marked change from previous 
government documents which either largely ducked or under-played the issue of rising 
energy costs, thereby failing to address the question of how these costs might impact 
upon the other objective of tackling energy poverty (DTI 2003 and 2007).   
 
By openly admitting that the cost of energy, and electricity, would rise it allowed DECC 
to start suggesting how to address this apparent contradiction between objectives.  As it 
stood fuel poverty, at 18.5% of households in 2008, was already dramatically on the rise 
                                                
128	  Although	  the	  economic	  fall	  out	  from	  the	  banking	  crisis	  was	  by	  this	  stage	  also	  facilitating	  carbon	  
dioxide	  emission	  cuts,	  of	  18%	  in	  2009	  on	  2008	  levels	  (DECC	  2009a:	  4).	  
129	  This	  mandate	  change	  is	  refined	  again	  in	  the	  2010	  Energy	  Act:	  “Ofgem	  should	  consider	  whether	  there	  
are	  alternatives	  (to	  competition)	  or	  additional	  measures	  that	  might	  better	  protect	  consumer	  interests	  
before	  taking	  action”	  (DECC	  2010:	  1).	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(BBC 2009; DECC 2010b: 9).  The plan recognises that government should seek to 
minimise the costs associated with energy transition and “…to apportion them fairly…” 
(DECC 2009a: Introduction).  It goes on to propose that impacts upon “…the most 
vulnerable…” would be mitigated through a new “…mandated social price support…” 
and through upping the level of the Warm Front grants (DECC 2009a: 4).  
 
4.1.2 Renewable Energy Policy 
Alongside the Low Carbon Transition Plan, DECC also produced the first dedicated 
Renewable Energy Strategy which was presented to Parliament in July 2009 (DECC 
2009b).  Reminiscent of the geopolitical narrative which had emerged in the mid 2000s, 
this Plan for the first time actually specified an objective of reducing fossil fuel demand 
by 10%, thereby also reducing the need to import gas by 20-30% against forecasts for 
2020 (DECC 2009b: 7).  As such, production of renewables was now understood not 
just as being about achieving climate targets but also about ‘home grown’ energy as 
preferable to certain imports: 
(t)urning to renewables will help the UK recover some of its energy self-sufficiency, 
while assuring that more of our imported energy comes from reliable sources (DECC 
2009b: 10). 
This language might be taken directly from one of the political groups involved in the 
security-climate narrative appropriation discussed above, which had also been echoed 
so strongly in the Malcolm Wicks’ report. 
 
Renewables, however, as of 2009 remained vastly under-invested - only 5.5% of 
electricity was generated via renewable sources, 2.6% of transport energy and in heat 
the UK was still generating ‘very low levels’ from renewables (DECC 2009b: 8).  As 
such the EU target of 15% of all energy from renewables by 2020 was understood, by 
this stage, to be undeliverable.130   This target, as laid out in the Renewable Energy 
Strategy, implied that electricity generation from renewables would have to rise to 30% 
by 2020 (DECC 2009b: 8).   This, clearly, was ‘challenging’ and demanded change to 
existing policy, which was now more clearly understood within Government to be 
under-delivering on renewables. 
 
                                                
130	  When	  the	  EU	  targets	  were	  finally	  set	  in	  2008	  Britain’s	  share	  of	  renewables	  was	  so	  low	  that	  their	  
target	  was	  revised	  down	  to	  15%	  (Helm	  2010:	  183).	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As such, this new plan sought to “…put in place mechanisms to provide financial 
support for renewable electricity and heat worth around £30bn between now and 
2020…” largely via, yet again, amending the Renewables Obligation (RO) but also 
through the introduction of the first ‘feed-in-tariff’ (FiT) aimed at domestic production 
(DECC 2009b: 8).  This FiT was by no means, a full, German-style, ‘risk free’, feed-in-
tariff aimed at large scale renewable generation, but did represent at least a ‘first step’ 
for the UK (cf. Mitchell 2008).  To oversee and administer all of this a new ‘Office for 
Renewable Energy Deployment’ (ORED) had been established within DECC who were 
now responsible for making sure that the UK delivered on its renewable targets (DECC 
2009b: 9).131  
 
This represents a change from the PEPP in a number of respects.  Firstly, emphasis on 
direct state support and legislation, even if it fell quite far short of that seen in Germany, 
Sweden and other European countries, marked a departure from previous policy.   The 
2009 Climate Change Act impact assessment report dedicated the opening section to 
answering the question, in recognition of what had come before, as to why intervention 
in the markets was understood as necessary (DECC 2009d: 3-4).132  What these 
documents also showed, in the degree of planning which had gone into ensuring growth 
in renewable energy generation, is that UK energy policy was no longer ‘technology 
blind’.  This contrasts openly with the 2003 and 2007 White Papers which had both 
clearly enunciated that it was not the job of government to decide on sources of energy 
for the UK (DTI 2003 and 2007).  It might also be suggested that, in terms of renewable 
energy representing ‘home grown’ energy, much emphasis was still being placed on 
facilitating the production of energy from other sources, including coal and nuclear 
(Wicks in Wintour 2008; Mitchell 2008).  This reflects ideas dominant prior to the 
instigation of the PEPP about relying on nuclear, and other domestic sources, in times 
of perceived supply crisis. 
 
 
 
                                                
131	  For	  more	  information	  see:	  
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/uk_supply/energy_mix/renewable/ored/ored.a
spx	  
132	  This	  report	  contained	  ideas	  not	  dissimilar	  to	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  in	  the	  PIU	  report	  
back	  in	  2002.	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4.1.3 The Energy Bill 
At the end of 2009, and following on from these two major policy papers, another 
Energy Bill was presented to Parliament which received very quick Royal Assent just 
ahead of the elections in May 2010.  The Bill put into place the mandatory social price 
support, clarification of Ofgem’s remit, measures to tackle electricity market power 
exploitation and a commitment to yet more regular parliamentary reports on progress on 
energy and climate objectives (DECC 2009c). 
 
The Energy Bill made provision for a great many of the policies and mechanisms 
proposed in the climate and renewables plans.  Interestingly, and building on the 2007 
White Paper, it specifically 
…sets out plans for the world’s largest package of statutory financial support for 
clean coal (Miliband in DECC 2009c: 1) 
This was the carbon capture and storage incentive aimed at supporting four separate 
demonstration plants in the UK, thus also allowing for a boost to the UK renewable 
energy economy.  Again this policy shows overt state financial support for indigenous 
as well as potentially clean energy, thereby killing energy security and climate birds 
with one stone.   
 
Also around this time, but after the Energy Bill, a ‘Gas Policy Statement’ was produced 
which outlined actions to be taken in order to ensure that gas supplies remain reliable 
(DECC 2010d: 1).  This infers acknowledgement, if not overt, of various critiques 
emanating from within narratives concerned about energy security and the lack of 
infrastructure spending, particularly on storage capacity, in the UK (Stern 2006; 
CEPMLP 2006; Kemp and Stephen 2007). 
 
4.2 The Process of ‘Re-think’ and Continuing Uncertainty 
What is also interesting, over this time period, is that despite the plethora of policy 
responses to the challenge of understanding how and what to do to transition to a lower 
carbon future still more research and questioning was considered as necessary. This is 
perhaps the clearest sign of one of the outcomes of ‘deliberative’ and ‘technocratic’ 
depoliticisation, in the form of ‘deskilling’, that had taken place under the PEPP, as 
much as it is of the degree of work now needed to reverse that position.  The high level 
of research and deliberation continued unabated, even despite the unfolding of the credit 
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crisis and recession which might have, under other circumstance, provided a more than 
worthy distraction for political attention.   
 
One clear example of this ongoing drive for further understanding is ‘Project 
Discovery’ which was an in depth study of the various challenges now understood to 
face UK energy and climate governance matched with a range of options in terms of 
addressing them (Ofgem 2009 and 2010a).133  Project Discovery, initiated early in 2009 
as a response to the changes in Ofgem’s statutory duties under the Energy Act 2008, 
was designed to explore “…whether current market arrangements are capable of 
delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies…” (Ofgem 2009: 2).  The 
consultation document was issued in October 2009, just before the new Energy Bill was 
presented to Parliament, indicating that despite the range of new policies which were in 
the process of being adopted Ofgem now felt that even more change would be required. 
 
Project Discovery was the first Ofgem report to focus on security and climate 
objectives, forced arguably by the mandate changes showing the importance of such 
mandates in policymaking processes.  It appears as an exercise of ‘re-thinking’ their 
position on energy which had been based, almost entirely, in protecting near-term 
consumer interests via ensuring competitive markets in electricity and gas.  Having 
ultimately concluded that current market arrangements needed to change, with a high 
degree of emphasis on substantial investment requirements of £200bn over ten years, 
the project goes on to consider what policy responses might be required (Ofgem 2009).  
 
In terms of these policy responses, Ofgem suggested five different routes including, 
most notably, the single buyer model (Ofgem 2010a: 3).  This model, whereby one 
single buyer would centrally buy all generated electricity which it would then distribute, 
was one of the more radical of the options being suggested by alternative political 
groups within ‘change for climate’ and ‘national energy-security-climate security’ 
narratives.  For Ofgem, historically so adamant in its arguments about market energy, to 
openly suggest this model in a very public document can perhaps also be a sign not only 
that change was understood as necessary, but change of a more structural and less 
                                                
133	  Not	  long	  after	  the	  Conservative-­‐Liberal	  Democrat	  coalition	  came	  to	  power	  in	  May,	  DECC	  was	  asked	  to	  
produce	  a	  departmental	  analysis	  very	  much	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  Project	  Discovery.	  	  Some	  have	  suggested	  
that	  the	  new	  energy	  team	  was	  unhappy	  with	  Ofgem	  filling	  the	  role	  of	  chief	  investigator	  which	  they	  felt	  
should	  belong	  to	  DECC	  (Interviews	  12	  and	  13).	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‘problem solving’ nature.134  This realisation is, in turn, significant in the process of 
energy governance change in that Ofgem, and its senior executives, had, as discussed in 
chapter four, represented some of the stiffest opposition to any movement away from 
energy markets in the past. 
 
The level of continuing active deliberation within Ofgem, DECC and the various new 
organisations set up to monitor, assess and advise them, could partly be explained by to 
changing mandates, objectives and requirements to report to Parliament.  In contrast to 
energy governance under the PEPP and associated degrees of deliberative, marketised 
and technocratic depoliticisation, these new institutions represented a growing capacity 
to question and understand, if not to act. This might, however, also indicate that despite 
new targets, and the realisation of their urgency and tractability, new programmes 
deemed both credible and able were still thin on the ground.  Although solutions such as 
the full, German feed-in-tariff and the single buyer model had been suggested, they still 
represented too much of a break with current UK energy institutions (Interviews 14, 15 
and 16).  In this way, the search for solutions continued well into 2011, and no doubt, 
will beyond and suggests a lack of credibility in the more state-led model adopted by 
countries like Germany, Denmark and Sweden. 
 
4.3 The Energy Governance Structure 2010 
As will be discussed at more length in chapter seven, this thesis does not claim that a 
completed process of policy paradigm change had taken place by 2010.  Arguably too 
much uncertainty still existed, too many changes were still in the process of being 
discussed and made, and too much support for pro-market ideas about how energy 
should be governed persisted.  What had emerged, however, were changes to most 
levels of the PEPP, and the new structure, taking account of these changes, is outlined 
thus: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
134	  Albeit	  one	  senior	  Ofgem	  staff	  member	  suggested	  that	  the	  ‘more	  extreme’	  suggestion	  of	  single	  buyer	  
had	  been	  included	  more	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  making	  it	  look	  like	  all	  options	  had	  been	  considered	  (Interview	  
15).	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Table 4: The New Energy Governance Structure: 2010  
 
 
This appears like an area of governance which, having travelled quite far down the 
process of policy paradigm change, has not yet quite made it.  In fact, there does not 
seem, in Oliver and Pemberton terms, to have been a full battle to institutionalise a new 
paradigm given that a coherent alternative set of ideas and solutions was not adopted by 
enough political and other interest groups (cf. Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  If anything 
can be claimed, however, as a new norm amongst these changes it would be way in 
which the deliberation of, and policies put toward, climate and energy policy had 
become inter-twined in an ‘energy–security-climate nexus’. 
 
Conclusions 
It is, perhaps, remarkable that there should have been two Energy Acts within less than 
two years.  The speed with which DECC managed to produce these major policy 
documents and legislation is indicative of the degree of urgency which had, post 
2006/7, started to press on Government thinking about energy and climate change.  It is 
almost as if, once the process of deliberation had commenced, it both became more 
apparent that the PEPP was failing whilst, at the same time, more and more detail 
started to emerge about how much needed to be done to progress towards fulfilling the 
• Energy	  and	  climate	  inter-­‐linked	  inextricably;	  • Energy	  as	  an	  issue	  of	  national	  concern;	  Ideas	  about	  Energy	  
• Markets	  work,	  but	  under	  different	  circumstances;	  • More	  state	  assistance	  to	  transform	  energy;	  Ideas	  about	  Economic	  Governance	  
• New	  Department,	  DECC	  and	  Ofgem	  mandate	  altered;	  • New	  dedicated	  institutions	  re?lecting	  alternative	  narrative.	  Physical	  Structures	  
• Legally	  enforcable	  climate	  objective	  across	  government;	  • Security	  of	  supply,	  and	  affordability;	  Objectives	  
• Markets	  remain	  responsible	  for	  energy	  supply;	  • New	  instruments:	  feed-­‐in-­‐tariff,	  greater	  subsidies	  Methods	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new hierarchy of objectives. Hence the plethora of debates, discussions, policy papers, 
consultations, impact assessments, reports to Parliament, new institutions, Acts and 
Bills which define this period. 
 
In attempting to measure policy paradigm change at this point it can be concluded that 
shifts had, to a greater or lesser extent, occurred in every ‘level’ of the PEPP.  In terms 
of ideas about the nature of energy it is noticeable the degree to which energy was now 
talked about as a national policy issue, rather than as a sector of the economy or 
fungible commodity.  The new objectives of energy policy had, by this stage, and in an 
extremely public way, become firm, and in the case of climate targets legally binding.  
Albeit not enough was being done to recognise and counter the ways in which the rising 
cost of electricity would interact with energy poverty objectives.  DECC had been 
established upon the idea that climate and energy policy needed to be considered 
together due to the extent to which they are inter-related and inter-dependent within the 
process of pursuing energy transition.  Ofgem had also, by this stage, been mandated to 
alter its practices such that energy sustainability and security would become priorities.  
As such the objectives and physical structures of governance had undergone quite 
significant change.   
 
These changes that had so far taken place suggest a high degree, also, of repoliticisation 
particularly of the ‘deliberative’ and ‘technocratic’ kind, if not of a ‘marketised’ kind.  
Certainly it appears that although ideas about energy’s role in society were altering, 
ideas about the role of the markets in delivering energy supplies were not.  Neither had 
there been any radical turnaround within elite policymaking circles regarding the role of 
competition and economic efficiency.  In sum, therefore, although some changes had 
taken place to each level of the PEPP these did not appear to add up to profound 
governance change and this question of sufficient conditions for claiming profound 
governance change will be taken up in section three of the next chapter. 
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Chapter	  7:	  The	  Complex,	  Uncertain	  and	  Lengthy	  Evolution	  of	  Change	  
 
Introduction 
The role of this chapter within the overall thesis, as promised in chapters four to six, is 
to reflect in a bit more depth on the various iterations of change over the course of the 
2000s, and on differences in the way in which change evolved between each of the three 
empirical chapters.  It will do so by looking back at each chapter in turn and considering 
how energy governance evolved, through the application of notions of policy 
paradigms, how and why change takes place, and de- and repoliticisation as outlined in 
chapter two.  The various iterations of change analysed can then in turn be used to 
reflect on theoretical implications emanating from the thesis as a whole.   
 
The first empirical chapter, four, suggested the emergence of various challenges to the 
status quo in energy and, in response, a high degree of resilience within the five levels 
of the PEPP.  Although it appeared on the surface that the objectives of energy policy 
were changing, this chapter questioned the degree to which this really was the case.  
The degree of resilience can be explained in particular through the application of the 
notions of ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’ de-politicisation.  By considering the PEPP 
during this period of growing climate challenge we can better understand both ways in 
which the PEPP managed to continue to draw on existing ideas and other structures in 
answer to problems, newly perceived to be actionable, and ways in which challenges to 
the PEPP were defused. 
 
Chapter five suggested that heightened political and public concern about the security of 
UK energy supplies prompted a process of repoliticisation, as well as a ‘re-think’ of 
energy, accompanied by some more geopolitically informed policy responses overlaid 
on top of the PEPP.  This chapter will seek to trace relationships between geopolitical 
narratives of supply insecurity, growing public and political interest, processes of 
‘deliberative’ repoliticisation, and the start of the lengthy process of ‘re-thinking’ 
energy.  Some consideration, within this, will be given over to the role of wider public 
perception and the language of security in prompting political re-engagement with 
energy.  It will also be suggested that one factor in drawing out and extending the 
process of ‘re-thinking’ energy was the degree to which it became apparent that state 
capacities to govern energy, and to present new solutions, had shrunk under 
depoliticisation. 
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In chapter six the process of ‘re-thinking’ energy is understood to still be ongoing.  It is 
however also accompanied by mounting evidence of failure, and alternative solutions 
being produced by increasingly high profile but competing political protagonists.  It is 
during this era that it can be claimed that change really started to escalate as evident in 
new institutions and evolving ideas about energy and new methods of governance.   
This chapter concluded by suggesting that although a degree of change had taken place 
within each level of the PEPP, it did not yet feel like a planned process of policy 
paradigm change had been completed.  This is largely because, as of the end of 2010, 
market ideas about energy governance had not been rejected by political elites nor had a 
comprehensive new framework been accepted. 
 
What can be identified therefore across the empirical chapters are three broad eras of 
the evolution of change: consistency of interpretive framework and associated 
structures; re-politicisation of energy under conditions of perceived crisis; and 
tendential change - even if not yet representing a significant break with the past.  In total 
these eras of change have led to an emphasis on the complex, messy and evolutionary 
nature of change, but they also raise the question of what might constitute necessary 
conditions for paradigm shift to be considered as taking, or having taken, place.  
 
 
1.	  	   Challenge	  and	  Resistance:	  2000-­3	  
The analysis of UK energy governance in the early 2000s showed that despite mounting 
challenges, particularly from the Performance and Innovation Unit’s (PIU) Energy 
Review of 2002, the PEPP managed to remain largely intact.  What did seemingly 
change, however, was the addition of new climate and social objectives to energy 
policy.  Given Peter Hall’s observation that third order change takes place only when 
the objectives, in addition to policy instruments and settings, change these new policy 
objectives might have been considered as significant in measuring profound change 
(Hall 1993: 279).  However, at this time the other four levels of the PEPP remained 
consistent and the below analysis will use various notions, including those of 
‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation, to further explain this apparent 
contradiction. 
 
 
 225 
1.1 Embedded Paradigms and Inertia 
Despite the series of mini-crises in pro-market energy, Enron, California and the 2000 
UK refinery pickets, and declining North Sea output energy was not widely considered 
to be in crisis at this time.  What was arguably far more important during this period, 
particularly in terms of public perceptions and political contestations, were the 
September 11 attacks and the emerging War on Terror.  Clearly much political capacity, 
intellectual and financial, was being actively put behind making a case for war in Iraq, 
preparing for the war and fighting it, without, of course, making much open reference to 
Iraq’s substantial oil reserves.  It would not be at all surprising if energy, and climate 
change were, on a comparative basis, on the political back burner at this time.  
Particularly as large scale governance change would have to be understood as justified, 
and understood to warrant the degree of political, financial and human capacity that 
would need to be committed. 
 
Never-the-less, in terms of explaining the degree of consistency within all levels of the 
PEPP whilst objectives ostensibly changed, it is useful to dwell in some detail on the 
ideas that impacted most actively on policymaking at this time and the degree to which 
they had become embedded. It has been suggested that there has been an observable 
closeness between theory and praxis in energy (Ciuta 2010), and this arguably applies in 
both periods of ‘normative’ and of ‘normalised neoliberalism’ (cf. Hay 2007: 98).  
Under ‘normalised neoliberalism’ in energy, however, the emphasis was no longer 
about how energy should be governed, as it was assumed that that question had been 
answered, but about how to problem solve within that given framework.  ‘Problem 
solving’ is used here, following Robert Cox, in the sense that “...(p)roblem solving 
assumes the functional coherence of existing phenomena...” (Sinclair 1996: 6).  
 
The observation that the PEPP represented a “…high degree of functional coherence…” 
under New Labour in the early 2000s relates closely Peter Hall’s definition of a policy 
paradigm as an interpretive framework within which policymakers work which not only 
defines problems, and therefore solutions, but is also often “taken for granted” and 
“…un-amenable to scrutiny as a whole” (Hall 1993: 279; cf. Campbell 1998).  One of 
the consequences of policymakers working within interpretive frameworks is that sets 
of unexamined assumptions emerge which influence the objectives of policy, preferred 
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methods of achieving those objectives, and physical structures of governance.135  These 
assumptions are cast in terms of ‘common sense’ and are understood, certainly, as the 
correct or appropriate way of doing things.  They remained unexamined to the degree 
that the framework that binds them is relatively deaf to challenges expressed outside of 
its terms, or using different or non-expert language (cf. Adler and Haas 1992; Kern 
2009: 53; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
 
Unexamined assumptions about energy governance, particularly at the level of methods 
of achieving objectives, can be found littered across policy documents from the early 
2000s, including the 2003 White Paper.  This partly reflects the degree to which policy 
paradigms are self-referential, to which they fail to look beyond the boundaries of what 
is considered appropriate, in that old methods are thrown at new problems (Hall 1993; 
Helm 2005a and 2007a).  This was especially evident in the series of claims made that 
new climate and social objectives, however vaguely worded, would be met by the 
markets, through competition as one of the main drivers (DTI 2003: various).  In fact, 
the lack of new policy instruments is highlighted in the 2003 Environmental Audit 
Committee report for the House of Commons.  Whilst recognising the stated 
commitment to environmental objectives as a positive step it also observes that 
(o)ur fears about implementation have proved largely justified.  The Energy White 
Paper is weak on specific measures and contains little that is new (House of 
Commons 2003: 2) 
 
This observation about the degree to which assumptions remained consistent, and 
unexamined, serves partly to offer an answer to the principal question posed in chapter 
four about how new instruments of policy, or methods, did not accompany new 
objectives.  One of the specific challenges to the PEPP posed by the PIU Energy 
review, among others, was for energy policy to formally commit to new, climate 
objectives (RCEP 2000; PIU 2002).  By including as a compromise the new climate 
objective in 2003 this challenge could, at least for a period of time, be defused.  By also 
arguing that the existing framework allowed for this objective to be met compromise 
could be achieved without any more profound change to energy governance structures. 
                                                
135	  The	  term	  ‘unexamined	  assumptions’	  is	  taken	  from	  Ian	  McEwan’s	  2010	  novel	  ‘Solar’	  which	  is	  about	  a	  
climate	  sceptic,	  Nobel	  prize	  winning	  physicist	  who,	  for	  career	  reasons,	  becomes	  involved	  in	  a	  project	  to	  
produce	  photovoltaic	  power.	  	  Although	  this	  is	  a	  work	  of	  fiction	  it	  reflects	  very	  closely	  debates	  prevalent	  
within	  energy	  and	  environmental	  discourses	  today.	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We have looked at a number of reasons thus far as to why the PEPP remained static 
overall despite objectives changing, but here it might be worth looking, in a little more 
detail, at the objectives themselves.  It was claimed, in chapter four, that the stated 
objectives became more complex in 2003 on an official basis – moving from one central 
objective that included within it different elements, to four separate objectives which 
included, for the first time, climate goals.  It was also claimed that the climate objective, 
in particular, was very loosely worded and a far cry from the much more specific 
suggestions in the PIU review, which had also included the notion of ‘trade-offs’.  The 
PIU, in addition, had been specific about the need for climate targets to be given priority 
in any trade-offs between objectives (PIU 2002: 52). What also seems apparent, from 
several interviews, is that the new objectives were not at this stage taken as absolute 
within the DTI, and certainly not within Ofgem (Interview 5; 13; 14; 15; 16).  DTI and 
Ofgem civil servants were now back in control of designing energy policy post the PIU 
review process. 
 
The 2003 White Paper included little recognition of trade-offs, nor any overt 
recognition that there might be instances where such judgement was required between 
objectives (DTI 2003).  Again, this omission could be assigned to the consistency of 
ideas within the interpretive framework, given that it was proposed that competition, 
free markets and expanding liberalisation could, theoretically, go such a long way 
towards achieving each objective. It was also noted at the time that the 2003 White 
Paper was not accompanied by any kind of departmental implementation plan (House of 
Commons 2003: 2).   
 
Before returning, below, to further implications of depoliticisation and policy paradigms 
for the PEPP, it is worth considering other actors involved in these processes.  ‘Number 
Ten’ had directly requested the 2002 review of energy in anticipation of the UK’s 
changing import-export status and in the light of New Labour’s ‘commitment’ to 
climate change (Interviews 13 and 14; PIU 2002).  It is significant, however, that it was 
claimed to me, in interviews, that when faced with a report that implied a high degree of 
change, Tony Blair sidelined it and passed responsibility back to the ‘experts’ at the 
DTI and Ofgem.  It is also noteworthy in that the Prime Minister is said to have 
considered the 2002 review “a step too far” – leaving him, and those more directly 
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involved in energy policymaking, well outside their comfort zones (Interviews 13 and 
14).   
 
This position adopted can be seen as more understandable in the light of quotes from 
Blair that “…capital liberalisation is right…” and that “…the market is an ally not an 
enemy… we understand the benefits of open markets” (Blair in Watson 2002: 196).  It 
can also be understood in the light of other political commitments at this time, not least 
the war on terror, and the degree of support for the PEPP and continuity within and 
outside policymaking circles.  Although challenges to pro-market energy consistently 
emerged from the climate perspective, elsewhere, all eyes were arguably on foreign and 
not domestic policy.  Influential sectors of the economy, not least among them the 
financial services sector, stood to continue to gain through liberalised, privately funded 
energy markets.  In the 2000s it was also widely hoped that ‘spot markets’ would start 
to emerge for gas which could ultimately undermine the position of those suppliers who 
continued to insist on long-term contracts (Interview 1; Helm 2003; DTI 2007).136 
 
1.2 ‘Technocratic’ Depoliticisation and Institutional Mandates 
This sub-section will apply more closely the notion of ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation, 
originally proposed in chapter two, to unpack further why so little change was taking 
place, especially at the level of physical structures of governance. This form of 
depoliticisation infers over time some more structural elements to the PEPP not 
dissimilar to the concept of “institutional depoliticisation” suggested by Flinders and 
Buller (Flinders and Buller 2006: 298-9).   The degree to which the notion of passing 
responsibility to relevant ‘experts’, often at ‘arm’s length’ from central government 
institutions (cf. Flinders and Buller 2006; Hay 2007), had become embedded at this 
point had had specific implications for the PEPP, and in addition, helps to further 
explain resistance to change.  A significant factor within this process of passing 
responsibility to experts was that these experts, in turn, were often chosen, as argued in 
chapter three, partly because they supported the interpretive framework and the primary 
role of the markets in terms of energy supply and trade. 
 
                                                
136	  This	  position	  reflects	  the	  counter-­‐point	  to	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  large	  suppliers	  of	  gas,	  i.e.	  in	  
Russia	  and	  Qatar,	  that	  the	  size	  and	  timescale	  of	  investment	  requirements	  in	  developing	  and	  producing	  
gas	  mean	  that	  long-­‐term	  contracts	  are	  a	  requirement	  for	  stable	  and	  successful	  long-­‐term	  trade	  
(Interviews	  7	  and	  17).	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Whilst the 2003 White Paper set out what it called a “…challenging, long-term, agenda 
for change…” it also confirmed that no new organisation, or in the terminology of this 
thesis physical structures of governance, would be needed to facilitate this change (DTI 
2003: 113).137  In effect therefore when responsibility for responding to the PIU review 
was passed back to the DTI’s Energy Directorate chances of profound change occurring 
dropped significantly.  Experts at the DTI, and Ofgem, were not just strong proponents 
of pro-market ideas about energy governance but these institutions actually embodied 
some of these ideas in that their structures perpetuated ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  
Ofgem was ‘independent’ and energy remained a sub-division of the DTI, leaving 
elected Members of Parliament, and Cabinet officials at one remove from deliberating 
energy and how it was governed.  
 
Those tasked initially with setting up these physical structures of governance, such as 
Stephen Littlechild and Eileen Marshall, were part of the generation of economists who 
believed in restricting government involvement (Littlechild 1981; Robinson 1981; 
Robinson and Marshall 1981; Littlechild and Vaidya 1982; cf. Yarrow 2010), or in 
terms of this thesis ‘technocratic’ de-politicisation.  These economists, and those that 
followed who were also informed largely by Austrian School economics and ‘evidence 
based’ policymaking, encouraged, from the top down, the use of economic models and 
analysis within the DTI and Ofgem (Helm 2003; Interview 13; Yarrow 2010). 
 
Interviews conducted in the energy division of the DTI and at Ofgem confirm that 
within the pecking order, particularly of Ofgem, classical economists were always “at 
the top” of the organisation (Interview 13).  They also confirmed that those involved in 
producing analysis supporting energy policy, and in advising on policy outcomes, 
actively believed that ‘economics’ trumps ‘politics’ when dealing with the energy sector 
(Interviews 1, 2, 6, 13, 15, 16).  All of this conforms to notions, suggested in chapter 
two, of policymakers as institutionalised subjects and of specific institutional structures 
as restricting the access of social groups to bureaucratic leaders (Yee 1996: 92), and 
setting the parameters of what people talk about (Schmidt and Radælli 2004: 197).  
 
                                                
137	  Again,	  this	  decision	  is	  opposite	  to	  the	  suggestion	  in	  the	  PIU	  review	  that,	  long-­‐term,	  a	  new	  
Government	  Department	  be	  established	  with	  responsibility	  for	  energy,	  climate	  and	  transport	  (PIU	  2002:	  
13).	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References have repeatedly been made during these interviews to the idea that 
politicians are “bad” at making decisions which might affect energy, and to the related 
idea that politics just ‘muddies’ the pristine waters of economics (Interviews 1, 2, 15).  
This might represent a certain, rational choice informed, perspective but it may also 
suggest that the degree of ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation had left generalist politicians 
less informed about energy, and therefore less able to make ‘informed’ choices.138  
 
It is worth returning here to the question, raised in chapters two and four, of the degree 
to which energy experts were operating strategically with reference to concepts used 
within the literature on ‘epistemic communities’ (Adler and Haas 1992).  These suggest 
that hiring and training practices have a high degree of influence over which interpretive 
frameworks are actively influential within given institutions.  In fact everyone, bar one, 
interviewed for this thesis involved in energy policymaking at the DTI, Ofgem and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), was trained in classical economics, with a 
clear emphasis on market economics, modelling and statistical analysis.   One expressed 
not only their surprise, but also their delight, at the high degree to which economic 
modelling, learnt at University, was applied in the process of energy policy decision-
making (Interview 15; DTI 2003: 20).139   
 
The one non-economist met in interviews had been trained, within the DTI, in ‘basic 
economic principles’ so that they could apply these to analysis and decision-making 
(Interview 1).  In fact the understanding was that as long as staff understood basic 
economic principles they would be equipped to work within any division of the DTI, 
not just the energy division.140  In this way reasonably high degrees of turnover were 
experienced both in Ofgem and the energy divisions of the DTI (Interview 15), which, 
in turn, relates to the important question of human capacity to deliberate about energy as 
a specific topic area within the context of this policy paradigm and under conditions of 
                                                
138	  Given	  the	  notion	  that	  markets	  function	  best	  when	  participants	  are	  informed,	  within	  conditions	  of	  
transparency,	  the	  situation	  of	  less	  informed	  politicians	  might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  somewhat	  ironic.	  
139	  Three	  of	  the	  four	  sub-­‐divisions	  within	  the	  energy	  division	  of	  the	  DTI	  were	  given	  over	  to	  statistical	  
analysis	  and	  running	  the	  models	  which	  would	  monitor,	  maintain	  and	  underpin	  energy	  decisions	  
(Interview	  2).	  
140	  This	  was	  by	  no	  means	  ‘uncommon’	  practice,	  the	  IEA	  has	  also,	  almost	  from	  inception,	  been	  dominated	  
by	  faith	  in	  the	  market	  and	  by	  a	  tendency	  to	  hire	  only	  economists	  (Friedrichs	  2011:	  4).	  	  These	  arguments	  
have	  also	  been	  made	  repeatedly	  about	  the	  IMF,	  WB	  and	  other	  IGOs.	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‘technocratic’ de-politicisation. As such it appears that the ‘experts’ to whom 
responsibility had been passed were first and foremost experts in market economics, but 
not necessarily in energy, and certainly, as energy policy critics had suggested, not in 
considering wider social impacts of energy policy. 
 
Compounding these tendencies, human resources dedicated to carrying out the 
necessary analysis and decision-making were, by 2003, at “…an all time low…” and it 
has been claimed that the future of the DTI’s Energy Directorate was also “in doubt” at 
this time (Helm 2003: 399-400).  When the Cabinet was reshuffled in June 2003 
Stephen Timms became Labour’s fifth energy minister since 1997.  Not only had there 
been many incarnations of energy ministers, reinforcing observations above about staff 
turnover, he was on this occasion given a very broad remit in that the role of Minister 
for Energy would now also include responsibility for telecoms and postal services.  This 
led some to claim that energy policy had been further downgraded to a status meriting 
only a “part-time minister”, let alone a Secretary of State reporting directly to the 
Cabinet (Helm 2003: 400; see also Leake 2005). The growing degree to which 
responsibility for energy remained divorced from processes of active political 
deliberation continued to have implications for the PEPP, but also reflected the 
fundamental assumption that it was ‘experts’ not politicians who should be involved in 
deliberating energy. 
 
To make this point about implications for the PEPP, it is worth returning here to the 
importance of statutory responsibilities within the DTI and Ofgem.  Chapter three 
highlighted the significance of passing responsibility for energy to a division within the 
DTI, not just because it was at this time understaffed and very much set within the pro-
market interpretive framework, but also because of the DTI’s own particular statutory 
responsibilities.  The DTI was tasked principally with supporting UK business and 
delivering “…free and fair markets, with greater competition, for businesses, consumers 
and employees…” (DTI 2008: 15).  This mandate, with its emphasis on facilitating 
businesses, served to institutionalise, and structure pro-market ideas about how energy 
should be supplied, i.e. by the private sector.   
 
In addition the DTI had not, up until 2003, been officially mandated with the 
consideration and delivery of climate objectives, this had been the job of DEFRA.  It is 
hardly surprising, therefore, that when the need arose to respond to climate solutions put 
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forward in the PIU review that the DTI settled on such vague and loosely worded 
climate objectives, which some then took to be less than absolute.  In addition, non-
competitive, non-free market solutions to new objectives would have appeared to be 
beyond the legitimate remit of this kind of mandate. 
 
Similar arguments can be made about Ofgem and the degree to which its formal 
responsibilities stood in the way of change.  As a reminder, the Utilities Act stated that 
Ofgem’s primary duty was to  
…protect the interests of consumers, present and future, wherever appropriate by 
promoting effective competition between persons engaged in… the generation, 
transmission, distribution or supply of electricity…’ (Ofgem 2006: 107).  
Emphasis on the centrality of competition within assigned responsibilities would 
prevent Ofgem from pursuing ‘non-competitive’ instruments, even if it did take new 
objectives as absolute, or even if staff wanted to.  Ofgem was, over time, assigned other 
secondary and tertiary responsibilities, particularly within the “…social and 
environmental guidance…”, but these were not perceived to be capable of over-riding 
Ofgem’s primary responsibility (Mitchell 2008: 141).  
 
Callum McArthy’s involvement in sidelining the PIU report and its findings, referenced 
in chapter four, served to highlight institutional, in this case Ofgem’s, resistance to 
change.  Personnel within the DTI have, however, suggested that if the DTI could be 
labelled as economistic and market oriented, especially in comparison to the qualitative 
and “wooly” DEFRA, then Ofgem was practically off the end of the economistic scale 
(Interviews 5, 13 and 16).  This is significant in terms of maintaining the PEPP as much 
responsibility for policy analysis, decision-making and delivery had been passed to the 
independent Ofgem and as such they were perceived as having been ‘drivers’ of the 
liberalisation agenda (Interviews 5, 12, 13 and 14).  Historically, when the DoE was 
disbanded, many of the prominent economists went to Ofgem, leading some to 
comment about ‘de-skilling’ within the DTI (Interview 13).  This suggests a degree of 
emphasis on the independent body over the DTI’s Energy Directorate, which conforms 
to public choice and pro-market preferences for depoliticising energy and removing it 
from “… the political arena…” (Helm 2003: 386; see also Kern 2009).  It also raises 
questions, however, of how this regulator could continue to claim ‘independence’ to the 
degree that it was involved in policy decision-making.  Perhaps, because economics is 
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considered to be neutral the degree of Ofgem’s involvement could be argued away as a-
political. 
 
1.3 Deskilling and ‘Deliberative’ Depoliticisation 
It is argued here that ‘de-skilling’ within the physical structures of energy governance is 
another important outcome of ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation, alongside the lack of 
physical capacity referred to above.  When arguing that the Utilities Act of 2000 was a 
sub-standard document, Helm has suggested that the DTI bill team simply lacked 
sufficient resources, as well as specific utility experience and expertise, to handle such 
complex and technical matters (Helm 2003: 292). This tends to confirm observations 
made above that that the emphasis within this process of ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation 
had been on economists as qualifying as ‘expert’ rather than on those with specific 
experience of energy sectors.   It also suggests that the energy divisions, being 
understaffed, were also operating at sub-optimal capacity and in this way ‘de-skilled’. 
 
What is perhaps also noteworthy at this point was the intellectual distance between the 
initial ideational context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, within which the structures 
of the PEPP were developed, and policymakers within the DTI and Ofgem in the late 
2000s (Yarrow 2010: 5).  In the absence of much specific ‘energy’ expertise decisions 
were based on more generalised market economics, models and statistics – somewhat 
divorced both from the complexities of the energy sector, and importantly, politics.  
 
Arguments about the understaffed and de-skilled energy division within the DTI can be 
put forward to explain why, for example, such little understanding was displayed about 
just how expensive renewable energy would be, or of considerable potential 
contradictions between the objectives of promoting renewable electricity and of 
reducing energy poverty (Interview 12; Helm 2003: 300; cf. Rutledge 2007).  What is 
also noteworthy along this line of thinking is that mounting evidence of changing 
supply and demand patterns in international energy, perceived from within the PEPP, 
did not seem in the early 2000s to pose much threat (DECC 2003).  This is despite 
growing political, and Departmental, awareness of the UK becoming an importer once 
more.  At this stage, however, the PEPP interpretation of, amongst other events, 
growing Chinese and Indian demand was sanguine, given assumptions about how 
international markets would continue to develop in a more ‘marketised’ direction and 
given assumptions about positive economic interdependence (DTI 2003: 78-9; cf. PIU 
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2002: 53).  Deskilling, along with ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation, might also account for 
why, when a security of supply crisis did emerge that the reflex was to return to 1950s 
and 1970s ideas about facilitating more domestic energy production, including from 
nuclear.  In these continued underestimations of the complexity of energy, perhaps, we 
can identify seeds for future credible challenges to the PEPP. 
 
It appears that, aside from a degree of deskilling, ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation also fed 
into processes of ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation.  By attempting to remove energy from 
politics (cf. Helm 2003: 386), and by passing responsibility for decision-making away 
from Hay’s ‘sphere of Government’ (Hay 2007), energy did become largely removed 
from active political deliberation at Cabinet level and within the Houses of Commons 
and Lords.  Only a small community of experts were understood to be qualified to 
deliberate energy, many of whom were, ironically, not energy experts per se.  
Furthermore, by insisting that only experts could really understand what needed to be 
done, with the help of complex, unexplainable models, generalist politicians might both 
appear and feel less than qualified to comment.141 The fewer instances that elected 
Members of Parliament had cause to be involved in thinking about energy matters, the 
less they would presumably know about energy.  This would be a ‘good’ thing under 
public choice theory as politicians are too generalist, anyway, to understand economic 
subjects such as energy and too motivated by subjective political interests (cf. Hay 
2007: 95-97).   
 
This is somewhat missing the point, however, in that what MPs are, theoretically, 
equipped to do is represent the interests of their constituents and to openly relate 
outcomes of policy choices to policymaking decisions (cf. Wood 2011).  In this way 
public debate and deliberation about the positive and negative outcomes of policy 
choices should allow policy decision-making to maintain a system which meets social 
and national requirements on an ongoing basis.  One of the principal criticisms of the 
PEPP was, in the 1980s as well as in the late 2000s, that it failed to take sufficient 
account of social considerations and system properties on a national basis (Keegan 
                                                
141	  One	  senior	  energy	  policy	  advisor	  has	  remarked	  that	  the	  NETA	  model	  of	  electricity	  market	  regulation	  
was	  designed	  largely	  by	  one	  executive	  at	  the	  DTI,	  but	  when	  they	  moved	  to	  Ofgem	  no-­‐one	  at	  the	  DTI	  had	  
the	  specialist	  knowledge	  to	  understand	  this	  system	  (Interview	  14).	  	  If	  energy	  analysts	  working	  within	  
energy	  policymaking	  teams	  could	  not	  understand	  the	  system	  there	  would,	  arguably,	  be	  little	  possibility	  
for	  generalist	  MPs	  to	  do	  so.	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1985; Hope et al 1986; Cooper 1987; CEPMLP 2006; Mitchell 2008).  This is akin to 
Hay’s notion of politics as deliberation, and as informed agency and choice (Hay 2007: 
67; cf. Wood 2011).  If, however, politicians are unaware of what those policy choices 
are, or how alternatives might work, a self-fulfilling prophecy unfolds whereby 
outcomes can be divorced from decisions made ostensibly to meet the needs of the UK 
population. 
 
‘Deliberative’ depoliticisation appears to represent a less planned or strategic form of 
depoliticisation than ‘technocratic’ or ‘marketised’ which both came about through 
specific political decisions.  It might also provide a useful underpinning in instances of 
‘secretised’ depoliticisation.  A lack of general deliberation about, awareness of, and 
understanding about the complexities of energy can be beneficial in the instances that 
decisions about energy become ‘secret’.  Certainly in looking back at Tony Blair’s 
actions in terms of addressing the refinery pickets of 2000 there was little open 
deliberation about how Government should act in response – decisions appear to have 
been taken by Blair, without consultation, and then communicated to the army and 
police (Blair 2010: 296). 
 
1.4 Theoretical and Other Implications  
Chapter four, therefore, and the further theoretical analysis provided here of the ways in 
which this specific policy paradigm, the PEPP, fought off challenges provides a picture 
of a reasonably static, conservative governance system.  Although New Labour had put 
greater political momentum behind seeking to address climate related issues, the 
compromise position reached largely reflected established ideas about energy, its 
governance and institutions.  In fact compromise, by including new, but vague climate 
objectives, may have represented a policy of defusing climate calls for change.  As 
such, at this point, notions of policy paradigms and the degree to which they can self-
perpetuate through institutionalisation and depoliticisation hold up well (Hall 1993; 
Jacobsen 1995; Hay 1998, 2001 and 2007; Woods 2011).    
 
This degree of ‘in-built’ resistance to change can further explain the frustration 
experienced by climate change protagonists waiting for what they considered to be 
essential energy governance change to facilitate climate objectives (Jacobs 1991; Carter 
2001 and 2007; Mitchell 2008; Scrase et al 2009).  This section of chapter seven has 
suggested that pro-market ideas were deeply embedded within the precise ways in 
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which the institutions of energy governance were structured, but the population at large 
was also not supportive of the notion of ‘man-made’ climate change. Various UK polls 
have over time confirmed the relative lack support for notions of man-made climate 
change (cf. BBC 2010; Niblett 2011).  A cursory glance at the Australian anti-carbon 
tax protests of August 2011 give a clear indication of how politically difficult it can be 
to implement climate measures in a country where man-made climate change, or the 
need to change behaviour or policy to address it, is not a majority view.142   
 
References to the long-term and global effects, albeit potentially devastating, of burning 
fossil fuels seemed not to have had the same degree of impact as, perhaps, elsewhere in 
Europe.  In the absence of widespread popular support for, or interest in, climate 
arguments there seemed little incentive, or even perhaps possibility given forces still in 
support of the PEPP, to change the status quo.  Change inferring, as it often does, both 
political costs and different sets of winners and losers within the political economy.  In 
a broader sense those suggesting more radical changes, for example to pro-market 
systems of governance, and not just to energy policy, to facilitate climate goals still 
found themselves on the political margins (Jacobs 1991; Carter 2001; Bernstein 2001; 
Paterson et al 2003; Mitchell various).  This is clear within Prime Minister Blair’s 
decision, having invited a new, team to review energy policy in 2002, then passed 
responsibility to respond back to the DTI. 
 
The compromise position reached in 2003 after the challenge of the 2002 PIU energy 
review however, in that it did allow at least for superficial climate and energy poverty 
objectives, may ultimately have contributed to conditions within which more credible 
challenges to the status quo in energy could be heard.  This is because, as already noted 
in chapter four, by stretching the terms of a given policy paradigm a loss of integrity 
and credibility may well occur especially given the persistence of anomalies between, in 
this case, new objectives and actual outcomes (Hall 1993: 280; cf. Oliver and 
Pemberton 2004).  As such this very process of self-perpetuation in itself, as also seen 
                                                
142	  The	  poll	  undertaken	  by	  the	  BBC	  suggested	  that	  although	  75%	  of	  people	  thought	  that	  climate	  change	  
was	  ‘a	  reality’,	  only	  26%	  believed	  it	  to	  be	  a	  ‘man-­‐made’	  event.	  	  It	  had	  long	  been	  recognised	  by	  climate	  
protagonists	  that	  question	  of	  climate	  change	  are	  not	  a	  salient	  issues	  in	  UK	  national	  elections	  (Carter	  
2001:	  119).	  	  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  protests	  in	  Australia	  see:	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐
asia-­‐pacific-­‐14554882.	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above in the example of sanguine perceptions of the international energy environment, 
may well have opened up possibilities for more credible future change and challenge. 
 
 
2.	  	   Repoliticisation	  and	  ‘Re-­Thinking’	  Energy:	  2004-­7 
If the process of continuing to look inward to find solutions may have contained within 
it possibilities for future change to the PEPP, then this section considers how further 
impetus for change actually came about.  The way in which processes of paradigm 
change were conceptualised in chapter two suggested that as anomalies between 
objectives and outcomes, and uncertainty about what to do, continue to mount 
competing narratives may emerge as being better able to explain the situation and to 
proffer credible solutions (Hall 1993; Hay 1996; Wilson 2000; Blyth 2002; Oliver and 
Pemberton 2004; Widmaier 2005; Widmaier et al 2005).  As it stood at the end of 2003, 
however, the PEPP appeared, certainly overtly, to have ‘seen off’ the climate challenge 
implied in the PIU review and other reports. 
 
2.1 Uncertainty and Anomalies  
As outlined in chapter five, what is reasonably clear when looking back at policy 
documents from the mid 2000s is that energy was indeed in a period of flux and 
uncertainty.  When, in 2004, Russia re-nationalised its core energy companies reactions 
within UK energy governance circles were as shocked as they were damning 
(Interviews 3 and 6).  The very idea that a country, considered since the 1990s as an 
emerging economy, might either want to challenge, or be capable of challenging, the 
direction of international energy governance, had just not been seriously considered. 
This can partially be attributed to the degree to which assumptions about international 
energy, and importantly a lack of capacity given over to analysing international energy 
politics, had led to an under-estimation of what might be possible or of potential 
objections to further marketisation.  In might also be possible to suggest that if more 
trained diplomats had been conducting energy relations with Russia, and not just 
economists and business representatives, that a more informed position might have been 
maintained (cf. Lee 2004; Williams 2005).  Certainly, initial elite and departmental 
reactions to Russia’s policy shifts were based on the notion that Russia would change its 
behaviour when the UK directly explained the error of its ways (FAC 2008; Interviews 
1, 6 and 19). 
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As events continued to unfold through 2006, particularly with the advent of the Russia-
Ukraine gas transit dispute, levels of uncertainty about energy, and how to proceed, rose 
whilst it also became increasingly an issue for political debate.  One example of the 
level of uncertainty surrounding energy governance at this time was the high degree of 
fluctuation, referenced in chapter six, not only in Energy Ministers but also in how this 
role was defined (Miliband 2008; cf. Helm 2003).  The level of fluctuation in key 
energy personnel might reflect political uncertainty but somewhat belies, however, the 
degree of consistency in the fundamental operations of the PEPP.   
 
It was almost as if energy’s resurgence as a subject for political debate dictated some 
sort of response, but what that should be was at this point still far from clear.  This was 
then played out in key personnel alterations, which not only outwardly displayed 
uncertainty but did nothing to demand confidence in UK energy governance.  In 
essence, the degree of uncertainty in response to unfolding events suggests, particularly 
with the benefit of hindsight, that the PEPP, partly through ‘technocratic’ and 
‘deliberative’ depoliticisation, was not equipped to deal with what was happening.  It 
might also reflect an emerging period of post-normal science where “…facts are 
uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent” (Ravetz in Friedrichs 
2011: 2). 
 
What is important therefore when considering this period as part of a process of 
profound governance change is that anomalies were starting to be perceived between 
objectives and outcomes, in line with the process of paradigm change outlined by Hall 
and others (Hall 1993; Hay 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  As secure 
and competitive supplies of energy still remained an objective of energy policy, then 
volatile and rising oil and gas prices, along with fears about unreliable producers and 
growing political interference, would result in this objective not being met.  Such a stark 
anomaly in energy governance would be difficult to ignore in political terms if, as 
suggested below, it started to become more widely perceived and debated.  It was also 
already being claimed that climate targets, still largely part of DEFRA’s mandate, were 
being missed. 
 
Certainly energy analysts and policymakers were beginning to become cognisant of the 
fact that these events, perceived as unpredictable and exogenous, might have 
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consequences for UK energy policy (Interviews 3, 5, 6, 13; Ofgem 2009).143  This 
suggests a new twist in that the UK, in the sphere of energy governance, was reacting to 
policymaking elsewhere instead of being, as it had been over the past decades, a rule 
giver and “model” energy reformer (cf. IEA 2006). 
 
2.2 Speaking Security, Repoliticisation and Political Interest 
Given that anomalies and uncertainty were emerging, conditions within which change 
could theoretically take place were therefore starting to be met (cf. Blyth 2002).  What 
would further be needed, to make more sense of this period of uncertainty and to 
provide further impetus for change, would be a clear, alternative narrative providing 
both acceptable explanations of, and related solutions to, policy contradictions (Stone 
1989; Hay 1996 and 1999; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Widmaier 2007). 
However, as already suggested in chapters two and five, this analysis appears to 
suggest that the dominant explanation of these contradictions did not proffer a 
complete, or necessarily credible, set of solutions nor, at this stage, a credible 
critique of pro-market ideas about governing energy.  
 
The increasingly dominant crisis narrative of the mid 2000s did, however, reflects the 
sense of shock being experienced as well as the level of disapproval of the direction in 
which Russian energy policy was moving.  The situation, of security of supply crisis, 
was explained using old notions of energy as an influential material asset, of Russia as a 
powerful, potential enemy, and of the UK as being correct in its pursuit of ‘free and 
fair’ energy markets.  Russia emerged as the “energy superpower” using its bonanza of 
natural resources to bully and threaten the West (Roberts 2005; Robinson 2006; 
Wagstyl 2006; Ostrovsky 2006; Fox 2006; House of Commons 2007a).  These 
interpretations, although underpinned by geopolitical ideas about how the world works, 
were arguably also influenced by the degree to which Russian actions were understood 
as presenting a threat to the UK’s preferred methods of governing energy.144 
 
Given the emergence of this alternative, if not entirely new, energy narrative in public 
and elite circles it might be worth considering how the type of explanation accepted 
might be significant in terms of possibilities for change.  New institutionalist accounts 
                                                
143	  Unpredictable,	  perhaps,	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  technocrats	  had	  not	  foreseen	  them.	  
144	  The	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  PEPP	  was	  considered	  as	  ‘British’	  was	  underlined	  by	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
“British	  model”	  (Thomas	  2006).	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of paradigm shift have emphasised the role of narratives in explaining crisis, and in 
bringing about a return to certainty by offering a related, and comprehensive, set of 
solutions (Hay 1996 and 2001; Blyth 2002; see also Schmidt 2006).  This geopolitical 
narrative did offer a plausible explanation of crisis, even if it failed to offer a 
comprehensive or credible set of long-term solutions.  This section focuses more, 
however, on the way in which emerging perceptions of credible threats to the UK 
security of supply facilitated change and partly why the process started to accelerate and 
take hold. 
 
In section 3.2 of chapter two it was suggested that the notion of ‘securitisation’ might 
have something to tell us about the ways in which changes to energy governance were 
both understood as necessary and facilitated, the how and why of change (Waever 1995; 
Buzan et al 1998; cf. Browning and MacDonald 2010). What the analysis in chapter 
five seems to suggest is that political interest in energy was renewed specifically in 
response to widely reported perceptions of foreign threats to energy supply, at a time of 
rising UK energy imports and prices.  This is in line with suggestions that the language 
of security is evocative and that it represents the language of political priority (Wæver 
1995; Buzan et al 1998; see also Ciuta 2010).  As such the re-ignition of political 
interest observed in chapter five in response to the geopolitical crisis narrative might be 
expected within the terms of the notion of ‘securitisation’. 
 
What might be less expected is that although the geopolitical narrative did encourage 
some lasting geopolitically informed policy response, for example that secure energy is 
‘home grown’ energy, it was also capable of resulting in a degree of ‘deliberative’ re-
politicisation and a process of ‘re-thinking’ energy.  Recognition of energy as a security 
issue seems to have prompted its re-evaluation to a subject of national importance, as 
opposed to a sector of the economy, thereby making it politically more relevant and 
arguably demanding some sort of state response.   This might tie in with long-standing 
notions of security as a public good which Government is responsible for providing (cf. 
Wæver 1995).  
 
What is interesting is that, in this instance, the Government’s response necessitated a 
degree of ‘deliberative’ re-politicisation in that it became clear over time that the state 
had lost considerable capacity to understand the complexities of energy.  Government 
was considered to be more responsible, given that the narrative was of national energy 
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supply security, but lacking in information and knowledge both about what was 
happening and what to do about it.  It might be plausible to argue that it is precisely the 
lack of Government capacity which then triggers the degree of ‘technocratic’ re-
politicisation discussed in chapter six and section three below.  These necessities also 
provide a link between securitising moves and ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation.  These are 
not the kinds of responses to ‘securitising moves’, or ‘speaking security’, envisaged 
within the Copenhagen School, nor by those that critique the securitisation of climate 
change (Deudney 1990; Barnett 2001; Dalby 2009).  They do, however, support 
suggestions made within critical security studies that securitisation does not always 
have to lead to decision-making behind doors nor to conflict inducing, or militaristic, 
solutions (McDonald 2008: 580; cf. Floyd 2007; Browning and McDonald 2010).  
Although it does suggest that subjects, once understood as security issues, are more 
likely to become the responsibility once more of the state. 
 
To bring us back to a suggestion made in chapter two, this understanding of the role of 
securitising moves in re-igniting political interest, deliberation, and more open debate 
does not necessarily need to pose an outright contradiction to Copenhagen School 
concepts.  This is because, as Ole Wæver has suggested, when a subject becomes part of 
a process of securitisation it can travel on a continuum between ‘non politicised’ 
through ‘politicised’ to ‘securitised’, defined as decision-making behind closed doors, 
or in secret (Wæver 1995).145  Energy appears to have started to travel the continuum 
from non- to politicised, but did not become securitised in that it had entered, and 
remained, in the realm of overt political deliberation.  Thus what is important to note, is 
the connection between emerging public and political interest, perceptions of insecurity 
and the potential for political agency.  As such the act of ‘speaking security’ can be 
understood as having lent energy a degree of political saliency, importance and 
deliberation which it had not enjoyed prior to the mid 2000s. 
 
This suggestion that ‘speaking security’ can serve as a catalyst for ‘deliberative’ 
repoliticisation is not, in this respect, particularly different to associations of crisis with 
suitable conditions for change (Hall 1993; Hay 1999 and 2001; Blyth 2002; Greener 
                                                
145	  This	  end	  of	  the	  continuum	  is	  then	  characterised	  as	  ‘depoliticised’	  (cf.	  Wæver	  1995).	  	  As	  suggested	  in	  
chapter	  two,	  it	  is	  worth	  making	  the	  distinction	  clear	  between	  a	  successfully	  securitised	  subject,	  which	  
emerges	  as	  ‘depoliticised’,	  and	  one	  which	  is	  not	  fully	  securitised	  in	  that	  it	  remains	  politically	  salient	  and	  
open	  to	  further	  debate.	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2002; Widmaier 2007; Chwieroth 2010).  It has also been suggested that repoliticisation 
can be understood as explanatory of change in that it implies the possibility for 
collective agency (Wood 2011: 21).  As discussed in chapter two, feelings of shock and 
uncertainty can evoke a sense of crisis, and this sense in turn creates the sense that 
policy should be re-evaluated and, potentially, changed.  In order to re-evaluate, clearly, 
there would have to be sufficient capacity to do so, something found lacking in the mid 
2000s which, arguably, then led to a further degree of ‘deliberative’ and then also 
‘technocratic’ re-politicisation.  As such, therefore, re-politicisation can be understood 
as explanatory of why change took place (cf. Wood 2011). 
 
A return to active political re-engagement with energy was, however, by no means 
guaranteed to form the root of further structural change.  It did appear, however, that 
some sort of response to the security of supply crisis was understood as necessary, 
as is evident in the political pressure that was then brought to bear on the DTI, and 
Ofgem, to “do something” (Interview 15).  In that energy policy changed to any 
particular degree, however, it seemed that this was in response to perceptions of events 
exogenous to the PEPP.  As such much of the focus was on the new International 
Energy Strategy which the UK was, for the first time, implementing (DTI 2007: 9; FAC 
2007).  This, and other geopolitically informed policies adopted as referenced in section 
3.2 of chapter five, can indeed be better understood within the particular context of the 
re-conceptualisation of energy as a national security concern, under threat from 
unreliable foreign suppliers (DTI 2007).   
 
Policies, in particular, focused on actively improving domestic abilities to produce 
energy and on facilitating further nuclear builds can be related, therefore, to the 
increasingly dominant explanation of crisis.  As such, just as pro-market interpretations 
of the 1970s economic crisis drove certain specific forms of governance change in the 
early 1980s, so too can it be argued that the geopolitical interpretation of energy did 
drive some related policy responses (Hall 1993; Hay 1996).  It is this set of policies, 
aimed at improving supply security by facilitating domestic production, that proved to 
have staying power, as seen in chapter six.  This falls more convincingly in line with the 
notion that narratives can inform solutions (Hay 2001; Blyth 2002), and that ‘speaking 
security’ can encourage realist responses from the state (cf. Waever 1995). 
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However, in that some of the new geopolitically informed policies adopted in response 
to perceived threats from abroad were received with a high degree of scepticism within 
some quarters of the DTI and Ofgem this suggests faith in the ability of traditional 
geopolitical solutions to provide any kind of long-term solution was at this stage 
relatively low.  Protectionist policies had been generally discredited over the previous 
few decades given the dominance of ideas about free trade and positive economic 
interdependence.  This would apply particularly to ‘institutionalised subjects’ within the 
DTI and Ofgem (cf. Hall 1993; Campbell 1998).  What seems to have occurred, 
therefore, is that although the dominant explanation of the crisis did drive some lasting 
solutions, it did not contribute at this stage towards the adoption of a cohesive and 
credible alternative framework of ideas for governing.   
 
Given also the lack of critique of the PEPP inferred in the actual version of the 
geopolitical narrative which dominated, with its focus on exogenous energy problems, 
there was less impetus to change the underlying structure of energy governance.  With 
the focus on foreign actors UK energy policymakers, and their decisions, were not held 
up, at this stage, as being responsible for the contradictions and anomalies.  As such the 
market framework was not being specifically challenged and was not, at this stage, 
widely perceived as necessarily less legitimate.  
 
2.3 Public Interest and Political Action 
If the way in which a crisis is narrated, in this case as a security of supply question at a 
time of uncertainty, could lead to a degree of renewed state interest then implicit in this 
is an assumption about interconnections, in a democracy, between public awareness and 
political interest and involvement.  Some reference was made in chapter two, section 
4.1, to arguments that an inter-subjective relationship exists between publics and 
political possibility (Widmaier et al 2007: 755) and to the concept of securitisation 
inferring that wider publics matter in processes of breaking with ‘normal’ politics 
(Buzan et al 1998).  
 
Chapter five has suggested that fears about Russia, in particular, and its ability to affect 
supplies combined with interest in energy security as a subject struck a chord with 
wider publics, and political elites, in the UK.  This narrative, as such, can be described 
as cognitively convincing and as being able to tap into a high degree of inter-subjective 
meaning in the UK (cf. Yee 1996: 90-91; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004: 335; Schmidt 
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2006: 252; cf. Kern 2009: 49).  Certainly both ideas were underpinned by perceptions, 
of the Cold War and of energy supplies as subject to threat, which had been dominant at 
various stages throughout the 20th century.  Furthermore, in that attempts to securitise 
climate change had not been met with much widespread, public support in the UK, 
given the relative popular and political success of the notion of energy supply 
insecurity, this suggests that securitisation is to some degree, as suggested in chapter 
two, referent object specific (Buzan et al 1998).146  
 
Colin Hay is also quite specific about public awareness within processes of profound 
structural change in his claim that they are generally associated with “…highly 
politicized and public debates…”, at times of perceived crisis (Hay 2001: 200).  Hay 
goes on to suggest that, in the event that contradictions and failures are not publically 
perceived it is more likely, as had been the case with the PIU review in 2002, to be dealt 
with within the terms of the existing paradigm (Hay 2001: 200).  The relative lack of 
widespread public involvement in debates about energy and climate change in the early 
2000s can, in addition to concepts of embedded policy paradigms, provide part of a 
plausible explanation as to why relatively little change occurred at that time. 
 
The degree of public engagement with energy as a security issue, however, has been 
identified in chapter five as an important factor in terms of initiating the processes of 
‘deliberative’ repoliticisation and ‘re-think’ in energy.  One example was the degree to 
which energy started to be deliberated and discussed in political circles, and outside of 
‘expert’ communities at this stage (Fox 2006; House of Commons 2007a).  The degree 
of inter-subjective meaning underpinning notions of Russia as threatening and energy 
supplies as valuable arguably assisted in connecting public awareness with political 
interest.  If, in turn, we apply Hay’s concept of politicisation as placing a subject into 
the realm of contingency and deliberation then that subject, energy in this case, and the 
way it is governed, is likely to become more open to scrutiny and question (Hay 2007: 
79).  This is particularly, as seen in chapter six, in the instance that anomalies continued 
to exist and that policy became increasingly understood to be failing to deliver 
objectives. 
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  It	  might	  also	  be	  suggested	  that	  energy	  security,	  it	  that	  it	  represented	  near-­‐term,	  national	  threats	  was	  
more	  tangible	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  people.	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What is not claimed here, however, is that growing public and political engagement 
with a subject as a rule leads to paradigm change, but that in this instance it did enable 
the start of a process of ‘re-thinking’ energy governance.  Certainly interviews 
undertaken within the DTI and Ofgem have pointed to growing political involvement, 
in the form of direct political pressure, starting to impinge on energy governance 
processes (Interview 2, 5, 15).    
 
2.4 ‘Re-Thinking’ Energy and Change as Process  
Findings here about the process of ‘re-thinking’ suggest a further slowing down of, and 
layer of complexity to, processes of structural change than more usually observed (Hall 
1993; Hay 2001; Blyth 2002; Greener 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  What can be 
drawn from the analysis in chapter five is that the process of ‘re-thinking’ energy 
governance did continue alongside other processes of consistency and change.  It seems 
that this process was of particular importance in renewed attempts to understand what 
was happening in UK energy governance in the mid 2000s, but also in linking this 
period to later changes.   
 
This chapter, above, has already referred to claims that ‘deliberative’ and ‘technocratic’ 
depoliticisations had resulted in an inability to understand fully the possible 
implications both of boosting renewable energy supplies for energy poverty and of 
international energy events unfolding for the UK.  A further example takes us back, 
again, to the 2000 fuel protests.  It appears that neither the Prime Minister, nor 
“…anyone else in a position of authority…”, was aware that UK petrol stations need re-
filling every 48 hours (Blair 2010: 292).  Therefore when refineries were blocked and 
no petrol flowed, and stations do not keep reserves, there was a considerable impact. 
Clearly, given that the refineries were being picketed this piece of important 
information about how the UK’s energy infrastructure works might have been vital to 
stopping the impacts of the pickets earlier.  This mini-crisis did, however, serve as a 
brief reminder of the links between public interest in energy and the price of petrol 
(Blair 2010: 292-3).  These examples tell us something specific about the ability and 
capacity of systems characterised by ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’ depoliticisation to 
react to crisis and to enact and manage change.  
 
It took a great deal of effort, in the mid 2000s therefore, to re-engage actively with and 
understand energy once more, further affecting the degree of uncertainty being 
 246 
experienced.  One catalyst for the ‘re-think’ of energy can be found in the mounting 
realisation that current Government capacities in, and understandings of, energy 
appeared to be incapable of explaining and reacting to emerging events. The first steps 
in this process were the plethora of new energy documents including yet another Energy 
Review and White Paper, the new DTI mandates for regular reports to Parliament on 
energy security and climate issues, and the devising of the first International Energy 
Strategy (FCO et al 2004; DTI 2005a, 2006a and 2006c; DTI 2007). The scale of policy 
documents produced at this time is taken to be further evidence of a process of 
‘deliberative’ re-politicisation and ‘re-think’.  Furthermore capacity was being added 
within the energy divisions of the DTI and the FCO to provide more analysis and to 
contribute to, and frankly enable, the process of ‘re-thinking’.  At this stage, however, 
technocrats were still largely responsible for analysis and solutions, just more of them.  
 
The House of Commons special report on energy security (House of Commons 2007a), 
commissioned by a new committee established for this purpose, is however a different 
example of the ways in which the governance system was trying to come to terms with 
this baffling and uncertain area.  This, in addition to other reports assessing and 
questioning climate policy (SDC 2005; House of Commons 2007b), indicates a 
broadening of the debate away from technocrats and growing possibilities for external 
scrutiny of existing governance frameworks.  This is significant given Hall’s assertion 
that change is more likely to come from outside those communities directly engaged in 
policymaking and, as such, this active political re-engagement might also help to 
facilitate the production of new ideas about how to proceed (Hall 1993: 290).  The 
emerging notion that a ‘re-think’ was required was opening up this area of governance 
to more debate and to possibilities for a different range of voices to be heard. 
 
If we accept, in line with Hay’s views, that politicising a subject can be positive, in that 
deliberation can be understood as providing for more informed agency and in that social 
interaction can assist in accountability, then ‘re-thinking’ energy could also provide for 
improved governance (Hay 2007: 67-68; cf. Higgott and Erman 2010).  Certainly, as we 
saw in chapter six, political re-engagement on a more committed basis did assist in the 
process of coming, eventually, to understand more about the breadth and depth of 
problems facing UK energy.  The central role of ‘re-thinking’ energy policy might also 
provide an answer as to why ‘speaking security’ might result in deliberation rather than 
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‘secretive’ depoliticisation.  We will return to this potential link in the concluding 
chapter. 
 
 
3.	  	   Unravelling	  Ties:	  2007-­10 
In analysing in more detail some of the observations made in chapter five about UK 
energy governance from 2004 to 2007 some suggestions were made about ways in 
which ideas and institutions have constrained, facilitated and influenced change.  This 
section, with reference back to chapter six, will offer more answers to questions about 
how policy change takes place, what the drivers were and which actors were involved.  
The above section has already briefly considered the importance of time in processes of 
change particularly with the inclusion of the notion of ‘re-thinking’ energy, and its role 
in unravelling depoliticised governance structures.  What becomes more clear as the 
analysis in chapter six progresses is that time is not only important to understanding this 
process of change, but it may also be important in assessing the degree to which the 
widely perceived energy crisis provided suitable conditions for change. 
 
Section two has suggested that although there was a widely accepted crisis narrative that 
impacted upon public and elite political thinking, it did not appear to provide a 
systematic and credible framework for change.  Never-the-less chapter six did claim 
that a certain degree of structural change had taken place, to each level of the PEPP, by 
the end of the first decade of the 21st century.  This section will consider in more depth 
the role of other crisis narratives within the changes observed, how particular narratives 
presented evidence of failure and drew upon the sense of energy crisis, and what other 
solutions were offered.  All this points to interconnections between the mounting sense 
of uncertainty and security crisis in the mid-2000s and later changes, but also to a long, 
drawn-out, messy and contested type of change.  In addition, it also points to a 
governance system which, although altered, still left the UK with a degree of 
uncertainty as to the future of energy governance, in stark contrast to new 
institutionalist understandings of re-imposed certainty post-paradigm shift (Hay 2001; 
Blyth 2002).  
 
3.1 The Energy Security-Climate Narrative  
What seems to emerge from the analysis in chapter six is evidence of the role, given the 
right circumstances, of narratives as political agency within processes of change (cf. 
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Yee 1996; Bulkeley 2000; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Schmidt 2006; Hajer in Kern 
2010: 30 and 49).  At the end of chapter five a situation had been reached wherein 
recognition was mounting of a need to act, but this was, importantly for processes of 
structural change, in response to factors perceived as exogenous to the PEPP.  As such 
the security narrative had highlighted a possible lack of UK, and OECD, energy security 
but not problems inherent within the pro-market system of governance.  A number of 
geopolitically informed policies, related to the crisis as perceived, were pursued to 
address these exogenous problems but energy security was still understood to be a 
function of freely trading energy markets (FCO et al 2004; DTI 2006c and 2007).  
 
The narratives identified at the start of chapter six, however, not only attempted to claim 
that existing governance was failing to meet new objectives, but that the PEPP itself 
was partly to blame.  Collectively the geopolitical and climate narratives had been 
providing proofs of failure to meet both security and climate objectives for some time, 
and by the end of the 2000s these proofs were mounting.  Furthermore, given renewed 
governance efforts in 2003 and 2007 to address these problems by using existing 
institutions of governance, such failures could be increasingly interpreted as attributable 
to the PEPP and its reliance on ‘pro-market’ structures.  
 
The field for energy debate had arguably also been opened up by the energy security 
crisis in the mid 2000s, and this did allow new voices, and evidence of failure, to be 
voiced outside of previously limited circles and by political elites.  The ‘re-think’ of 
energy governance, and emerging realisations of the extent of the problems, had left 
various actors and institutions looking for solutions.  In the absence of the energy 
security debate it is harder to conceive of how energy would, to the same degree, have 
come to be understood as an area of national interest once more.  The question of 
national interest is important here to the degree that the re-framing of energy as a 
national question can be seen to require centralised, or state, answers (cf. CEPMLP 
2006; Wicks 2009).  This brings us to the role of the energy-security-climate narrative 
within this process of change.  
 
Given the high and continuing degree of scepticism in the UK about man’s role in 
climate change referenced in section two above (cf. BBC 2010; Niblett 2011), and the 
contrasting effectiveness of the way in which climate narratives drew on national 
security concerns to boost the solutions they offered, we might be able to learn 
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something about political resonance.  Although, as will be argued below, legally 
binding climate objectives might in and of themselves have driven energy governance 
change, the re-focus within the UK on energy as also requiring action on a national 
scale provided an additional boost to climate solutions.  As such the energy-security-
climate narrative embodied and encouraged an emerging recognition of what Blair 
referred to as the “…two immense challenges…” facing our country (DTI 2006: 4). 
 
This narrative, however, not only helped to re-frame the understanding of the crisis – as 
a joint energy and climate crisis – but it also offered up both evidence of failure as well 
as climate policies as solutions to energy security and climate problems.  This 
represents an about-turn from the dominant PEPP narrative, evident still in the 2007 
White Paper, whereby the market-based approach and competition, the panaceas for 
energy security, were still also understood to be the principal routes for producing 
climate outcomes (DTI 2003, 2006a, 2006c and 2007; JESS 2006).  The geopolitical 
narrative of secure national energy systems, in order to avoid “unstable foreign 
suppliers”, requiring more domestic production seemed, however, to have found a high 
degree of political purchase (IPPR 2007; DTI 2007; House of Commons 2007a; FAC 
2008; Wicks 2009; DECC 2009c).  And it was this political purchase that the energy-
security-climate narrative continued to build on in putting forward renewable energy as 
part of the solution.   
 
Furthermore, importantly, by providing evidence of the degree to which renewable 
energy had been underinvested, and to which it was under-represented in the UK energy 
mix, a strong argument could be built that further change would be required to fulfil the 
potentially positive roles of renewables and energy efficiency (Mitchell 2008; ITPOES 
2010; WWF 2010).  This narrative was still one, therefore, of policy change to meet 
climate ends, even though it increasingly drew on ‘traditional’ security understandings 
of energy and on proving policy failure.  If we consider, however, that governance 
changes ultimately made were least profound at the level of ideas about energy 
governance, then the element of these narratives which sought to discredit market 
ideas can be seen as having been less effective.  The background to energy debates 
by 2008/2009 was one wherein a wider discrediting of market ideas might have 
been possible due to the financial crisis but again, here, challenges were not 
entirely successful either (cf. Gamble 2009; Hay 2010). 
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We can observe, therefore, inter-relationships between various aspects of the process of 
change thus far.  We can follow a thread of narratives about energy independence from 
the mid 2000s, when they were used to recommend geopolitical solutions to perceived 
energy security problems, through their adoption within climate narratives, on to their 
inclusion within distinct political narratives, such as that of Malcolm Wicks (Wicks 
2009).  Wicks, as such, might have served as a political mediator for the ideas of the 
climate-energy narrative, ideas which might previously have been marginalised under 
the PEPP (cf. Schmidt 2009: 3).  Ultimately, as referenced in section 4.1 of chapter six, 
the narrative of self-sufficiency did come to form a lasting underpinning for a range of 
new renewable and nuclear policies in 2009, in that they are not only climate friendly, 
but also boost ‘home-grown’ energy  (DECC 2009b: 10).  
 
The way in which this narrative became woven into political discourse and policy 
documents can provide us with further evidence in support of claims about the degree to 
which ‘speaking security’ can be understood as politically salient.  The notion of 
defending domestic energy production in the face of foreign threats seems to have 
underpinned, in addition to the process of re-thinking energy mentioned above, both a 
process of narrative appropriation and elements of energy governance change.  This 
suggests, at least within the UK, that once a subject can be understood in national 
security terms it can raise its public and political profile leading to possibilities for 
political action.147 
 
We can also start to understand more about the role of narratives in that they too can be 
understood as inter-related.  In that climate narratives adopted, but also importantly then 
adapted, elements of geopolitical narratives this suggests, as mentioned in chapter one, 
that narratives are neither static nor can they be understood as representing cleanly 
delineated perspectives on energy.  As such, in combination, these narratives provided 
an emerging understanding of the crisis, renewed emphasis on particular solutions as 
able to meet twin objectives, whilst also offering up a critique of current methods of 
seeking to provide solutions within the PEPP.  In this way narratives seem to have 
played a role similar to that suggested by new institutionalists in chapter two but, again, 
                                                
147	  This	  relates	  to	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  Chris	  Brown,	  in	  a	  critique	  of	  Ken	  Booth’s	  cosmopolitanism,	  
that	  appeals	  to	  localised	  and	  recognised	  communities	  can	  be	  more	  tangible	  and	  effective	  than	  appeals	  
to	  broader	  swathes	  of	  society	  (Brown	  2010).	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in a messier and more drawn-out way (cf. Stone 1988; Hay 1996 and 2001: 94; Wilson 
2000; Blyth 2002; Widmaier 2007; Widmaier et al 2007). 
 
3.2 Other Drivers of Change 
Mounting evidence of failure to meet climate objectives over time was accompanied 
with a sense that other institutions would need to change.  Although it had been claimed 
earlier that the institutions of governance need not change to meet new objectives (DTI 
2003), by 2008 a clear overhaul of the physical institutions of energy governance was 
taking place.  Arguably, given the growing number of un-answered questions about 
energy governance, and its role in delivering climate objectives whilst maintaining 
supply security, the DTI and Ofgem had begun to lose their right to self-refer over time.  
The PEPP was further undermined, as suggested above, by the unsuccessful 
commitment of old policies to new objectives, objectives which had in any case been 
resisted to a certain extent by policy-making teams.  Not only were the DTI and Ofgem 
seemingly unable to offer alternative and credible answers to mounting evidence of 
failure but the sheer scale of policy documents, White Papers, Acts and Bills of 
Parliament, each representing a new iteration of policy, hints not only at the lengthy 
process of ‘re-thinking’, in that new problems were constantly being perceived, but also 
at a continuing sense of uncertainty.  
 
As already suggested in chapter six the creation of a new government department 
dedicated to energy and climate governance reflected the degree to which energy had 
become re-politicised and re-conceptualised but was also claimed to reflect the further 
coming together of climate and energy narratives about energy governance (DECC 
2010).  DTI economists were thrown together with the “woolly” DEFRA climate teams 
and instructed to work together to solve climate and energy problems (Interview 5).  
This move is understood here as evidence of a loss of faith in existing institutions of 
governance as well as reflecting the institutionalisation of the longstanding climate idea 
that energy and climate policy should be treated, in active political terms, as completely 
inter-related (Carter 2001; PIU 2002; Held 2006; Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 2009; 
Scrase et al 2009).   
 
New institutions, however, do not necessarily imply profound changes in governance.  
One clear example of this had been the Joint Energy Security of Supply working group 
(JESS) formed in the early 2000s (cf. JESS 2002).  This group had been tasked with 
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assessing implications for UK energy security given the imminent switch to importer of 
oil and gas.   Being as it was, manned by existing personnel from the DTI and Ofgem, 
conclusions reached followed largely in line with those already discussed in policy 
documents (JESS 2006).  Although many disenfranchised civil servants did leave both 
DECC and Ofgem around this time these institutions did maintain a core of the old 
personnel who had operated under the PEPP for substantial periods (Interviews 2 and 
15).148  As such dominant narratives associated with the PEPP did not disappear in that 
although pressure was being felt to change contestation about the requirement to depart 
from the PEPP also persisted (Interview 15).   
 
As noted above, in section one, what had been significant both in how the energy 
division of the DTI and Ofgem operated were factors such as overall institutional 
mandates, personnel employed and their educational and training backgrounds, and 
their hierarchical position versus other departments of government.  Changes observed 
in chapter six, therefore, in mandates for Ofgem and the movement of responsibilities 
away from Ofgem, the independent regulator, back to DECC did add to a profile of 
more profoundly shifting institutions (DECC 2009c).  A combination of new 
institutional mandates, more alternative institutions, such as the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC) and the House of Commons Committee on energy security (House of 
Commons 2007a) among others, meant that by the end of the decade DECC and Ofgem 
personnel were noting the degree to which they now felt more politically implicated in 
their decisions (Interviews 15 and 16).  This feeling might well have been enhanced by 
the newly mandated requirements to report annually to Parliament on energy security 
and climate change progress. 
 
The changes to physical institutions of governance referenced above, and at greater 
length in chapter six, are taken here to represent a reasonably high degree of reversal of 
‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  By 2010 energy policy-making processes were less 
distanced from central political processes, more subject to deliberation at Cabinet and 
Parliamentary levels, and subject to more formalised and on-going scrutiny via new 
institutions.  As such the ‘deliberative’ repoliticisation and ‘re-thinking’ of energy, in 
addition to mounting evidence of failure, are understood here to have been partly 
                                                
148	  Also	  tells	  us	  something	  about	  lenses	  –	  for	  those	  who	  felt	  a	  requirement	  to	  leave	  DECC/Ofgem	  there	  
was	  clearly	  a	  consideration	  that	  the	  intellectual	  integrity	  of	  energy	  governance	  was	  being	  challenged,	  
however	  others	  expecting	  more	  radical	  change	  consider	  this	  to	  be	  just	  a	  small	  step	  change?	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responsible for some reasonably profound institutional changes and reversal of 
‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  In this way these processes are taken here to have been 
fundamental to this particular process of change. 
 
As well as changes to the physical institutions of governance chapter six traced closely 
the way in which climate objectives had developed from vaguely worded targets, which 
were not necessarily taken as strictly binding, to legally binding, specific targets 
including for renewable energy (HMG 2008a).  These new objectives themselves are 
taken here to have facilitated other institutional changes.  It was noted in chapter one 
that one of the most prominent academics on the question of energy paradigm shift in 
the OECD, Dieter Helm, had concluded that a policy paradigm shift had already taken 
place.  This seemed based largely on the observation that the objectives of energy policy 
had changed, from that of creating liberalised and competitive energy markets to that of 
achieving climate and energy security targets (Helm 2005a and 2007a).  
 
Although this thesis on the whole disagrees with Helm’s conclusions, not least in that 
no policy paradigm shift is claimed here, it is worth analysing the role of objectives 
more closely particularly as Hall’s ‘third order change’ has highlighted objectives as 
being of primary importance to measuring change.  Hall had considered that ‘goals’, or 
objectives, guide policy and as such, third order change could not be considered to have 
taken place without a new direction for policy (Hall 1993: 279).  Helm likewise seems 
to infer that ideas about governance would change in response to new objectives and 
instruments (Helm 2005a: 1).  Neither, however, breaks this relationship down into any 
particular detail. 
 
On the evidence of chapter six, however, a case could be made that new objectives of 
energy policy, especially once understood to be ‘serious’, did drive further questioning 
of energy governance structures and a search for new solutions (see also Kuzemko 2012 
forthcoming).  As an example we can turn to the Climate Change Act of 2008 wherein 
for the first time specific climate targets became legally binding and budgets were set 
across government.  What was just as significant, however, is that this Act laid down a 
specific challenge for energy policy-makers - to start finding specific policy solutions to 
meet the new targets (House of Commons 2007a; HMG 2008a).  The combination of 
legally binding targets and the challenge to be specific about how to meet them 
arguably forced the hand of policymakers and took energy governance beyond target 
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setting exercises.  Again the role of those new institutions and opposing political groups 
in continuing to scrutinise achievements and point to policy failures were also important 
in keeping the ball of change moving. 
 
The challenge of how to deliver new objectives was picked up in 2009 in the ‘UK Low 
Carbon Transition Plan’ and the ‘Renewable Energy Strategy’, both of which 
recognised the need for further governance change (DECC 2009a and 2009b).  It is 
within these documents that we can see a more concrete move towards direct state 
involvement in governance processes through legislation, financial support 
mechanisms, the ‘feed-in-tariff’ and more new and specific institutions among others.  
As such these solutions, many suggested within climate narratives, do represent the 
instruments of governance breaking further with the market-orientation of the PEPP and 
reflect also a new degree of determination to meet objectives.  In this way objectives to 
which policy is set, or direction of policy, is understood here as being a specific driver 
of change not just a way of measuring whether change has taken place.149 
 
3.3 Necessary Conditions for Paradigm Change 
In the first chapter of this thesis, as part of the review of literature on energy paradigm 
change, it was noted that different conclusions have been reached, depending often on 
theoretical perspective or normative position taken.  Amongst those writing specifically 
about energy policy, some had claimed a full or partial paradigm shift whilst others had 
referred still to a ‘band of iron’ restricting change to policy (Helm 2005a and 2007a; 
Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Jegen 2009; Kern 2009; Rutledge and Wright 2011).  
Certainly paradigm shift, in that it has tended to be under-theorised in much of this 
literature, was often not specifically measured, as has been attempted in this thesis by 
looking at change to the five identified levels of the existing paradigm.  However, 
although a number of important structural changes were observed, in chapter six, to four 
levels of the PEPP the conclusion was that paradigm shift could not be claimed.  This 
can be attributed to a number of factors, some of which will be discussed here below, 
but it also raises questions of other necessary conditions for paradigm change beyond 
the measurement process adopted here.  
 
                                                
149	  As	  suggested	  in	  chapter	  one,	  some	  recent	  research	  has	  suggested	  that,	  on	  a	  global	  basis,	  the	  state	  
has	  become	  more	  Involved	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  attain	  energy	  security	  and	  climate	  objectives	  
(Froggatt	  and	  Levi	  2009:	  1129).	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Before moving onto a discussion of necessary conditions for change to be considered 
successful under the theoretical framework used here, it might be worth commenting 
that perceptions of change can also be coloured by normative positions taken.  Just as 
we have tried to measure change in UK energy governance by comparing the five levels 
of the PEPP between 2000 and 2010, change might also be measured by looking mainly 
at the end governance position.  For a more ‘radical’ analyst recommending paradigm 
change based on a specific vision of what the new system might look like, changes thus 
far might seem paltry.  This might apply to those who had expected a higher degree of 
direct state investment, the setting up of a ‘single buyer’, or even those who are still 
arguing for a rejection of the current industrial paradigm (Bernstein 2001; Carter 2001 
and 2007; Mitchell 2008; Scrase et al 2009; Newell and Paterson 2010).  For those, like 
Helm, who come from more of a classical economics background changes made thus 
far might already seem like a genuine structural shift.  Specifically in the case of Helm 
he, like Hall, expects any new paradigm to be coloured and shaped by the previous 
paradigm.  As such his claims of paradigm shift, whilst at the same time seeking ways 
to marry up “…the new objectives with the liberalized markets”, might not seem like 
such a contradiction (Helm 2007a: 32).  For others the current position in the UK might 
still be more akin still to Bernstein’s ‘liberal-environmental’ compromise (Bernstein 
2001). 
 
This relates closely to the question of ideas and their role in paradigm change.  Chapter 
six had suggested that the PEPP level least affected by change had been that of ideas 
about energy governance in that they had not been convincingly discredited.  It appears 
that specific arguments offered by climate and geopolitical narratives about the market 
model itself being at fault were never really taken on board.  This might partly have to 
do with the nature of the dominant crisis narrative which laid the blame on external 
circumstances, the unstable foreign suppliers and the changing climate, rather than 
suggesting that the PEPP might have exacerbated these situations.  The lack of rejection 
of such ideas contrasts with the way that many new institutionalists have pointed to a 
very specific discrediting of Keynesian economic management as part of the economic 
policy paradigm shift of the 1980s (Hay 1996 and 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and 
Pemberton 2004).  
 
Lack of comprehensive discrediting of part of the previous ideational framework might 
also be connected with a perceived lack of systematic and credible alternative 
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framework which could address the crisis.  As it happened a number of solutions had 
been drawn from within climate narratives, and also some informed by geopolitical 
thinking, but this seems to represent a ‘pick and mix’ process which, in turn, might also 
represent the rather ‘mixed’ explanation of crisis.  This is particularly in that the crisis 
came to be understood within energy policymaking and wider political circles, from 
2007 onwards, as a joint energy security and climate crisis.   
 
Again, if we compare this process of change to the paradigm shift observed by new 
institutionalists in the early 1980s there are some distinctions in the way in which the 
dominant narrative is understood to have facilitated change (Hall 1993; Hay 2001; 
Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  The 1980s ‘Winter of Discontent’ narrative 
contained within it a credible explanation of the crisis, as suggested above, but also a 
coherent and directly related set of solutions, underpinned by neoliberal thinking, about 
how to solve it.  As suggested by Hay, one of the primary drivers may well have been 
the simplicity of the narrative (Hay 1996, 2001 and 2009).  Oliver and Pemberton 
suggest that “…the triumph of a new policy framework depends… on a workable new 
idea (or… a set of ideas) being available” (Oliver and Pemberton 2005: 419).  Solutions 
pursued, however, in answer to the perceived climate-energy security crisis were not 
suggestive of a well-defined, alternative package of measures to achieve the new 
objectives.  As such what seems to have been accepted within energy policy-making 
communities is a new direction for policy, but no clear and comprehensive 
understanding of the best way to get there.   Hence observations at the end of chapter 
six that the process of ‘re-think’ continues and of ‘pick and mix’ policymaking which 
might be comparable to Hay’s suggestion of “inter-paradigm borrowing” (Hay 2010: 
22).   
 
The stickiness of pro-market ideas about how to govern energy may also be related to 
the type of crisis being identified here in that it is one, although inter-related in practice 
with many other aspects of the international political economy, that is not perceived, 
yet, as representing a specific challenge to ideas about economic governance.  Indeed 
part of the argument here has been that the perception of crisis was directly linked to a 
feeling that the pro-market system of energy governance adopted and advocated by, and 
in some ways defining, the UK was under threat.  It might be somewhat ironic if, in 
attempting to defend the system, it were to be rejected completely.  This tells us 
something, in turn, about the importance of the interpretive framework in defining the 
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PEPP, as pro-market energy policy paradigm.  In the 1980s when the PEPP was being 
implemented it was done as a process of turning pro-market ideas into political practice 
via the creation of new structures of governance.   
 
Lastly, although the evidence collected in this thesis, and the interpretation thereof, may 
not qualify for policy paradigm change clearly some important structural changes have 
taken place.  This begs questions about how to measure varying degrees of change and 
processes of shift which fall outside of paradigm shift.  In terms also of the temporality 
of change a likewise mixed and complex picture has emerged.  Governance change 
suggested here finds itself neither completely in the camp of a gradual or evolutionary 
process (Mahoney and Thelen 2010), nor, indeed entirely of a process of punctuated 
evolution (Hay 2002).  The findings of this thesis support claims by Mahoney and 
Thelen that change can take place in many ways – linear and progressive, evolutionary 
but punctuated, and suddenly.  
 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter, in reflecting in some more depth on the various iterations of change over 
the course of the 2000s, has tended to highlight that the process has been complex, 
messy and, arguably, on-going.  In taking new institutionalist concepts of paradigms 
and change and applying them to UK energy governance it appears that ideas have, 
indeed, both constrained and facilitated structural change, with the emphasis perhaps 
still in this instance on constraint.  An attempt has been made here to not only monitor 
and track changes but to also understand how and why they came about.  Table five, 
below, is an attempt to provide a summary of these changes in a more accessible format 
and although it does provide a glimpse of the complexities involved it does underplay 
the inter-connections between various elements of change.  This is something which the 
concluding chapter will seek to address, along with a deeper consideration of the 
implications of this research for concepts, of paradigms, change and depoliticisation, 
and for understandings of UK energy governance. 
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Table 5: Processes of Energy Governance Change: 2000-10 
 
 
What seems apparent is that thinking about UK energy governance in terms of policy 
paradigms and depoliticisation has helped to explain in more depth the difficulties 
associated with large-scale structural change.  This is particularly given the degree to 
which dominant pro-market ideas had both influenced the formation of the PEPP and 
had become embedded, specifically via ‘technocratic’, ‘deliberative’ and ‘marketised’ 
depoliticisation, over time.  ‘Secretised’ depoliticisation has not featured as heavily in 
these explanations given the extent to which it was not a feature particular to this model 
of energy governance.  This chapter has also, however, argued that the ways in which 
the PEPP operated contained the seeds of its own unravelling both in terms of throwing 
existing policies at new problems and, particularly, of the extent to which the UK had 
lost energy governance capacity and understanding.  A lack of capacity to think beyond 
the ideational framework arguably led to a compromise position which did not, 
ultimately, prove successful. 
 
• Embedded	  paradigm:	  depoliwcised	  
• Climate	  challenge	  builds	  within	  credible	  
inswtuwons	  
• Challenge	  diﬀused	  via	  compromise	  
• Claims	  that	  PEPP	  can	  deliver	  
Continuity	  and	  Compromise	  
• Nawonal	  supply	  security	  crisis	  
• Anomalies	  and	  uncertainty	  build	  
• Energy	  're-­‐think'	  commences:	  degree	  of	  
'deliberawve'	  repoliwcisawon	  
• Policy	  response	  mixed	  reﬂecwng	  uncertainty	  
Repoliticisation	  and	  're-­‐think'	  
• Energy-­‐security-­‐climate	  narrawve	  builds	  
• Mounwng	  evidence	  of	  failure	  
• PEPP	  loses	  some	  credibility	  
• New	  inswwtuwons:	  degree	  of	  'technocrawc'	  
repoliwcisawon	  
• 	  Legislawon	  and	  new	  instruments	  
Change	  in	  Direction	  of	  Policy	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Utilising concepts of paradigm change together with considerations of the roles of 
widely perceived crisis, of ‘speaking security’, and of narratives pointing to policy 
failure has assisted in eking out understandings of why and how changes have taken 
place.  The acceptance within policy-making circles of a narrative about sustainability 
and national energy security has not, however, resulted in a full return to conditions of 
certainty.  The ‘re-think’ of energy-climate governance is ongoing and the opportunity 
for inconsistencies to continue between objectives and outcomes is, arguably, high. As 
such, instead of identifying a process of paradigm change what this thesis may have 
found might be more accurately described as an evolving process of structural change. 
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Thesis	  Conclusion:	  Questions,	  Answers,	  Concepts	  and	  Possible	  Futures	  	  
 
Introduction	  
This concluding chapter will briefly look into some of the implications of the findings 
of this thesis for the ways in which we can understand UK energy governance today as 
well as for the literature reviewed in chapter one.  It will do so principally by 
summarising, in brief, the answers to the four questions raised about UK energy 
governance in the introduction to this thesis.  These summary answers will be produced 
here only briefly in order to avoid unnecessary duplication with observations already 
made in each chapter.  This conclusion will, however, also eke out further implications 
for those theoretical concepts, policy paradigm theory, ‘speaking security’, and de- and 
repoliticisation, which have largely underpinned the framework of analysis used here. 
Some attempt will be made to identify the ways in which those concepts, some of which 
have emerged from different disciplinary backgrounds, conflict and inter-relate with one 
another, as well as complement each other.  
 
It is this theme of challenge and ongoing uncertainty that will underpin the final section 
of this concluding chapter.  One of the drivers of change highlighted within this thesis 
has been the way in which alternative narratives have challenged ‘business as usual’ in 
energy. Their challenges were given considerable assistance, however, with the advent 
of publically perceived energy security crisis and growing deliberation about energy, a 
widening of the energy debate and growing awareness of failure of existing policy to 
provide for the new objectives.  All of this was, in turn, underscored by the continued 
failure of PEPP policies to provide working solutions, despite strong claims by 
policymakers that competition and markets would provide for energy security and 
renewable energy.  Such conditions for change are, arguably, still in place in UK energy 
and climate governance and might provide, as discussed in more length below, 
incentive for further, broader change in the future. 
 
 
1.	  	   Answering	  Questions	  and	  Conceptual	  Implications	  
This thesis has set out to answer some specific questions about UK energy governance 
change, not just in an attempt to address inconsistent conclusions within the literature 
on energy paradigms and change, but also because the UK has been one of the strongest 
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proponents of pro-market energy over time. The ongoing changes in UK energy 
institutions and policymaking may impact upon the notion of pro-market energy as 
‘orthodoxy’, or as an accepted logic or norm.  Given the degree to which the UK has 
based its external relations on successful norm diffusion (Davies 1996; Helm 2003; 
Timmins 2006; see also Watson 1999), this is likely to have specific implications for 
relations with producer states such as Russia.  Change to the PEPP would also have 
relevance for those countries, and regions, who had chosen to attempt a re-structuring of 
their own energy governance systems using the UK governance system as a ‘model’, as 
suggested by the IEA (IEA 2006; see also de Oliveira and McKerron 1992; Thomas 
2006). 
 
As a reminder, the four questions posed in the introduction to this thesis were: 
• Has UK energy governance undergone a profound structural change? 
• What type of energy governance system existed at the start of the period of 
analysis? 
• Why is UK energy governance changing, what have the catalysts for change 
been? 
• How do processes of change unfold?  
The answers to these questions will form part of the sub-sections below, and will also 
be related back to the literature reviewed in chapter one.  Answers to questions will also 
be intertwined with an explanation of how they were reached and which aspects of the 
conceptual framework were most useful in allowing answers to be reached. 
 
As suggested in the thesis introduction, the conceptual framework of analysis adopted 
here has ranged across new institutionalisms, but with an emphasis on ideational 
institutionalism, concepts of depoliticisation as well as Copenhagen School, and more 
critical, approaches to securitisation.  As such the framework has, in Hall’s words, 
“…borrowed from multiple schools of thought…” (Hall 2010: 220).  The conceptual 
framework has been utilised in order to structure this thesis on UK energy governance 
as well as to answer specific questions about how, why, to what degree change has been 
taking place.  As such, the intention has not been to form a new and generalisable 
concept to account for both consistency and change, but to provide contextual and 
lasting explanations.  
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It has been suggested that there is an inevitable tension between a requirement to 
develop the relatively simple models that form the substance of social science and a 
need to portray the world in realistic terms (Hall 2010: 219).  By erring more on the side 
of being overt about the complexities and the messiness of the processes of change 
being undergone within UK energy governance this thesis has, perhaps, been more 
about portraying the world in “realistic terms”.  That is not to say, however, that no 
conceptual observations can be made as a result of this study.  In fact, by borrowing 
from a range of different conceptual areas, although there have been some 
contradictions, some innovative and complimentary inter-relationships have also 
emerged which are worth identifying and analysing here. 
 
1.1 Defining and Measuring Change 
As suggested in the thesis introduction, the principal question that this thesis set out to 
address has been whether or not policy paradigm change has occurred.  In order to 
provide a sufficiently plausible answer to this question this thesis has further argued that 
energy governance at the starting point, 2000, must be defined in detail in order to have 
a marker against which to measure change.  The ability to measure has been considered 
important given the degree to which energy paradigms have been under-defined within 
the relevant literature, reviewed in chapter one.  Arguments that energy policy has 
undergone a paradigm shift (Helm 2005a and 2007a) as opposed to those that argue that 
UK energy policy remains profoundly constrained (Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Kern 
2009) are hard to assess given the lack of precise definition of what change or stasis 
actually means within the terms of each analysis. 
 
Chapter two built upon Peter Hall’s concept of policy paradigms in order to develop a 
detailed understanding of energy policy in 2000, which was characterised as a ‘pro-
market energy policy paradigm’ (PEPP) (Hall 1993; cf. Wilson 2000; Hay 2001; 
Greener 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Gamble 2009; Larsen and 
Andersen 2009; Chwieroth 2010; Wood 2011).  Inspired by Hall’s separation of policy 
into three components (Hall 1993: 278), the PEPP was constructed as consisting of five 
separate, but inter-related, levels.  Identifying these levels has provided the thesis with 
the possibility for a detailed mechanism for measuring change.  Governance change 
could be measured by analysing whether any changes were apparent in 2010 versus 
2000, but also in terms of the degree of difference.  As such this mechanism of 
measuring change has also allowed for analysis of the depth, or profundity, of changes 
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in that a marked shift against all levels of the PEPP would qualify as a paradigm 
change. 
 
The question of depth of change has been important to cover in that a policy paradigm 
change, as explained and explored by new institutionalists, implies that a significant 
shift, or break, from past policies is experienced.  Use of the term paradigm shift with 
reference to energy, as suggested in chapter one, seems more emblematic, or symbolic 
of something important and worth reading about, rather than as clearly understood or 
defined (cf. Helm 2005a and 2007b; Jegen 2009; Froggatt and Levi 2009).  What this 
symbolic use of the term ‘paradigm shift’ does, however, imply is that the term is 
broadly taken as having a high degree of inter-subjective meaning attached to it.  The 
clearly defined method of measuring paradigm change, accompanied by the five level 
characterisation of the existing policy paradigm might be taken as a clear contribution to 
the literature on energy policy paradigms. 
 
There have been further advantages of the way in which change has been measured 
here.  Arguably, if this thesis had applied Hall’s notion of third order change (Hall 
1993), with its more narrow focus on objectives and instruments, then it might not have 
been able to identify other important aspects of change. For example this thesis would 
have missed the chance to identify change to the physical institutions of governance 
which have had such an impact on energy policy outcomes.  In addition, however, by 
including the interpretive framework within the conceptualisation of the PEPP it has 
also been possible to understand both change, as in ideas about energy, and consistency, 
in terms of ongoing belief in ideas about the role of the market, of competition and of 
the need to design economically efficient policy.  Arguably, if ideas about how best to 
govern energy had not been included then this thesis might have concluded that there 
had been an energy policy paradigm change. 
 
In addition, by avoiding the temptation of forming early conclusions about whether or 
not profound changes had taken place or about what those changes should look like, this 
system of measuring change has also allowed recognition of consistency as well as 
alteration.  As such, this thesis has set itself apart in that it has considered both 
processes of consistency and change but also in that it has not commenced the analysis 
with a particular set of ideas about what would constitute ‘best practice’ in mind.  
Positions taken with regard to energy paradigm stasis or shift have, as argued in chapter 
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one, often been coloured by normative political positions about how energy should be 
governed (Carter 2001; Stanislaw 2004; Helm 2005a and 2007a; Rutledge 2007; 
Mitchell 2008; Klare 2008; Scrase et al 2009).   
 
In terms of further relating the conclusions of this thesis back to the literature reviewed 
in chapter one it might also be worth highlighting some other differences.  Although it 
has not been possible claim paradigm change this thesis has been able to claim more 
change than observed by work on UK energy policymaking which emphasised ideas as 
strongly constraining possibilities for change (Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 2008; Kern 
2009).  On the evidence of this body of work it appears that Mitchell’s ‘band of iron’ 
has started to unravel, if not perhaps in ways that she might consider either useful or 
appropriate (Mitchell 2008: 1).  This thesis has observed, as of May 2010, new physical 
institutions of governance, that the state has assumed a more active role in the 
governance, if not the supply, of energy and that energy policy is guided by a new set of 
objectives.  In terms of Helm’s work on energy paradigm shift in OECD energy policy 
this thesis suggests some similar kinds of change, most particularly in the form of new 
policy objectives, but also some other ways in which governance is changing (Helm 
2005a and 2007a; cf. Jegen 2009).  Again, the formation of DECC and other political 
institutions for the purposes of governing energy and climate policy might not have 
been what Helm had envisaged, given his suggestions of more rather than less statutory 
independence for such institutions (Helm 2007a: 33).  
 
To the degree that it is possible to identify new and alternative ways of thinking about 
and governing UK energy it would be to suggest the emergence of an energy-security-
climate nexus as governance norm.  This new norm has been proposed here as being a 
reflection of the idea that energy and climate policy should be intertwined in a policy-
making sense as each can have such strong consequences for the other.  It was argued in 
chapter six that the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), were formed to 
reflect this idea, long discussed within climate perspectives (Carter 2001; PIU 2002; 
Held 2006; Greenpeace 2006; Giddens 2009; Scrase et al 2009).150  Working 
assumptions about the ability of domestic renewables and energy efficiency to meet 
both energy security and climate objectives is another sign of this nexus in practice. 
 
                                                
150	  Similar	  changes	  are	  ongoing	  within	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  where	  climate	  and	  energy	  foreign	  
policy	  units	  are	  being	  amalgamated	  (Conversation	  5).	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Observations made here about the emerging energy-security-climate nexus represent 
one more aspect of this thesis which sets it apart from other works on energy 
governance.  Much analysis has been undertaken on energy or climate policy as 
separate policy areas.  As suggested in chapter one, within the more recent literature on 
energy, that considers overtly the politics of energy, there has been tendency to 
emphasise two models of governance based on geopolitical or neoliberal ideas (Correlje 
and van der Linde 2006; Finon and Locatelli 2008; Youngs 2009; Luft and Korin 2009).  
This arguably under-represents the influence of climate ideas within energy governance 
practices today.  In addition, as already referenced, much climate policy literature has 
suggested that energy and climate policy should be inter-connected in political practice.  
By suggesting the kinds of connections starting to unfold in policymaking practice 
between these two formerly discrete policy areas this thesis is also claiming that it will 
become increasingly problematic to analyse energy policy as separate from climate 
policy.  Further reinforcing the energy-security-climate norm. 
 
A second lasting, but closely related, change to thinking about UK energy governance is 
the positive relationship that is now assumed to exist between domestic, or “home 
grown”, supplies and energy supply security (cf. Wicks 2009; DECC 2009c). This 
assumption now so firmly underpins the energy-security-climate nexus that, arguably, 
without it it could not be claimed that climate policies would result in energy security 
objectives.  The idea that “home grown” is good is not new, it has informed energy 
policymaking for much of the previous century, except of course in the 1980s and 
1990s when very different assumptions were made about what constituted energy 
security.  Clearly, there are those that argue that being over reliant on domestic sources 
could also lead to supply insecurity (see Jim Watson 2009 and 2010).151  This could 
take place at times of natural disaster, or of protest, an obvious example being the 
disruption caused by the refinery pickets of 2001 (Blair 2010).  However, it appears that 
it is now understood that some sort of balance needs to be struck between becoming 
over-reliant on imports from ‘unstable’ foreign suppliers and becoming cut-off from 
other supplies in the form of imports in the case of a domestic disaster, such as Japan’s 
recent earthquake and tsunami.  Home grown energy has become a central tenet in 
providing geographic supply diversity. 
 
                                                
151	  Current	  emphasis	  on	  boosting	  domestic	  production,	  both	  from	  renewable	  and	  fossil	  fuel	  sources,	  
might	  be	  interpreted	  as	  British	  ‘resource	  nationalism’.	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What is lastly worth highlighting in this sub-section on UK energy governance change 
is the degree of consistency, again, between energy governance in 2010 under New 
Labour and in 2011 under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition.  No changes 
have been made which indicate movement away on any level of the 2010 governance 
structure as outlined on table three of chapter six.  For example, references to renewable 
energy and energy efficiency policies serving dual climate and security purposes have 
remained become quite commonplace under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government (HMG 2010: 1, 2011: 3).152  As is the emphasis on avoiding 
fossil fuel imports by growing “home grown” supply sources (DECC 2011c: 3), on 
raised levels of state intervention in energy governance, on facilitating renewables and 
energy efficiency, and on pursuing a cross-Government management approach (HMG 
2011a: 10-11).  There remains also, again consistent with the new governance structure 
under New Labour, a strong narrative supportive of the market’s role in supplying 
energy, of arguing for the benefits of competition and economic efficiency, even while 
pursuing the other governance practices mentioned above (cf. HMG 2011a: 16; DECC 
2011d: 3).   
 
What is interesting to note, however, is the degree to which uncertainty and the process 
of ‘re-thinking’ has continued.  The new Administration has, yet again, produced a 
string of documents as well as new legislation, including a new Carbon Plan, another 
Energy Bill, as well as a new White Paper on how to reform, or even “transform”, the 
UK electricity market (DECC 2011c: 5; cf. HMG 2011a, 2011b).  The substantial 
proposed reforms to the electricity market, and the debate that has surrounded them, are 
a clear indication of the process of applying new capacity to deliberating energy 
producing a much more detailed, but complex and messy picture of challenges facing 
energy governance.  The focus on domestic production remains structured within the 
energy-security-climate nexus.  
 
 
 
                                                
152	  A	  conference	  organised	  in	  April	  2011	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  International	  Business	  and	  Sustainability	  at	  
the	  London	  Metropolitan	  University,	  “UK	  Energy	  Day”,	  was	  focused	  on	  promoting	  awareness	  of	  “…the	  
significance	  of	  sustainable	  supply…”	  within	  the	  context	  of	  needing	  to	  “…balance	  home-­‐grown	  energy	  
and	  energy	  imports…”	  to	  “…address	  balance	  of	  payments…”.	  	  See:	  
http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/lmbs/research/cibs/energyday.cfm.	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1.2 Policy Paradigms, Depoliticisations and Resistance to Change 
The difficulty lies not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which 
ramify… into every corner of our minds  (Keynes 1997: 384) 
 
An important subsidiary question has been to establish what kind of governance system 
existed as of the start of this period of analysis, the year 2000.  Answers to this question 
were reached not only by considering the UK energy governance system in 2000, but by 
looking back at the ideas which had originally underpinned the system and how these 
were institutionalised over time. Having considered some of the ways in which certain 
neoliberal ideas about economic governance and about energy influenced, over the 
course of the 1980s, the construction of a new system of energy governance chapter 
three concluded that the UK had established a pro-market energy policy paradigm 
(PEPP) by the early 1990s.  The PEPP was, in short, a system fashioned to achieve a 
competitive, cost efficient, privately run energy system.   
 
The section above, on measuring change, referred back to the five levels of the PEPP.  
These five levels have provided us not only with a mechanism for measuring change but 
also, however, with a great amount of detail about how the PEPP operated.  The first 
two levels, ideas about energy and energy governance, can be understood as the 
interpretive framework of the PEPP, whilst the other three are more indicative of the 
specific ways in which these influential ideas became embedded.  The concept of policy 
paradigms can tell us a lot about how interpretive frameworks, or sets of ideas, can 
frame thinking about policy, through influencing interpretations of events and by 
limiting the range of responses (Hall 1993; Campbell 1998; Berman 1998; Hay 2001; 
Greener 2001; Blyth 2002; Gamble 2009; Chwierorth 2010; cf. Rutledge 2007; Mitchell 
2008; Kern 2009).   
 
Peter Hall’s notion of policy paradigms raised the question of the cognitive element of 
policy decision-making by suggesting that, over time, the original set of ideas can 
become taken for granted and less amenable to scrutiny (Hall 1993: 279). Concepts 
drawn from discursive institutionalism have also raised the cognitive element of 
understanding policy-makers’ choices and modus operand, by explaining the role of 
language and credibility in marginalising other sets of ideas (Yee 1996; Campbell 1998; 
Schmidt and Radaelli 2004; Geddes and Guiraudon 2004; Schmidt 2006; Kern 2009).  
These insights can be considered especially important as time passes and those 
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responsible for translating certain ideas into policy practice leave the policymaking 
community.  The quote from John Maynard Keynes that precedes this subsection is a 
healthy reminder that ideas have long proven difficult to shift, and these various 
explanations help us to understand how this can be, specific to policymaking practices.   
 
The definition of a policy paradigm utilised in this thesis has provided more opportunity 
for understanding both ideas and how they relate to and influence political practice.  
This has been done by taking a policy paradigm to represent policy objectives and 
practices as well as representing  physical institutions of governance and the interpretive 
framework.  In doing so ideas, as accepted and established, have been strongly 
emphasised in terms of the ways in which they delineate politics, deliberation and 
agency.153  The inclusion of the other layers has allowed us to consider not just which 
ideas influence political practice and how, but, in addition, the ways in which these 
ideas became institutionalised over time. The ways in which ideas have become 
embedded can, in particular, tell us a lot about how ideas can prove resistant to change.  
 
There is a further conceptual link that can be identified here between notions of what 
constitutes an embedded policy paradigm (Hall 1993; Jacobsen 1995; Hay 2001; Blyth 
2002; Chwieroth 2007), and processes of depoliticisation (Flinders and Buller 2006; 
Hay 2007: Wood 2011).  In chapter two it was suggested that depoliticisation can be 
considered as a method in embedding a policy paradigm, both in terms of the ideas 
which underpin it and the political practice emanating from them.  This thesis has 
actively utilised those varying forms of depoliticisation that were defined in chapter two 
to show both how they served to institutionalise particular ideas and to further reinforce 
specific forms of practice.   
 
As a reminder, these forms were defined as ‘marketised’, ‘technocratic’, ‘deliberative’ 
and ‘secretive’ and are summarised here below, in table five, in terms of the ideas which 
underpin them, the way in which they were implemented and some outcomes of these 
processes.  Three of the four forms of depoliticisation have been reasonably specific to 
the PEPP, leaving ‘secretised’ depoliticisation as a form which was put into use 
regularly across energy policy paradigms, including under the Keynesian model 
preceding the PEPP. 
                                                
153	  Clearly,	  later	  chapters	  on	  change	  have	  illustrated	  just	  how	  difficult	  the	  process	  of	  establishing	  a	  set	  of	  
ideas	  can	  be.	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Table 6: Types of Depoliticisation154 
Marketised (type 1) Technocratic (type 1) Deliberative (type 2) Secretised 
- Specific political 
decision 
- Reflects ideas about 
economic governance 
- Specific political 
decision 
- Reflects ideas about 
state capacities for 
economic 
policymaking 
- Take energy out of 
political arena 
- Outcome of 
technocratic 
depoliticisation and 
implied in policy 
paradigms 
- Specific political 
decision (Official 
Secrets Act) 
- Reflects ideas 
about security, 
national interest and 
threat 
- Energy to be 
supplied by the private 
sector 
- State responsible for 
framework to enable 
private sector supply 
- Responsibility for 
energy policy to be 
placed at a remove 
from Government 
- Independent bodies 
to be created and 
populated by technical 
experts 
 
- Elected Members of 
Parliament seldom 
debate energy 
- Usual public 
channels of 
communication also 
relatively silent 
- Political decision-
making should take 
place in secret for 
national security 
reasons 
-Removal from 
realm of open 
political and public 
deliberation 
- National or societal 
interests not apparent 
or of interest to 
private sector 
companies 
- Low incentive to re-
invest in highly capital 
intensive sector  
- High asset depletion 
rates 
- RPI-X incentivises 
keeping costs low 
- Energy governance 
is rarely discussed 
outside of expert 
communities 
- Increasing lack of 
political capacity to 
understand energy 
- Lower visibility of 
policy choices 
-Harder to relate 
choices to outcomes 
- Economists 
- Reduced awareness 
of energy, its role in 
society and potential 
pitfalls 
- Reinforces lack of 
political interest in 
and capacity to 
understand energy 
- Reduces capacity for 
political agency and 
choice 
- Energy as a-political 
- Decisions, which 
might otherwise be 
politically difficult, 
can be made 
- Input from 
opposing groups 
reduced 
 
 
What each of these forms of depoliticisation has in common is the degree to which, 
through structuring ideas within political institutions, they have served to reduce 
                                                
154	  Types	  1	  and	  2	  in	  this	  table	  refer	  to	  Colin	  Hay’s	  definitions	  of	  depoliticisation	  (Hay	  2007:	  82-­‐86).	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political capacity for informed agency and choice.  Limited political capacity is 
considered here as ultimately important.  Hay sees politics as “… the capacity for 
agency and deliberation in situations of genuine collective or social choice” (Hay 2007: 
77).  This thesis has suggested that by placing those actors who have been elected to 
represent the collective interest at one remove from knowledge about how energy is 
governed, via the various forms of depoliticisation, energy had become somewhat a-
political.  For example, by utilising these forms of depoliticisation, particularly 
‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’, this thesis has been able to show why it was so 
difficult for politicians and policy-makers to recognise significant challenges to the 
PEPP, as a structure of governance.  It has also helped to explain that when these 
challenges were finally recognised, in the mid to late 2000s, politicians and policy-
makers were, for some time, lost for alternative responses.  Informed agency and choice 
were, by this definition, somewhat lacking within the UK energy governance process 
for much of the 2000s. 
 
These types of depoliticisation have reflected active political decisions to implement, 
arguably often genuinely held, ideas about the role of the state in energy governance.   
‘Marketised’ depoliticisation appears to be particularly relevant to understanding the 
PEPP, given that it reflected neoliberal ideas about who should be responsible for the 
supply of energy.  ‘Technocratic’ depoliticisation, in that it includes the passing of 
responsibility further from formal politics, might have some brief application also to the 
period immediately preceding the establishment of the PEPP.  In 1969 the Ministry for 
Power was disbanded and responsibility, as in the 1990s, was ultimately passed to the 
Department of Industry.  This, however, might reflect just as much ideas about 
expending political and human capacity where it is most needed.  What marks 
‘technocratic’ depoliticisation out from this earlier potential example, however, is the 
degree to which it was decided that ‘experts’ were to be responsible for policy-making 
given that politicians were so little ‘qualified’ to make decisions about technical, 
economic matters.  
 
All of this was arguably further underpinned by the ‘unipolar’ moment of the 1990s.  It 
is worth returning here to a 1998 quote from Daniel Yergin in that it is particularly 
illustrative of an increasingly dominant point of view.  He suggested that, in future, it 
would be the “…economic terms themselves, rather than the philosophy of the terms, 
over which governments and companies wrangle” (Yergin 1998: x).  This is indicative 
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of a wider viewpoint that liberal, Western capitalism was now the only viable model 
given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the victory of the West in the Cold War (cf. 
Fukuyama 1992).  For those that believed in the end of ideological history, and there 
have been arguments put forward that many in British political circles did, not least 
Tony Blair (cf. Watson 2002; Williams 2005), then there would be little argument for 
investing political capacity in deliberating and understanding alternative political 
approaches.155 
 
1.3 Speaking Security and Repoliticisation 
Given the degree to which ideas, institutionalised in political practice and structures, 
have been characterised here as resistant to change, this infers that any substantive 
reversal of the PEPP would be difficult to achieve and significant. This is where we turn 
to the third question posed in the thesis introduction that asks why UK energy 
governance did indeed start to undergo a process of change.  One of the reasons why 
this thesis has applied a conceptual framework informed by new institutionalism is 
precisely because that it offers explanations both of consistency and change.  If this 
conclusion were to offer a simple answer as to what the catalyst for change was it would 
be to suggest that perceptions that UK energy security might be under threat, 
particularly given interpretations of Russian energy restructuring and associated events, 
led to a re-igniting of political interest in, and need to understand, energy and 
governance.   
 
This is where we return, again, to the ways in which applying a range of concepts can 
inform explanation.  This thesis, particularly in chapters five and seven, has suggested 
that the increasing prevalence of the notion that UK energy supplies might not be secure 
led to a period within which energy was repoliticised, particularly in a ‘deliberative’ 
sense.  The debate broadened out, energy was discussed in Parliament and within 
committees, and it included a range of actors, and institutions, not previously directly 
involved in discussing energy and governance.  This both required politicians to be able 
to answer questions on energy but also caused them to put pressure on the DTI and 
Ofgem to respond to renewed public and political interest.  This points to a role for 
                                                
155	  Interviews	  with	  Foreign	  Office	  officials	  tend	  to	  support	  this	  point.	  	  This	  is	  partly	  why,	  when	  Russia	  
started	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  ‘Western’	  model	  of	  energy	  governance	  the	  UK	  experienced	  such	  a	  sense	  
of	  surprise	  and	  shock.	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repoliticisation in the process of change similar to that suggested by Wood in that it 
allows for political agency (Wood 2011: 22).   
 
One further conceptual insight observable from the ways in which perceptions of crisis 
related to processes of change, is that this renewed political interest can be understood 
as causal of the realisation of a lack of capacity to understand energy.  And, therefore, 
also of the process of ‘re-think’ which included a further unwinding of aspects of 
‘deliberative’ but also then of ‘technocratic’ depoliticisation.  The notion of ‘re-
thinking’ energy, specifically in order to return to a position of more informed agency, 
can also help to explain why debates can open up to alternative narratives in times of 
crisis.  What is interesting about the role of re-thinking energy in the process of change 
is that it, in itself, represents some shift from previous, depoliticised, governance 
practices.  But it arguably also, ultimately, brought politicians and policy-makers to the 
conclusion that governance change was needed. These observations compliment ideas 
from new institutionalism about how paradigm change takes place, discussed at length 
in chapter two (cf. Hay various; Wilson 2000; Mahoney 2000; Greener 2001; Blyth 
2002 and 2007; Campbell 2004; Oliver and Pemberton 2004; Widmaier 2005; 
Widmaier et al 2007; Challies and Murray 2008; Chwieroth 2010).  
 
A further explanation of why change came to be understood as necessary is offered 
through insights gained from applying the Copenhagen School concept of 
‘securitisation’ and ‘securitising moves’ (Waever 1995; Buzan et al 1998).   Links have 
been drawn up, in the second section of chapter seven, between how a crisis is 
perceived, degree of public interest and the perceived need for political agency.  The 
suggestion is that ‘speaking security’, using the evocative language of imminent threat 
to a nationally defined space, has indeed been an integral part of why UK publics and 
politicians became interested in energy once more. This provides a useful link between 
new institutionalist ideas that crises and uncertainty can provide conditions within 
which paradigm change can take place (Hay 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 
2004; Widmaier et al 2007; Chwieroth 2010; Mahoney and Thelen 2010) and the 
language of security as being politically potent.  As such, the claim here is that if the 
crisis had been understood differently then publics and political elites might also have 
been less interested.  As such the type of dominant crisis narrative can not only shape 
what policies might be accepted in response to that explanation of crisis (Hay 1996; 
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Blyth 2002), but also whether or not crisis is indeed understood to exist and the degree 
of political response. 
 
An example of this can be found in chapter five, and chapter seven, where it was argued 
that Russia’s energy governance changes, and the way they were interpreted in the UK, 
served to raise energy up the political agenda on a domestic as well as international 
basis.  It could further be argued that if these actions had been taken by almost any 
country other than Russia they might not, perhaps, have had the same public and 
political impact.  Interpretations of Russia as threatening and representing a way of life 
distinctly alien to the UK appear, arguably due to the Cold War period, to have been 
deeply embedded.  As such ‘resource nationalism’, conducted by Russia, seems to have 
provided strong ballast for energy supply to become an issue for national security once 
more.  This suggests that some countries are more suggestible as ‘threatening’ than 
others.156 
 
Another example of the political saliency of certain narratives was suggested in the way 
in which climate narratives started to change from focusing on stories of long-term, 
global, but devastating, consequences of climate change to ones based on near-term, 
national interests.  Certainly in the UK, where public support for notions of man-made 
climate change has historically been relatively low, the narrative of national supply 
insecurity appears to have prompted political interest, deliberation and re-thinking with 
an intensity that climate narratives had failed to elicit.  This could also be explained by 
the observation that some subjects, as suggested in chapter two and six, are more 
suitable to speaking security than others (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al 1998; Browning and 
MacDonald 2010).  Due to historical associations between energy, material power and 
conflict, as well as those between energy and economic crisis, supplies of energy appear 
to represent just such a subject.157 
 
 
                                                
156	  This	  raises	  an	  interesting	  question	  about	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  ‘speaking	  security’	  represents	  a	  specific	  
political	  intervention	  in	  order	  to	  excuse	  certain	  policy	  responses,	  and	  to	  which	  it	  represents	  a	  reflection	  
of	  genuine	  beliefs	  that	  Russia	  could	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  valuable	  supplies	  of	  energy.	  
157	  A	  series	  of	  high	  profile	  IPE	  analysts,	  Robert	  Keohane,	  Susan	  Strange	  and	  Simon	  Bromley,	  have	  
suggested	  that	  energy	  has	  specific	  properties,	  related	  to	  power,	  which	  mark	  it	  out	  from	  other	  subject	  
areas	  (Keohane	  1984;	  Strange	  1988;	  Bromley	  1991).	  	  This	  observation	  might	  support	  these	  claims.	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1.4 The Further Role of Narratives in Processes of Change  
We turn here to the last of the four questions raised which asks how processes of change 
can come about.  Clearly, part of answering this question has been covered in the 
subsection above in so far as there needs to be a reason why changes are understood to 
be necessary – some sort of prompt for action.  Understandings offered so far have been 
insightful but are incomplete in that they do not explain fully why change was felt to be 
necessary nor much about how it took place.   
 
This is particularly in that the dominant, geopolitically informed, crisis narrative 
although politically salient contained little within it to explain mounting political 
pressure to reduce carbon emissions nor did it appear to suggest a comprehensive and 
credible response to the energy security crisis. This explanation of why change took 
place differs from other explanations of the role of narratives in paradigm shift that 
suggest that the dominant narrative, based on a specific set of ideas, should provide both 
explanation and comprehensive solution (Hay 1996 and 2001; Blyth 2002 and 2007; 
Widmaier et al 2007).  As such, the geopolitically informed narrative could be 
understood as a partially effective crisis narrative. 
 
This is where the climate narrative re-enters, particularly in that it seemed to offer a 
wider range of solutions and a more credible critique of existing policy and governance.  
Concepts of paradigm change have emphasised the importance of recognition both that 
anomalies between objectives and outcomes exist and that these anomalies are related to 
the failure of existing policies (Stone 1989; Hall 1993; Hay 1996 and 2001; Blyth 2002; 
Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  The security of supply narrative had substantially 
repoliticised energy, certainly in a ‘deliberative’ sense, which had allowed for more 
informed policy agency to start emerging (cf. Wood 2011: 21).  But, in that it was 
focused on the wrong-doing of others, it did not contain sufficient critique of UK 
energy policy. 
 
What seems apparent, however, from this analysis is that climate narratives were more 
successful both in critiquing existing policy structures and in providing for Hall’s 
“…mounting evidence of failure…” of current policies (Hall 1993: 289; cf. Oliver and 
Pemberton 2004).  As such, although pressures for governance change may have been 
seen by many policymakers and politicians as coming from without, in terms of various 
international events, this narrative pointed directly towards credible, endogenous 
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reasons for change.  By openly insisting across various White Papers, in the early to 
mid 2000s, that existing PEPP instruments would be sufficient to meet objectives 
policy-makers had left themselves open to critique and diminished credibility.  The 
climate narrative was able, conversely, by the end of the 2000s to claim greater 
credibility by proving that both renewable energy and carbon emissions targets were 
being missed.  In the absence of deliberative and technocratic re-politicisation, spurred 
by the sensation of supply crisis, these narratives might not have found the same degree 
of purchase. 
 
This brings us to the energy-security-climate narrative which emerged as more 
prominent in the late 2000s.  In chapter six it was suggested that various notions from 
within the energy-climate narrative had started to appear within political narratives on 
energy, particularly by the new Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Ed 
Miliband, and Prime Minister Brown’s advisor on Energy Security, Malcolm Wicks 
(Miliband 2008; Wicks 2009; DECC 2009b and 2010b).  The appropriation by climate 
protagonists of ideas about the need for the UK to boost domestic production in order to 
underpin arguments for renewable energy and energy efficiency suggests that narratives 
are fluid and changeable over time (cf. Interview 18; Plesch et al 2005; Roberts 2005; 
Greenpeace 2006; Bird 2007; Ochs 2008; Giddens 2009).  As such, in line with 
conclusions about the emergence of an energy-security-climate norm within energy 
governance practices, the energy-climate narrative might be considered here as a more 
successful ‘crisis narrative’ then either the security or climate narratives on their own. 
 
This suggestion is, however, to suggest a range of new difficulties.  It is certainly a 
more complex proposition in that two narratives, previously considered as separate and 
underpinned by different ontologies, inform and enable change.158   In addition, as with 
the liberal-environmental compromise referenced in various chapters of this thesis, the 
energy-security-climate narrative drew largely from certain ideas, which were 
understood to be more politically feasible, whilst rejecting others.  In fact this was done 
specifically because it was felt that ecologically informed climate arguments had not 
found sufficient purchase with UK audiences to enable change, so the emphasis was on 
securing change.  The emphasis on Britain’s energy supply capacities has tended to 
                                                
158	  A	  recent	  paper	  by	  Eric	  Helleiner	  suggests	  that	  the	  variety	  of	  opposing	  narratives	  to	  economic	  
liberalism	  raises	  the	  level	  of	  difficulty	  in	  answering	  the	  question	  of	  what	  will	  replace	  it	  (Helleiner	  2004:	  
685).	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marginalise other climate ideas about interdependencies between eco-systems and 
political, cultural and economic systems and about equity within the global commons 
(Carter 2003: 16).  Again, although the emphasis on developing renewable 
technologies, through greater state support, was a break with the old liberal-
environmental compromise, opposition to nuclear energy, a key environmental idea, 
was not part of the new nexus.  
 
Because various narratives have been drawn upon to provide explanations of and 
solutions to crisis, the why and how of change, the emerging energy governance system 
is, as a result, a hybrid rather than reflecting any distinctive or comprehensive set of 
ideas.  This might tell us something about the seeming lack of ability of this new set of 
ideas about energy governance to credibly challenge market ideas about energy 
governance.  It might also tell us that, as Oliver and Pemberton have suggested with 
regard to incomplete paradigm change, the extent of the shock has not yet been 
sufficient to fully discredit deeply embedded pro-market ideas (Oliver and Pemberton 
2004: 435).  As such policymakers have seemed to cling to old, established ideas whilst 
layering new solutions, picked from geopolitical and climate perspectives, on top. 
 
There remains, also, a deep tension, at least theoretically, between responding to 
perceptions of statist practice by others in energy governance with protectionist 
measures.  The UK in considering Russian energy policy to be illiberal and ‘wrong’ was 
overtly supporting its position that energy liberalisation and privatisation should 
continue to expand within the economically inter-connected world.  But by re-focusing 
on boosting independence in energy supply through supporting domestic production the 
UK is itself turning to geopolitically informed methods of governance, without 
necessarily approving of such measures.   So it appears that government support for 
changes to domestic production capabilities is acceptable, but not a re-nationalisation of 
energy companies.  A further inconsistency in the refocus on domestic energy 
production whilst maintaining key pro-market ideas is the questions of why this would 
be necessary within an world of positive economic interdependency. 
 
A last example of tensions between catalysts for change and responses can be found in 
the links between growing public interest in energy issues and political response.  If 
politicians are indeed prompted to respond partially in response to growing public 
interest and if public interest grows at times of perceived energy insecurity and high 
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energy prices then policy responses, surely, should encourage lower prices going 
forward.  However, by presenting low carbon energy sources, including nuclear, as part 
of the solution to UK energy security, electricity prices are more likely to rise in future.  
This is, as will be discussed in more detail below, at a time of growing energy poverty, 
fiscal austerity and high unemployment. 
 
1.5 Further Conceptual Insights 
Lastly, also in terms of understanding how change can take place, it is worth 
highlighting the role, suggested in chapter seven, of objectives in prompting further 
governance change in UK energy.  It appears as if the new objectives of UK energy 
policy, once formalised, did drive change despite limited acceptability of new ideas 
about other methods of governance.  This, clearly, applies to the objectives of energy 
security and lowering carbon dioxide emissions but not to that of energy poverty which 
still appears somewhat sidelined.  Objectives represent an instance within which ideas 
have, indeed, facilitated change - ideas not about how to govern but about to what end.  
The re-recognition of energy security as something which actively needed to be 
achieved, in combination with new, legally binding, climate targets have driven a 
scramble for credible ideas about how these objectives can be reached.  This 
observation might also help to explain the importance which Hall assigned to 
‘objectives’ in his analysis of third order change, in that paradigm shift can only take 
place once objectives take place (Hall 1993). 
 
 
2.	  	   Possible	  Futures	  
The scramble for credible methods of achieving new objectives is, arguably, still 
ongoing and this observation brings us to the last section of this conclusion.  Although 
some decisions seem to have been accepted and seem to be in the process of becoming 
institutionalised the search for legitimate solutions has perhaps been hampered by the 
observation, made above, that the market mentality still dominates and that faith in old 
more ‘statist’ methods of governing is not high.  Such questions about methods of 
governing, with commitment to achieving climate objectives, might be key to linking 
energy governance change with calls for wider economic governance change in that 
energy continues to represent a challenge.  If objectives are not met they might, of 
course, ultimately be rejected.  Unmet objectives might, conversely, also prompt further 
evidence of failure, a more thorough discrediting of the currently emerging compromise 
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model and increased desire to take a risk by looking at alternative solutions.   For 
example, those presented by environmental academics and groups which link climate 
degradation with current models of capitalism based on growth, individualism and 
materialism (cf. Meadows et al 1972; Tickner 1993; Bernstein 2001; Carter 2007; 
Newell and Patterson 2010; Garner 2011) 
 
The above sections have pointed to a number of other specific areas of tension within 
UK energy governance as of 2010 all of which might provide fruit for future challenges.  
As briefly suggested at the end of chapter six, one area which could be interpreted as 
particularly problematic is the objective of addressing energy poverty (cf. Rutledge 
2007; Boardman 2011).  Some UK energy strategies and legislation have sought, with 
limited success, to address continuing high levels of energy poverty, but questions of 
how affordability will relate to more expensive ‘clean’ energy have not been directly 
addressed.  The social implications of this, coupled with the new era of ‘fiscal 
austerity’, have the potential to be deeply and publically discussed, particularly given 
the suggested correlation between public interest in energy and high energy prices.  This 
might lead to some more serious consideration of such trade-offs between objectives of 
energy policy.   
 
Comparisons have been drawn in previous chapters between this examination of energy 
governance change and the paradigm shift observed in UK macro-economic policy in 
the 1980s, largely to highlight differences between the processes of change (cf. Hall 
1993; Hay various; Greener 2001; Blyth 2002; Oliver and Pemberton 2004).  It is worth 
noting another point of difference between these periods of change and that is to suggest 
that they occurred in response to different formulations of crisis.  The dominant 
explanation of the 1970s crises, as a failure of the state to manage the UK economy, 
references a very broad area of governance (cf. Hay 1996).  Solutions, based largely in 
different methods of governance whereby the state would withdraw on a relative and 
absolute basis from active involvement in economic management, necessitated change 
on a broader scale (cf. Hay various; Blyth 2002). A widely perceived energy crisis 
offers a more limited critique targeted at the way in which only one, albeit very 
important, sector of the economy is governed.  The dominant explanation adopted in 
elite political circles has been focused on energy and climate specific problems as 
largely separate from the overall economic policy paradigm.  
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Lack of availability of, or perhaps more importantly, faith in alternative frameworks of 
governance has also been identified in some recent IPE literature on the 2007 credit 
crunch and banking crisis.  Observations have been made that the severe economic 
crisis of 2008-2010 has not resulted in change partly due to the perceived or real 
absence of credible ideas about alternatives to existing arrangements or about how the 
economy should be ordered (Watson 2009a and 2009b; Gamble 2009: 457; Hay 2010: 
3).159  There appears to be growing discontent with the ability of Anglo-liberal growth 
models to deliver, both within the wider economy and in energy-climate governance, 
but little faith in available alternative frameworks for governance (cf. Gamble 2009; 
Hay 2010; Wood 2011; Crouch 2011).   
 
This might partly be ascribed to processes of policy learning (cf. Hall 1993) whereby 
large political, policymaking and consultancy communities still believe more state-
oriented systems of governance, such a Keynesianism, not to have worked in the UK in 
the past.  Lack of willingness to embrace a new set of solutions, such as those contained 
with environmental arguments about how to build sustainable systems, might also be 
partly connected with the lack of ability to break with pro-market ideas which many 
political elites, including many within the Conservative Party, still appear to have a high 
degree of faith in.  Certainly within energy policy circles it is commonplace to suggest 
that the low energy prices, and secure system of supply were products specifically of the 
pro-market energy governance system that was then in place (cf. HMG 2011a: 16; 
DECC 2001d: 3). 
 
This thesis has argued on a number of occasions, in chapter two specifically, that energy 
and economic governance processes have been deeply inter-related both under 
Keynesianism and neo-liberalism.  This inter-relationship seems to have worked such 
that the flow of ideas has been largely one-directional in that ideas about economic 
governance have tended to influence decisions made about energy and not vice-versa.  
This chapter will end, however, with some questions about the ability for ideas about 
climate governance to impact on ideas about economic governance.  To the extent that 
the 2008 Climate Change Act has already had implications across government 
departments, might continued requirements to change to meet climate targets, whilst 
maintaining energy security, not have further implications for the way we live and, 
                                                
159	  In	  fact	  Hay	  sees	  ‘pathology	  without	  crisis’	  specifically	  in	  that	  his	  understanding	  of	  crisis	  infers	  
successful	  change.	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specifically, for the ultimate target of economic growth?  If we return to chapter one we 
can see that this argument has, for some time, been put forward within environmental 
communities but with little success (Bernstein 2001; Giddens 2009; IPPR 2009; 
Friedrichs 2010; Newell and Paterson 2010).  If current governance systems continue to 
fail, if we emerge, as one climate analyst has suggested into a situation of “post-
normal science” where “…facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and 
decisions urgent…”, then this might suggest that the real challenge and change is 
yet to come (Ravetz in Friedrichs 2010: 2).   
 
 
3.	  	   Final	  Reflections 
As a final comment it might be worth reflecting that some of the questions posed by 
this thesis have offered themselves up to more decisive answers than others.  In 
particular the question, which might on first glance have appeared more straight 
forward, of whether or not policy paradigm change has occurred has proven the 
most problematic to answer.  This is despite attempts made, in chapter two, to be 
rigorous in laying out a system for measuring profound change.  Arguably this has 
much to do with the time-frame within which the analysis was conducted, which as 
suggested in the introduction has not left much room for hindsight, nor for certainty 
as energy governance changes are still ongoing.  What is also less than discernable 
is the precise direction of change that is taking place in that it does not suggest 
movement toward a new and cohesive framework.  Instead, it appears that in 
response to perceived crisis, critique and policy failure, the UK by failing to reject 
central tenets of the PEPP, whilst at the some time adopting ideas from geopolitical 
and climate perspectives, may be indulging in what has recently been termed “inter-
paradigm borrowing” (Hay 2010: 22-23).   
 
What have been easier to answer are questions of why and how changes have taken 
place.  Insights from ideational and discursive institutionalism, alongside those 
from the Copenhagen and critical security schools have allow this thesis to present 
a very rich and contextualised explanation of change.  In particular, the 
relationships drawn out between public acceptance of security explanations of 
crisis, processes of repoliticisation and political processes of ‘re-think’ have been 
crucial in understanding how change took place.  This is one of the ways in which 
this thesis has contributed to understandings of the links between crises as 
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perceived and possibilities for change and between narratives as vehicles for those 
perceptions as well as for critique of current policymaking practices.   
 
This thesis has also contributed to the literature on energy and paradigms by 
providing more precise definitions of how policy paradigms work and ways in 
which they can become embedded, in particular via various processes of 
depoliticisation.  The application of these understandings to UK energy governance 
during the first years of the 2000s has helped to provide some answers as to why so 
little change took place despite mounting political support for climate change 
mitigation.  In particular the notions of ‘technocratic’ and ‘deliberative’ 
depoliticisation used alongside the inclusion of physical institutions of governance 
as a level of the PEPP have shone particular light on self-perpetuation and 
resistance to new ideas.  As such the ‘energy security-climate nexus’ sits nestled 
within still embedded ideas about the role of markets, competition and cost 
efficiency.   
 
However this thesis does leave open possibilities for further change.  The literature 
on energy and paradigms has, when identifying ideas as influential, tended largely 
to focus on ideas about governance.  However, by including ideas about energy as 
an important level of the PEPP and by noting the degree to which these seem to 
have started to change at an elite political level one driver for further change can be 
identified.  Another contribution is the suggestion that objectives can be drivers for 
change, a notion implicit in Peter Hall’s 1993 work on paradigm change (Hall 
1993).  Given the degree of political re-focus on energy security alongside binding 
UK, and EU, climate targets energy governance has much to keep up with over the 
next decade up until 2020. 
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